

A  
DISCOVERY  
OF  
D. JACKSONS  
VANITIE.  
OR

F. 5. 20

*A perspective Glasse, whereby the admirers of D. JACKSONS profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received.*

---

Written by *William Twisse*, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the Copie came to the Presse.

---

Iob 38. 2.

*Who is this that darkeneth counsell by words without knowledge?*



---

L Imprinted ANNO M. DC. XXXI. a





1286:02



## To the understanding Reader.

**T**Wo sorts of men there are (to passe by the meer Politicians ready to serve the times, and their owne turnes without any fear of God or man) which now undermine that doctrine of grace, which formerly they themselves have beleived, and by the preaching wherof they have receyved the grace wherby they are what they are, in any true good. Some under a shew of modestie and simplicity, hold off themselves and others from admitting so high poynts, as not willing to beleive that which is above their comprehension. But others take up the cause a clean contrary way, and would bear the World in hand, that the failings of our divines, in this doctrine, came from shallownesse, and want of profound knowledge in Metaphysicall speculations. Of this later ranke, Mr. D. Jackson is the ringleader. This man doubteth not to professe, that *he hath found no character of the incomprehensible Essences ubiquitary presence (no not in the Holy Prophets and Apostles writings) from which he hath receyved so*

(\*)

full

To the understanding Reader.

full instruction, or reaped the like fruits of admiration; as from one of Trismegist, an Egyptian Priest. part. 1. pag. 55. So that the sentence which he passeth upon Vorstius (whom he seemeth more to emulate in overturning the divine attributes, then any other) doth shrewdly reflect upon himself: *The evaporations of proud phantastick melancholy, hath eclipsed the lustre of glorious presence, in this prodigious Questionists braine, which would bring us out of the Sunne-shine of the Gospell, into old Egyptian darknesse.* From the same Egyptian learning, thorough Plato and Plotinus, he taketh his draught of the divine decrees. For he acknowledgeth no decree of God, concerning humane actions, good or bad (no not of those which God promised to effect either concerning his mercy in Christ and Christians, or concerning his judgements to be effected by the wicked) but onely *disjunctive*, that is by his owne instances, part. 2. Sect. 2. cap. 17. *Aut erit, aut non erit; it shall eyther raine all day to morrow, or be faire all day to morrow* (in which example of a false disjunction, he may seem to teach that Gods decrees may also be false;) *the Sunne will eyther shine, or not shine, this day at twelve of the clocke.* Surely from this character of a divine decree, though we can receyve no good instruction, yet have we as much fruit of admiration, as D. lackson himself receyved from the former of *ubiquity*. For what Christian can satisfie himself in wondering, how *erit illa die*, (which is the usuall expression of Gods decree, in the Prophets phrase) can be interpreted by *erit aut non erit*? how all the promises, which declare Gods decree of dispensing his grace, upon all nations, by the ministry of men, as *ra ne*  
or

*To the understanding Reader.*

or dew upon hearbs, should be so glossed; *it shall eyther raine, or not raine?* or how all the decreed promises concerning the prevayling course of the *Sunne* of righteousnes in & by his, & his servāts activitie, should be flouted with this disjunction: *it shall shine, or not shine?* It would bring some fruit of admiration, if any Prince or Law maker, should make no other decree, about such things as concerne their, and their subjects good, but meerly disjunctive, *eyther men shall doe so, or not so; eyther they shall doe good, or suffer evill:* For though men have not power of determining absolutely future actions, yet they come neerer to that, then the indifferencie of an even-weighing disjunction doth import. They putte so much weight as the efficacie of their will can bear, to that scale wherin they place, *this shall be.* But Plato and Plotinus conceived (or rather in some of their discourses expressed) no more then this: All Christians therfore are by D. Iackson called back agayne to this, as if by the Prophets and Apostles they had been caried too farre; It can not indeed be denied, but the Platonists did commonly so decipher their humane *ideas* of divine decreeing as D. Iackson doth. For *Alcinons de doctrina Platonis*, cap. 12. hath the same relation in plaine termes, which D. Iackson hath turned into his *strong lines of Oxford: Sic fatum (ex sententia Platonis) pronunciat: quaecunque anima talem vitam elegerit, & huiusmodi quadam commiserit, consequenter talia patietur. Libera ergo est anima, & in ejus arbitrio, vel agere, vel non agere ponitur; quod autem sequitur actionem, ab ipso fato perfinitur. Veluti ex eo quod Paris Helenam rapies, quod quidem in ejus erat arbitrio, sequetur ut Graci de*

To the understanding Reader.

*Helena decerent. Indeterminatum atque indifferens natura sua, libertate nostra, in utram placuerit, statere lancem quodam modo declinate, mox aut verum aut falsum, ex possibili fit.* But if D. Jackson had not too much been caried away with admiration of these ideas, he might have receyved a double instruction from this Alcinos. 1. That Plato did overthrow his owne idea, by granting a fatall decree of the Grecians fighting against Troye (in which warre were conteyned so many thousands of humane actions as there were soldiers in the Grecian army) in exemplifying the liberty of humane actions from fatall decree. 2. That Plato went before Aristotle (of whom he was forsaken in better notions) in denying, upon that libertine ground, any contingent, especially free actions to come, to be true before they be acted. Which Swarez himselfe (in his Metaphysicks) confesseth to be no lesse an error then the overturning of Christian faith doth amount to, *libertate nostra, mox aut verum aut falsum, ex possibili fit.* Had not the same passion of admiration stood in the way, he might have learned out of Marfilus Ficinus (to whom he is beholding for other Platonick notions) that Plato himself was, by fits of another minde. For so sayth this Author, de Theol. Platon. cap. 13. *Deus naturarum omnium Imperator, dum regit cuncta, singula pro singulorum regis natura. Quoniam vero motor primus prevallere debet & dominari, ideo sic animos (ut Plato vult) quasi cogit ad bonum, ut bonum ipsum nolle non possint.* And that these second thoughts of Plato were more agreeable to Christian faith, the same Marfilus Ficinus is witnesse, Epist. lib. 2. Epist. cui tit. *Homo quam difficile extra*  
*habitu*

To the understanding Reader.

*habitu naturalem posilus felicitatem sequitur, tam facile hanc in naturalem habitum restitutus assequitur?* where treating of the like question, he saith: *Quid respondebimus? Magi, Pythagorai, Platonici, Peripatetici* forsan sic: Denique exactissima Theologorum examinatio rem omnem breviter, ita concludit: *Quamobrem motor ipse qui animum propriè vertit ad infinitum, est ipsa met sola infinita potestas, quæ mentem, pro libera voluntatis natura, modo quodam movet ad eligendas vias maxime libero. Rursus pro infinita moventis potentia, ad appetendum finem usque adeo incitat, ut non appetere nequeat.* From the same Platonist, D. Jackson might have learned also more sense, then to ourface all his readers with that unheard of sinking bulle of his owne proper forging (which both in his epistle dedicatorie, and also in divers parts of his treatises, he maketh the basis of his vayne conceyts,) namely that if God should have certainly, and immutably decreed any singular action or end of man, then God should be deprived of his freedome. For let him but looke in Marfil, Ficin. Theolog. Platonica, de immort. anim. lib. 2. cap. 12. he shall finde this Title: *Voluntas Dei necessaria est simul & libera.* And in the Chapter it selfe, he shall finde that the Platonists would be ashamed of such flim-flam. *In ipso bono certe summa natura necessitas una cum summa libertate voluntatis concurrat. Atque ibi natura necessitas, voluntatis confirmat libertatem, & libertas necessitati consentit, usque adeo, ut necessario liber voluntariusque Deus sit, & voluntarie necessarius. A nobis id tantum ubique affirmari optamus, quod Deo sit dignum, quale est, in Deo cum summa necessitate, summam congruere libertatem. Sed in hac re meminisse oportet, ut placeat Thema nostro, splendori*

To the understanding Reader.

*Theologia: quamquam divina voluntatis actus, secundum conditionem, positionemve, quando dici potest rem hanc aut illam necessario velle, viz. postquam semel eam voluit, cum sit divina voluntas non aliter immutabilis, quam essentia, ipsum tamen suapte natura non habere eum necessitatis absolute respectum ad effectus suos, quem ad seipsum habet.* I would have englished these passages, but that I conceyve no man to be in perill of misguiding by *D. Iacksons* sultian kinde of writing, except he understand not only a Latine stile, but one of yron, clay, brasse, sylver & gold, like the Babylonish image, which none but Daniel could interpret. Neyther is it needfull, that I should go about the examining or discovering of *D. Iacksons* dreames. It is done to my hands, with singular learning and judgement, in the ensuing censure. Which as it seemeth, was written by *D. Twisse*, for his owne contentment; as Scholars are woont to finde themselves willing work in communing with those, which bring forth extraordinary notions. But in such a subject as this, it could not long be kept private. An honorable man therefore having gotten from the Author a copie, could not but communicate the same with his friends, by whom at length it came to the Printer, whose profession is to make such workes publick, as are of publicke use. And howsoever upon Politicke considerations, disputes of this kinde are forbidden and suppressed; yet it were to be wished, that more were found, amongst those that are able to defende the truth, which were not so servile unto the times, as by their silence to become accessary unto the murder of that religion, which they profess and be-  
leave.



*To the understanding Reader.*

leave. In reason also, it were better that such as dislike of and undermine by piecemeal insinuations, the doctrine hitherto receyved amongst us, would lay us downe the full platforme of their opposite doctrine; and not contente themselves with some plausible snatchings and carchinges, at commune tenents, not manifesting in the meane time, how they can bring their jarrings in those parts which they question, to agree with others, which as yet they dare not question. It is by experience proved, in the low Countries, that Arminianisme tendeth directly to Socinianisme, which is the only dangerous and damnable heresie of this age. If our Arminians can shew us how to bound these waves of the same lake, or avoyd those rockes any better then they of Holland, they have no reason to envy us the common courtesie of Sea-men. Let them take up therfore (if they love plaine dealing) the Remonstrants confession and Apologie, and either testifie their full consent with them; or signifie how farre we ought to sayle by that compassse, and in what part of that Sea-card we are to leave them, and where the danger lieth. *D. Jackson* would perswade us (pag. 1. sect. 3. cap. 18.) that if his doctrine of love and grace universall, were well taught and pressed in the particulars of it, all men would unfeignedly endeavour with fervent alacrity to be truly happy, and that with astonishing fruit. Surely if he know such particulars of any doctrine, as would bring forth such miraculous fruit (a hundred folde more then the doctrine of Christ himselfe and his Apostles could atteyne to, who never brought all their auditors to unfeigned endeavour and fervent alacritie



*To the understanding Reader.*

critic in seeking of God) I say he knoweth such particulars, and will not impart them to the World, the engines which extorte confession, might be better imployed about him, then ever they were about any. It is well knowne by experience, that neyther the generalls, nor the particulars eyther of the Iesuits doctrine concerning universall grace in Spaine, or of the Lutherans in Germanie, or of the Arminians in Holland, have brought any such miraculous fruit of pietye. Neyther have I yet heard of any such extraordinary successe upon *D. Jacksons* doctrine at Newcastle or Oxford, but may at least be equalled (to say no more) by the successe of their doctrine, which have pressed the contrarie tenents, in a thousand congregations of England. Except therefore he declareth his doctrine in the particulars of it, he must pardon us, if we make no more account of his generall colours, then of those new inventions or projects, which promise so incredible wonders, that they can find no credite, but onely with those that are willing to be deceived.





TO THE  
 PRÆFACE  
 OR SOME  
 PASSAGES  
 IN THE  
 EPISTLE DEDICATORIE.

**D**esire to fetch a walke in your *Paradise* of contemplation; & allthoughe you professe to *encampe* therein, & are very martiall in your wordes & phrases of terrour, litle answerable to that expectation which a *Paradise* doth bespeake; yet dothe it nothing dismay me, because you professe opposition only against the enimies of God, & my selfe, though a cheife of sinners, yet have found mercy at the handes of God, that I should be faithfull vnto him & to his truthe in such sort, as to *doe nothing against it, but rather ingage* all my poore abilitie 1. Cor. 13. 8 *for it.* And in case I finde your selfe going *not the right way to the truthe* of God, (an error incident to as great an Apostle Gal. 2. 14. as S. Peter), I shall take boldnes to enterpole my iudgment forthe discovery of errour, & that I hope without all just blame, or deserved censure in respect of that old acquaintance

A

which

Ethic. 1. 6.

ἀμφοῖν γὰρ

ἀντὶ τοῦ φι-

λοῦ, ὁ πρῶτος

ἄριστος

καὶ ἁλ-

ωτατος.

Matth. 10.

37.

Luc. 10. 16

Iam. 3. 2.

which hath bene betweene vs ; for as much as I have learned bothe of my great Mr. in knowledge naturall, *Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, amicus veritas.* And of my farre greater Mr. in knowledge spiritual, & to whose blessing allso I cheifly owe my progresse in knowledge naturall, that *he who loveth his Father or Mother more then him is not worthy of him;* & whose peremtory voyce is this also; *If any man come to me & hate not his Father, & Mother, & Wife & Children, & Brethren & Sisters yea & his owne life allso, he cannot be my disciple.* God forbid, the mayntenance of truthe shoulde be interpreted to proceede from hatred, or want of love to a mans person; though in the manner of cariage offense may be given bothe to God & man. For *he is a perfect man that sinneth not in word.* Luther was conscious of this, when before the German Princes in a meeting at Woormes, a part of his protestation was this, that he was not a man that made profession of holynesse; acknowledging that as a man, he might erre; but I am verily perswaded, he was conscious off a good heart towards God.

The cause that mooveth me herunto is partly the profession which you make in your Epistle Dedicatory, that diverse passages in your discourse doe manifest, that what I account the lower leven of Arminianisme, is very tastfull unto you, which nowe you beginne to sett a broach in print, as hertofore you have uttered them in the pulpit, & afterwards by writing communicated unto others, wherof diverse particulars have lately come unto my handes; which have put me to some paynes, & to the spending of some precious time, in the scanninge of them. As for the passages, tending that way, in this booke of yours, I reserve them to be considered in their place. But as for the profession which you make in your preface, I purpose here, to take that into consideration, before I passe on farther in my way. *It is not so unusuall (you say) nor so much for you to be censured for an Arminian, as it will be for his Lordship (to whome you dedicate it) to be thought to patronize Arminianisme.* Herby you seeme prepared to stand upright & not couched under the burthen of this censure, as Isachar was by Jacobs prophecy to couche under his: & withall

withall you doe imply that, that *honourable Lord*, to whose patronage you inscribē this your Treatise, may herby be thought to patronize Arminianisme. And you doe well to signifie, that his Honour is not like to take it well, to be so conceived off; as who hath ever hitherto bene accounted both orthodoxe himselfe, & a Patron of those that are such. Yet these insinuations of yours, seeme to me some thinge strange on your part. For I have founde by experience in other writings of yours, that you hertofore have affected to be the inventor of a middle way, & soe the report goeth of you: though I confesse, I never founde the issue of your discourses answerable; which hath made me conceive, that practise of yours to have bene but a pretence, & herin I am confirmed by this your present profession. For ought I perceive, you are more foule then Arminius himselfe, bothe as touching your Tenets, & the manner of maynteyninge them; they more voyde of truthe, this more voyde of Scholasticall argumentation, to proove what you undertake. It may be you take more boldnes to professe your opinions nowe then hertofore; although I see no reason for it, nor can believe, that Arminianisme is like to finde more countenance under the reigne of King Charles, then it did under the reigne of King Iames; who professed Arminius to be the enemy of the grace of God; & as I have heard, King Charles himselfe hath taken notice of his Fathers distast that way, & sometimes made profession of it. But satisfaction you endeavour to give unto his *Lordship*, which you say you are not bound to give to others. Yet it is well, that for his Honours sake, your reader is like to pertake of this courtesie in the way of satisfaction unto many as well as unto one. For my part, I desire not to oblige you unto any thinge; but rather to entreate you, that you would be pleased to take notice of those morall obligations, that belong vnto all, in the way of honesty; namely that you would undertake lesse, & proove more, as in this particular; when you professe that all other contentions in the point of Gods Providence & Prædestinat on, betweene the Arminians & their opposites, will be only about

wordes, in case they doe all agree in this, *That your Almighty Creator hath a true freedom in doing good; & Adams offspring a true freedom of doing evill.* I thinke since the beginning of these differences, never any, neyther Papist nor Protestant; neyther Lutheran, Calvinist, or Arminian was of this opinion besides your selfe; but the more transcendent and supereminent shal be your sufficiency, in being able to performe this. And indeede, I have founde you wonderously conceyted, of the force of consequence, which these propositions (as you imagine) doe conteyne; & in two treatises of yours, you have spent a great many wordes, in dilating upon them, & shaping consequences from them, but as inconsequently, as an Adversary coulde expect; abusing your selfe with the confusions of those things, which being distinguished, the consequences you frame, woulde streite-way vanish into smoke, & proove to be no better, then mere imagination of a vayne thinge.

And this confusion of yours dothe appeare in that opposition which you make, of other positions to these; as when you say; *If any in opposition to Arminius will maynteyne, that all things were so decreed by God before the creation of the world, that nothing since the creation, coulde have fallen out otherwise then it hath done, or that nothing can be amended that is amisse, then you must crave pardon of every good Christian to oppugne his opinion; & that not only as an error in Divinitie, but as an ignorance.* In which wordes of yours, I doe observe first, that you doe not herin oppose Gods decreinge all things, but only a certeyne manner of decreinge all things, as in denyinge that *all things were soe decreed by God.* Secondly you doe not well to couple your selfe which Arminius in this. For I never founde that Arminius maynteyned, *that God did decree contingency, but not any thing contingent*, which is your Tenet in diverse pieces both printed & manuscript. He excepts, I grant against Perkins for saying, *God did will that sinne shoulde be.* Yet he himselfe professeth, that *Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere*; & wheras the Iewes went farre enoughe in their ignominious handlinge of Iesus Christ, he

confesse the that *Deum voluit Judaeos progredi quousque progressi sunt.* Thirdly, I woulde this were all, (to witt sinne) that you are pleased to exempt from being the object of Gods decree. But the case is apparent, that you deny faith, & repentance, & every gracious action to be the object of Gods decree. For it is manifest, that these all are contingent actions; Now your opinion is, that God decreethe Contingency but not any contingens thinge. Though on the other side you confesse God cannot decree necessity, but withall he must decree things necessary allso. Lastly, doe you knowe any that maynteyne any such Tenet (eyther in opposition to Arminius, or otherwise) which here you obtrude upon your opposites? I assure you I knowe none such. But whatsoever our Tenet be, I pray remember your promise, that if we agree with you in the former, namely, that *God hath a true fredome of doing good, & Man a true fredome of doing evill*, then you will not dissent from vs in other points controverted. And doe you knowe any of vs to deny eyther of these? And yet we may desire explication of that, which you passe over smoothly, as though it needed none. For what doe you meane by *libertie of doing good, & liberty of doing evill*? is it *quoad specificationem*? or only *quoad exercitium*? dare you professe that God is free to doe evill, as well as good? or that Man since his fall, & in the state of nature is free to doe good as well as evill? *quoad exercitium* we grant that both God is free to doe or not doe, whatsoever he dothe; & soe likewise Man is free to doe or not doe, whatsoever he dothe. Why doe you take such pleasure in confounding things that differ, at least in not distinguishing them? Yet this is not all the confusion we complayne of. For Gods absolute power is one thinge, his ordinate power is another thing, for this includes his will. God coulde have refused to make the world, when he did make it, & he made it freely; but supposing Gods decree to make it, & to make it at that time it was impossible it should be otherwise, as it is impossible that Gods will should be changed. In like sort, God dothe al this time continue the World, & he continueth it freely. But yet in re-

spect of his decree to continue it certeyne yeares it is impos-  
 sible, upon this supposition, that it shoulde ende before the  
 time appoynted. Agayne, what meane you to feigne any  
 such Tenet, on our parts in opposition to Arminius, as that  
*God forsoothe hath soe decreed all thinges, that nothing can fall  
 out otherwise then it hath done?* For we expressely to the con-  
 trary maynteyne, that God hath decreed many things to  
 come to passe in such sort, that they could have fallen out  
 otherwise, to witt all such thinges as are contingent. For we  
 doe not maynteyne that God hath decreed, that all thinges  
 shall come to passe necessarily; but some things only necessa-  
 rily, & other things contingently. And in respect of these  
*modi rerum* in generall, which are necessitie contingency, we  
 say it is impossible that any thing should come to passe o:her-  
 wise, than God hath decreed they shall come to passe, in this  
 sense: to witt, if God hath decreed some things to come to  
 passe necessarily, they shall come to passe necessarily, if he hath  
 decreed some things to come to passe contingently, they shall  
 come to passe contingently, & it is impossible, that thinges  
 should come to passe otherwise. And I presume you will  
 not deny this, though therby you shall contradict your selfe,  
 in respect of that Tenet, which here you cast upon your Ad-  
 versaries, & disavowe as an *error* & *ignorance*. I say, con-  
 tradict your selfe, unles you distinguish those thinges, which  
 in this your Tenet, you deliver without distinction, and  
 confound as your manner is. But by your leave, whatsoever  
 God hath decreed, that shal come to passe, & that in such  
 sort, as supposing his decree, it shall be impossible to be  
 otherwise; neyther will we feare your censures of error &  
 ignorance, noe nor your presumptuous consequences of *involve  
 enmitie against your sweete disposition, of the all-seieng and  
 unerring providence of God*; thus with wordes as sweete as  
 butter, & as soft as oyle you woulde wooke in your Reader  
 an opinion of your devotion to Godward, to prevent suspi-  
 cion of ill affection to his providence, when you turne out  
*All decreeing*, & put in *All seeing* in the place of it. Wheras  
 before you made shewe, as if you excepted not against our  
 Tenet



Tenet of Gods decreeing all things, but only against the manner of it, & his *so decreeing* all things. But be not deceived, God is not mocked. Let vs ever feare to make profanes, with the vizard of devotion, & doe not you thinke with the smoake of woordes, in such sort to dazle the eyes of your intelligent Reader as to disable him to discern your deedes in their proper colours. Neyther have you any colour for this your Tenet in denying God to have decreed all things, but only in respect of sinne. And what reason have you to range sinne amongst the number of *Things*, without distinction, considering; it is rather a mere privation of some thinge, then conteynes any positive thinge therin. Yet, as I sayde before, your opinion were tolerable, did you maynteyne all other things to be decreed by God besides sinne. But your opinion is, that God decreeth contingency, but not the things contingent, which is in effect to deny in playne termes that God hath decreed that any Man shall believe, or repent, or performe any gracious action. God foreseeeth these things, but decreeth them not; this is your fowle opinion, in that opposition to the prerogative of Gods grace. For if God by his grace & holy spirite dothe worke men vnto faith & repentance (in shewing, mercy vnto whome he will) then vndoubtedly he did decree thus to worke them. For *God worketh all things according to the counsaile of his will.* And his will I hope you will not deny to be eternall. Yet you seeme to strengthen your opinion with a reason of State. Therefore be like (amongst other reasons yet concealed) you decline the acknowledgment of Gods all decreeing providence; because that Tenet is *aforerunner of ruine to most flourishing states, where it growes common, and comes to full light.* Heathen States then undoubtedly, had never any experience of such ruines, proceeding from any such cause: I doubt not but you will accommodate this your prophecy, or politicall observation, vnto Christian States. And what Ecclesiasticall history (I pray) hath afforded you this oracle? Noe ancient history I am perswaded, doe you rely upon in this; for as much as you will not acknowledge that this

Eph. I. 11.



this opinion which you impugne, was received amongst any States of ancient times. Is it then (as it is most likely) that the later times experience hath cast you vpon this interpretation of Gods providence, wherupon you are bolde to make rules, & to commend them unto posterity? And I pray answer me, was the Kingdome of Bohemia one of those flourishing States, wherein the conceyte of Gods all decreeing providence, was a forerunner to the ruine of it? And did Prince Palatine, & the lady Elizabeth, or their Associates, bring in this conceyte amongst them? did this opinion growe common there? Did that Kingdome consist of more Protestants then Papists? Or amongst the Protestants, was the number of Calvinists more, then of Lutherans? Speake playnly, & say, the choosing of a Calvinist to be their King, was the ruine of the State, & of the Provinces, which were as members incorporate therinto: say Calvinisme was the ruine of the upper & the lower Palatinate. And herupon let your Almanacke of Prognostications proceede, & be bolde to tell the States of the Lowe Countreys, that this Tene is a forerunner of their ruine also, & unles they & we forthwith turne Arminians, we are like to be lost, & fall into the handes of Papists. But of what Papists? Not such as Thomists, & the Dominicans, the most learned Divines in the Church of Rome (for they maynteyne that God determineth the will of Men & Angells to every act of theirs whether good or evill, as touching the substance of the act, by influence generall; & over & above also unto every good & gracious act, such as faith is & repentance, by influence speciall. And as he dothe thus determine the wills of all his creatures, so from everlasting he did decree thus to determine them.) Belike the Iesuites are they into whose handes we are like to fall, unles with speede, we turne Iesuits, that so herafter we may comfort our selves as Themistocles did, with *Perissemus, n. si perissemus*, we had bene undone if we had not bene undone, & that vnto both body and soule. Happy are the Lutheran & Arminian party, that they are acquainted with no such forerunner of their ruine. They are like to holde their owne, while they acknowledge a *sweete* *dispo-*

disposition of the Allseeing, and unerring providence, & leave out  
all decreeing providence, out of their Creede.

But let the Dominicans tooke to it, least their ruine  
be not at hand also, as well as ours. For there is to be  
founde such an oracle in some Mens writings; that who-  
soever shall embrace the doctrine of Gods *Alldecreeing pro-  
vidence*, let them knowe, this opinion is the *forerunner of  
ruine in most flourishing States & Kingdomes*, where it growes  
common, or comes to full light. And the experience of the course  
of these times, & especially in the ruine of the Palgrave, &  
of so many Christian Provinces with him. For certainly in no  
time or part of the world besides, was any such experience to  
be founde, so conveniently to serve your turne. Is it not  
great pitie but that the Kinges majestie & his Counsell, & both  
houses of Parliament, should be acquainted with this mystery  
of State (for why should I doubt but that God will heare the  
affectionate prayers of his people, & in good time establishe a  
perfect vnion betweene the King & his people. In the meane  
time we will *waite upon the Lord, who hath hid his face from the  
house of Iacob, & we will looke for him; Yea & we will give him* Es. 8. 17.  
Es. 62. 7.  
*no rest untill he restore Ierusalem the prayse of the world.*) This  
I confesse is a way to supplant your Adversary opinions, but  
of any power you have to confute them, and therby to pre-  
vent the growthe of them, I have founde litle evidence in  
other of your writings, & by the generall survey I have allrea-  
dy taken, I have small hope to finde any great satisfaction in  
this. But let us examine this point a little more narrowly.  
You suppose that some in opposition to Arminius doe mayn-  
teyne, that *all things were so decreed by God before the Creation  
of the world, that nothing since the Creation could have fallen out  
otherwise then it hath done; and nothing can be amended that is  
amisse.* But I knowe none of any such opinion; nay rather  
they whome I conceave you doe most ayme at, doe directly  
teache the contrary. We are willinge to professe with Au-  
stin, that *Non aliquid sit, nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit, vel si-  
pendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo;* Enchirid.  
cap. 95.  
Nor oughtt commeth to passe  
but that which the Allmighty will have to come to passe, ey-



*after the same manner that God will have them come to passe. Now God will have somethings come to passe necessarily, somethings contingently, that there may be an order amongst thinges to the complete perfection of the Universe. And accordingly God hath ordeyned all sorts of second causes, bothe contingent causes to worke contingently, as the willes of men & Angells; & necessary causes to worke necessarily, as fire in burninge, the Sunne in giving light, heavy things in mooving downwards, & light things in moovinge upwardes. And as he hath ordeyned them to be such kindes of Agents thus distinct; so he hath ordeyned, that they shall worke agreeably, & he setteth them going in working agreeably to their natures, the one contingently the other necessarily. So that whatsoever, the will of God is, shall fall out contingently, the same falleth out in such sort, as it might have fallen out otherwise; if good, so as it might have fallen out woorse & bene marred: if ill, yet so as it might have fallen out better & bene amended. And the eleventh Article of Irelande having professed that God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable counsaile ordeyne whatsoever in time should come to passe, addeth herunto by way of explication that so this was ordeyned as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of reasonable creatures, & neyther the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. So that the opinions which you make bold to supplant or prevent, are opinions of your owne makinge, not of others maynteyninge; And to sett an ende to his owne fancyes, every man may take liberty when he please the, without any great paynes takinge, about argument to overthrowe them.*

---

SECT. I.

**I**N the first Section and before the first Chapter, according to exact method (as you professe) in reference unto your former Discourse, you propose two thinges to be enquired: 1. *How this truth of Gods being most certainly knowne by internall experience unto some, may by force of speculative argu-*

*To the first Section.*

ment be made manifest unto others. Secondly how his nature and attributes may be fullest resembled. The latter of which two I shoulde never have expected in a Philosophicall, or Theologicall discourse. Yet I will prescribe to none, but give every vessell leave to vent his owne humour, & to be delivered of such notions, wherwith his braynes have bene conceaved. If we have any use to make of them, we may; if none, we are litle the worser for that. Every beinge hathe three passions denominating it. For there is a trueth of it, there is a goodnes of it, there is an unity of it. Therefore allso all these are to be founde in the beinge of God. But it seemeth not to be your meaninge to speake of this trueth, which is a passion of beinge, a simple terine; but rather of the trueth of this proposition, *There is a good*, to witt, howe it may be made manifest by speculative argument, you desire to inquire; grantinge it to be most certenly knowne by *internall experience*, unto some, wherby unles you understande our *Christian Faith*, I discern not your meaninge. Vpon the first point, you will not have vs to looke for much as yet; and the reason you give, is enoughe to put us out of expectation of any thinge at all. For allbeit a desperate enemy despayring of his life; is therby the more animated to fight; yet an Adversary in discourse, by evidence of argument brought to despayre of maynteyning his Tenet, is not therby the more provoked to dispute. And therefore I see no iust restraynt to hinder you from bestowinge your best ability upon this argument, even in this place. And your selfe confesse, that notwithstandinge all this, you may proceede upon such advantages, as groundes of nature give you. And your mayne purpose extendes no further.

---

C H A P. I.

**Y**OVR first Argument is not like to strike your enemye with any great feare or despayre. Arguments weak or weakely prosecuted, weakneth the cause maynteyned, strength

strengtheneth the cause oppugned. And first it is not handsomely carryed, thus *If every particular generation hath causes, then all generations have some cause*; implying that every generation hath many causes; all have but one. But carry it howe you will, it is not capable of any sound inference. It is true, *Every generation hath his cause: therefore all generations have causes*; But what causes? only the same causes, which every one hath a part, aggregated together. For as you make an aggregation of particular generations; so the cause of this aggregation, inferred, can be but an aggregation of the particular causes of particular generations. So that nothing at all is concluded here hence distinct from the premises, much lesse the being of the Godhead hereby evidenced. Then your second inference is as wilde, when you adde, *Otherwise all should be of one kinde or nature*. For there is no congruity in affirming the whole by aggregation, to be of the same kinde or nature with every particular. For every particular is *unum per se* consistinge *ex actu & potentia*; But the whole by aggregation is *unum per accidens*, consisting of many particulars (each wherof is *unum per se*) heaped together, not by any naturall union vnited into one. As we doe not say the bushel of corrie is of the same kinde with every particular grayne, as also it cannot be sayde to be of a diuerse kinde in any congruie, although there were diuerse kindes of graynes therein; But rather an heape of graynes, whether of the same kinde, or of diuerse kindes. Agayne you propose your argument, not only of the generation of Man, who is of one kinde, but of all generable bodies, who are well knowne to be of diuerse kindes; & therefore why should you account it any absurdity, for all these to be *not of one kinde or nature*? Furthermore, when you make shewe of such an Inference as this, *All must have some cause, otherwise they be not of one kinde or nature*, you doe hereby imply, that All, that have some cause, are in a fayre way to be of the same kinde or nature, which upon consideration you will finde to be utterly untrue. For all creatures have some cause, yet are they not any thing the more of one kinde or nature; Allthough they have not only

some cause, but the same cause also, namely God. Like as though things have different causes, yet it followeth not that they are of different kindes: As all mice are of the same kinde, though some are bred equivocally, some univocally; so of life and diverse others. For although Averroes were of opinion, that mice bred equivocally, & mice bred univocally, by generation were of different kindes, & therupon maynteyned that such as were bred equivocally, did never propagate their like by generation; yet I doe not thinke you are of that opinion, it being contrary to manifest experience. And to us it is manifest (who believe the creation) that the first creatures were not produced by way of generation, yet did propagate their like, & were of the same kinde with creatures propagated from them. But Averroes was an Atheist even amongst Arabians, & denyed all creation. I am sorry, you are so unhappy in defendinge truthe, especially such a truthe as the being of God; but the best is, that truthe needeth no mans defense. I hope you will proove nothing more happy in defendinge errours. Yet I deny not, but that the greatest Divines doe conclude that there is a first cause (that is God) because the progresse from effects to causes, & from causes inferior to causes superior cannot be infinite. According wherunto your argument shoulde have proceeded thus. In generations, as of the Sonne by the Father, the progresse upwards cannot be infinite. Therefore at length, we must ascend to the first of Men, as Adam, who was not borne by generation of Man; (for then he had not bene the first) but otherwise; and in like sort of the generations of all other things, that they had their beginnunge from some superior cause, to their owne natures; which supreme cause of all, we account to be God. But yet I thinke you are not ignorant, that some Schoolemen maynteyne the world might have bene everlastinge, and that by creation; in which case there shoulde be an infinite progresse in generations; unless as Aquinas in his reconciliation of seeming contradictions in Aristotle, to prevent an infinite number of immortall soules hence ensuinge deviseth, that though the World had bene from



from everlasting, yet shoulde it not be necessary that there shoulde have bene an infinite number of Men deceased, because saythe he, God coulde have preserved the first Man from generation, & propagation of his like, untill some five or six thousand yeares agoe: so you shoulde take some such course to prevent an infinite progresse in naturall generations. But I meane not to put you to any such shifts. For I holde creation from everlasting, to be a thing impossible, and that the impossibility therof, may be made evident by demonstration; and accordingly that fiction of Aquinas before mentioned, to be of a thing merely impossible also. So that in fine, this argument of yours, though with litle accuratenes proposed by you, is drawne from the creation; which kinde of argumentation in the Praeface you seemed to put of, till another time, yet in the first place you have fallen upon it, ere you are aware. Bradwardine writinge against the Pelagians, layeth downe two suppositions as the ground of all, wherof this is the second, that there is no infinite progresse in entities; but that in every kinde there is one upcrame. The other is that *God is most perfect and good in such sort as nothing can be more.* And least he should seeme to suppose this without all prooffe, one argument & but one he produceth to prove this. And the prooffe is to this effect: It implyeth no contradiction to say, such a one there is; therefore it is necessary, that such a one have beinge, & it is impossible there shoulde be no God. If any Man denieth the Antecedent, it behooveth him to shewe, wherein the contradiction dothe consist. And it is very strange, & so strange as incredible, that for the best nature to have existence, it shoulde imply contradiction. As for example, we finde these manifest capitall degrees of perfection amongst entities corporall. Some have only beinge, some have beinge & life also; some have beinge, life, and sense; some unto all these adde reason also. Nowe that nature which includes bothe being & life, is of greater perfection, then such, as have beinge without life, and it is no contradiction for such natures to exist. Agayne that nature which includes bothe beinge, life, and sense, is of greater perfection,

Summa de  
causa Dei,  
contra Pel-  
lagium.  
Nullus est  
processus  
in finitum in  
Entibus.  
Deus est  
summ.  
perfectus  
& summ.  
bonus,  
tantum  
quod nihil  
perfectius  
vel melius  
esse potest.



fection, then that, which includes only beinge and life, without sense, and it is no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist. Agayne, that nature which, besides all these, in the notion thereof includes reason also, is of farre greater perfection then the former, and it implyeth no contradiction, for natures of such perfection to exist. Lastly, there are, besides all these, natures purely spirituall, which we call Angells or Intelligences, of farre greater perfection, then natures materiall & corporall, & it implyeth no contradiction, for natures of such perfection to exist, as the Philosopher hath demonstrated the existence of such substances abstract from all materiall concretion: Why then shoulde it imply any contradiction, for a nature of greater perfection then all these to exist, unles they are supposed to be of greatest perfection, even able to make a World out of nothinge; and consequently to be of a necessary beinge themselves. For if possible not to be, howe is it possible, they shoulde attayne to beinge? Not of themselves; For that which is not, hath no power to give being to it selfe. Nor of any other; whether of a nature superior or inferior. Not of any of inferior nature. For a Man cannot possibly produce an Angell, neyther by generation, nor by creation. If by a superior; this is to acknowledge, that there is a nature existent superior in perfection, unto Angells. And if Angells had a necessary being; then seinge they are of a certeyne number, their number also must be necessary; Nowe if it implyeth no contradiction, that God shoulde be, it is most necessary, that he is and must necessarily be granted, that he is. For being supposed to include greatest perfection, if he had no being, it were impossible he shoulde have beinge; seing nothinge can bring it selfe from nothinge to beinge, neyther can ought els produce him. For if any thinge could, then that, whatsoever it were, shoulde be of greater perfection then he. This is the argument of Bradwardin. And the same was the argument of Aquinas long before, and but one of the five wayes, which he takes in the prooffe of this. The first way & more manifest, as he saythe, is that which is taken from the consideration of motion;

tion; wherence he concludeth that we must at length ascend to one who mooveth, and is not mooved, & that is the first moover, which (sayth he) all understand to be God. The second is drawne from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient. For (sayth he) we finde even in insensible things an order of efficient causes, one subordinate to another, wherein he supposeth there cannot be an infinite progresse; & secondly, that nothing can be the efficient cause of it selfe. Hence it followeth (sayth he) we must ascend & rest in one supreme efficient, which acknowledgeth no efficient of it, and that all understand to be God. The third way is that, which hath bene already prosecuted, from the consideration & comparison of things possible, with things necessary. The fourth is from the degrees that we finde in things, as some things are more or lesse true, more or lesse good, more or lesse noble; whence he concludes, that something must be acknowledged to be most true, most good, most noble, & that to be the cause of truth, goodness, & perfection in all others, as fire is the cause of all heate. And that which is the cause of all others, we acknowledge to be God. The first and last is drawne from the government of the World, & the consideration of the order of things amongst themselves; whence he concludeth, there is some thing that ordereth them, and that must be God.

This last argument is, that which Raymund Sebond doth so much dilate & insist upon. And wherof he is very confident, like as of the successe of his undertakings in generall; as namely to make a Man a perfect Divite, within the space of a month; and that without any knowledge to prepare him, so much as the knowledge of Grammar, & yet he shall not be proud of it neyther.

Vasquius further telleth us, that Egidius was of opinion, that this truthe, *that there is a God*, is a truthe knowne of it selfe. And albeit Thomas Aquinas denyeth it to be a truthe *per se nota quoad nos*; Yet in it selfe he professeth that it is *per se nota* for as much as the predicate is included in the very nature of the subject. And to my judgement it seemes also to

In his  
Theologia  
naturalis.  
In Prologo.

Vasq. in 1.  
disp. 20.  
cap. 3.  
Aquinas.  
q. 2. art. 3.

be so *quod nos*, if it be duly considered & pondered what we understand by God, to witt the most perfect nature of all others. Nowe howe is it possible, that that which is more perfect then all others, shoulde not have beinge? And every man knowes that, that which hathe beinge, is more perfect, then that which neyther hathe, nor can have beinge, (such as is the nature of God, if it have no beinge.) For according to the Proverbe, a live Dogge is better then a dead Lyon.

In the next place you inquire, wherunto you shall liken him? This indeede was the second thinge you proposed to be inquired into. But in what congruitie to a Philosophicall, or Theological discourse, I leave it to others to examine. I will be content to summe up the account of what you deliver, rather then to argue the unseasonableness of such a discourse. *Though nothing can exactly resemble him, yet somethinge, (you say) can better notify howe farre he is beyond all resemblance, then others.* But truly, what you meane herby is a mystery unto me. I shoulde rather thinke, the incomprehensible nature of God is not to be manifested by way of resemblance, drawne from inferior thinges. That he is the cause of all thinges dothe better represent the nature of God, then the resemblance of him to any thinge; especially considering, what cause he is, to witt an efficient cause of all thinges, and that not univocall but equivocall; & consequently such as comprehendes all thinges eminently, but in perfection without comparison beyond them. For comparison hathe place only betweene thinges agreeing in kinde, or in proportion. But God and his creatures agree in neyther. This I confesse may drawe to admiration. As the Philosopher, who beinge demanded what God was, required three dayes libertie, to put in his answeare; and at three dayes ende, required three more, & at the ende of these, three dayes more, giving this reason of his reiterated demurring upon the matter; because the more he gave himselfe to the contemplation of the nature of God, the farther he founde himselfe of from comprehendinge it, but wheras you adde, that such admiration will more & more enlarge our longinge  
after

after his presence: I doe no way like eyther your collection, or the phrase, whereby you expresse it. For as for the presence of God; of the very apprehension thereof we are not capable in this World, but by faith. Neyther can any naturall admiration arising from naturall inquisition after the nature of God, & consideration of the fruites issue thereof, drawe men to a longing after that presence of God which they knowe not. Bothe the knowledge of the presence of God, and a longinge desire after it, I take to be a woorke of speciall grace, and not any woorke of nature; upon the power wherof I finde you doate too much in all your writings.

*Painters (you say) can more exactly expresse, the outward li-  
meaments of things, then we their natures.* Painters expressions are in colours; our expressions are not so, but rather in woordes. And what a wilde comparison is it, to compare things so heterogeneous in exactnes. But though the expression of the one fayle in exactnes, in comparison of the other, yet the delight taken therein (you say) needes not: And thus you plot to make the love of God a woorke of nature, wherunto the naturall conceptions of him, though nothing exact, by meanes of the creature may leade us. These conceptions of yours, are in my judgement as farre from truthe, as from pietie. The frequent ebbs & flowings of Euripus, may cast a Philosopher into admiration, not comprehending the reason of it, yet bringe him nothing the more in love with it. Angells are of very glorious natures, & in a manner quite out of the reach of our reason, bothe touching their being in place, their motion, their understandinge, & the communicatinge of their thoughts, & exercising of their power; yet all this bringeth us never a whit the more in love with them. Impressions of love are wrought only by the apprehension of goodnes in the object, which alone makes things amiable; as a beautifull picture affecteth the sense with pleasure and delight. But nowe I finde, that from the impression of love, you slip I knowe not howe, to the impression of truthe: & this I confesse, delighteth some mindes of purer metall; as Aristotle speakes of the delight that a Man

Prov. 25. 3.  
Eccl. 3. 11.

takes, in the demonstration, whereby it is prooved, that the Diameter in a square, hath no common dimension with the sides of it, or that a triangle hath three angles equal to two right. Especially if the conclusion be rare & long sought after but not founde, as the squaring of a circle receaved as knowable in Aristotles dayes; though not knowne till of late, as Pancirolla writes & Salmuly in his commentaries upon him, about 30. yeares before that time. Yet some speculations may be as vayne as curious: as to proove, that two Men in the World there are, that have iust so many hayres on their head one as another. But to make a rayne bowe in the ayre, & by ocular demonstration proove the truth of that which reason concludes, namely that as often as a raynbowe appeares in the cloudes, though it seeme but one, yet indeede there are as many, as there are Men that beholde it, because it discovereth a secret of nature, very curious and nothing vayne. For it is the glory of God to hide a thinge; and it is the glory of a Kinge to finde it out. And seeing God hath set the World in Mans heart, though a Man cannot finde out the woork that God hath wrought from the beginninge to the ende; yet it is good to be doinge, & to discover as much as we can, especially such as have a calling herunto. But to proceede, you put your Reader in hope of great matters by your perfourmances, namely to have *a sight of some scattered rayes, of a glorious light*, which Saints have in blessednes; and to this purpose to elevate us, to a certeyne Horizon, whose edges and skirts shall discover this. Thus you phraseify the matter gloriously, & prosecute your allegory in allusion to the brightnes that appeares in our Horizon after the Sunne set. But surely that Sunne did never yet rise upon us, and when it dothe, surely it shall never sett. And I much doubt, least the glory of your phrases proove to be all the glory we are like to be acquainted with before we part.

Hence you proceede to a rule of *Decorum* in all resemblances, that so you may make way to betray your learninge in Hieronymus Vida his Poetry; passinge his censure upon a comparison of Homer, wherein he compares Ajax retiringe from

from the Troians unto an hard kinned asse, driven with batts or staves out of a corne field, by a company of children. The comparison is justified by Vida, but thought not fitt to be applied in like sort unto Turnus, unless a Lyon be put in the place of the asse, in the judgement of those courtly times wherein Virgill lived, thereby desiring belike to justify Virgill also. I still attend, when those *scattered rayes* you promised us, of *that glorious light*, you spake of, will breake forth; But it may be, we are not yet come to the Horizon, whose *edges and skirts* alone can discover them. But yet to stay our stomachs you tell us by the way; that the *Holy Prophets in their courtly Decorum* observed in framinge comparisons, are nothing inferior to any Poet, though as good as Virgill & Homer also. They are something beholden unto you, for your good woord. Your instance is out of Esay 31. 4. *Like as the Lyon & yong Lyon roaring on his pray, when a multitude of sheepebeards is called forth against him, he will not be afrayde of their voyce, nor abase himselfe for the noyse of them: so shall the Lord of hosts come downe to fight for Mount Zion & for the hill thereof.* I beginne to conceive, this was it you went with childe withall, in casting your selfe upon this digression touching the resemblinge of the nature of God. And because the comparing of Virgill with Homer, is a pretie point of humane learning; and you had observed this passage in Scripture suitable to that of Turnus his description in Virgill: to vent this peece of learning, you have drawne in by the eares a discourse or rather an inquiry, *Howe Gods essence is to be resembled*, the issue wherof is but this, that the Prophet observes a very courtly decorum, in resembling him vnto a Lyon.

Yet by the way take this; If it were not courtly enoughe to compare Turnus to an asse as Homer compares Ajax, but rather to a Lyon; doe you thinke it courtly enoughe to compare the Lord of hosts to a Lyon? And what courtly decorum is observed thinke you when the second comming of Christ is compared to the comming of a theife in the night? Persuade your selfe; the holy Ghost affectes no courtly decorums; his language is allwayes savoury to a gracious spirite,

not otherwise. The witts of Virgill & Homer both at the best, favoured but of the fleshe, So dothe not the woord of God. I honour them bothe in their kindes; but I would not have them remembred the same day, wherin we consider the spirituall decorum of the language of Gods spirite.

Well, the childe is delivered, & these panges are over; Now we may expect to be advanced to the Horizon you spake of, for the discovery of those *scattered rayes of glorious light*, wherwith you inamoured us. But first we are to be acquainted with three sorts of errours out of Austin, in setting forth the Divine nature; The first (you say) ariseth from comparing God to bodies, as by saying that he is bright or yellowe; the second, from comparing him unto soules, as by attributing forgetfulnes unto him; The third by attributing such things unto him, as are neyther true of him, nor of any other, as in saying that he is able to produce, or begett, himselfe. Yet you tell us fictions, or suppositions must be used of things scarce possible, wherby to represent God, in default of better. And thus you make way for a fiction of yours, wherby to represent God, & that is of a soule diffused thorough the whole Vniverse. Nowe that *Deus was Anima Mundi*, was an olde opinion of certeyne heathens two thousand yeares agoe. And what necessitie, I pray, of any such fiction? And withall it is a fiction full of absurditie; considering that a great part of this Vniverse is a World of soules of diverse kindes; and the rest are incapable of soules whether they are inferior to animate things as baser bodies, or superior even to reasonable soules themselves, as Intelligences. And I woonder what you meant by that sory qualification, when you say. You *must use fictions of things scarce possible*; Implyinge that this fiction of yours which here you introduce, is of a thing *scarce possible*; Wherby you seeme to conceive that this is a thing not absolutely impossible.

Neyther doe I finde any congruitie, why bodies abstract or Mathematicall, shoulde be of fitter capacity to receive this imaginary soule wherby to represent God. Only I confesse, that an imaginary body is most fit for an imaginary soule, but  
neyther



neither fitt to represent God by. For what vertues, I pray, can you finde in them, fitt to resemble him? Yet you are not at ende of your *extractions*, though the ende of this Chapter touchinge Gods resemblance, mooveth us to sende an ende to our expectations, and to looke no more for those *scattered rayes of that glorious light* you spake of. The childe you travayled with, was Homers comparinge Ajax to an asse, & Virgils comparinge Turnus to a Lyon, & Vida his judgement therupon, and the Prophets concurrence with the witt of the latter, and three errours mentioned by Austin, in resembling the nature of God. And last of all a fiction to this purpose of a thing scarce possible, and that something refined, and the whole put of to further extractions, & all the glory, we were put in hope of, is the glory of a fewe phrases, wherwith you wishe your Reader, seing his cheare, to be merry, for he is wellcome. And thus you have given us a flashe of powder without shot, but not without smoke. Our enterteynment may be better in the chapter followinge.

---

## CHAP. II.

*Concerning two Philosophicall maximes which are sayde  
so leade us to the acknowledgement of one infinise, &  
incomprehensible essence.*

**F**ROM leight shewes we come to solid discourse, at least we are promised such. The principles wherof are two, termed springs & founteynes, that they may be the fitter, for the baptizing of Atheists, (so you speake) as they are fitt enough for the confirming of Christians. The first is, *Whatsoever hath limite or boundes of being hath some distinct cause, or author of being.* This is taken for a proposition knowne of it selfe; yet are the termes very ambiguous, as namely the terme *limite or boundes*. In one place you professe that *beginninge of beinge is one speciall limit of being.* Nowe I confesse,



confesse, that in this sense, the proposition is evident thus, *Whatsoever hath a beginninge, hath a cause thereof distinct from it selfe*; because nothing can have a beginninge of beinge without a cause; Neyther can any thing give beinge unto it selfe. And therefore, if all things in this World are acknowledged to have had a beginninge; it must be acknowledged that they had a Maker which is God. But that this World hath had a beginninge hath not bene acknowledged by all: Nay the Learnedest Men that ever were out of the Church of God, as Aristotle and his Followers, have utterly denyed the World to have had a beginninge as you well knowe; And therefore unles, the contrary be proved, & these Philosophers confuted, we have hereby nothing profited in convicting Mens consciences of this trueth by the light of reason, *That there is a God*; and so are farre enoughe from baptizinge Atheists into the name of God the Father. Much more from baptizinge them into the name of the Father, of the Sonne, and of the H. Ghost. And therefore I am perswaded that your proposition is not delivered in this sense, but rather you extende the word *limites* or *boundes* to a greater generalitie of signification, in which sense, you woulde have it supposed, that *All things, besides God himselfe, have limite and boundes of beinge*, not in regard only that they had a beginninge which is questionable, but in regard that they are *Entia finita*, which is out of question; In like sort the woord *being*, is of ambiguous signification; For it may be taken, eyther for beinge of essence, or for beinge of existence. The limits of existence or duration are such as wherby things are sayde to have a beginninge or an ende; and that at such a time or other.

But the limits & boundes of things according to their essence, are such, in respect wherof *Entia* are sayde to be *finita*, or *infinita*. Nowe in this latter sense, your proposition hath bene very questionable, amongst the most learned Philosophers, that have bene. For Aristotle and his Peripateticks never doubted, but that this visible World was finite.

Yet that he did acknowledge a cause of it, is no where evident. Nay he opposethe Plato, & the rest before him, who  
mayn-

maynteyned, that the World was made, & so accordingly, that it had a beginning: wherby it seemes, that he, denyinge the creation of the World, denyed therewithall that the World had any efficient cause. And indeede, whosoever maynteynes, that the world had a beginning by creation, must therewithall maynteyne, that eyther it was made of somethinge, or of nothinge. You will not say that tis a thing evident that the World was made of some preexistent matter, which matter had existence without creation. For that is unto us Christians a manifest untruthe. Therefore you must be driven to maynteyne, that it is a truthe evident of it selfe, that the World was made originally out of nothinge; or at least, that it may be immediately concluded evidently, by a principle, which is evident of it selfe; thus *whatsoever hath boundes of beinge hath bene made, the World hath boundes of beinge: therefore it hath bene made*; and seing it was not made of any thing pre-existent; therfore it was made of nothing. Now what Wise man will acknowledge this discourse to be evident? considering howe many Learned Philosophers conceived it to be a thing impossible, that any thing coulde be made out of nothinge; as allso consideringe that the H. Ghost imputeth the acknowledgement herof, not to any naturall evidence, but only unto faith, as where the Apostle saythe, *by faith* Heb. 11. 2. *we believe that the World was made, so that things which we see were made*  $\mu\eta\ \epsilon\kappa\ \phiαινομένων$ , not of things that doe.

2. You proceede to the enlargement of this position, & tell us, that this maxime is simply convertible thus, *Whatsoever hath cause of beinge, hath also limits of beinge, because it hath beginninge of beinge: For, omnis causa & principium, & omne causatum & principiatum.* There is litle soundnes eyther of Logicke or Philosophy in all this. For to say that a proposition is simply convertible, is in a Logicall phrase, to say, that it is a good consequence which is drawne, from the proposition converted to the convertent, that is to the proposition wherinto the conversion is made. But this is untrue of the proposition convertible, which you speake of. For an affirmative universall cannot be thus converted by simple conversion,

Confundunt Graeci  
Theologi  
in hac dis-  
putatione  
ἀλλὰ καὶ  
ἀποκρίν. Da-  
narus Cen-  
sur. in  
Lumbard.  
dist. 29.

sion, but only an Vniuersall negative, & a particular affirmative. But I leave your wordes, and take your meaning; You say it is also true, that, *Whatsoever hath cause of beinge, hath also limits of beinge.* Nowe bothe this proposition is naught, and the reason worse. For the Sonne of God, the second person in Trinity, hath the cause of beinge from his Father: for he is begotten of him. And the H. Ghost, hath the cause of beinge bothe from the Father and from the Sonne: For he proceedeth from them bothe. Yet neyther God the Sonne, nor God the holy Ghost, have any limits of their beinge. If you say, the Persons are limited, though the nature of the Godhead be not; I woulde gladly knowe howe the Person of the Sonne, and of the H. Ghost are more limited then the Person of the Father. For of the Sonne and H. Ghost, I knowe no other limitation then this, that the Sonne is not the Father, nor the H. Ghost: Likewise the H. Ghost, is neyther the Father nor the Sonne. And in this sense, the Father is limited as much as eyther. For as the Sonne is not the Father, so the Father is not the Sonne; and as the H. Ghost is not the Father, so the Father is not the H. Ghost. You shoulde have sayde, *All thinges that have cause of beinge by creation, have also limits or bounds of being;* Or thus, *All thinges that have cause of beinge in time, and not from everlastinge, have limits, and boundes of beinge.* Or if you woulde apply it to generation, thus, *All thinges that have cause of being by generation of finite Agents have limits and boundes of beinge.* Yet none of thele is to the purpose, save the first. And that first proposition supposeth the creation, which yet is not evident, but unto faith. So then you see howe weake this proposition is; Yet the reasons you bring for the prooffe of it, are much worse. Your first reason is this, *because it hath beginninge of beinge.* Nowe if by limits of beinge, you meane limits of existence, such as is the beginninge of duration, then your prooffe is merely identicall. But if you meane by limits of beinge, limits of essence, wherby a thing is sayde to be *Ens finitum*, the consequence is true I confesse, but nothing more evident is the conclusion, by this reason, then it was before of it selfe.

it selfe. For that it hath a cause efficient which produceth it, dothe as well argue a finite condition of the thing produced, then that it hath a beginninge. Yet neyther dothe the havinge of an efficient cause sufficiently argue, that the effect produced is finite, unles the efficient cause be finite. For to say that a finite thinge coule produce an effect infinite, is to maynteyne that a cause in workinge shoulde exceede the spheare of his activity. But there is no place for this exception, in case the efficient cause be infinite. And I have knowne some inferre herchence that the World is infinite; Otherwise say they, there shoude be no effect of God suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent. And consider; finite thinges are able to produce finite thinges, equall unto themselves, why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite? It may be answered, that the experience of producinge equalls to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation. And so God allso in the way of eternall and incomprehensible generation produceth a Sonne equall to himselfe, yea, the same with himselfe as touching his nature. But this is grounded upon a mystery of faith, which hath no evidence unto reason naturall. For although by reason & meditation on Gods woorkes we may attayne to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature, yet can we not therby attayne to the knowledge of God as touching the Trinity of persons. Adde unto this, that diverse have not only believed, but undertaken to proove allso, that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension, eyther in quantitie continuall or discrete.

Hill. in hic  
Philoso-  
phia Lu-  
ceppea, E-  
picurea,  
Democre-  
tica.

And Hurtado de Mendosa, a Spanishe Iesuite, and a late Writer, is most eager in the mayntenance of this. So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their heads. Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent. For you suppose, that *whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge, of beinge*, and that in time. But this is notably untrue unto us Christians. For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hath a cause of his beinge, to witt the Father. Likewise the H. Ghost, hath not only a cause,

Disputatio-  
ne in Phi-  
losophiam  
Vniversam  
a Summulis  
ad Meta-  
physicam.

but causes of his beinge, to witt bothe the Father and the Sonne, for he proceede the from them bothe; yet hathe he not such beginninge of beinge as you speake of. For bothe he and the Sonne are everlasting like unto the Father. Your second reason is woorst of all, as when you say: For *omnis causa est principium, & omne causatum est principium*. For in the meaning of this proposition *causa* and *principium*, are taken for *voces synonymae*, woordes of the same signification; not signifying two thinges, the one wherof is consequent unto the other. And what sober Scholer would affirme, that *omnis causa est principium*, as *principium* signifieth the beginninge of beinge, whereas indeede it is the cause of beginninge of beinge to its effect, rather then formally to be stiled the beginninge of beinge it selfe. That which followeth of the limits of thinges, more easily or more hardly discerned, accordinge as the cause is founde to be preexistent in time or no, is an assertion as wilde, as the similitude wherby you illustrate it; and all nothing to the purpose, to proove, that whatsoever hathe cause of beinge, hathe also limits of beinge, though still you proceede ambiguously without distinction, eyther of beinge, or of the limits thereof.

For first, where the cause is not preexistent in time, as in things risinge by concomitance, or resultant, yet the effects are as easily scene to be limited, as when the cause is preexistent in time; as for example; the light of the Sunne, and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by naturall emanation, was as easily scene to be limited, the first time it was, as after the light is a long time hid from us, and afterward appeares agayne unto us. Secondly, what if the limits be not scene, what I say is that to the purpose? Angells are invisible, yet we knowe, their natures are limited. Thirdly, what thinke you of the World, hathe it limits or no? You thinke (no doubt) it hathe; yet was not God the cause thereof preexistent in time, but only in eternitie. For before the World, no time had any existence. Agayne suppose the World had bene made from everlasting, which some Scholemen have helde to be possible; in this case, God shoulde have  
no pre-

no preexistence eyther as touching time actual , or as touching time possible ; Yet I hope that limits of the World, even in that case had bene as discernable to Aristotle, as now they are to you. As for the similitude wherby you illustrate it , that rather sheweth howe in such cases when effects doe rise by way of concomitance or resultant, they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernable. Yet what shoulde moove you thus to amplify, howe hard it is to discerne such effects, from their causes, I knowe not. For what hardnes , I pray, is there, in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sunne that gives it , or from the body of a Candle , or of a Glowewoorme, or of some kinde of rotten wood, or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the darke ? Yet is all this nothing pertinent to the confirmation, or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you. Howe farre dependance upon a cause dothe inferre limits of beinge upon the thinge dependinge, I have already spoken ; What meant you to distinguish of the consideration of effects and causes , accordinge to the consideration of them eyther distinctly , or in grosse, unles it be to puzzle the Reader as much as you confound your selfe , when erstwoones you manifest that you speake of them bothe as they have causes, which is to consider them only as effects. For that notion alone hathe reference to a cause. But whether this dothe inferre that they are limited, I have already therupon delivered my minde.

3. Hence you proceede to the solution of newe problemes, and that as a mere naturalist. *Why men in these dayes are not Gyants ; why Gyants in former times were but men.* And the reason you give is, because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables , of man especially, from which he receaveth nutrition and augmentation , is lesse now then it hath bene , at least before the flood. The latter of your two questions is wilde. For what doe we understand by Gyants, but men of a Gyantlike stature ? & is it a sober question to aske, howe it commeth to passe, that men of an huge stature are but men ? For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion

tion of parts, as great as the Image that Nabuchodonosor set up in the playne of Dura, or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes; shoulde not men notwithstandinge be men still? and neyther Angells nor beasts; much lesse eyther inferior to the one or superior to the other. If the heavens were infinite as some conceive that an infinite body may be made by God, yet shoulde those heavens be heavens still, and a body still.

Neyther dothe it followe, that therfore those Gyants were men still, because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite & limited. For though they had bene turned into Woolves or other beastes, the matter of nutrition had bene limited still; yet in such a case, they had ceased to be men. As touchinge the stature of men so much lessened in these dayes in comparison unto former times; I no way like the reason therof assigned by you. First because it carryeth no evidence with it, & you give no light unto it, but barely suppose the trueth of it. Secondly because you limit it, in comparison of the like causes before the flood; As if there were no Anakims knowne since the flood. Of late yeares in the place where I dwell, hath bene taken up the bone of a mans legge, broken in the digging of a well, the bare bone was measured to be two and twentie inches about, in the calfe, and the spurre about the heele was founde also, & that of a very vast proportion. It seemes the whole body lyethe there. If King Iames were alive, and heard of it; it is like enoughe that out of his curious and Scholasticall Spirite, wherby he was carryed to the investigation of strange things, he woulde give order that the body might be digged up, & the parts to be kept as monuments of the great proportion and stature of men in former times. As touching the stature of men in these dayes what dothe Capteyne Smith write by his owne experience of the Sasque Sahanoets, borderers upon Virginia on the Northe; He professeth they seemed like Gyants to the Englishe; One of their weroances that came aboard the Englishe, the calfe of his legge was 3. quartars of a yard about, and the rest of his limbes answerable to that proportion. Sure I am the siege of Troy was since the

*Voyages &  
discoverie  
of Capteyne  
John Smith  
in Virginia.*



since the flood ; and Homer writings of the stone that Æneas tooke up to throwe at his enemies calleth it

χαρμάδιον μέγα ἔργον ὃ καὶ δύο ἄνδρες φερόμεν  
Οἷοι νῦν βροτοὶ εἰσὶ, καὶ δὲ μὴν θάλλε καὶ οἷος.

And he was litle acquainted with Noahs flood, that sayde *Terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos*. Thirdly in these dayes some are very lowe, some very tall of stature in comparison ; yet the vigour of causes nutritive and augmentative is the same to each. So in all likelihood both before the flood and after, such difference was founde.

The Spyes sent by Iosuah to take a viewe of the land of *Nab. 13. 34.* Canaan, having scene the Sonnes of Anak, seemed in their owne sight but as grasshoppers in comparison unto them.

Yet the vigour of foode and nourishment was the same to both. Farre better reasons might be alleaged, if I mistake not, of this difference ; and withall I see no reason to the contrary, but that men might be of a great stature in these dayes, as in former times, and that by course of nature ; if it pleased God to have it so. But I have no edge to enter upon this discourse, it is unseasonable, and I desire rather to deale with you in matter of Divinitie, and especially to encounter you in your Arminian Tenets. The question followinge, why vegetables of greatest vigour, doe not ingrosse the properties of others lesse vigorous, is a senseles question.

For whether you understande it of vegetables in the same kinde, or of a diverse kinde, it is ridiculous. As for example. Woulde any sober man enquire after the cause, why that vegetable which is of the greatest heate, hath not the propertie of such a vegetable, that is of lesse heate ? Or why that which is vigorous in heate, hath not the propertie of that which is vigorous in colde, or in any other disparate qualitie ? Nay why shoulde any man expect a reason why different kindes of things have different qualities ? Is it not satisfaction sufficient to consider, that they are different kindes of things, and therefore no mervyle if they have different

properties? The cause herof derived from the vigour of that which propagates is very unsound; For that which propagates, and that which is propagated is of the same kinde, and consequently of the same propertie. And the question proceeds equally as well of the one as of the other. If you shoulde aske how it comes to passe, that man is not so intelligent a creature as an Angell; it were very absurde to say the reason is, because the Father of a man was not so intelligent as an Angell, and therfore he coulde not propagate a man as intelligent as an Angell; least so he shoulde propagate a more intelligent creature then himselfe. I say this manner of answer would give little satisfaction. For the question was made of man, not of this man in particular, but of mankind, which comprehendes the Father as wel as the Sonne. And agayne, the Sonne may be more intelligent then the Father, though not after the same manner intelligent as the Angells are. The following question is as litle worthe the proposing as the former. For what hostilitie is to be feared betweene the ayre and the water? But you make choyse to instance in the hostilitie betweene the earthe and the water, as a matter of dangerous consequence. You demaunde the reason why *the restles or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth*. I had thought the earthe had bene fitter to swallowe up water, then water to swallowe up earthe. For suppose the Sea shoulde overflowe the Land, shoulde it therby be sayde to swallowe it up? Then belike the bottome of the Sea is swallowed up by the Sea. And by the same reason, the Element of the Ayre swalloweth up both Sea and Land, because it covereth them; and the Element of fire in the same sense, swalloweth up the Element of the ayre. And the heavens swallowe up all the Elements, for as much as they doe encompassse them. Every Naturalist conceaves, that it is not out of any hostilitie, that the Element of water is disposed to cover the earth, but out of inclination naturall, to be above the earthe, beinge not so heavy a body, as the massie substance of the earth is; And we knowe it is withdrawne into certeyne valleys by his power who *jussit subsidere valles*, as the Poet acknowledgede,

gethe, who was but a mere naturalist, & that in *commodam habitationem animatum*, that the earthe might become a convenient habitation for such creatures, in whose nostrills is the breathe of life; of whome the cheife is man, made after the likenes and image of his maker, and made Lord over his visible creatures. The last question is worst of all, and all nothinge to the purpose, but mere extravagants. What sober man would demaund a cause, why the heavens doe not dispossesse the elements of their place? might you not as wel demaunde, why the fire dothe not dispossesse the ayre, and then why it dothe not dispossesse the water? & lastly why it dothe not dispossesse the earthe of her seate? which is as much as to say, why is not the heaven where the earthe is, and the earthe where the havens are? whereas every man knowes, that the more spacious place, is fitter for the more spacious bodies; and the higher places more agreeable to lighter bodies, like as the lowest place is most fitt for the body of the earthe. To say that the nature of the heavens, hath not so much as libertie of egress into neighbour elements, is as if you shoulde say, that light things have not so much as libertie of moving downewards, nor have heavy things libertie of moving upwardes. Yet there are cases extraordinary, when a certeyne universall nature mooves them contrarily to their speciall inclinations, for mayntenance of the integritie of the whole, and for avoydance of all vacuity. I see no reason for that other assertion of yours, *that nature cannot sett boundes to bodies naturall, but rather is limited in them*. What thinke you of the soules of men, doe not these as other soules prescribe limits unto the matter? *Materia prima* was accompted in Zabarell. our Vniversitie, to have *dimensiones in determinatas*, and that it de materia received the determination therof from formes, but by the *prima*. operation of Agents, in their severall generations. I confesse nature it selfe is but the effect and instrument of God, who is the God of nature as well as of grace. But yet whether every thinge that hath boundes of nature, as the World hath, dothe hereby evidence and inferre the creation therof, is such a question, wherein Aristotle and his followers did pe-

Heb. 12.

remotely maynteyne the negative; and the Scripture it selfe dothe impute unto faichie, our acknowledgement of the Creation.

4. Nowe we come to the scanninge of your second Principle, *Whatsoever hathe no cause of beinge, can have no limits or boundes of beinge.* This in part hathe evidence of truthe thus, *Whatsoever hathe no efficient cause of beinge, the same hathe no beginninge of beinge.* But if it proceede of limits of essence, or of qualitie, or of quantitie, it requires helpe of reason to make it good. For as many as denyed the World to have a beginninge, denyed as it seemes, that it had any cause of beinge; and thought the *beinge* therof to be by necessitie of nature. Yet did they maynteyne that the World had limits of quantitie, and qualitie. For they maynteyned that *Infinittum magnitudine* was absolutely impossible, as Aristotle by name. By your distinction followinge, of diverse wayes wherby *beinge* may be limited, you make no mention of limitation by havinge a beginninge therof; which yet hathe bene the cheife, if not only limit, which hitherto you have mentioned.

Agayne, why shoulde you make but two wayes, confoundinge the limits of quantitie, with the limits of intensive perfection in every severall kinde. It were too much in my judgement to confound limits of quantitie, with limits of qualitie, which yet are both accidentall. But most unreasonable it seemes to confound eyther of these with intensive perfection of every severall kinde. But howe will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition? Allmightie God hathe no cause of beinge; therefore he hathe no limits of beinge. Nowe, I pray, apply this to the members of your distinction concerninge the kinde of limits of beinge. Is he without limits in number? why then belike he is numberles. Yet indeede he is but one and can be but one in nature, and in persons can be but three, & must needes be three. Is he without limits in quantitie, and so infinite therin? But in very truthe he hathe no quantitie at all. Is he without limits in qualities, not materiall (for such are not incident to him) but spirituall, & so infinite therin? Are there

there no boundes of the degrees of his goodnes : why but consider, in God there are no degrees, no qualities at all.

As touching perfections created therof indeede, we have severall kindes, but none such are to be found in God. Only because God is able to produce them, therefore they are sayde to be eminently in God, though not formally. But the like you may say as well of any materiall attribute, as of spirituall. For God can produce all alike. Therefore all are eminently alike in God. *Of thinges visible the most perfect,* you say, *are but perfect in some one kinde.* It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible; but this kinde is to be understood of a kinde created. But you may not say, that God is perfect in all such kindes, but rather in none of them, For that were to be perfect in imperfections. Gods perfection transcends all created kindes, and he is the Author of them, producinge them out of nothing. They that maynteyne the World to have bene eternall, maynteyne it to have bene so, by necessitie of nature. And all such would peremptorily deny, that it was possible for the World not to have bene; and therefore in this discourse of yours it would have becotted you rather to proove the contrary, then to suppose it. How the Heaven of Heavens shoulde be accounted immortal I knowe not, seing they are not capable of life. And seing deathe properly is a dissolution of body and soule, immortalitie must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soule, which is not incident to Angells (much lesse to Heavens) which have neyther bodies nor soules wherof to consist. Neyther dothe Seneca, in the place by you alleaged, speake of Angells, in my judgment, but rather of the Species of thinges generable; particulars, though subject to corruption, beinge inabled for generation, and therby for perpetuation of their kindes, and consequently for the mayntenance of the World, and that for ever. It is well knowne that the Platonickes, though they maynteyned the World to have a beginninge, yet denied the matter wherof the World was made, to have had any beginninge. Of the same opinion were the Stoicks. Their com-

mon voyce was, *De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti*, & accordingly they might well conceive, that God might be hindered in his operation, by reason of the stubbornes and churlishnes of the matter; & so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers, I conceive to be just. Yet by your leave, I doe not thinke, that any creature, capable of immortalitie, in what sense soever applyable to Angells as well as unto men, can be made immortall by nature. Yet I doubt not, but God can make creatures in such sort immortall by nature, as that no second cause can make them cease to be. For it is apparant, that God hathe many such, as namely the Angels and soules of men. Yet still their natures are annihilable, in respect of the power of God. Neyther can I believe, that to be immortall in Senecaes language, was to be without beginninge. For I doe not finde, but that the Stoicks together with Plato, conceived that the World had a beginninge. But in this respect he calleth them eternall, (I shoulde thinke) because the World, together with the kindes of thinges therein conteyned, subject to corruption and generation in particulars, should have no ende, and that by the Providence of God. We believe that nothinge is absolutely necessary, but God. But Aristotle believed the World also to be everlasting without beginninge, & of absolute necessity. For that the World shoulde be created originally out of nothinge, all Philosophers helde impossible, and that the matter shoulde be everlastinge, and of absolute necessity, wherof the World was to be made, that seemed impossible unto Aristotle, and that upon good reason. The creation therefore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument, and not avouched only by bare contestation. That which followethe, we Christians are apt enough to believe, but you take upon you to convict Philosophers of the truthe of them by evident reason; this I say you undertake, but proove not. You say, that the most strong and perspicuous way of inferringe the existence of God, is by this, that all thinges are originally derived from him, and made by him. And indeede, let it be proved, that the World had a beginninge of beinge, and it will

will be manifest thereby, that there is a God, to witt, the Maker of the World. But you have not yet proved against Philosophers that the creation of the World is to be acknowledged. Nay this kind of argument (which I acknowledge to be the most pregnant and illustrious) you put off till another time, and to another discourse of yours, and yet all that you have to say doth but harpe upon this, though herein you doe but fumble, and proove nothing, supposing belike, that feeding us with expectation of some performance of yours, this way hereafter, we shoulde be the more willingly drawne to beare with the imperfection of your discourse here. Yet had it bene farre better for your credite in my judgement, to have wholly passed it over according to your project mentioned at the first, then thus slightly to dispatche it.

5. But you have not yet dispatched it as it seemes. Nowe you beginne to dispute the creation of the World; but your phrase in expressing it, is very incongruous, as when you suppose Philosophers to mainteyne, that *the roote of incorruption in the heavens, can brooke no limits of duration, but must be imagined without ende or beginninge*. Now Philosophers maynteyned (and they only were the Peripatetickes. For Aristotle ingenuously acknowledged in his bookes *de Calo*, that all that went before him, supposed the heavens to have had a beginninge) that the Heavens were without beginninge and without ende, not that *the roote of incorruption in the Heavens* (as you speake) was without beginninge and without ende. For of any such roote of their incorruption he disputeth not; and I verily thinke, that herin, affecting to phrasifick, you speake you knowe not what. Now this he maynteyned, in opposition unto those, who feyned the World to have had a beginninge *ex prajacente materia*; which matter had no beginninge. And Aristotle concurring withall that went before him in this, that *nothing coulde be produced out of nothinge*, and opposing them in the point of *matter prajacent*, drew up his Tenet to this pitche, that the World had no beginninge. As if he had disputed thus; If the World had a beginninge,

Arist. de  
cælo. lib. 1.  
cap. 11.  
conti. 102.



it must have its beginnunge cyther *ex aeterna materia prejacente*, or no. But not *ex aeterna materia prejacente*, as he laboured to proove; therefore if it had a beginnunge, it must be of nothing; Now all granted that *ex nihilo nihil fit*; whence it followed that it coulde have no beginnunge at all. And truly, I am of opinion, that his Tenet was more sounde then his opposites; and that with better reason it may be maynteyned that the World had no beginnunge, then that the matter or *Chaos rudis indigestaque moles*, wherof the World was made, had no beginnunge. Now that Principle wherin they all agreed, *nothinge can be made of nothinge*, they thought to be evident of it selfe, and such as needed no prooffe.

Lib. 12.

Yet Averroes in his commentaries upon the bookes of Aristotles Metaphysickes, gives a reason of it, disputing thus. If the World were made, and that of nothing, then it was possible to be made before it was made; which we willingly grant. Now saythe he I demaunde, in what subject this possibilitie was? And withall telleth us that Ioannes Grammaticus made this answer, that it was in Agente, which Averroes takes up in scorne, but confutes it not. Now Grammaticus his answer rightly understood is fayre and full; not meaninge that any possibilitie or power passive was in God; but that there was an active power in God so allmighty as inabled him to make a World out of nothinge, & consequently was foundation sufficient to denominate the World possible to be, before it was; not by any physicall possibilitie, which allwayes requires a subject really existent, to support it; but only Logically, which is nothinge els but *negatio repugnantia*, which is applicable to *non ens*. For that which is not, may be denominated possible to be, in case there be an active power existent sufficient to produce it. But to proceede; against the opinion of Philosophers you dispute thus, *If the Heavens can brooke no limits of your duration*, such as are beginnunge and ende, why shoulde it brooke limits of extension? as it dorthe. For the heaven is supposed by them to be finite in extension. For answer whereunto I say the reason is manifest. For an infinite magnitude actual is impossible, and admits manifest contra-

contradiction as Aristotle hath disputed the point at large. But to be without a beginning of duration, they conceived to be nothing impossible. Nay rather to the contrary, to have a beginning out of nothing, all of them conceived that to be a thing utterly impossible. And albeit in other cases they helde motion, magnitude, and time to holde exact proportion, yet those cases were nothing to this purpose.

And whereas you say duration is a kinde of extension; implying thereby, that extension is the *Genus* to magnitude and duration, as unto two species comprehended by it, I take this to be untrue. I judge rather, there is no univocall notion common to duration, and magnitude; though this be little materiall. But if you can shewe that it implyeth as great contradiction that the World shoulde be everlasting, as that it shoulde be infinite in magnitude, then you should speake home indeede to the purpose. And I professe I make no doubt but the demonstration of the one may be as evident, as of the other: but that is a task, which you have not hitherto perfourmed. And whosoever undertakes it, is like to finde opposites enoughe. For there want not Schoolemen, that maynteyne the possibilitie of bothe, namely bothe of the everlastingnes therof in duration without beginning; and of the infinity therof in extension. And one thought no Schooleman, hath adventured to proove that the World is actually infinite, sayinge that otherwise, there were no effect suitable enoughe, to lo infinite a cause and agent as God is.

Yet I feare not any of these colours, but am perswaded that each is impossible, and that the impossibilitie of each may be demonstrated, and the reasons to the contrary evidently refuted. But you hitherto have rather begged what you undertooke to proove, then proved it. Yet you proceede, sayinge *things caused are allwayes limited*. But you shoulde have proved, that things of limited essence are allwayes caused, and have a beginning of their duration. So that this your proposition is nothing to the purpose, were it true. But neither is this proposition allwayes true, as hath bene shewed in the example of the persons in the Trinitie. And yet on this

Bich. in 2.  
sect. dist. 1.  
q. 2. a Scot  
there answereth  
Gandavania  
his arguments proving  
the impossibility of the  
World to be from everlasting.

point, which is neyther univerſally true, nor at all to any purpose, you insist liberally in your followinge discourse.

You should proove, that whatsoever hath limits of extension, the same also hath beginninge of duration: which yet I deny not to be a truth, and demonstrable, but of the demonstration herof, your discourse hath sayled hitherunto. When you argue thus, *It is as possible to put a newe fashion upon nothing; as for any thing that is, to take limits, or set forme of being from nothing.* You corrupt the opinion of your opposites and not refute it. For they that maynteyne the World had no beginninge, doe also maynteyne, that it tooke no beginninge of the limits therof: And as they doe not say, the World tooke his beginninge from nothing; so neyther doe they say, that the World tooke the beginninge of his limits, or tooke his limits or forme from nothing. Nowe you, by this forme of your dispute, doe instruct Atheists howe to discourse against the creation of the World, thus; *If God made the World out of nothing, then he put a newe fashion upon nothing: But it is impossible that any newe fashion shoulde be put upon nothing; therefore it is impossible that God shoulde make the World out of nothing.* Nowe in this Syllogisme the minor is most true. For not any thinge can consist of *nothing* as the matter and of a fashion, as the forme therof. But the consequence of the major, is most untrue. For when we say that God made the World out of nothing, our meaninge is not that *nothing* was the matter wherof the World was made, but only that it was the *terminus a quo*, not *materia ex qua*. As much as to say God made the World, wheras nothing went before, neyther had God any matter wheron to worke when he made the World. And Philosophers affirminge that the World had no beginninge, doe therewithall deny that the World tooke eyther being or limits from any thinge. You turne their negative into an affirmative, so to corrupt their opinion, in steade of confuting it. They thought, it needed not any thinge to give it beinge or bounds of beinge, least they shoulde be driven to affirme that somethinge coulde be made out of nothinge: wheras they had rather maynteyne, that the world

ever had existence by necessitie of nature. Neyther did they maynteyne, that the world tooke limits or beinge from it selfe any more then from any other, which you devise and impute unto them, in steade of convictinge their Tenet of error, by force of argument, in the way of naturall reason which you undertake. And therfore havinge so weakely disprooved the everlastingnes of things limited, you doe thereby betray the weakenes of your proove of Gods illimited condition from the everlastingnes therof.

6. And yet as if you had confounded all the Philosophers that ever lived, in the point of creation, you proceede magnificently to suppose, that *the conceyte of beinge without limits is essentially included in the conceyte of beinge without cause precedent*, which if it were true, then were it a trueth *per se nota*, and consequently the creation of the world evident of it selfe even to common reason, seinge it is supposed to have limits. And agayne your discourse is so fashioned, as if Philosophers maynteyned that the world tooke beginninge of it selfe, which is untrue and indeede a thinge evidently impossible, namely that any thinge shoulde take beginninge of it selfe. And indeede if a thinge coulde give beinge to it selfe, it might give what it lusted to it selfe, if so be it had a lust, which the Elements and Heavens have not: Yet those Aristotle maynteyned to have bene from everlastinge, not that they gave beginninge to themselves, but that they tooke no beginninge from any thinge. The reason wherof was, because they coulde not conceive, howe any thinge coulde be made out of nothinge, a thing contrary to all naturall experience: upon which kinde of ground your selfe but erst builded your discourse, when you sayde, *things caused, as induction manifesteth; are all wayes limited and moulded in their proper causes*. Yet notwithstandinge upon this fiction, of a thing able to give beinge to it selfe, you dilate at large.

I grant, that upon this fiction nothinge coulde restrayne it from takinge all bodily perfection possible to it selfe, in case it had power to give beinge to it selfe. But never any Philosopher maynteyned, that it had power to give beinge to it

selfe. For they that maynteyned a Chaos proceedinge the  
 production of the world, maynteyned that out of this Chaos,  
 God produced all thinges, and not that the Chaos or ought  
 els gave being to it selfe. And Aristotle that denyed such an  
 eternall Chaos, & maynteyned the world had no beginninge,  
 was farre from maynteyninge that the world gave beinge to it  
 selfe. Secondly I answere, that though it shoulde thus re-  
 ceave all bodily perfection possible, yet this shoulde not be  
 infinite, and without limits as you woulde have your Reader  
 to suspect without prooffe, and indeede unles this be ima-  
 gined, tis nothinge no the purpose. The reason why in this  
 case, it shoulde not be infinite, is this; because all bodily per-  
 fection possible is but finite, as they conceived, and therein  
 conceived nothinge amisse. So of quantitie or qualitie, the  
 impossibilitie of cyther to be without measure in bodies,  
 whose perfection is only finite, is a sufficient hinderance from  
 takinge cyther quantity or qualitie without measure. In like  
 sort, let Vacuitie (as you speake) be left free to give it selfe  
 full and perfect act; let it take all possible perfection, yet  
 since all possible perfection of bodies, is supposed to be only  
 finite, it will not followe that the perfection taken shall be  
 without limits: which yet you must proove, otherwise your  
 discourse is of no force to proove, that *whatsoever hath no  
 cause of beinge distinct from it selfe, is without limits.* Allthough  
 the Philosphers that maynteyned the world or matter therof  
 preexistent to be without beginninge, driven herunto, because  
 they conceived not how it was possible, that any thinge  
 shoulde be made out of nothinge; yet did they never mayn-  
 teyne that the one or the other gave being to it selfe. Yet this  
 fiction you pinne upon their sleeve, to supply the weaknes of  
 your discourse. Much lesse coulde it enter into any sober  
 mans conceyte, that they gave power to a Vacuitie, *to give it  
 selfe full and perfect act*, seinge Vacuitie is starke nothinge; which  
 the Chaos was not, but a materiall thinge, though merely  
 passive and nothinge active. But as for vacuitie that is neyther  
 active, nor passive, as being starke nothinge. And yet to this  
 you adde a further solecisme in this your fiction; as when you  
 suppose

suppose this vacuities to have power to assume eyther bodily substances or spirituall ; which the Chaos had not , nor not so much as in capacities, being wholly materiall , whereas spirituall substances are immateriall. And yet , I confesse as you give unto that which is nothinge power to assume which it list, eyther bodily or spirituall substances ; it may well be sayde that *nothing* hath the power indifferently to assume eyther or both of them. This I propose by way of an universall negative, not by way of a particular affirmative as you doe , making the terme *nothing*, to be the subject in your propositions, and not an universall signe only. Yet all thus assumed (as you speake) shoulde be but finite ; because all possible perfection besides the nature of God it selfe , is but finite. Therefore I say it shoulde be but finite, if any thinge at all ; which caution I doe put in, because upon due account , it will be founde , that the summe of all this, in a good sense , will proove to be no more, then just nothinge. For suppose, nothinge dothe assume bodily substances ; agayne suppose , nothinge dothe assume spirituall substances ; put this together , and adde nothing to nothing, and see whether the totall will proove to be any jot more, then just nothing. You proceede further , and tell us that *while we imagine it without cause of existence or beginninge, no reason imaginable could confine it , to any set place of residence or extension, why rather in the center, then circumference, or eyther rather then bothe.* In this you seeme to have reference to that which immediately went before, and that was a vacuities. And in very truth upon this supposition , where nowe the center is, nothing was ; where nowe the circumference is, nothing was ; and in all the bodies betweene, nothing was. For you suppose a vacuities of all, and nothing to be, where now there is some thinge. Yet this *nothing* by your leave, must be confined in reference to the places, where bodies were before or after. And the places where bodies were before , being the same, by your supposition , with the places which nowe are, must needs be finite. For undoubtedly , the space of this whole world, betweene the center and circumference , yea & including bothe, is but finite. But forthwith you relapse to

the former iniquitie of your supposition; and in steede of having a being without beginninge, which was indeede the opinion of some great Philosophers, concerninge the world; or concerninge preexistent matter, wherof the world was made, driven herunto upon supposition, (as of a thinge impossible) that nothinge could be made out of nothinge; wherein all agreed, though otherwise of different opinions; nor different only but contrariant also: I say, from this true state of their opinion, you relapse, to the worlds taking of beginninge to it selfe; which is rather to maynteyne that it had a beginninge (though of it selfe) then that it had none at all; yet this alone was affirmed by them, and not the other. Of which other, namely of takinge beginninge to it selfe, imagination only (you say) is the true cause. And therein you say true, but this cause is to be understood of your imagination, not theirs: For they imagined no such taking of beginninge to it selfe, eyther in the world it selfe, or in the preexistent matter therof. Yet upon this you founde a newe imagination, of *extendinge* (forsoothe) *its existence bothe wayes, and drawing a circular duration to the instant, where it begins;* to witt where it begins in your imagination not in theirs; for they imagined no such thing. And indeede, he that imagineth the white to be blacke, I see no reason why he may not proceede further and imagine black to be white, and adde unto this a third, to witt, that white is neyther white nor blacke, and blacke is neyther blacke nor white. Of circular motions I have read; but of circular durations I have neyther read nor heard till now; well, let us understande it of duration in circular motions. But if you please, imagine time to be circular like the motions of your orbes, and in course of time to returne at lengthe to the beginninge of it. For what els to make of the *instant where it begins*, I knowe not. It seemes by this discourse, that you have seene the gigge, and if your braynes have not runne round, I assure you mine have almost in followinge you. At lengthe you come to a more sober supposition and expression; as when you relate their opinion thus, *that the world hath a true present beinge without any cause prece-*



*dem.* This I confesse is suitable to their opinion whome you impugne; who were driven herunto (as I sayde) because they could not comprehend, howe any thinge could be made of nothinge. But when you adde, *Without a superior guide to appoynt it a set course*, you somethinge swerve from the right. All maynteyned the world could not be made out of nothinge. But all of them did not deny that it had a guide to direct it. The Platonickes and Stoicks acknowledged a divine understandinge to have made the world, but out of a pre-jacent matter, which they conceaved to be eternall, and to acknowledge no maker. Nowe as they acknowledged a maker, so they acknowledged a Governour, though sometimes hindered in his course, by the stubbornes of the refractary matter, which acknowledged no maker. Aristotle maynteynes also a first moover, therefore he acknowledged a guide also. But wheras he acknowledged him to be a necessary Agent (as I conceive) it was in effect as much, as if he had acknowledged, no Governour. But all agreed that the duration eyther of the world, or of the pre-jacent matter was everlasting for the time past, and that the world shoulde be everlasting for the time to come. To this Plato yielded. And so conteyned all duration imaginable bothe wayes; namely both for the time past, and for the time to come; but with this difference, that for the time past it was actually infinite; only the duration for the time to come not actually, but in such sort infinite, as it shoulde never have an ende. Now this consideration openeth a fayre way to a discovery of the impossibilitie of this conceyte of theirs concerninge the eternitie of the world, or the eternitie of time, and that by very evident reason; (though I deny not but men have and may sett their wits on worke in quashinge the evidence thereof; in their zeale I thinke to defend the honour of Aristotle.) For if the world were everlastinge? Paulus Venetus, though zealous to defend the possibilitie herof, yet acknowledgede it would followe, that the part is equall to the whole, nay greater then the whole; and that in so evident a manner, that he hath no other way to answer it, then by professinge that

this maxime, *Totum est majus sua parte*, is of force only in *materia finita*, not in *materia infinita*; which in effect is as much as to say; The world may be everlasting I will mainteyne it, but I forbid any man to dispute against it. For I purpose to deny all maxims that are made use of, in disputing against it; and will be bolde to say that they all have force only in *materia finita*, and not in *materia infinita*.

And because seeing I have excepted against weake courses of argumentation, in defense of the creation; it may be expected I shoulde substitute stronger arguments in the place of them. I will not spare to addresse my selfe herunto so farre as out of the old store of my Philosophy I have in readines. And yet if thinges be considered aright, there is no necessitie of any such course. For certainly we have no neede of it for the fortification of our faith, that being built only upon the

Grego. in word of God; and according to that old sayinge: *Fides non*  
Euangel. *habet meritum quoties humana ratio prabet experimentum.* And  
Rom. 25. as for Atheists, may we not justly say of them, as Abraham

Luc. 16. 31. saythe of the rich Gluttonous bretheren. *If they believe not*  
*Moses and the Prophets, neyther will they believe though a man*  
*shoulde rise from the dead.* Especially considering that the  
Scriptures suppose (in my judgement) the creation to be ac-  
knowledgeed by generall instinct, actuald by consideration

Psal. 19. 1. of the course of the world; as where it is sayde, *The Heavens*  
2. 3. *declare the glory of God, and the Firmament sheweth his handy*  
*woorke, Day unto day uttereth the same, and night unto night*  
*teacheth the knowledge. There is no speech or language, where their*  
*voyce is not heard.* And as is the voyce of the Prophets in the  
old Testament, such is the voyce of the Apostles in the newe.

Rom. 1. 20. *The invisible thinges of God, that is his eternall power and God-*  
*head, is seene from the creation of the World, being considered in his*  
*workes, so that they are without excuse.* And Paul preachinge  
before the Athenians, in an Vniversitie much addicted to A-  
ristotles Philosophy, yet is bolde to suppose this, as a thinge

Act. 17. 24. without his preachinge receaved amongst them, *God that made*  
25. 26. *the World, and all thinges that are therein, seeing that he is Lord of*  
*Heaven and Earthe, dwelleth not in Temples made with handes.*

Neyther

Neither is worshipped with mens handes, as though he needed any thing, seinge he giueth to all life and breathe & all thinges. And hath made of one blood all mankind, to dwell on all the face of the Earth, and hath assigned the seasons, which were ordayned before, by the boundes of their habitation. And the being of the World from everlasting, though by creation, doth apparently limit the power of God thus farre, that he could not then have made it sooner. And if God could make the creature like unto himselfe in everlastingnes, why not in any thing els, seinge the Apostle, speaking of the Godhead as evidenced by his workes, noteth it to consist in his eternall power. But come we to that manner of demonstration which is expected, leaving such arguments as Mornay persecuteth, as namely the novell invention of all Arts and Sciences, as appears by History, and the like, evidencing that the World had a beginning: It is well knowne that the most generall opinion is (even of Aristotle himselfe) that an infinite magnitude or a number actually infinite, is a thing utterly impossible as that which implyeth the manifest contradiction. Now let those arguments be well observed, and considered, whether the most pregnant amongst them, may not with as great evidence be accommodated against the everlastingnes of the World, to proove it to be a thing impossible. As for example. One of the most forcible arguments that I have founde to proove the impossibilitie of an infinite magnitude is this. If a magnitude were actually infinite, then it shoulde consist of an infinite number of yards or ells; for if it consisted but of a finite number of them, the whole could be but finite. Nowe it is manifest that such an infinite magnitude can consist but of an infinite number of inches. And here-hence it followeth, that the number of inches, and the number of yardes or ells in such a magnitude are equall; & here-hence it followeth that an inch in this case shoulde be equall to a yarde or ell; which is impossible, and consequently as impossible it is that there shoulde be any magnitude infinite. In like sort, if the World were everlasting, then the dayes past shoulde be infinite, & not so only but the yeares past shoulde be in-

Rom. i. 20.

be infinite; and so the number of dayes and number of yeares past, shoulde be equall, and consequently a day shoulde be equall to a yeare; For if twenty dayes were equall to twentie yeares, then certeynly one day shoulde be equall to one yeare. For *si ab equalibus equalia demas quæ remanent erunt equalia*. Now it is impossible that a day shoulde be equall to a yeare, & consequently it is impossible that the World shoulde be everlasting without beginninge. Perhaps some may say that the same reason might proove as well that it is a thing impossible the World shoulde be without ende. But this is untrue, though at first sight men are apt to be deceaved with a shewe of paritie, where indeede there is no paritie. For though we shall continue as the Angells already doe without ende, yet herehence it shall never come to passe, that it can be verified of such that they have continued an infinite space of time; but still the space is finite, though with addition of continuance longer & longer *in infinitum*. But if the World were without beginning, then an infinite space of time were actually past already, which implyeth manifest contradiction as before hath bene shewed. Now consider the answer to the former argument, & whether it be of any force. The only course to weaken it is to maynteyne, that *datur infinitum, infinito infinitum*. One infinite may be greater then another, so with an infinite number of yeares past, greater then an infinite number of dayes past. This at first sight seemes to be a madde kinde of answer. For hence it followeth that one infinite can not be admitted, but that therewithall you must admitt an numberles number of infinites. As for example; If there were past an infinite number of yeares, then seinge every yeare conteynes 365. dayes, you must acknowledge that this infinite space of yeares consists of 365. parts, each wherof is infinite. And wheras if the World were eternall, & the space of time past, infinite, then the millions of yeares past were infinite also; whence we inferre that the space of millions of yeares past being infinite consists of tenne hundred thousand parts, each wherof is infinite, and each infinite part consists of 365. parts, each wherof is infinite also. And this is the  
very

very argument that Aristotle useth in his Metaphysickes to proove that there cannot be an infinite magnitude; for then it shoulde consist *ex infinitis*, now indeede this they doe grant that streyne their wits to maynteyne the possibilitie of infinitie in magnitude as namely Hurrando de Mendosa in his disputations; as being necessarily driven herunto. And the like course they must needs take that maynteyne the possibilitie of infinitie in time past. But as for the possibilitie of it in time to come, that is altogether of another nature, as before I have shewed. Nowe I will clearly overthrowe this answere and proove evidently that an infinite number of yeares is not greater then an infinite number of dayes; and I proove it thus. If upon the position of an infinite number of dayes, there followeth *hoc ipso*, the position of an infinite number of yeares, then an infinite number of yeares is not greater then an infinite number of dayes. All experience justifieth this. For if upon the position of a quart of measure, followeth the position of two pints, then it is manifest that two pints is not greater then a quart, and so give instance in what you will, it never fayles. Now to the major proposed I adde my minor thus; But upon the position of an infinite number of dayes, *hoc ipso* there followeth the position of an infinite number of yeares; And therfore an infinite number of yeares is not greater then an infinite number of dayes. The minor I proove thus; Vpon the position of an infinite number of dayes there shall followe a position of a number of yeares not finite, therfore infinite. Not finite; For if the number of yeares arising from the presupposed number of dayes were but finite, then the dayes wherof this number of yeares consists shoulde be but finite; For the dayes shoulde be but 365. times more then the yeares. And a finite number multiplied by a finite number, can bring foorth but a finite number. But we have supposed, & the Tenet touching the possibilitie of the Worlds everlastingnes dothe suppose the dayes past to be possibly infinite. Which yet by this one argument we have demonstrated to be impossible. Consider one argument more. Paulus Venetus maynteynes it is a thing possible that the time

A Summa-  
tis ad Me-  
taphysicam  
tract. de  
infinito.

past of the World shoulde be infinite ; yet to exercise his wittes he disputes against it in this manner in effect. If the time past were infinite, as we all confesse, the time to come may be infinite, then the part shall be greater then the whole, as for example, the time from yesterday upwards shall be greater then the time from this day upwards ; which he prooveth thus. The time from yesterday upwards, is equall to the time from yesterday downwards. (This is supposed for as much as all confesse it to be possible that time shoulde be without ende.) But the time from yesterday downwards is greater then the time from this day upwards ; therefore the time from yesterday upwards, is greater then the time from this day upwards. The minor he prooveth thus. The time from yesterday downwards, is greater then the time from this day downwards. But the time from this day upwards is equall to the time from this day downwards ; therefore the time from yesterday downwards is greater then the time from this day upwards ; & consequently the time from yesterday upwards (being equall to the time from yesterday downward) is greater then the time from this day upwards ; which is as much as to say, that the part is greater then the whole. These inferences depende upon this maxime most evident, *that which is equall to a greater, is also greater.* Nowe marke how Paulus Venetus answereth this argument, which is of his owne devisinge ; & his answere is this ; This maxime *the whole is greater then his part*, hath place only in *matter finite*, not in *matter infinite*. A most absurde answere ; for it is in effect to forbid all disputation against him. For we cannot dispute without groundes to insist upon. And no more evident groundes can be devised, then such as conteyne the rules of contradiction. Yet I will make it manifest, that this maxime must have place in all matter, whether finite or infinite. To mainteyne that the whole is not greater then the part in some case is to mainteyne that bothe parts of contradiction are true in some case. But bothe parts of contradiction cannot be true in any case ; neyther in matter finite nor in matter infinite ; Therefore in no case can it be truly

mayn-

maynteyned that the whole is not greater then the part. The minor I proove thus ; there cannot be greater difference betweene matter finite and matter infinite, then betweene ens & non ens. But both parts of contradiction cannot be true eyther about ens or non ens ; (like as one part must be true *de omni ente & non ente*) ; therefore neyther can they be true in any matter whether finite or infinite. Agayne if this which he saye were granted , then there coulde be no disputation as touching the nature of God, seinge he is infinite. And if we take away the rules of contradiction, we take away all disputation. Nowe I proceede in scanning that which followeth in your discourse.

7. I have hitherto followed you in the course of your owne suppositions, and shewed how farre short you fall of provinge what you intended, allihoughe your fictions have bene wonderous wilde. We commonly say, *Uno data absurdo, mille sequuntur*, we doe not say infinite. Yet I see no reason to the contrary , but that from these thousand absurdities, others may followe, and that *in infinitum*. Thoughe fewer followe it suffizethe us, if your collections be of the number of them. By the way, let me tell you, your marginall quotation stands in no congruity with the text. Then you compare impossibilities, and tell us, that for a mere logicall possibility, to take beginninge of actuall beinge from it selfe is as impossible, as for that which is thus supposed to take beginninge, to be refreynd to any determinate kind or part of beinge ; Implyinge that the opinion of Philosophers, which you oppose did maynteyne, that a mere Logicall possibilitie did take beginninge of beinge from it selfe ; wheras indeede there is no such matter. Never any Philosopher was founde to doate in such manner as you fashion the nobler sort of them. This is a mere fiction of your owne brayne. For first whether they maynteyned the World to take beginninge of it selfe, as you seeme to fancy they did, or the prajacent matter, wherof it was made to take beginninge of it selfe ; yet herby they did not maynteyne that a mere Logicall possibilitie, did take beginninge of actuall beinge unto it selfe. For they were never founde to maynteyne



teyne that the World was a mere Logically possibilitie, or that the matter præjacent wherof it was made, was a mere Logically possibilitie. Secondly they never avouched, that eyther the World, or matter præjacent wherof it was made, did take beginning of being to it selfe, as you impute unto them, without all modestie, only endeavouring to supply the weakenes of your argument, and give some colour of strengthe to your discourse, by the corruption of other mens opinion. But Aristotles opinion was, that the World was without beginninge; and the former Philosophers opinion was, that the matter wherof the World was made, was without beginninge: and the reason of bothe was this, because they conceived not how it was possible, that any thinge could be made out of nothing. So that your argument rightly accommodated should runne thus, *It is as impossible that the World was without beginninge, as it is impossible that, that which is without beginninge should have any limits of being, and be finite.* Nowe this they would maynteyne to be utterly untrue; and were it true, yet is it not so true, as to be evident of it selfe. And you have hitherto afforded no evidence at all to justifie it. And agayne there is both reason, why, whether a body have beginning of beinge, or no beginning of beinge, yet can it not be infinite, because that implyeth the manifest contradiction: and on the other side, Divines have bene founde to justifie, that a body might have bene everlastinge, by the power of God, and consequently without beginninge. And agayne, if the World hath a beginninge (as we believe it hath) it must necessarily followe, that some thinge should be made out of nothinge, which not only Philosophers conceived to be impossible, but the H. Ghost also professeth it to be a trueth so farre overreachinge the ordinary capacity of man, that he imputes it unto faith, sayinge, *By faith we believe that the World was made.* What I thinke of your modell I have already signified. In fine you tell us, wherto they tende, which you expresse in pompe, sayinge, *They are destinated to the erection of an everlasting adifice.* And that is a certeyne proposition concerning the nature of God, namely, that *God is such a one,*  
as he

as he should have bene, if he had had beginnunge of himselfe. Which assertion of yours how well it becommeth the honour of God, let every sober Reader judge. For you affirme that God is of such a nature, as should be existent, upon supposition of a thinge impossible; namely, *The taking of beginnunge of being from ones selfe.* By the way I observe, that though you maynteyne God to have no beginnunge of beinge, yet you deny him to take beginnunge of himselfe; and therby distinguishe betweene such thinges upon the confusion wherof alone, the plausibilitie of your former discourse did wholly depend. For whereas Aristotle maynteyned that the World was without beginnunge; and the ancient Philosophers before him were of opinion, that the matter præjacent, wherof the World was made, was without beginnunge, you shaped their opinions in such sort, as if they had affirmed, that the World tooke beginnunge of it selfe, or the præjacent matter wherof the World was made, tooke beginnunge of it selfe, which indeede is most absurd; yet not their opinion but your fiction; the lesse was your ingenuitie in pinninge such a conceyte upon them: though I confesse, it served your turne well, this corruption of their opinion wrought by you, being your best argument to strengthen your discourse. By the way I observe, you make God to be the sole Maker of all thinges, yet I never founde you to acknowledge God to be, the sole Author, or so much as Author of faith and repentance.

---

CHAP. III.

*Of Infinity of Eeing, or of absolute Infinity and the right definition of it by Ancient Philosophers.*

**B**EFORE you come to your Philosophicall Divinitie, you are pleased to acquaint us with some Logicall formalities. You dispute that there is no *medium* betweene *nihil* & *aliquid*, præsupposinge that some Answerers in the Schooles, though

though fewe, would make choise to affirme a *medium* betweene these. You say to finde a *medium* betwixt them by abnegation, is as hard as to assigne a space or vacancy betweene a line and a point that terminates it. And this is a very harde matter I confesse, even as harde (to requite you in your owne Rhetoricke) as to finde a space betweene a part of a line and the point that joynes it to the other part. To this you resolutely adde, that *what name soever we propose, unless it have some degree or portion of entity answeringe to it, we may justly say, It is just nothinge.* But this to my understanding is untrue. For to the name of God no degree or portion of entity is answeringe, but rather entity, without degree or portion. It may be you understande this part of your discourse as well as the former, of the names of entities create in distinct on from God the entity increate. For forthwith you confesse, that *these reasons notwithstandinge though they firmly holde in secular disputes of predicamentall or numerable entities, yet the infinite essence comes not within this division.* So then God, is neyther *aliquid*, nor *nihil*. And therefore it is not so hard to finde a meane by abnegation betweene these, as to assigne a space betweene a line and a point that terminates it; unless you will say, that to acknowledge a God is as hard, as to acknowledge such a space or vacancy. As then God is not nothinge, so he is too excellent, you say, to be comprehended under the name of some thinge. And indeede the word *Aliquid* signifieth a part of quidditie, or entity, which cannot be affirmed of God, neyther in respect of created quidditie; For in that respect, he is verily *nihil*, and not at all *aliquid creatum*; Nor in respect of quidditie increate; for that hathe no parts; and if it had, God shoulde be rather all that quidditie, then a part of it. And thus we may say that *aliquid* and *nihil* are not contradictories: if they were, it coulde not be avoyded, but God himselve must admitt the denomination of one of them. But if it be farther objected, that God is *aliquid* in respect of quidditie or entity, neyther create nor increate in speciall, but considered in common to them both. So also it may be denyed that God is *aliquid*, or a part of such entity or quidditie, scinge

feinge no entitie, is common to create and increate entities. For entitie is no univocall Genus, fitt to comprehend God & his creatures; though some subtle inventions have bene on foote brought in by some to justifie that the word *ens* dothe univocally comprehend God and his creatures. But you seeme not to approve of such speculations. For as much as you deny him to be a numerable part of entitie; and if he were a *species* of *ens*, he might well be numerable with the other *species* therof. Therefore I thinke it needeles for me to undertake the disproovinge of Scotus his reasons, though curious ones, whereby he proves the univocation of the word *ens* in respect of God and his creatures. It shoulde rather have bene your taske, who undertake a discourse of this nature, which for my part, I had never medled withall, had it not bene for some pieces of corrupt Divinitie, which you patch on in some places to this your Philosophy. Yet by the way we are to consider, that althoughe the word *aliquid* be an unfit denomination of God, yet *ens* is not, which thoughte it be not univocally attributed unto the Creator and the creature, yet usually it is analogically. God may well be sayde to be an *ens independant*, and upon whome all other *entia* doe depende. You farther proceede to give a reason why the Latine word *ens*, is not fitt to denominate God, so to make the Divine nature a meane by abnegation, not only betweene somethinge, and nothinge, but also betweene *ens* and *non ens*. For the word *ens* you say, out of Mirandula, hath the forme of a concrete. And every concrete hath his name from that nature wherof it participates; as *hot* from that, which participates of heate; *white* is such a nature as participates of whitenes. But God cannot be sayde to participate of essence. In this I finde some defect. First, because you doe not shewe, howe *ens*, which you call a concrete is divided, (as concretes are) into a part materiall participating, and a part formall participated. In a word, you doe not once offer to resolve *ens* into the parts of its signification. Secondly, there is litle congruity betweene *ens* that which hath beinge, & *hot* or *white*, that which hath heate and whitenes. For that which hath whitenes in it, or heate,

heate, is a substance, or subject really existent, wherein the quality of heate or whitenes is founde. But the word *ens* admitteth no division comparable, or congruous herunto. For you cannot with sobrietie say, that *ens* signifieth a nature really existent, wherein essence is found distinct from the nature signified, or comming over and above unto it, as heate dothe over and above to the constitution of the subject. And therefore it followeth not, that because *hot* dothe signifie a subject participating of heate, therefore *ens* allso signifieth a subject participating of essence. A great deale of difference there is betweene concretes of accidentall denomination, and concretes of essentiall denomination. As *Homo* & *Animal*, which may be accounted concretes, in respect of such abstract notions, as are conceived under the termes of *Humanitas* and *Animalitas*. The specificall essence beinge constituted by the abstract notion, and not participating of it, as bodies participate of heate. The truthe is, all compounds doe properly admitt a concrete denomination, as in whome the *suppositum* (as *Homo* and *Animal*, differeth from the nature denominatinge it, as *Humanitas* & *Animalitas*. But in things not compounde it is not so, least of all in God. For though *Homo* be not *Humanitas*, yet *Deus est ipsa Deitas*. Aquin. 1 q. 3. art. 3. *De rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus; & ideo de Deo loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis ut significemus ejus substantiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita. Et utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus ejus simplicitatem. Quod ergo dicitur Deitas, vel vita, vel aliquid hujusmodi esse in Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem, qua est in acceptione intellectus nostri, & non ad aliquam diversitatem rei.* That God is one, by whome all things are, is true; but this description is litle congruous to the nature of God; in as much, as it could have no place before the creation, or in case the World had never bene created. Yet Gods nature is still the same. I cannot admitt that things created participate of Gods beinge. They have their beinge from God, I grant; but I cannot admitt their beinge to be any part of Gods beinge, or Gods beinge to have

have parts. Yet if all things are from him, howe can you avoyde, but that God himselfe shall be from himselfe. Vnles the Apostle helpe you in this discoursing, *In that he hath put all things under him, it is manifest that he is excepted who did put all things under him.* But be it so that all other things are from him; & then allso accidents as well as substances are from him, and can they participate of Gods being? Of accidentall beinge, I grant they doe participate and that from God, but not of Gods beinge. If so; howe much more must faith and repentance be acknowledged to have their production from God; which I much feare, you will be founde to deny, if not at first hande, yet at least in a second place, by maynteyning it in such a manner to be the worke of God, as upon condition of mans will; which in my judgement is in effect to deny that God is the Author of them. The name of God *I am*, openeth a fayre way to the expoundinge of a mystery, which you medle not with, contenting your selfe with ventinge of phrases, in settinge foorth the nature of God. The existence of all creatures may be accounted as a mere accident to their essence; for as much as all of them have *being* after *not beinge*; and from *being* eyther doe or may retorne agayne to *not beinge*. It is not so with God, who is everlastinge and that formally by necessitie of nature. So that wheras the essence of every creature abstract from existence, includes a possibilitie formally indifferent to *being* or *not being*, Gods essence includes a necessitie of *beinge*, an impossibilitie of *not beinge*. Your lines of amplification are eyther very wilde and without sense, or my wits are too shallow to comprehend them, the rest I cannot construe, the close I can, when you say the essence of God is *the bond of all things that can be combined or linkt together*. I can construe these wordes, but not comprehend their meaninge. The combination of things together, you understand, it seemes in affirmations & negations. Nowe that Gods essence shoulde be the *copula*, wherby the subject and predicate in all propositions, are linkt together, and that whether true or false; Holy or profane, may well passe, I thinke, for the tenth woonder of the world.

God only is by nature, all other things by the will of God. *I am that I am* saythe the Apostle, but *by the grace of God*. God only is in such sort as that his existence is his essence, we are in such sort, as that our existence is not our essence. For sometimes we were not; and if it pleased God, we might cease to be. But yet we live and moove, and have our beinge, & all in him. I cannot admitt that Angells participate of Gods essence, or that God communicates his essence to any, but to his Sonne. They, as all other things, have their essence from God, but not his; Yet are they according to the Image of God. Other creatures may have *vestigia* footestes of God. In the reasonable nature alone is found the Image of God; I say the Image of God, but not the essence of God.

2. Whether Angells are creatures, and consequently of a finite nature, no Christian makes question. But as touching their nature, understanding, place, and motion attributed unto them, they are such secrets and mysteries unto me, that I have no heart to medle with them. The Scriptures, tell us, that a Legion of divells were in one man; and of the good, that the Angells of litle children doe allwayes behold the face of God their Father. But touching the nature of God, to say that his *indivisible unitie*, comprehendeth all *multiplicity* is an ambiguous speeche; both because multiplicitie is found in evill as well as in good; and the phrase of *includinge*, to my thinking, inclines to signifie, comprehension formall rather then vertuall. As for Senecaes sentence, which you so much magnify, as if we could not say more of him in fewer words, I judge to be an unwoorthy speeche to denote the nature of God, as indeede more false then true, or rather false throughout, and voyde of all truth. And why shoulde we expect any tolerable description of the nature of God from an heathen man, and from a Stoicke, as Seneca was. So Lucan, *Deus est quodcumque vides, quocumque moventur*, out of the mouth of Cato Uticensis, a man of Stoicall profession, as Seneca was. And such sayings as these, *Deus est totum quod vides, & totum quod non vides*, favour horly of an Atheisticall opinion, of such, as being ignorant of the nature of the true God,



God, deified the nature. And commonly their severall Gods denoted only severall parts of the World, as Vesta the Earth, Iupiter the ayre, Baal or Bel, and as some say, Hercules, Tyrius the Sunne. Yet severall Nations, like enough had their severall opinions, but all concurring in this, namely in adoring the creature, and specially all the host of heaven, in steede of the Creator. And then withall they had an universall Deitie, whome they called Pan, representing the whole Vniverse. And according to Platonicall opinion, God was accompted *Anima Mundi*. And thus with them, God was *Totum quod videt, & totum quod non videt*. Yet I may well grant, that more coulde not be sayde in fewer wordes, but this is in the way of falshood, and not in the way of truth. The best construction, that can be made of it, is to say that God is the Author of all that we see, and of all that we doe not see. Yet this was not the opinion of the Stoicks, of whose profession Seneca was. For though he did believe the World was made, as Aristotle professeth in his bookes *de Celo*, it was the opinion of all that went before him: Yet Lib. 1. did he not believe, that it was made out of nothing, but that cont. 102. the matter wherof the World was made, was eternall. Therefore they did not believe, that God was the Author of all, both of that we see, and of that we doe not see. Your selfe confesse, they conceived the matter to have bene coeternall with him, and not so only, but *able also to overmatch the benig- nitie of his active power by its passive untowardlines*. Agayne I doe not finde, that any of them maynteyned, that immateriall substances were made by God; for then they shoulde all be made out of nothing. For Angells consist not of materiall extensions. And it was their generall voyce that nothing coulde be made out of nothing.

3. The analogy you speake of, is without all proportion. For the picture of a man, though it be no true man, yet it may be a true picture; and whether a true picture or no, yet undoubtedly it hath a true beinge, though imperfect, in comparison to the beinge of a man. And therefore hereence to conclude, that *no creature truly is*, is without all proportion:

Man indeede is but the Image of God, as some things are the Images of men: Whence it followethe; as the Images of men are not men, so man the Image of God is not God. But to inferre that therefore man is not in truthe, or hath no true beinge, hath no ground, no foundation. If the beinge of a creature is but the shadowe of true beinge, then humanitie (which is the beinge of a man) is but a shadowe of true humanitie, & brutality, which is the beinge of a beast, is but the shadowe of true brutality. And is it proper thinke you to say, that the truthe of all these are founde in God, to witt true humanitie &c. David and Solomon were types of Christ; but I never read, nor heard, that the creatures are types of the Creator. Effects they are, and the workes of God; and as the cause dothe shine in the effect, so Gods eternall power & Godhead are made manifest by his workes. Yet the types of Christ, were not types according to their essence, but according to their course of life and actions. And yet the very actions, wherby they represented Christ, were true actions in themselves separate from typicall signification; though the actions of Christ or office of Christ, were of farre greater dignitie and price then were the actions of men which represented him. Before the World was made, this proposition was true, *God alone is*, and he could agayne make it true if it pleased him, by turninge all things into nothing, from whence they came. But nowe other things all so are. Otherwise there could be no place, eyther for the name of creatures, or for the representation of God in them. And howe can that be sayde not to be, or not truly to be which as you say, participates of Gods beinge? It is true, God alone is in such sort, as whose essence and existence are all one. For as much as possibilitie in him is mere necessitie, not so in any creature; as who all were not, before they were, and agayne may returne to nothinge, if so it please him that made them, to dispose of them. What is that ancient Philosophy of the heathen you speake of, and howe well it accordes with this, I knowe not. As touching the nature of God, I knowe no such discourses superior, if equall to the discourse of Aristotle

Rom. i. 20.

Lib. 12. c.

3. cant. 39.

in a ccr-

in a certeyne chapter of his Metaphysicks. Your text, *I am God and there is none besides*, is faire short of congruities with your present discourse. For will it followe that because *there is no God, besides him*; therfore there is nothing that hath any true being besides him?

4. It is incredible that the Stoickes or any other, helde *nothing woorthy the name of essence, which was not αὐτογενής*. Such speeches rather make men unworthy to be esteemed of any facultie of witt. But what thinke you? is God αὐτογενής? Cap. 1. n. 4. Have you forgotten the diversitie of errors, which in the former chapter you mentioned out of Austin, the last whereof was, to conceive that God could beget himselfe? Yet if αὐτογενής shall be the propertie of God, as your selfe confesse by Plotins Philosophy (you might as well have sayde by the Philosophy of Heathens that denyed creation out of nothing) there shall be many Gods, even as many as there be immateriall substances, which they called *minde* or *Intelligences* from their nature; but from their office we call *Angells*. But this error, you say, was easy to be checkt, *If the favourers of it had bene put in minde, that these their demy Gods, by necessary consequence of this opinion, must have bene acknowledged infinite in beinge*. So that had you lived in their dayes, you had easily brought of not Plotin only but Aristotle also & all others from this point of heathenisme. For necessary consequences all must yeilde unto, especially if the consequence be perspicuous also, as you seeme to suppose, by the litle or rather no light you give unto it by force of argument. For oportet, ut lancem ponderibus, ita animum veris & perspicuis cedere. And seinge Intelligences, if made, must needs be made out of nothing, which I am perswaded you will not deny, hence it followeth, that you could evidently convict all those Philosophers of error in denyinge the Creation. Yet shall not you by this your confidence any way hinder us, from givinge God thanks, for bringing us acquainted with his word, and givinge power unto it by his Spirite, to make us by faith to believe that the world was made, and that the things Heb. 11. 3. that be,

that be, were not made of things that doe appeare. But of this your confidenciary consequence we have discoursed enoughe in the former chapter. Touching the comparison betwene Plato, & Aristotle; or betwene Platonick and Aristotelick Christian, dothe any Aristotelick Christian deny, that immateriall substances have their dependance on God? If any man by Aristotles discourse, hathe bene withdrawne from acknowledginge this trueth, he ceaseth to be a Christian, and becomes an Atheist. The meanest Christian by light of grace knowes more then Aristotle by light of nature concerning God. So might Plato, if by tradition he receaved something derived from the Word of God, and believed, which Aristotle eyther receaved or believed not. Compare their achievements (if you please) by light of nature, eyther concerning the nature of God, or the knowledge of the World & the parts therof: that is consider what each affirmed, & what reason for his assertion each delivered, and thence consider whose abilitie deserves to be preferred. Plato with the rest maynteyned the World to have a beginninge, but the matter, wherof it was made, to be eternall. Aristotle maynteyned the World to be everlastinge. Zabarell thinkes he had better reason for this opinion of his, then Plato, and the rest had for that opinion of theirs. I am of Zabarells judgement in this. The eternitie of the matter is as absurde to us Christians, and as contradictious to the trueth of God, as the eternitie of the World. But supposing the eternitie of the matter, and denyinge the eternitie of the World, this brings foorth some proper absurdities over and above the former. The continuance of the World for everlasting is maynteyned by Plato as well as by Aristotle, herein cryed downe by others, in that maynteyninge it to have a beginninge, yet denyes that it shall have an ende. Plato maynteyned you say, the creating of immateriall substances, Aristotle denyed it: This was suitable with the opinion of Aristotle, who denyed the possibilitie of creation: that not suitable with the opinion of Plato. For if the World could not be made out of nothing, which Plato affirmed as well as the rest, why shoulde he thinke that Angels

gells could be made out of nothing. For if the more excellent nature could be produced out of nothing, why could not the lesser nature, such as matter is by the same power, be brought out of nothing? Agayne you say, Plato denied things sensible truly to be: Aristotle, we doubt not, professed the contrary, which of these opinions, I pray, is most agreeable unto reason? Is not the latter, and that both by the light of nature, and by the light of grace? Is it not true of us all, that *in God we live and moove & have our being*? And if our life be a true life, our motion a true motion, is not our being also a true being? especially, if as you say, all things that are, doe participate of Gods being. But let us come to Senecaes interpretation herof; *that is they put on a countenance of being for a time, being incapable of the stability, and soliditie of true being.* Marke, I pray, whether this be a sober speeche. For eyther the being of sensible things is a true being or no. You say a true being, then herin you shall contradict both, Plato and your selfe also: If not a true being, then seeing it is sayde that in this they continue not, it followeth that they want not so much continuance of true being, as continuance of such a being, as is no true being. Nay the Glossse corrupts the text, as I proove thus. They that want continuance or stabilitie of true being, sayle not in the want of true being, but only in want of continuance of true being: so that herby it must be confessed, they have true being, though they have litle or no continuance therin. Agayne it dothe not followe, that because they want continuance, therefore they are incapable of continuance. For cannot God preserve the Heaven and Earthe for ever if it please him? Yet these are sensible things. Agayne what meant eyther the Author or the Interpreter to say, that sensible things have no stabilitie of being; when in the opinion of Plato, the Heaven and Earthe were to continue for ever, as well as immateriall substances; especially if the continuance of those were by nature, of these only by grant, or Charter of their Maker. And of this we reade from you, of the other we reade not. I willingly confesse, the being of God cannot be communicated unto any, but by  
the

the Father unto the Sonne; and therefore I have already misliked, that you should maynteyne, that the Creatures doe participate of Gods beinge.

5. That Principle *Omnia unum sunt*, was the position of Melisus as well as of Parmenides. And though Simplicius dothe not double with you (for why shoulde you suspect that, especially feinge any man may erre and misreport anothers opinion without doublinge); but though he erred not, and Parmenides indeede acknowledged distinction (and no other liklihood but he did), yet this is farre from justifyinge that mysticall interpretation which you make of Parmenides his meaninge: allthough you positively deliver that Parmenides meant the same that Plato did, to wit that *Multitude of things visible is but the multiplyed shadowe of invisible independent unitie*. He spake Poetically, you Figuratively; which kinde of discourse, as I remember, Aristotle sometimes reprehended in Empedocles. But surely, eyther you mistake, or I; who rather thinke that sayinge to be delivered in respect of the matter, wherehence all things are derived; and not in respect of the Agent, who derives them. Sure I am, it may as naturally signifie respect to the matter, as to the Agent; yea and much more, and that for two reasons. First, because the matter wherof every thing consists, is of the essence therof, so is not the Agent. Secondly because all other things, besides the matter, came from the matter, in their opinion, but all other things besides the Agent, came not from the Agent. For the matter it selfe, in their opinion, proceeded not from the Agent, but was as eternall, as God himselfe. Nay nor all other things, besides the matter, came from the Agent; but some as it were in spight of the Agent, being overruled with the untowardlines of the matter, as your selfe but a litle before professed to be the opinion of the Stoicks. In Gods essence is only his owne being formally, ours vertyually and eminently, in as much as God can produce it, and exemplarily allso, but that, I confesse, is somethinge mysterious unto me, save that I conceive, it respecteth his understandinge, like as to be in him vertyually, respecteth his power, And I doubt not, but

not, but that the essence of God dothe represent unto him, all natures possible. But to say that this beinge of the creature in God, cannot be with safety committed to the creatures owne charge and custody, is a very wilde phrase, and as much as if you should say, Gods infinite wisdom, & power, and essence cannot be committed with safetye, to the creatures charge and custody: for nothing that is in the creature is formally in God; nothing that is formally in God, can be communicated to the creature.

6. Howsoever Aristotle had implied his witt yet without grace it had never ended in his happines. And yet I tell you, he hathe done strangely herein, and in my judgement to the woonder of the World, in so much that I may woonder, that you take so litle notice of it. But seeing he had only the booke of Gods creatures, whereabout to exercise his witt, & to reade God therein, and wherby his eternall power & Godhead is manifested; and you knowe, this booke is written in a woonderous hard language, and requires many yeares study to attayne to the understanding of it; & necessarily we must beginne with the knowledge of the creatures: Therefore no mervyle if he beganne with the knowledge of things visible; but thence he ascended to the discovery of things invisible. In his Physicks he discovereth unto us, a first moover; and he hathe Metaphysickes as well as Physickes; and in his 12. booke especially he discourseth of the nature of this first moover, and that unto admiration. He sheweth also the references of immateriall creatures unto him, and of materiall creatures unto them all. But as touching that reference which you glance at the reference of creation, he speaks nothing indeede therof. For he believed it not; but as touching the opinion then current with some, of the making of the World out of a prajacent matter, he gave himselfe to the utter disproovinge therof, in his 8. booke of Physicks. Vndoubtedly he gave himselfe to the contemplation of this (whatsoever you out of cunninge insinuate to the contrary, to make the better way, for the broachinge of your conceytes) yet never perceaved, *that the definition of infinity imagined by him in the*



divisibilitie of magnitude or succession of time, was but a measurable image of that true and solid infinity, to witt of God. We are reasonably well acquainted with the nature of God in the Schoole of Christ; yet have we not learned the Infinity of God to be such, as may fitly be resembled by the one, or by the other. To my understanding it is quite contrary, even by that definition of infinity which your selfe applaud in sayinge. *Infinitem est extra quod nihil est*, infinity is that without which nothing is. Nowe infinity in division of magnitude and succession is quite of a contrary nature, being such as *semper licet accipere aliquid extra*, we may allwayes take something without it, as when more and more divisions in magnitude may be still made, and more and more revolutions in time may still succede. And Aristotle might well deny that definition of infinity, which you propose. For by that definition, the uppermost spheare of the Heavens, might justly be accounted infinite. And other Philosophers, that proposed this definition, which you say was censoriously rejected by him, did as well as Aristotle understande *Infinite* only in quantity. And if you blame Aristotle, for this acception of the word, you must blame the rest as well as him. So that with all these that *maxime*, *infinitem est, extra quod nihil est*, signified, that an infinite body was such, as without which no body was, or no quantitie was, the meaning wherof I conceive might be this; No measure of quantitie could be imagined, that was not comprehended under infinite quantitie. Nowe we knowe, that no quantitie, or bodily dimensions are to be found in God, but altogether without him. Yet you seeme to attribute such a kinde of infinity unto God: for you would have the definition of *infinite* not to be appropriated to quantitie only, but to be simply and absolutely considered, as much as to say, it should comprehend that which is infinite in quantitie also. Yet we confesse, *immensitie* is one of the attributes of God, because he fillles all places, but yet by your leave, without all quantitie. Your comparison is very incongruous. For infinity in lengthe comprehends all lengthe formally; but will you say in like sort, that Gods infinity in

finity in being, comprehends all being formally? Is the being of a body of a man, of a beast in God formally? Exemplarily and virtually, or eminently they are in God; but so is not all longitude, in that which is infinite in longitude, but rather formally, and admitteth all denominations of lengthe. God dothe not admitt all denominations of beinge. Thus, say you, *did these Ancients feele after, and seeke the Lord*; whereas alas, they thought not at all of God in this their definition of *infinitum*, when they sayde, *infinitum est extra quod nihil est*. Aratus, I confesse, was farre more Theologicall, then most of them, when he sayde, that *in God we live and moove & have our beinge*; but this hath little correspondency with the former definition of *infinitum*. As sillily doe you conclude against Aristotle, as for the other Philosophers, when you say he came farre short of the trueth in sayinge *infinitum est, extra quod semper aliquid est*. For this is applied by Aristotle only to division in magnitude, and succession in time, not unto God, as neyther did the other Philosophers, which gave another definition of *infinitum*; apply that their other definition unto God, but all of them accorded in this, that *finitum* and *infinitum* were the differences of quantitie and of corporeall dimensions. And as for infinity of being, Aristotle had nothing to doe with that consideration in his Physicks, where he treateth of *infinitum*. For infinite applied to beinge, is a difference of *ens*, and so belongs rather in consideration to the Metaphysicks, whose subject is *ens*, then to the Physicks, the subject wherof is *corpus naturale*. To inferre infinity of being from no better ground, then those branches of infinitie, which consist only in possibility and succession, were a very sorry inference in my judgement, and little becomminge any grave divine. For by continuance of time, and succession of creatures in time, no specifick perfection is added; but only individualls of the same kinde succcede one another. The Angells themselves being to continue for ever, shall ever produce newe thoughts newe actions; but dothe this argue any infinity in them? By this manner of discourse, Aristotle had better reason to conceive of Gods infinity, then we Christians.

stians. For he maynteyned succession of time and of the parts of this World by individuall propagations, bothe without beginning and without ende, which we doe not: but as we knowe the World hath had a beginninge, so we believe it shall have an ende; And consequently the producing of more individuall substances shall have an ende. And wheras all Species, and individualls formerly produced, being put together, doe make up a number only finite, howe can this inferre, that God is infinite? especially if so be, more Species might be produced, then have bene produced. For eyther it argueth a greater power to produce more and more kinds of things, or no. If it dothe; then the producing of those that are produced, is no evidence of Gods greatest power. If it dothe not; then the number of things produced, were they double to that they are, or shall be, cannot evidence that Gods power is infinite. Agayne, seeinge God is yet in producing more and more, we can have no evidence herby of Gods greatest power, till he come to the ende of his workes: therefore as yet we have herby no evidence of his greatest power, or that his power is infinite, though perhaps the world may have, to witt, when God is come to the ende of his workinge. Yet when that time is come, wherein God shall cease from producinge newe, all his workes put together being but finite, howe can that consideration, evince a power infinite? Wherefore Hill that Atheist in his Philosophia Epicurea &c. maynteyned, that the World already made, was infinite; because it was fitt (as he thought) that an infinite cause should have an effect correspondent, and therefore, saythe he, the world must be infinite. To proceede a litle further; when the time shall come, that God shall cease to produce any newe thinge eyther in kinde, or individuall the particulars produced put together from the beginninge of the world to that day shall be but finite, and howe can this inferre a power infinite? Nowe all this discourse of yours proceedes, upon supposition, that all things are produced by God, and not only by course of nature; but by such a cause as was first created, and since maynteyned, and governed, and ordered by God, which truth

was nothing evident to the greatest Philosophers that ever were. And you well knowe that the creation of *materia prima*, was denyed by them all. And therefore I should conceive that the infinitenes of God, is rather evidenced by his manner of producing things, then by the number of things produced; as namely, by his creating of the World, & that of nothing. For if God hath the power to give beinge, unto that which hath no beinge, but only is capable of beinge (as put the case to a man or Angell) and that by his word & will, he is as well able to give being to any thinge conceivable, (that is capable of beinge,) by his word and will; and *Qui potest in omne possibile est omnipotens*. He that can give beinge to any thinge that is possible to be, he is Almighty.

Agayne, if God were finite in perfection of entity, then it were easy to imagine a more perfect thing then God; & then that allso should have an existence. For if the essence or existence of a nature lesse perfect shoulde be all one, how much more shoulde this be verified of a nature more perfect. And consequently, there shoulde be many Gods, one different in perfection above another.

#### CHAP. IV.

*There is no pluralitie of perfections in the Infinite essence, albeit the perfection of all thinges be in him. Of the Absolute Identitie of the Divine essence and attributes.*

**A**S for the argument, which you propose, *We must either allowe the Gods to have bodies, or deny them sense*, because sense is never founde without a body. I see no great cause to mislike it; especially if it be rightly proposed, as it may be, thus, because sense (to witt in proper speeche) cannot be founde without a body. For is not sense an organically facultie, that is such a facultie as cannot exercise its function

without materiall instruments? How you dispute in justifying your censure upon this argument, let the Reader judge. God the supream Artificer can make *Virtus formatrix*, (you say) doe more then Epicurus can by all his sense and reason; and hence you conclude, that therefore God hath both sense and reason. Whereas you may as well proove that God hath bodily substance in him, both because he setteth *Virtus formatrix*, on worke in producing bodies, and can doe more then we can withall our bodies and soules. Therefore if you please, you may in confidence of such illations, proceede to say that God consists of a body, and soule too. The Psalmists Philosophy is a poore ground for you to builde on. For you may as well conclude out of the Psalmist, that God hath eyes, and

*Psal. 34. 15.* *are over the righteous, & his eares are open unto their prayers. The*  
*Psal. 118.* *right hand of the Lord is exalted, the right hand of the Lord hath*  
*96.* *done valiantly.* And if you are pleased to attribute sense unto God, why doe you not attribute unto him feeling, and smelling, and tastinge also? Whatsoever we come to understand by our five senses, why may not God understand the same without sense, as well as Angells. That God only is, and all things numerable are but mere shadowes of his beinge, are your owne principles and phrases; & to drawe conclusions from such groundes, is to builde Castles in the Ayre. You thinke to helpe it by sayinge, that *Hearing sight and reason are in God according to their ideall patternes or perfections*, you might have taken in three senses more as well, and have sayde that *smelling, tastinge and feelinge are in God according to Ideall patternes and perfections*; and justify Epicurus too, in mainteyninge that the Gods have bodies. For thoughte our Saviour sayde, *a Spirite hath not fleshe and bone*, yet you knowe howe to justifie that bodies and soules, and fleshe and bone, and braynes and senses, yea and the basest thinge that is, are in God, to witt, *according to their ideall patternes and perfections*. For we make no question, but that all these things are knowne to God, and he is able to produce them, (& no more doe you require in the next Section unto this, that *all things*

are in God;) yea *materia prima* and all). And this conceyte of yours you prosecute, with a great deale more Rhetoricke then Philosophy or Logicke. Certainly not to be, and not to have operation, are farre more different betweene themselves, then *nihil agere*, and *otium esse*. For these are formally the same, the other are not. For like as, to be, and to worke, are in themselves manifestly distinct, so must be their negations also; so are not *nihil agere*, & *otium esse*.

2. Your affectation of phrasifyinge, more like a Rhetorician, then a Philosopher, makes you overlashe and cast your selfe upon resemblances without all proportion. As when you say, *all things are in Gods power, as strengthe to moove our limbes is in our sinewes, or motive faculty*. Now in this, I say, is no proportion. For seinge all things are in God because he can produce them, so strengthe (by just proportion) should be in our sinewes, because our sinewes could produce it, which is palpably untrue. You shoulde rather say, as the motion of our limbes is in our sinewes, or in our motive facultie rather, because our motive facultie can produce such motion. Yet this were a very strange resemblance taken at the best. For it is nothinge strange that our motive facultie shoulde moove our limbes; but that God, shoulde produce all things out of nothing, is so wonderfull strange a thing, that the most learned Philosophers could never digest it, and the H. Ghost imputes it unto faithe that we believe it. Here *Hebr. 11. 3.* you confesse that sense cannot be without a corporall organ, whence it followeth manifestly, that if sense be in God, then also corporall organs must be found in God. And agayne you confesse, that what we feele by sense, he knowes much better without sense: how little then did it, become you to professe, that *he argued like himselfe* (that is fortithly belike) *who sayde, we must either allowe the Gods to have bodies, or deny them sense?* I make no question, but that the Divine essence represents the natures of all thinges: For by knowing himselfe, Divines say, he knowes all thinges. But is this representation only of natures extant as you speake? If so; how did he knowe all thinges before the World was? howe shall he knowe

he knowe all things , after that the World shall cease to be, some natures only reserved. How varietie sets foorth the unitie, as you speake, I am to seeke; yet the variety of Gods creatures, by your leave, is not infinite.

3. Of the questions proposed by you, let the Reader judge, as they deserve; as allto of your solution of them, & of your more accurate and exquisite distinction of universalitie, and totalitie, then the Platonicks ever attayned too, you distinguishinge it, not only from that totality, which ariseth from aggregation of parts, but from that also, whose extent is not more then equall to all the parts: which last member, I confesse, is very curious, to witt, that there shoulde be a totalitie more then equall to all his parts; and I litle woonder that the Platonickes, were not acquainted with this subtile curiositie. Gods nature we acknowledge to have no parts, but yet conteynes all entities, not formally, but virtually, or eminently and exemplarily; which eminent comprehension is equivalent to a formall comprehension of all (if possible) though the number of them were infinite; but not greater, because a number cannot be imagined greater then infinite. Exhaustinge by particulars derived from them, belongs to natures that conteyne the particulars formally; as a bushell of wheate by subtraction of graynes may be exhausted, it belongs not to natures, that conteyne particulars eminently. To say that God is being it selfe, or perfection, dothe not exclude pluralitie in my judgement, and that for this reason. Humanitie is humanitie it selfe, yet this hindereth not, but that many thousands may be partakers of humanitie. In like sort, though divine perfection be perfection it selfe, yet this hindereth not, but that many may be partakers of Divine perfection. But you speake, I confesse, of pluralitie in the nature of God, and that in respect of attributes reall, not of denominations personall. For pluralitie herof undoubtedly you doe not deny. Now to say that God is all perfections eminently, dothe no way hinder his formall unitie; as likewise his formall unitie dothe nothing prejudice his perfectious eminent pluralitie.



4. I see no cause for this distinction of yours, concerning Ideall perfections, & internall perfections. For if you understand ideall perfections of perfections externall and possible to be created by God, but from everlasting represented unto God by his essence; there is no cause why you should exclude the pluralitie of these from the essence of God. For what Divine can doubt, but that as the perfections of created things are many, so they are all knowne by God, and from everlasting were represented unto God; and pluralitie of finite perfections represented unto God, and knowne by him, dothe no way hinder the unitie of Gods infinite essence, no more then it hinders the unitie of our soules essence, such as it is. But if you meane it not of Idea representata, but representans; so I grant, there is but one in God, as there is but one essence, which essence of God represents all entities, and quiddities possible. But the argument which you use to proove this unitie in God, is neyther congruous, nor sound. Not congruous, because it tends only to this, namely to proove that God is illimited and infinite; as much as to say, that all kinde of entities are comprehended in the nature of God; but whether they are so comprehended, as with distinction of pluralitie, or without, that is another question, to the clearing wherof, you conferre nothing for ought I yet perceave. You demaund, if Gods beinge be absolutely illimited, *what could limit or restrayne it from being power, from being wisdom, from being goodnes, from being infinitely whatsoever any thing that hath being is?* I leave the congruity of your last phrase to be justified by your selfe. I dare not say, that God is whatsoever man or beast is. But touching your interrogation, I say, it is nothing to the purpose. For the question in present is not, whether Gods being be bothe life and power, and wisdom, and goodnes, and whatsoever any thinge is, which is your phrase, not mine: But the question is, whether all these are one in God, or more, that is, whether his life be his power, and both, his wisdom, and all these his goodnes, and every thinge els, that any creature is, whose beinge also (as you say) is infinitely in God. Not whether

K

all these

all these things are in God, but whether all these are drawne to an unitie in God, without all pluralitie? If you frame your argument in another fashion to helpe this, as thus; *What hindereth Gods life from being his power, and wisdom &c.* I answered that the formall notions of these is sufficient to hinder it, except you can give some better reason to the contrary, then h therto you have done. A second incongruitie I finde in your discourse and that is this. That question, the decision wherof you meditate in this chapter, arose from that which formerly you maynteyned; that all things were in God, in a kinde of Ideall, and transcendentall manner, nowe your selfe have confessed that Ideaes were of substances, if not only of them. For your wordes are these, *If Plato meant that there were as many severall Ideaes eternally extant, whether in the first cause of things, or without him, as there were substances specifically distinct, &c.* But here you give instance only in such things as are of accidentall notion and denomination with us, such as are life, and power, and wisdom, and goodnes. Lastly, I have allready shewed that this argument of yours is not sounde, wherby you proove Gods being to be illimited, because forsoothe it is independant: As if this consequence were evident of it selfe, wheras on the contrary, all Philosophy is against it. For Aristotle maynteyned the World to be independent; all others maynteyned the matter wherof the world was made to be independent: Yet none conceived, that herchence it woulde followe, that eyther of them was therfore illimited, or at all illimited. That Gods attributes are not really distinguished, we all confesse, you neede not have brought in Aulins authoritie to justify this. But you take upon you to confront Atheists by evidence of demonstration wherin you fayle very much. For it will not followe, that if these attributes be distinct among themselves, or from the essence of God, then the Divine essence is limited. Like as on the contrary, it will not followe, that if the essence of something be limited, the attributes therof must needes be distinct from the essence. For the soule of man is limited, yet some have maynteyned that the faculties of the soule are

not really distinct from the essence of the soule, as Scotus, & that by shrewde arguments. And Zabarell professeth, that *Intellectus practicus* is all one with *Voluntas*. And albeit the power of God be distinct from the wisdom of God, yet if bothe be acknowledged to be infinite, each in his kinde, what prejudice is this to the infinitenes of Gods essence? Neyther will it followe, that one attribute shall want so much of infinite being in his kinde, as another hath of proper being distinct from it; consideringe that these notions are of different kindes. As for example, if a body, as put the case, the outward heaven, were infinite, there shoulde be bothe infinite lengthe, and infinite breadthe, and infinite thicknes, neythers infinitenes being any whit prejudiciall to the infinitenes of the other, because they are of different kindes. And what colour of reason have you, why infinitenes of power should prejudice the infinitenes of wisdom, though they were distinct really, which yet we believe they are not. And what thinke you, if some attributes be founde answerable to personall distinctions in the Trinity? Is it not commonly sayde that the second person in Trinity is the wisdom of the Father, and cometh from the Father *per modum intellectus*; and that the H. Ghost proceedeth from bothe *per modum voluntatis*? But I have no edge to looke into the Arke, or suffer my disputation to trenche upon these mysteries. Yet I confesse, though the Father be not the Sonne, nor the H. Ghost, &c. Yet they are not really distinct one from the other. In the Trinity there is *alius & alius*, not *aliud & aliud*. But you maynteyne that Gods power is his wisdom, &c. which yet notwithstanding I mislike not, but only doe question the argument, wherby you endeavour to proove it, and to my judgement it seemes very superficiall. But my comfort is this, if you weakely maynteyne the nature of God, you will as weakely oppose the grace of God. Agayne I say, it will not followe, that if the severall beings of wisdom and power were distinct, and not identically the same with the essence of God, then the essence should not be infinite. For it may be sayde that the essence is infinite in a being substantiall; the power and wis-

dome of God are infinite in a being accidentall, though such as necessarily flowes from the nature of God. Indeece if it were prooved, that there is no accident in God, then the case were cleere, that these attributes were not distinct from the essence of God, as indeede they are not; but this is more then hitherto you have prooved. And till you have prooved it, they may be conceived as distinct from the essence (as before hathe bene sayde) without any prejudice to the infinity of Gods essence, or danger of expoling it unto nakednes, for ought your discourse, hathe as yet alleaged to the contrary.

5. As for that definition of a thing absolutely infinite; *Infinitem est, extra quod nihil est*, which you make so much reckonning of; I take it to be a wayne conceyte; considering that the Philosophers who urged it, never made any such construction of it, as you doe; but applyinge it only to materiall bodies of quantitie and extension, maynteyned that in this sense the World was infinite. But Aristotle dothe not approve of such a notion of infinite, as nothinge agreable with the denomination; the world being finite rather then infinite in his opinion; and yet as they all thought, without the world nothing was. Yet some in my knowledge have avouched the world to be infinite, though I nothing commend cyther their learninge, or their honestie herein. And in those former dayes *finitum & infinitum*, were taken only for materiall differences of bodies nothing at all belonging to immateriall natures, abstract from bodily or materiall extension of parts. And Zabarell (as I remember) observes as much (as touching the opinion of Aristotle) upon the last chapters of the eighth booke of Physicks. And howe farre foor the *infinitem* is to be acknowledged in nature, Aristotle in his Physicks hath discoursed. Now in the sense before spoken of, it is very absurd, to attribute such a definition of infinity unto God, who is not only a Spirite but the Father of Spirits, and incapable of parts, much more of extension in any materiall manner. But let the wordes be shaped after such a construction as you devise to make the definition suitable to the nature of God; to witt, as if he were such an entitie, as comprehendes all entitie.

titie. I say it is manifestly untrue. For is not the World & all the parts therof, from Angells unto the basest woorme that creepe he, and drop of mire, or sparkle of fire, or the least cinder; are not all these something, and that *extra Deum*? For though eminently they may be sayde to be in God, yet undoubtedly they are *extra Deum* formally; and to my understanding it is absurde to say, they are identically conteyned in Gods essence. It is true that Gods essence dothe represent them. For God knowes them not, but by knowing of himselfe and his essence, and beinge of infinite power, can produce any thing that implyes not contradiction. I cannot represent a fit comparison: but such as the creature can afford if you give me leave to make use of, I say that every thing which a glasse represents, is not identically conteyned in the glasse, neyther is it true, that whatsoever is knowne by the understanding of man or Angell, is identically conteyned in the understanding or spirite of man or Angell. As I have sayde, so I say agayne; I see no evidence of that consequence you make thus; *God is illimited, therefore all things are in God*; and therefore allso, *all things that are in God, or are attributed unto him are all one*. That which you adde, when you say, *whatsoever is incapable of limit, is incapable of division or numericall difference*, is very ambiguous; and the ambiguitie being cleered, will proove partly to be without all question, and nothing to the purpose, partly as questionable as ever, where it is to the purpose. For that, that which is infinite in essence, must be one and not many, I thinke is without question even amongst Atheists nowadayes, that have any learning in them; although a man may fayle in the demonstration of it, as here you doe. For to be infinite in essence, is to comprehend all specificall entities not numericall. For such, as such, differ not in essence. And for it to be multiplied according to numericall differences only, seemes nothing prejudiciall to the infinitie of the essence, save only as infinity of essence is corruptly conceaved to imply quantitie. Infinity of power dothe more evidently include opposition to numericall pluralitie, then infinity of essence in my judgement. But be it, not only

without question, but also supposed to have bene made evident by some demonstration of yours, yet is it nothing to the present question. For the question in present is not, whether there may be two Gods: but only, whether in the one nature of God, there be not things different; to witt whether Gods wisdome be not different from his power, and both these different from his goodnes; that is in a word, whether there be not any accident in God. And yet, unto this question you are arrived, but in a very indecent, and incongruous manner. For wheras before you had undertaken to proove, that all things were in God accordinge to ideall perfections, by all things understandinge substances cheisly, as of Angells, and men, and beasts of all sorts. And in this chapter doe undertake to shewe, that all things thus being in God, are not in him by way of pluralitie, but drawne to unitie: and accordingly should herby proove, that the essence of an Angell, and the essence of a man, yea and the essence of a beast, and of every base thing is so in God, as one with him, and one with every thinge: You shift of from this, and in the place therof only mention, how Gods life, and wisdome, and power, and goodnes are all one in God. And this you proove only from this, that God is illimited; which is as sory a consequence as that, wherby you proved his illimited condition, to witt from this, that he is independent, and received not his being from any thinge. Which consequence of yours, is so farre from naturall evidence, that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of olde, who maynteyned cyther the World, or the first matter (not to speake of Intelligences) to be independent of any efficient cause, and without all makinge, yet did never conceive that hence it must followe, that cyther of them should be infinite. No lesse inconsequent is that, which followeth also, as when you say, *Whersoever it can be truly sayde, this is one and that another, or this is, and is not that, each hath distinct limits.* I say this is untrue. For suppose a body were infinite; In this case bothe lengthe, and bredthe, and thicknes were infinite; yet lengthe were only lengthe, and not breadthe,

breadthe, yet never a whit the lesse infinite. Neyther is infinity in thicknes any hinderance to infinity in breadthe, though breadthe be not thicknes; nor infinity in breadthe, any hinderance to infinity in lengthe, though lengthe be not breadthe. In like sort the infinity of Gods power shoulde be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisdom, though his wisdom be not his power; Nor the infinitie of his goodnes, any prejudice to the infinitie of his power, and wisdom, though his power, and wisdom, and goodnes were different in themselves. But to come nearer; what thinke you of the Persons in the Trinitie? The Father is the Father, and neyther is he the Sonne, nor the Holy Ghost; will you here hence conclude that he is not infinite? The Sonne is the Sonne, but he is neyther the Father nor the Holy Ghost; will you therefore say, he is not infinite? The Holy Ghost, is the Holy Ghost, but neyther the Father nor the Sonne, will you hence inferre that he hath limits, and is not infinite? And is it not confessed not only by great Schoolemen, but even by our divines also, that the Sonne is produced of the Father *per modum intellectus*? Is he not the wisdom of the Father, and what difference betwene the wisdom of God, and the understanding of himselfe? And doe they not also confesse, that the H. Ghost proceedes from bothe *per modum voluntatis*? And as we say, Gods understanding is not his will, though it be no different thing from his will; and Gods will is not his understanding, though it be no different thing from his understanding, so we may adore the indivisible unitie of the Godhead, notwithstanding the Trinity of the Persons, though we are not able to comprehend the mystery herof. It is true, our understanding is such, as that, *oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari; & imaginatio non transcendit continuum*. Yet notwithstanding we attayne by discourse to the acknowledgment of things immateriall, as of our soules, yea and of Angells; yea and of the God both of men & Angells; yet not by materiall things as by the pictures of them, as you phrasify it, but rather



rather as in the effects; wherein as it were in glasses doe shine the causes of them. Thus Aristotle from the motions of the heavens hath inferred the existence of immateriall and abstract substances as the moovers of them. And we commonly say, that the World is as a glasse wherein the glory of God is represented. His eternall power and Godhead being made manifest by his workes, as the Apostle speaketh Rom. 1. 20. Of Gods illimited beinge we make no question; but well we may question the soundnes of your arguments, wherby you proove it, as also the soundnes of those consequences, which you make from it. And farre better it is to content our selves with the simplicitie of our Christian faith, in believinge of God, what Gods word teacheth us, then to depend upon weake reason for the confirmation therof. For weake reasons doe rather betray a cause, then justify it. We believe that God is one, and that there is no pluralitie of natures in him, but only of Persons. And we must take heede that the Metaphysicall extract of *vis unita fortior* (which you speake of) doe not so farre possesse us with the contemplation of Gods unity, as to deny the Trinity. And touchinge the attributes of God, as neyther distinct from the essence of God, nor from themselves, we doe not much affect curiosity of demonstration; but if any man voluntarily undertake such a taske, we looke for substance of sound proofes, and are not content to have our mouthes filled with emty spoones. You seeme to gratify God with your hyperboles; but surely he dothe not put us to tell any untruthes for him, as man dothe for man, to gratify him. You enterteyne a conceyte of Gods power, above all conceyte of infinite power; of Gods wisdom above all conceyte of infinite wisdom; of Gods goodnes above all conceyte of infinite goodnes. To be essentiall to the nature of God, is more noble, I grant, then to be accidental: but howe any power can be greater then power infinite, or any wisdom greater then wisdom infinite, or any goodnes greater then goodnes infinite, I cannot comprehend yet I verily believe, that whersoever infinite power, & infinite wisdom, & infinite goodnes is founde, that nature is not  
acciden-

accidentally but essentially both powerfull, and wise, & good, as namely the nature of God: thought of the evident demonstration thereof, for ought you have brought to helpe us herein, we may be still to seeke. As for succession, and extension, we holde that each is impossible to be infinite. And neyther of them any attribute of God, as power, and wisdom, and goodnes is. And therefore, the comparison you make of the nature of God in this kinde, must needs be wonderous wilde.

Yet I envy no man the delight that he takes in these and such like contemplations, but rather wonder that succession, and extension shoulde be reckoned up by you as excellencies and perfections conteyned in God, and that all these mentioned attributes layde out in severall, should have infinities added unto them. Much more should we have wondered, if the issue of your discourse had bene answerable to the original, which is to shewe, not how power, and wisdom, & goodnes are all one in God, which are with us of accidental denomination; but to shewe how every substance is in God, of Angell, of man, of beasts, of birds, of fishes, of woormes and every creeping thinge; and that all these are to be accounted excellencies and perfections. And surely they had neede to be in God, in a more excellent manner, then they are in themselves; otherwise their advancing so high, woulde be too great a degrading of the nature of God.

But to adde my mite of discourse, touching the being of all things in God, and the precise unitie of all things in God, which under a forme of pluralitie according to our conceytes, are attributed unto him. As touching the first, that all perfections are in God, is to be acknowledged without all controversy, because we understand by God such a nature, as nothing can be imagined better; and I approve of Aquinas his reason. Like as heate if it did exist of it selfe, it should comprehend all degrees of heate: so the essence of God being all one with his existence, that is he being essentially *Totus*, all perfections of being must necessarily be comprehended in him. But as for the perfections of being

which are founde without God, according to their severall rankes and kindes therein; as namely of being, without life, of being and life without sense, or reason; of being, life, & sense without reason, of bothe being, life, and sense, and reason: as they are not like unto God according to any univocall notion of Species, or kind, but only analogicall, which as Aquinas sheweth, is this, that God is entitie by essence, every other thinge is an entitie only by participation. So likewise their perfections cannot be sayde to be in God univocally, but only analogically, as the effect is sayde to be in the Agent, in as much as he hath power to produce it. It is true, some things are attributed unto creatures, which cannot be attributed unto God; and some things are attributed bothe to God, and to the creatures. As for example; God is not a body, man is a body; God is a spirite, an Angell is a spirite; God hath beinge, so have all things; God hath life, so have many things. God is wise, good, powerfull; these attributes are likewise conveniently given to men and Angells. Yet these denominations, in admitting wherof bothe God and creatures doe agree, are as different in respect of God and the creatures, as those denominations in the communion wherof they doe not agree. As for example the Spirituall nature of God is as farre different from the spirituall nature of an Angell, as from the bodily nature of man or beast, as being infinitely different from each. And therefore it is that some make the measure of perfections in the creatures not their approximation in nature unto God, but rather their remotion *a non esse*. One creature having more perfections of beinge then another, & consequently so much the more remooved from not beinge. But the creatures of greatest perfection being but finite are still infinitely remooved from God who is infinite. So that like as the bodily nature of man dothe not agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God; so neither dothe the spirituall nature of an Angell agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God. But God is equally an equivocall Agent in respect of bothe. And no mervyle; for the denominations wherein God and the

the creature agree, are commonly such as are of accidentall denomination unto the creatures; as when we say God is wise, and holy, and powerfull; a man or Angell is wise, and holy, and powerfull &c. But is there any colour why, the nature of God shoulde come nearer unto those things that are of accidentall denomination in us, then unto those that are substantiall; whereas every meane scholer knowes, that substances are more noble then accidents, and as for substantiall denominations wherein God, and the creature doe agree, if they be examined, it will be founde that in the resolution of the truth, the agreement will appeare to be only in negation. As when we say, God is a spirite, the negation of extension corporall and materiall, is the only thinge, wherein the nature of God agreeth with an Angell. Like as our Saviour intimates the description of a spirite in distinction from a man, to consist in this, that *a spirite hath not fleshe and bones.* And Luc. 24. as for the generall notion of entitie common to all, marke what a vast difference there is herein betwene God and the creature, and such as excludes all univocation. God is an entitie independant, and whereof all other entities depend bothe for their production, and for their preservation, and that out of nothinge, as touching the last resolution of them into their first principles. Let it suffice then, that all perfections are in God, and that they all are his one most pure and most simple essence. But as for created perfections, the word *created* is a terme diminishing *perfection*; but such as they are, they are in God only, as effects are in their causes, and they not univocall, but equivocall only, or at the best but analogicall. Let us come to the consideration of the unitie of Gods attributes, especially with Gods essence, whence it will followe, that an unitie of them is to be acknowledged amongst themselves. And the question wil come to this, whether there be any accident in God? Not that I have any edge to these Metaphysicall speculations; or that I thinke our language to be fitt for them, for want of termes of Art in common use to expresse such notions, as here must necessarily occurre; But only being provoked herunto by your discourse,

who here and there inculcate foule errors in Divinitie, & that depending sometimes upon these, or such like Metaphysicall contemplations.

Some therefore argue thus. If there were any accident in God, then there shoulde be some essence common unto God with complete substances create, to witt an essence supporting accidents. And if there were any common essence to God with other substances, then there were to be acknowledged something in nature before God; as the *Genus* is commonly accounted in nature before the *Species* thereof. And further, it seemes, that if any genericall nature were common to God and us, then some part of Gods essence should be found in us, and some part of our essence shoulde be found in God. Like as the essence of Animalitie being common unto man & beast, is found both in man and beast. And consequently, God creatinge substances, should create in part a certeyne common essence, which is founde in himselfe, and so the selfe same essence shoulde be bothe the Creator, and the creature. If to avoyde these dangerous consequences, it be replied that to support accidents is not of any essentiall denomination, but accidentall; as great absurdities seeme to followe on that part also. For if to support accidents be an accident, this makes way to a progresse *in infinitum* without end. For even this supportation of accidents, if it be an accident, must be supported by a substance and so without end. Agayne if to support accidents be an accident; it must eyther flowe from substance, in case it be an accident proper; or be brought from without by some agent, if it be an accident common. This latter cannot be admitted in respect of God. If the former be, then there must be acknowledged some common essence bothe to God and other substances, whence this accident flowes, and then we are, where we were.

Another argument may be conceived thus. It is commonly received, that every substance is more noble, and of greater dignitie then any accident. And therefore if accidents were to be found in God, some thinge shoulde be founde in God, more ignoble then his creatures.

If acci-

If accidents were to be found in God, then eyther they shall denote entities of perfection or imperfection. Impotible it is that any entitie of perfection shoulde be founde in God. For *Demonstrat quod nihil melius excogitari potest*. If of perfection, then it is the very essence of God and no accident, for as much as Gods essence is *Tota essentia*, which comprehendes all perfection of entitie. Like as heate comprehendes all degrees of heate.

Agayne an accident is compared to the subject, as an act to the power of receavinge it. But there can be no power passive in God: For as much as passive power is allwayes perfected by the act. And so the nature of God should admitt perfection from an accident.

Lastly, God is a Spirite, and therefore no bodily or materiall accident can be found in God; if any be found in him, it must be spirituall. Nowe as Aristotle saythe, there are but three sorts of things in the minde of man, and they are eyther faculties, or passions, or habits. Of these, passions are too base to be attributed unto God, and they are not severed from change. And as for habits, they suppose an imperfect nature, which is perfected by them, which cannot be verified of the nature of God. Nowe the faculties of God are eyther of understandinge, or of willing, which are operations immanent or of working without by operations transient. If it may appeare, that Gods facultie of understandinge is all one with the act of his understandinge, then it will thereby appeare that the facultie of the understanding is not distinct from the nature it selfe of God: considering, that albeit it is without question that the facultie of mans understanding is distinct from the act of his understandinge; yet some have questioned, whether the faculties of a mans soule be really distinct from the substance of the soule, and maynteyned that they are not, as namely the Scotists. But what neede we proceede further. Aristotle him selfe, that great naturalist hathe acknowledged the first moover to be *his life*, and *his intelligence*.

Yet consider in reason; If Gods essence and existence be all one; how much more his understanding facultie; and his actuall intelligence. For an understandinge facultie can easily produce the act of understanding; but essence cannot give it selfe existence. But essence and existence in God are all one. For if they were not; then eyther his existence should flowe from his essence; which is a thing utterly impossible. (For act cannot flowe from possibilitie; neyther can any thing be conceaved to be productive, unles it suppose existence.) Or existence must proceede from some exterior Agent that causethe it; Now this were to maynteyne some superior cause unto God himselfe; which hath the power to create him. In which case he should have something better then himselfe, which is flat contradict on to the nature of God, whome we conceive to be such, as nothing better then he can be imagined. But I willingly professe; I nothing like these curiosities, neyther did I ever give my selfe to this kinde of study before. There is no reason but may be shaken by wrangling opposition. Faith cannot.

**SECT.**



## SECT. II.

*Of the Severall branches of absolute infinity; or of the infinity of the Divine attributes as they are severally apprehended by us.*

---

### CHAP. V.

*Of Divine immensity, or of that branch of absolute infinity wherof infinitie in magnitude or space imaginary is the shadowe.*

**H**ENCE you drawe us to the speculation of the severall branches of absolute infinity; and first of Gods immensitie, which you premise unto Gods eternitie; wherof I muse not a little: considering that immensitie is an attribute denominating God in respect of creatures; and is not any otherwise considered by Schole Divines nor by your selfe neyther, but in this respect that he filleth all places. And therefore before the World was, and before there was any place to fill, he could not be sayde to fill all places. As for eternitie in being without beginnunge, that is an absolute attribute, and was ever verified of God. Perhaps you consider immensitie not as it signifieth his filling of all places, but as it signifieth his abilitie to fill all places. Yet this is in reference unto place, and we commonly confound Gods immensitie with his ubiquitie. Much lesse can I approve your Rhetoricke, as when you make infinity of space to be the shadowe of Gods immensitie. First because infinity of space is neyther existent nor possible to be existent, and to my judgement, such a thing seemes not fitt to be a shadow of that which is existent, such as you suppose the immensitie of God to be.

Secondly

Ira. 6 4.

Arist. phys.  
1. cont. 36.

Secondly immensitie of space is in respect of that quantity which is called *quantitas motus* quantitie of extension, and capable of division, but the immensitie of God denominates him, in respect of that quantitie, which is called *quantitas virtutis*, quantitie of vertue, incapable of extension or division. And therefore the one seemes no way fitt to be the modell of the other. Thirdly shadowes doe many times exactly represent the proportion of the thing shadowed; and if at some times they are farre lesse, at other times agayne, they are farre greater then the bodies which they represent, as when *the day declineth and the shadowes of the evening are stretched forth*, as the Prophet speaketh. And indeede you may well say that immensitie of space is even in this respect a shadowe of Gods immensitie. For immensitie of space is absolutely infinite; but Gods immensitie as it signifies his existence in all places, (neyther doe I finde it otherwise considered, eyther by Schoolemen or your selfe) is absolutely finite: For as much as all places put together are but finite, nor can possibly be any more then finite. But let us consider the particulars of your discourse. You tell us, that *our imaginations will hardly suffer infinitie to be severed from time and place*. This is a paradoxe to me. I had thought rather, it had bene farre easier for us to imagine time finite, and place finite, then eyther of them infinite. For it is a ruled case, that *infinitum quia infinitum non potest cognosci*; Yet you will have it so easy to be imagined, as that you make it a very difficult matter for imagination to apprehend eyther time or place otherwise then infinite. If you had avouched it of time and place indefinite, it had bene lesse distant from the truth; yet that also distant from the truth. For undoubtedly my imagination may conceive a time definite, as well as indefinite; As for example, it may as well conceive three yeares space of time, as well as more yeares space of time then three, without defining how much: the like may be sayde of place also. As for infinite time and place, as it is impossible that any such thing should be, so I promise you, I cannot conceive that it should be so easily (as you suppose) if possibly imagined. Yet you take  
upon

upon you to give a reason of so uncouth an assertion. But that proöfe is as inconsequent, as your former assertion was insolent. For though the sensible things cannot easily be separated in our understanding from place and time, yet when herehence you inferre, that place it selfe cannot be separated by the understanding from the immensitie therof; nor time it selfe from the eternitie therof, I finde neyther art in this consequence, nor any tolerable colour or shewe of reason to make it probable. And to the contrary (as I sayde) It is a ruled case that *infinitum quia infinitum non potest cognosci*. And therfore it is so ealie a thing to separate infinity from time & place; as it is impossible, that in the understanding of man it should be conjoynd with them. Yet this is not all the error of this your discourse. For the Antecedent is utterly untrue; as when you say, that sensible things when they are winnowed from the rest into the closet of the understanding, they still reteyne their circumstances of time and place. Whereas to the contrary it is undoubtedly true, that *Intellectus abstrahit ab hic & nunc*; the understanding considereth things abstract from time and place; and so dothe the imagination allso. Only this is the condition of the imagination, in distinction from the understanding, that *imaginatio non transcendit continuum*: It cannot consider things abstract from continuitie, that is from extension of parts: but from time and place it can abstract, how much more from the infinity of each. And surely each facultie were a sory winnower, if it could not separate the graydes of naturall things; from such grosse hulkes that inwrappe them. It is true we are apt to imagine a locall distance, beyond the utmost surface of heaven; but it dothe not herehence followe, that we imagine an infinite distance beyond it, but rather indefinite. And therfore we are apt to imagine a distance without the globe of Heaven, because we can imagine the globe of Heaven in as small a proportion as we list, even no bigger then one of the globes in our College Libraries. In like sort we may imagine time before the World; for who doubteth, but that it was possible that time should have bene sooner then it was & whereas

it is nowe about sixe thousand yeares since the World beganne; so if it had pleased God, it might have bene a thousand. But doe not you inferre herehence, that we doe imagine infinite time preceeding the World; for that is not helde to be possible as finite time is. But it is an easy leape, I confesse, in the error of a mans imagination to passe from time indefinite, to time infinite, and to take one for the other. To imagine a succassive duration of time much longer before the creation of the world, then hath bene the continuance of it since, is one thinge; but to imagine an infinite duration of time before the World, is another thing, and much different, yea infinitely different. Looking backe upon this discourse of yours to proove, whether it might admitt any other tolerable construction; I conceived your meaning might perhaps be this; not that place and time coulde not be conceived without the immensitie of the one, and the eternitie of the other; but rather that immensitie could not be conceived without place, nor eternitie without time. But upon serious consideration I doe not finde this latter interpretation to be any way congruous unto your text. For you playnly professe, that albeit both reason and faith drives us to confesse both time and place to be finite, yet our imaginations will hardly suffer infinity to be severed from them, which can admitt no other interpretation then that which I have impugned. That which you talke, of certeyne Schoole braynes puffed in passing this unsoundable gulf, and that so farre as to suspect, that God, who now is in every place of the world created by him, was as truly in these imaginary distances of place and time before the creation was attempted, is nothing but a bundle of mysteries unto me. For I never knewe any that offered to passe that unsoundable gulf, you speake of, otherwise, then by imagining it; and how their braynes were puzzled in giving way to this imagination I knowe not; much lesse doe I understand, how being puzzled in this imagination, they should herehence grow to suspect, that God was as truly in that imaginary distance of place as in things truly existent, and truly distant each from other. And most of all doe I wonder, what

der, what you meane to clap the imaginary distance of time, with the imaginary distance of place. For though I have read of some that discourse of *vacuum loci*, an imaginary distance of place, and mainteyne that God was and is therein; yet I never heard nor read of any man discoursing in like sort of *Vacuum temperis*, and mainteyninge that God was and is therein. And as touching the question, whether God be in *Vacuo* or in that imaginary distance you speake of; I have read the question propoled by Vasquius, and the opinion of some *Vasq. In 1. mentioned, who mainteyned that God was in Vacuo; but p. disp. 29.* very fewe; yet he reckonethe Cajetan for one; but whence dothe he fetch this opinion of Cajetan? not out of his Commentaries upon Aquinas his Summes, where is the proper place for a Schoolman to manifest his opinion herabouts; but out of his Commentaries upon Iohn. 1. v. 12. which makes me suspect the fidelitie of his relation or interpretation of Cajetan. The other which he mentioneth is *Major* upon the 1. of the sentences and 37. distinction. And since we are fallen upon it, I am willingly to conferre discourse with you herabouts. And first, I say, that Scripture and reason seeme to favour it. For King Solomon professeth *1. Kings 8.* that the Heavens of Heavens doe not conteyne the Lord: & likewise Iob sayeth of him, that *He is higher then the Heaven, Iob. 22.* and deeper then Hell; & certainly God is able to produce a body without the Heavens, and consequently in Vacuo; & herupon it seemes to some, that in good reason God should first have a being there, before he produceth any body there. And this is one reason of many, which Bradwardine useth to proove, that God is in Vacuo: (for that is his opinion) though Vasquius was not acquainted with him. Now by your leave, I will consider your reasons to the contrary. First you demand whether this locall distance be created or not? whether it be something or nothing? I answer, that certainly it is not created, as being just nothing yet so as that it is possible a body should be, where before was no body. As for example where now the World is, before the World was, was no body, yet was it then possible there should be a body.

So without the Heavens is no body, yet is it possible that a body should be without the heavens. You proceeded saying, If it be nothing, then they had an imagination of an infinite space which really was nothing; and we grant they had. For they helde it only an imaginarie space or distance. Further you inferre; If really nothing, then it could not be truly termed an imaginary space, before the World was created. A manifest inconsequence. For as men may imagine things that are not, so such things may be truly termed imaginary things which are notteall. And there is no such difference, as you avouche, betweene these two, *To imagine an infinite space*, and to say, that *There is an imaginary infinite space*. For whatsoever there is the imagination of an infinite space, there must needs be an infinite space imagined. And therefore as often as there is in man the imagination of an infinite space without the heavens, this is as much as to say, there is an infinite space imagined by man to be without the heavens. But I observe your subtiltie following. Before the heavens, you say, there could be no imagination of any such space; therefore there was no such space imagined. I answer; though before the heavens there was no man at all to imagine it, yet nevertheless was it imaginable, and now you confesse it is so imagined. And not only doe we imagine a *Vacuum* to have bene before the World was, but even since the World is, to witt, without the Heavens. And taking it aright, is not only nowe so imagined by us, but a truth that a *Vacuum* is without the heavens, and was before the world was, where now the world is. For the error of the imagination is to mistake in the right meaning of *Vacuum*. For commonly it is imagined under the notion of a space existent, whereas indeede it is rather the negation of a body existent, joyned with the possibilitie of a body to exist. So without the heavens is no space or body, yet possible is it, that a bodily space should be. Neyther is it required herunto, that it should be created by God; for only reall things are created by God, but the negation of bodies existent requires no creation, but rather the suspension of creation. You thinke the reality of this imagination to be

God,

God, whome the Hebrewes call *omnis* place; I rather thinke the realitie of it is a voydenes of a body or bodies with the possibility of existence of a body or bodies. Touching which possibilitie, if it be demaunded in what subject it is; I remember what answere Ioannes Grammaticus made to the like question, reported by Averroes on the 12. booke of Aristotles Metaphysicks, namely that it was in God, to witt fundamentally not formally. For I nothing doubt but his meaning was this. In God allone is found an almighty power to make the world out of nothing, whence it followeth, that before the world was, there was a possibilitie that the world should be, and the mere active power of God is sufficient to denominate this possibilitie. A possibilitie physcally or naturall requires a subject to support it, but a possibilitie logically not so, as being only *negatio repugnantia*, a want of repugnancy. And if God was able to make a world out of nothing, then surely it was no contradiction, that the world should be, and consequently the world was possible before it was. And yet to drawe a litle nearer unto you in this; I professe, I finde it more hard to maynteyne, that God is any where as in a place, then to maynteyne that God is in *Vacuo*. For marke howe Durand distinguisheth; Place, saythe he, is considered two wayes, eyther as a naturall thing, or as conteyning the thing placed therein. As it is a naturall thing, God is in every place, but as it conteyneth the thing that is sayde to be therein; so God is in no place *secundum se*, in respect of himselfe. For nothing without him is able to conteyne him; but in respect of his effects, he is in all places; because he is conteyned of nothing, but rather conteyneth all things, and preservethem. But in respect of his effects he is every where. For he filleth every place with his effects; & in this sense, it is proper to God to be every where. Herupon some may conceive that God may be called *omnis* place, because he conteyneth all things, rather then is conteyned. Yet we knowe that the continency of place is corporall, and ordinarily the place is more base then the things conteyned therein. But Gods continency is merely vertuall and spirituall, and in

Durand. in  
1. dist. 37.  
p. 1. q. 2.



dignitie infinitely beyond the most noble creatures. And we have no great cause to doate upon the Rabbines, whose Philosophy was never a whit better then their divinitie. Yet one thing more : The question was whether God might be sayde to be in *Vacuo*, and your discourse is only to deny, that there is any such infinite space as is imagined, eyther now to be without the heavens, or hertofore to have bene before the world was, but you take no notice of the Arguments made to the contrary, much lesse doe you take any care to answere any one of them. And yet to my thinking some are shrewde ones, and different courses are taken in answearing them; which argues that one mans answere gave litle satisfaction to another. I will therefore take this paynes in part for you, & represent the arguments of Bradwardine, who takes upon him to proove, that God is essentially and presentially every where, not only in the World, and all the parts thereof; but also without the World, in that *Vacuum* or site imaginary; & withall I will make bold to shewe you my judgement of them. His first argument is large; in effect this : God can moove the World by a direct motion further Eastward, or further Westward. Vpon this supposition he proceedeth thus. Eyther God was here before, whether the World is now mooved or no; Agayne, eyther God continueth there from whence the World was mooved, or no. If God was there before his motion thither, and continueth still where he was before the motion from thence, then it is manifest he was and is in *Vacuo*. But if from the time that the World mooved from hence, he ceaseth to be here, and upon the Worlds mooving more Eastward, he beginneth to be there, then God changeth his place with the world, ceasinge to be where formerly he was, and beginning to be where formerly he was not; and consequently God shall be mooved at the motion of the world, as the soule of man is sayde to be mooved, upon the motion of the body. But this seemes very uncouth to be attributed unto God, though some are content to swallowe it, not satisfyinge themselves in finding out a convenient answer. Others deny the supposition, to witt, of a direct motion

Bradward.  
Summa de  
causa Dei  
contra Pe-  
lag. lib. 1.  
cap 5. co-  
roll. 2.

motion competent to the world. But saith Bradwardine, to deny that God is able thus to moove the world, is to curtail the Almighty power of God; and therefore that opinion saythe he, is amongst the Articles which were condemned by Steven Bishop of Paris. Yet of those Articles it was woont to be sayde, *non transcendunt Alpes*, they doe not climbe over the Alpes; and we may as well say, they doe not goe a ship board to sayle over our narrowe Seas. In my judgement the supposition is unsound and the contrary rather true, namely that the world cannot be mooved Eastward or Westward; not thorough any impotency in God, who can doe all things that imply not contradiction; but by reason that this is such a thing as implyeth the contradiction, if it be well considered, and therefore is impossible. For it supposeth that without the world there is a space, consisting of parts, thorough some parts wherof more or lesse: the world may be mooved. But this is utterly untrue; for they themselves confesse, that the space they speake of is only imaginary. Nowe herehence it followeth that the motion thorough an imaginary space, must be only an imaginary motion, and no reall motion. Secondly we answere, supposing the motion true and reall and such a thing possible; that God is sayde to be in the world not *secundum se*, but *secundum effectus*, as before we had out of Durand, because with his effects he filleth all things, all places. Now though these bodies doe thus moove, & therewithall the effects wherwith he filleth them, yet he himselfe is not mooved; because himselfe, as himselfe cannot be sayde to be any where, but as in himselfe he was before the world was, so in himselfe he continueth to be still. His second argument is this: Suppose God create another world without the heaven; then eyther God is there, where he was not before, and so shall be changed in place; or if he were there before, then he was in *Uacuo*. I answere, that God may be in things, wherein he was not before, not because himselfe becommeth otherwise then he was before, but because things which before were not, now are; and God with his effects dothe fill all things and all places, as they have their beinge.

beinge, and ceaseth to fill all thinges, as they cease to have any beinge. In a word God is sayde to coexist, or not coexist with thinges anewe, not that he dothe eyther beginne or cease to coexist with them; but in respect that they doe eyther beginne or cease to coexist with him. His third argument is, that as many as deny God to exist in *Vacuo*, must be driven to deny that God could make the world bigger or lesse then it is. But we see no cause, why we should be cast upon any so absurd assertion. We grant that God could and can make a reall and spacious distance beyond the Heavens: but till God doth create such a distance, we deny that there is any such, though we deny not, but man may imagine such. Agayne he saythe we must be driven to maynteyne, that God necessarily made the world in the site. A. where now it is, and that before the world was made, there was no other site, but the site A. where now it is. But we say that before the World was, there was no site at all, not only no site different from the site A. but also not so much as the site A. neyther. And that to imagine any different sites before the world was, is to imagine distance of parts, where neyther any parts were, nor distance; though such distance of parts be imagined by us, like as Chimeras are, and such like fictions. Agayne he disputes thus: Except *Vacuum* be granted to have bene sometimes, the world was everlasting; I answere; *Vacuum* sometimes was; but the question betwene us is not about the existence of it (as such negations and possibilities may be sayde to exist) but only about the nature of it, to witt whether it conteyned any distance of parts as it is imagined after the forme of a positive thinge. This we deny, and doe maynteyne that *Vacuum* is only a voydnes of bodies with possibilitie of existence of bodies, not of existence of bodies therein, as in a space capable of bodies as it is imagined, but simply of their existence. His cheifest argument is this: when God created the world eyther he was there before he created it or no. If he were there before he created it, then he was in *Vacuo*. For before the creation was, nothing was without God, but *Vacuum*. If you say, God was not there before he created

created the world; this he say he is contrary to reason. But to my judgement it is contrary to all reason, to say that the differences of *fit*, as *here* & *there* were extant, before any thing was created. Well he prooves it thus; for say he, God must first be there, before he workes there. I answer; Gods workes are of diverse sorts; there is a worke of creation, a worke of preservation, and a worke of moving his creatures agreeably to their natures diverse and sundry wayes, as he thinks good. Now all other operations of God about his creatures, suppose his being in them, they being already created; but his creation doth not, much lesse doth it suppose his being there as in *Vacuo*. For to be in *Vacuo*, is as much as to say to be in nothing. Which I confesse is true of God taking it as a negative thus, God was not in any thing. The trueth is, all differences of place and site as *here*, & *there*, and *els where*, are not, but by creation. For to say that God is in some site or place, is to say, that some site or place or thing is coexistent with God, which cannot be without creation. That which he addeth herunto is of the same nature, and admits the same solution, now I proceede along with you.

2. To the Atheists demand, where God was before the world was; your answer is, *God was in himselfe*. I doe not mislike it; and so I say, God is in himselfe still. For he is not changed. Only in the creation and preservation of all things, virtue did and still doth flowe out of him allwayes, so that with his sweete influence he filleth all things. To be coneyned in place, is too base a condition for the nature of God, he rather conteynes all things. So that even now, God is no where coneyned; before the world he was no where conteyninge, because there was nothing without to be coneyned and nourished by him. Neyther is it any thing harsh to say, that God was in no place, where there was no place for him, wherein to be. But betwene the question which you propose, and the answer therunto, you doe insperse some strange assertions, affecting curiositie of discourse, more then sobrietie of sense, as when you say; *In respect of*

*eternitie and immensitie, no creature, no positive essence, no nume-  
 rable part of this Vniuersi, is so like unto him, as this negation of  
 all thinges; which we describe by the name of nothing.* A string  
 may be strayned so high, as by breakinge to marre all the mu-  
 sicke; and some witts have affected so highe a streyne of sub-  
 tiltie of sentence, as that they have degenerated into non-sense.  
 Such is this assertion of yours, wherein you affirme, that no  
 numerable part of this Vniuersi (as much as to say, neyther  
 man nor Angell; yet was man made after Gods image & like-  
 nes) is so like unto God as *nothing*. Out upon such abomi-  
 nable speeches; wherby God himselfe who is the breath of  
 our nostrills is made, if not just nothinge, yet to come nearest  
 unto *nothing*. What sport are Atheists like to make with this?  
 why like Davids foole, say in their hearts, *there is no Gods*  
 when a Christian, and a Divine, and a great writer, whose  
 workes are current, when others are not, is founde to professe,  
 that *no creature is so like unto God as nothing*. Yet this is not  
 all; for you say also, that no positive essence is so like unto  
 God as *nothing*, as if God himselfe were not so like unto him-  
 selfe as *nothing* is. And indeede we commonly say *nullum si-  
 mile est idem*. Yet by your leave the Sonne of God is the  
 image of his Father, and dare you say that he is not so like his  
 Father, as *nothing* is? No mervyle if the Spirite of confusion  
 overspreades your discourse like a garment. For what sense,  
 I pray, is there in this speeche of yours as when you say, that  
 this name, *nothinge*, is the description of the negation of all thinges;  
 wheras indeede the negation of all thinges, is much fitter to be  
 the description of this name, *nothing*; then the name, *nothing*  
 to be the description of the negation of all thinges. For the  
 description is usually larger then the terme described. The  
 reason you bring to iustifie so uncouth a speeche, is as absurd  
 and odious, and false as your former assertion, as when you  
 say, *Nothing hath neyther beginning nor ende of dayes*. Fye, fye  
 upon such shamefull assertions, as much remooved from witt  
 as from honestie. Hathe *nothing* neyther beginning nor end  
 of dayes, which is as much as to say, that the dayes of it are e-  
 verlastinge? why I say. It hath no dayes at all, no being at  
 all, no not so much beinge as propositions attribute unto ne-

gations and privations. I say it never had, nor hath, nor ever shall have any dayes, at all, neyther is it possible it should have dayes, for as much as it is utterly impossible, that God should not be, or cease to be, who is the sovereign beinge, and in whome but erst, you professed that all thinges are, and that in a better manner then they are in themselves. And shall this name *nothing* be now so farre advanced, as to be above all positive essences, or parts of this World, in likeness unto God, and that in respect of eternitie, and immensitie? But what eternitie or immensitie of being is to be found in that which hath no being at all, nor ever had, nor ever shall have, nor can have, no not so much as negations have? Yet the Heavens have had continuance so long, as not very well knowne to man; and so have the Angels had, and shall have for ever. The smallest part of this Vniverse, hath some magnitude; some parts have *quantitatem motus*, quantitie of extension, and that allmost incredibly great, certainly incomprehensible by the witt of man, as the Heavens; other parts have *quantitatem virtutis*, quantitie of spirituall perfection, as the Angells, and that also inscrutable by the witt of man. But as for the name *nothing*, that hath no magnitude at all, neyther of corporall extension, nor of spirituall perfection, unles you will returne to the imaginary distance of space without the Heavens, which but erst you disputed against. For no immensitie otherwise can be found in this your *nothing*, which you advance so high as in eternitie and immensitie, to be so like to God, as *no creature, no positive essence, no innumerable part of this Vniverse* more, or so much. If in consideration of the most monstrous incongruities of your assertion, and that as God hath his beinge necessarily, so it is a thing utterly impossible, that *nothing* should have any beings; to shift your selfe out of this absurditie, you shall say, that by *nothing* you understand not the negation or privation of any thinge whatsoever (which yet was delivered by you without all limitation) but only the negation and privation of things created: yet herein you shall fall into a newe non-sense. For then your proposition shall runne thus in effect, *No creature is so like unto God*

*as no creature*, which yet is as untrue as absurd. For surely every creature is more like unto God, then no creature, in as much as it hath a true beinge, which the negation or privation of a creature hath not. And yet you consider not that in this sense, *nothing*, hath an ende of dayes. For as soone as the World beganne to be, forthwith ceased the being of nothing which went before it. But you proceede to take the word *nothing* in a more large signification, as when you forthwith say, *The negation of all things is more like unto God then any one thinge*; You were as good say, that it is more like unto God, then God himselfe, yea then the Sonne is like unto the Father. What blasphemous conceytes are these, & how fitt for Atheists to make merry withall. And that you may not seeme to runne madde without all reason, you adde a reason unto it, and the reason is this, *Because no distinct or proper place of residence can be assigned to nothing, or to the negation of all things.* A most absurd reason, and only plausible unto them, that have lost their witts, in the wilderness of their confused imaginations as you have done. For in such a sense no place can be assigned to the negation of all things, as makes it more base, then the vilest thinge that is, so farre off is it from advancing it to any likenes unto God above such things as have being at all. For therefore no proper place can be assigned to God, because he filleth all places, and if there were a thousand Worlds he should fill them all, not by beinge conteyned in them, but by conteyninge them, yet not locally conteyninge them, but virtually. But therefore no place can be assigned unto the *negation of all things*, because it is incapable bothe of place and beinge, whether, *circumscriptive* as bodies are capable of place; or *definitive*, as Angels are sayde to be in place; or *repletive*, as God is sayde to be in all places. Nay it is not so much capable of place, as accidents are, which are in places not *per se* of themselves, but *per accidents*, as they affect bodies, which are in place of themselves. For in very truth, the negation of all things never had, nor hath, nor ever shall or can have, any such exultence, as propositions attribute to negations or privations. For it was ever false, & is, and



is, and shall be to say, *Nihil est*; For as God allwayes is, and that necessarily: so it is impossible, that this proposition shoulde be true *Nihil est*. Yet that it may in some sort appeare, that this your wilde discourse procedes from the zeale of the glory of God, that so you may advance him, above that which is most like him, to witt above *nothing* or above the *negation of all thinges*, you tell us, that this *nothing* is most unlike him. Yet this allso is a newe non-sense, namely that, that which is most like unto God, and that for eternitie and immensitie, prime branches of Gods infinity, should be most unlike him; and herein you manifestly contradict your selfe. For if it be most unlike him, then every thing is more like unto God then it, which before you denyed; and to the contrary affirmed, that *no positive essence, no numerable part of this Universe was so like unto God* as it, to witt, as *nothing*. Yet now you say even this *nothing*, is most unlike him: and as it were to endoctrinate our plumbeous cerebrosities, and to supply our insufficiency of proovinge so quaint a point of Metaphysicall untruthe, namely that this name *nothing* is most unlike unto God, you helpe us in a freindly manner with a reason herof, and that is this, *because forsoothe nothing is truly, and absolutely no where*. But why did you not adde, that as it is *no where*, in respect of place, so it *never was*, nor is nor *shall be* in respect of time; nor is it possible that it shoulde be, like as it is impossible that God shoulde not be. For *nihil esse, est Deum non esse*: to say that *nothing* is, is to say that God is not, or to deny that God is. But you proceede to exercise your witt in disparaging *nothing*; and wheras before you sayde, that it was *no where*; next you say, that *It is not in it selfe*; as if to be *in it selfe*, were some kinde of being *some where*. And you adde as it were a reason herof, when you say, *non entis non est actio, non est qualitas, non conditio*. But this reason is as good as the rest. For that *nothing* should be *in it selfe*, it is not requisite, that it shoulde have eyther action, qualitie, or reall condition. Or if it had eyther of these, it should not be *in nothing*. And why shoulde you account it a condition of being, to be *in nothing*? You adde that *nothing* cannot have any right or title

to be accounted it selfe; a wonderous strange assertion. For if it be not it selfe, then it is not the same with it selfe; if it be not the same with it selfe, then it is different from it selfe, & that in somethinge. For if in nothing it be different from it selfe, then every way it is all one and the same with it selfe. But if in somethinge you conceive it to be different from it selfe, it behooves you to shewe what that something is, wherein *nothing* is sayde to be different from it selfe. But if nothing can be alleaged, wherein it differeth from it selfe, then surely it is the same with it selfe, and consequently it hath good right and title to be it selfe. You proceede in your unprofitable subtilties, and tell us, that *we may truly say some objective conceytes are nothing*. Yet surely every conceyte is somethinge, but the objects of some conceytes, perhaps your meaning is, are nothing. Now the objects of conceytes are the things conceived. You might then as well have sayde, that some things conceived are nothinge. And it is a trueth; for Chimeraes may be conceived, and Tragelaphoi, and Centaures, and after a sort privations and negations also, which yet are no reall thinge. But we cannot rightly conceive (you say) that *nothing should have any degree or kinde of beinge*. And I say, that neyther is any such conceyte requisite to mainteyne, that *nothing may have just right and title to be termed it selfe*. And yet by your leave, if it were possible that God should have no beinge, then this proposition *Nihil est*, were possible to be true, and not otherwise. Now in mainteyninge this proposition you have proceeded so farre, as to affirme that *nothing hath neyther beginninge nor ende of dayes*, and that therein it is most unlike unto God in respect of his eternitie. *Want of being*, you say, *is the worst kinde of barrennes*. But is it not more sober to affirme, that *want of being* is no kinde of barrennes at all. For barrennes implyes beinge. And why should you put your selfe to such paynes of phrasifyinge, in provinge that *nothing cannot bring forth any ranke of being*? since no such thing is needfull to this, to witt, that *nothing may have right or title to be termed it selfe*; taking it as an affirmative proposition,

proposition, wherein *nothing* is the subject, not as a negative, wherein the word *nothing* is only a signe of an Vniuersall negative. For in this latter acception, it is utterly untrue, sayinge every thing may be termed it selfe, as in sayinge a man is a man, and so is a mouse a mouse; and so the negation of all things (which is your owne description of the word nothing) is allso, it selfe, to witt, the negation of all things. And so it is true to affirme that *nihil est nihil*.

Thus farre you have discoursed of *nothing*; now you come to discourse of something, or rather of God.

And God, you say, cannot be sayde to have being no where, before the World was made, but with this limitation, *saye in himselfe*. But I judge this to be a very improper speache, as that which supposethe Gods being in *himselfe* to be a kinde of being *somewhere*, which in my opinion is untrue.

The trueth is, God is in *himselfe*, but not as in place. And to be in place, here, or there, or every where, is a denomination too base to be attributed unto God: who as Durand saythe is *nowhere* that is in *no place secundum se*, in respect of his essence, but every where by his effects, as filling all places, all bodies, all Spirits, whether of men or Angells with his effects. You say, he is so in *himselfe* as that he is *more then all things*. But consider I pray, how is pluralitie a fitt attribute for indivisible unitie? Yet tis true, he can produce more then all things of this world of creatures put together, are. You say he is *longer then time*; I had rather say, He is *more ancient then dayes*; because he is eternall, & being eternall and allmightie could have made time more ancient then it is. You say, he is greater then place; It had bene more fitt to say, he is greater then space; because the greatest place, is but the hollowe superficies of the uppermost heaven, the spacious body wherof is farre greater; and God greater then it.

Yet is this a very improper speache, because comparisons ought to be of things in the same kinde. But Gods greatnes & the worlds greatnes are farre different in kinde; the greatnes  
of the

of the world, being *quantitas motis*, quantitie of extension; & the greatnes of Gods beinge *quantitas virtutis*, quantitie of spirituall perfection. Yet in this sense it may passe. He is virtually greater then the space of this world, because he could & can produce a greater space then this. You say he is more infinite then capacity it selfe; Belike you suppose capacitie to be infinite, in sayinge God is more infinite. But created capacitie cannot be infinite; though greater, and greater it may be in *infinitum*, yet still finite; and this is all the infinity, that we doe or can conceive by succession or addition; & to Gods power to produce greater neyther doth nor can receive any boundes or limits. And as God is able to enlarge time and place, so is he able to limit it, but by your leave with distinction. It is not possible that time past shoulde be made lesse, then it is. But if I mistake not you overlashe, when you say, that God by his essentiall presence or coexistence is able to limit time and place. For as the limitation of things proceeds from Gods will, not from his essentiall presence; so likewise, it is Gods power that denominates him able to limit all things according to the pleasure of his will, and not his essence, or essentiall presence or coexistence. It is true, that nothing could have beginning or continuance of being but by him; and it is true also, that all other things have had beginning, and still have continuance, and that from him. Though this was no Article of the Peripateticks faith, yet it is an Article of our Christian faith. And herebence, to witt, from Gods preserving all things, and workinge in all things, dothe Aquinas inferre, that God by his essence (not only by his power) is in all things, because, and that according unto Aristotles doctrine, *Movens & motum* must be *simul*. But then agayne you knowe, or may knowe how this inference is impugned by Scotus and his followers. As if this were the propertie of a finite Agent, to worke only on things indistant from it. But God beinge an infinite Agent, they conceive it to be his propertie, to be of power to worke upon that which is distant from him; if by supposition, it were possible, that God were distant from any thinge, or any thinge from it.

And

And therefore thought if he be in all things, *as the center of their supportance* as you phrasifie; yet this is to be in them only by his power, and operation; and great Schoolemen have peremptorily denied, that herehence it can be soundly inferred, that he is in all things by his essence. It is untrue that things in succession, may be in number infinite. They may by succession be more and more without end; but never shall they come to be infinite. Likewise it is impossible that God should be in more things then those that are, or may be, because it is impossible that there should be more things, then those that are or may be. And withall I wonder, how you can mainteyne that God is in those things that yet have no being, but only may be.

3. You have discoursed so long of infinitie, that your discourse seemes to be transfigured into it. For the sentence, wherwith you beginne this Section, hath no end, no way out of it. *Had the evaporation of proud phantasticke melancholy, eclipsed the lustre of his glorious presence, in that late prodigious questionists brayne, which would bring us out of the sunshine of the Gospell, into olde Egyptian darkenes.* Here your Reader becomes erect, to understande, what then: But you falling upon giving a reason of the last clause, by way of parenthesis, utterly forget to make up the sense of your former sentence. This Questionist you speake of, seemes by that which followeth, to be Vorstius. For his opinion is, that of enclosing God in the Heavens, and excluding his essentiall presence from this inferior World, which was (as you report) first brought forth in Egypt. So that it seemes, the Egyptians were long agoe troubled with this disease, arising from the evaporations of proud phantasticke melancholy, as well as Vorstius; yea and some Nations too. You say indeede it was not propagated to many Nations, therby implyinge, it was propagated unto some. Only fewe Philosophers of the better sort entertheyned it (as you say) except Aristotle or the Author of the booke *De Mundo*. You would say, I take it, that no Philosophers of the better sort entertheyned it, except Aristotle &c. as it lyeth, your sentence is incongruous. But

herein, you say, Vorſtius did diſſent from them, in that he helde that God was and is every where by his power and immediate Providence. This error of his, you cenſure as exceeding groſſe and unſufferable in that he makes Gods infinite power, wiſedome, and goodnes in whole ſweete harmony, Divine Providence eſpecially conſiſteth, but as Agents or Ambaſſadors to his infinite Maieſtie: as if his infinite Maieſtie only were full compere to his eſſence; unfitting to be employed abroad, or to keepe reſidence any where ſave in the Court of Heaven. Concerning Vorſtius, I profeſſe, I never founde any ſuch ſufficiency in him, eſpecially for Metaphyſicall diſcourſe, as ſhould make any man zealous of ſalving his reputation. And that the eſſence of God ſhould be confined to one place, more then to another, yea to the Court of Heaven, rather then to the baſeſt corner of the earthe, is ſo abſurd to my judgement, that I profeſſe ingenuouſly, all the reaſon and witt that I have, is not ſufficient to make it good of Angels, as being Spirits abſtraet from materiall extension. And I will remember how Aquinas makes Angels to be in place, only in reſpect of their operation. And places are for the natures of bodies, and not of Spirits: and Durand diſcourſeth the ſtrange things of the nature of Angels, and ſuch things, as I am willingly content they ſhould continue as they doe without the reach of my comprehension. How much more abſurd were it to confine the eſſence of God more to one place, then to another. And indeede, to my judgement, to be in place, is too baſe a denomination to be attributed unto God. And Durand as already I have ſhewed, profeſſeth that God *ſecundum ſe* is in no place, but only *ſecundum effectus*, and ſo every where, for as much as he filleth all places with his effects. And as God is ſayde to have bene *in ſeipſo* in himſelfe, before the World was made, is he not ſo to be accounted ſtill according to thoſe verſes of courſe in this argument.

So Scotus  
underſtands  
him. 2. diſt.  
2. q. 6.  
Durand. in  
1. diſt. 37.  
queſt. 1.

*Dic ubi tunc eſſet, cum præter eum nihil eſſet:  
Tunc ubi nunc in ſe, quoniam ſibi ſufficit ipſe.*

And

And is there not reason for it: For Gods essence hath no respect to outward things, as his power hath, and his operation hath. And see, whether by ascribing place to him, you shall not be driven to acknowledge that God is in *Vacuo*, which opinion but erst you impugn'd. For suppose many Angells existent in the ayre, (as some are called Princes of the ayre,) and so within the hollowe of the moone, and suppose God should annihilate all that body of Element or Elements within the hollowe of the moone, the bodies and spheares of the Heavens only remaininge. It will not followe herehence that the Angells, supposed to be within the hollowe of the moone, shall be annihilated, because they being abstract substances, and undependant on any matter, shall exist still, and consequently shall be in *Vacuo*. For *Vacuum* is only a voydenes of bodies, not of Spirits. And who doubts, but that God could have created spirituall substances only, and not bodily; in which case they must be sayde to be in *Vacuo*, or no where without them. Then agayne suppose these Spirits themselves within the hollowe of the moone shoulde be annihilated; yet God shall not cease to be existent there, upon the annihilation of Angells, like as Angells did not cease to exist there, upon the annihilation of bodies: and consequently God himselfe shall exist in *Vacuo*; and all this commeth to passe by placing his essence there in distinction from his presence, and from his power. Doe not all confesse that God is no where without himselfe as conteyned, but only as conteyninge? now to conteyne is the worke of his power, and of his will, & not of his essence, save as his essence, and power, and will are all one realitie in God. And so God may be sayde to be every where, not only three manner of wayes, to witt, by his essence, by his presence, & by his power: but more manner of wayes, to witt, by his knowledge, by his wisdom, by his will, by his goodnes. Yet all these shall be but one way, as all these are but one in God. But yet in proper speeche as Gods essence is no where, but it may content us to say, that God ever was and is in himselfe only: so his goodnes is no where, but in himselfe, his knowledge, wisdom, and understanding no



where but in himselfe; his will & mercy and justice no where but in himselfe; his power to make, to preserve, to worke no where but in himselfe: but the operations of all these united in himselfe, are every where, and so sayth Durand; God filleth all things with his sweete influence and effects of his power, wisdom, and goodnes, all which are as it were the Trinitie of his one essence. Thus we may say, his power, and wisdom, and goodnes reacheth unto the earth, and to every thing within this canopy, cyther by way of influence naturall, or by way of influence gracious; like as in the Pallace of the third Heaven, by way of influence glorious. All which are not properly his wisdom, and power, and goodnes, but rather the effects of them; of them I say, which yet are all one thing with his essence. But Gods essence is such as implyeth no respect unto outward things, as his wisdom, power, and goodnes doe bothe, in the way of mercy, and in the way of judgement.

It implies contradiction to affirme his power, or wisdom to be more infinite then his essence, if so be we conceive his power, and wisdom to be his essence. And yet to be in many places more then another thing is, is not to make it infinite, because all places put together, are but finite, much lesse to make it more infinite.

Not only some great Schoolemen, as you speake, but all of them for ought I knowe to the contrary, distinguish of Gods being in all things by his essence, by his power, by his presence; and so the vulgar verbe runnes,

*Enter, praesenter Deus est, & ubique potenter;*

Althoughe they take severall courses in the explication of them, as we may reade in Vasquez. Three of which explanations, he takes upon him to confute, to witt, that of Alexander Halensis, as also the way of Bonaventure, and lastly the way of Durand: & resteth himselfe upon the explication of Aquinas, followed as he sayth by Cajetan, Albertus, Egidius, Ricardus, Capreolus, & Gabriel, & the exposition there set downe

Vasq. in 4.  
qu. 8. art. 3.  
disp. 30.

downe is this. 1. God is in all things by his essence, because his substance is not distant from things, but joyned with them, whether in respect of himselfe, or in respect of his operation. 2. By his presence, because he knowes all things. 3. By his power, because his power reacheth unto every thing. Nowe I freely professe, I cannot satisfy my selfe in this distinction. And to my judgement, presence is only in respect of essence, or of that individwall substance whatsoever it be, which is sayde to be present, whether it hath knowledge or no, what power soever it hath much or litle, & whether it worke or no. Nowe the essence of God is never parted from his knowledge and power. And God indeede cannot be sayde, in proper speeche, to be more distant from one place or thing, then from any other. But he may be sayde, I confesse, to be in one place more then in another, in as much as he dothe manifest himselfe more in one place, then in another. He is in all places as the Author of nature, & communicating the gifts of nature; in speciall sort he is sayde to be in his Church as the Author of grace, & communicating the gifts of grace, but in most speciall manner in the third Heaven as the Author of glory, & communicating himselfe in glorious manner unto his Angells and Saints; all which diversities of being are rather in respect of his power, then of his essence. For how is God sayde to be in any thinge? as conteyned? by no meanes, but rather as conteyning; which conteyning is a transient operation of God, proceeding from his power, & his will. Thus saythe the Apostle *God is not farre from every one of us; for as much as in him we live, & moove, & have our beinge.* And marke but the particulars of explication proposed by Vasquius, according to the best opinion, in his judgment, to witt, according to that of Aquinas. God is in all things by his essence, because his substance is not distant (& this is most true, I confesse; for certainly he is no more distant in place from a mouse, then from an Angell) but he is joyned with the things themselves, whether in respect of himselfe, or of his operation.

So then if Gods operation be joyned with the things themselves, it suffizeth, (by this opinion) to maynteyne,

teyne, that God is present with them by his essence; yet if you consider it well, you shall finde, that this is all one with his presence in respect of his power; for that was expounded thus; *God is in the whole Vniverse, by his power, because his operation reacheth unto every thing.* Next, consider, how God is in every thing by his presence.

First, to say that God is in every thing by his presence, seemes a very absurde manner of speeche: for it is as much as to say, that God is present in every thing by his presence. Then consider the explication of it. He knoweth all things, therefore he is present with all things: Now this seemes very absurd. For we read that

2. King. 6.  
12.

God revealed to Elishah, what was done in the King of Arams privy Chamber; might therefore Elishah justly be sayde to have bene present in the Kings privy Chamber? We knowe the number of the Starres, what therefore, are we present with them? God foreknowes things to come, is he therefore present with them allso, which yet are not? Vtquius himselfe professed before, in confuting the opinion of Durand, that *Nothing is sayde to be present with another, unles that other thing were conscious therof*, and he prooved it out of the digests, and out of the lawe *Coram*; *Coram Titio aliquid fecisse iussus non videtur presente eo fecisse, nisi is intelligat*; & allso out of the 112. epistle of Austin, *plane forsitan satis est, si presentia hoc loco intelligamus, quæ præsto sunt sensibus, sive animi, sive corporis, unde etiam ducto vocabulo. presentia nominantur.* As if *presens* were as much as *pra sensibus*. To this I may adde that of Æneas in Vi-gill, when the cloud wherwith his mother Venus had covered him, vanished away, then he breakes out into these wordes *Coram, quem queritis adsum Troius Æneas.* But now consider, according to this interpretation of the word *presens* God shall be sayde to be present with none, but with intelligent creatures: for such alone can knowe him and take notice of him; and because but fewe of them take notice of him; therefore he can be sayde to be present, but with a fewe of them allso. Yet Aquinas his explication of Gods beinge in all things by his presence, is quite of a contrary nature, to witt, because God knowes them, and not because they knowe or take

Aquino in  
1. q. 8.  
212. 3.

or take notice of him. Last of all, to be every where by his power, is sayde to be in this respect, that his operation reacheth to every thinge. Now who seeth not that this presence is rather in respect of his operation, and actuall workinge, then of his power to worke. And if we ascend to the cause of his operation, we must ascend not only to the power of God, but even to his wisdom, and goodnes, as which is the cause of his operation, as well as his power. And if we looke for some thing more proper, to admitt this denomination then other, we must take notice of his will, rather then of his power, as which is the most immediate cause of his operation. For infinite power to be able to reach every possible effect, is no more, then to be able to produce it, or being produced to preserve it, or to worke in it, or by it, whatsoever it please the, which is nothing pertinent to the being of it, therein as in a place, which belongs to essence rather then unto power: For when I am sayde to be here and there, the meaning is not, my power is here or there, but my person, which is properly sayde of me, because I am a body, to which kinde or natures, place properly belongeth. But as touching the essence of God, that being spirituall & infinite, it is not capable of any place to conteyne it, but rather it conteynes every thinge: in which respect your selfe have already observed, that by the Hebrewes he is called *omni* place it selfe. Nowe Iudge, whether God may be sayde in any congruities to conteyne bodies by his essence, or Spirits eyther created; and whether that were not to signify, that bodies and Spirits created, were of the essence of God. Neyther is it proper to say, that God by his essence dothe worke eyther the creation or the conservation of outward things, but rather by his understanding, power, and will. For to worke by essence, is to worke in the way of naturall Agents necessarily, but to worke by wisdom & will, is to worke after the way of free Agents, freely. If God were every where, (according to the sayinge reported and avouched by you) before there was any distinction of times; then surely God also was every where before there was any distinction of place. For certainly distinction of time,  
& distinc-

and distinction of place beganne together.) And must you not hereby be driven to the acknowledgement of a *Vacuum* before the World was, and that conteyning distinction of parts, in such sort, as to make way for the denominations of here and there, and every where, and that God was therein, and every where therein, before the World was? which opinion your selfe in this very section have impugned. To discourse of the effects of Gods infinite power, in case his knowledge were not infinite; or of the effects of his infinite knowledge in case his power were not infinite, I judge to be a very wayne thing; because it is impossible that the one shoulde be infinite without the other. For seeing many things cannot be brought to passe without knowledge; like as without knowledge none of such things can be brought to passe at all: so likewise, without sufficiency of knowledge, such things coulde not be brought to passe, as require such a proportion of sufficient knowledge to performe them. And if God had but a finite power, he coulde foreknowe no more thinges, then coulde be brought to passe by that finite power. It is true, God is, where any thing is, but howe? as conteyning it, not as conteyned by it; but it is untrue, that God is, where any thing may be. For without the Heavens something may be; but God is not without the Heavens. For without the Heavens is *Vacuum*; but God is not in *Vacuo*, as before your selfe have disputed. And indeede how should he be there seeing he coulde neyther be there as conteyninge, nor as conteyned. For that which is nothing, is neyther fitt to conteyne, nor fitt to be conteyned. In fine, I observe, how Gods being in all things you reduce unto two heads; The one is his creation; the other, his preservation of them. And so I confesse, God is not distant from any of us; for as much as we live and moove, and have our beinge in him as the Apostle speaketh.

4. The two wayes as you make them of Gods being every where, as you construe the Prophet Jeremy, are by Piscator conceived to be but one; the latter wordes, *Can any hide himselfe in secret places, that I should not see him?* being but an explanation

explanation of the former, *Am I a God at hande, and not a God a farre off.* As much as to say, that God seeth as well things done in earthe, as things done in Heaven. So that in Scripture phrase, things done in earthe are called things done a farre of, God speaking herein according to vulgar apprehension. Whereas God is layde to fill Heaven and Earthe, hence it is that God is sayd to be neyther circumscriptively in place as bodies are, nor definitively as Angells are, but repletively, that is filling all things; but howe? that is saythe Durand with his effects.

God dothe more then fill Heaven and Earthe. For he hathe made them, and dothe maynteyne them, not only filleth them with all creatures fitt for them.

Water fillles the bucket, and the bucket conteynes the water: But God forbid we should so conceive of the nature of God, as by filling the Heavens and the Earth, to be conteyned in them.

His infinite power and wisdom serves his turne first to make them, after wards to preserve them, and unto proper & congruous endes to order them, and with his various effects to fill them, but not with his essence, least we should be driven to ascribe extension to his essence, and maynteyne that he was and is in *Vacuo* as before I have shewed. Vndoubtedly Gods essence is as present with us on earthe, as with the Angells and Saints in Heaven, and no more distant or absent from us, then from them.

But how is God present? Not as *praesens Corpus* according to Austins exposition of the word *praesens*; for God is no sensible thing, for then he were corporall, and to be *praesens animi* is nothing to the purpose. God dothe coexist with every thing that is. For they doe exist, and God doth exist: But doth God coexist with them in time? they doe exist in time, that is their measure of duration, but God in eternitie that is the measure of his duration, to witt himselfe.

They doe exist in place, that is the measure of corporall extension; but doth God exist in place, who hathe no extension? dothe he not rather exist in his owne immensitie which is all one

is all one with himselfe, like as is his eternitie? In a word, the severall beings of one thing in another are usually comprehended in these verses.

*Infant pars, totum, Species, Genus, & calor igni.  
Rex in Regno, res in sine locoque locatum.*

Now see whether any of these are compatible unto God. Your selfe have observed and approved the Hebrewes conceyte in calling him *אֵל* Place. Let this then passe for a peculiar being of God in all his creatures, whether visible or invisible, corporall or spirituall, namely that as he hath made them, so he conteynes them, præserves them, ordereth them, filleth them all with his effects, and workes the good pleasure of his owne will in them, and by them. And this his presence, it is impossible he should withdrawe from them, save as he shall be pleased to destroy them, and take all beinge from them; and lastly that his very essence is as indistant from the meanest worme, as from the most glorious Angell. But to talke, of Gods piercing or penetrating all thinges not with his effects only, but with his essence, as the light pierceth the ayre, I dare not enterteyne any such grosse conceyte of the most simple and spirituall nature of God, for feare attributing extension unto his essence, and such as should continue though the World were destroyed, and make roome for the essence of God, to extend it selfe in *Vacuo*, and the parts therof (which are merely imaginary) as well as in the World, and in the parts therof, like as before I have argued. The power of God dothe exercise it selfe, according to the pleasure of his will: And therfore it seemes wonderous strange to me, that you should ascribe power to God, to dispose of his essence, as touching the placinge of it in space locall.

Neyther doe I see cause, why glorious Angells should be required to prepare a place of residence for God, more then bodies inglorious.

God I acknowledge to be as well in the basest worme, as in the most glorious Angell. And so farre forth as it belongs to



to Gods essence to be every where, I presume no sober Divine will mainteyne, that it is other then a naturall attribute unto God, & not in his power freely to dispose of his essence eyther otherwise, or so.

And therefore when you aske, whether upon the creatinge of a newe Heaven, it is not possible that God should be therein? I answer; looke in what sense God is sayde to be any where, in that sense it is impossible that God should not be here. And yet without all change in them, though not without change in things without him, one creature beinge annihilated, and another created a newe. And though Angels be subject to change, yet God is not. But when you shall proove that change is no fruite of impotency, I will renounce the Prophet that saythe, *The Lord is not changed*, and take you for my Apostle. And surely if not to be changed, were to be impotent; how impotent must God needes be, *Iam. 1. 17.* with whome is no variableness nor shadowe of change?

5. Gods immensitie is no more subject to his will and power to be streitned, then his eternitie: But as God is not in time, that being a measure only fit for creatures subject to mutation, but in his owne eternitie, which is all one with himselfe: So neyther is he in place a measure fit for creatures only subject to extension, but in his owne immanitie, which is all one with himselfe. And as by his eternitie he doth transcendently and supereminently comprehend all times: so by his immensitie dothe he comprehend all places. So that neyther doe we say, hat the first could not be, neyther doe we say, that this your second way can be. Only we dare not say, the essence of God dothe pierce all things; least we should give unto his simple and indivisible nature, some kinde of extension.

And how can you avoyde it, in making the essence or substance of God to pierce all things; how, I say, can you avoyde the mainteyninge of Gods essence to be changeable from place to place, (upon supposition that the World may moove eyther Eastward, or Westward, farther then it is) or that his essence is in *Vacuo*, and that after a manner of extension, as

before hath bene argued. Now you tell us, that mutabilitie is incompetent with infinitie : yet in the very next section foregoinge, you reckoned it a point of impotency not to be able to change, as Angells doe their mansions, when they mislike them. Of which course of Angells, eyther as touching their mislike, or change of mansion I am nothing conscious, as neyther am I of any oracle tending that way.

By your leave ; there is no proportion betweene Gods immensitie in respect of all places filled by him, and the infinitie of his nature.

For seeing place and created things can be but finite, his immensitie this way, never extends farther then to the filling of a finite creature. Neyther doe you well to confound distinction with limitation, as if they were all one. For when we distinguish Gods power, and wisdom, and goodnes, or the Persons in the Trinity, herby we doe neyther limit the nature of God, nor the Persons, nor his attributes.

It is true, that God is the supporter of all thinges, and in this respect, the Apostle acknowledgeth, that *He is not farre from any of us*, for as much as *In him We live, and moove, and have our beinge.*

Ad. 17. 27.  
28.

6. You say that God was, when nothing was. A most improvident speeche, and as good as sacke and sugar unto Atheists. For it is as much as to say, that God was nothinge, or that sometimes God was not. But elssoones you alter this dangerous forme of wordes, and tell us that God was, when nothing was besides himselfe. Without all peradventure, before the creation of the world, there was neyther distinction of time, nor of place. Though you doe not cloathe God with an imaginary space as without him ; yet may you doe as great wrong, to imagine such a space in the nature of God, as it seemes you doe, and that you call immensitie. For you say, such an imaginary space should be a checke to his immensitie, as being a parallel distance focall. So that you seeme manifestly to acknowledge a distance in Gods nature, but you woulde not have it checkt by any parallel distance as immense as himselfe. This imagination is wonderous grosse.

Wheras

Whereas on the contrary, I finde none to conceyte of any im-  
mensitie in God, otherwise then as he is sayde to fill all places;  
and therfore before places or bodiēs are existent, only a power  
and abilitie is in God to fill all places; & that filling, Durand  
professe the to be in respect of the effects wrought by him, &  
wherwith he fillēs all places, not with his essence piercinge all  
thinges as you discourse, as if it were as bigge as the World, or  
as an infinite World: & yet you thinke to charme this extra-  
vagant conceyte, with calling it indivisible.

And so the light of the Sunne which fillēs the world, with  
manifest extension, is yet indivisible.

Gods essence, you say, conteynes the Heavens. I would,  
you would consider this phrase well, & what it imports.

If you were askt what the essence of man conteynes, would  
you say, that it conteynes any thing more then that, which is  
of the essence of man, as *Animal rationale*? Yet without  
making any bones of scruple in the prosecution of your  
owne conceytes, you say that the essence of God conteynes  
the Heavens. May you not as well say, that the essence of  
God made the Heavens?

I had thought it had bene a more congruous speeche, to say,  
that God by his power & will made the Heavens, & so dothe  
preserve and conteyne them rather then by his essence. For  
in respect of essence, only such thinges are attributed unto  
God, as doe necessarily belong unto him; as for example that  
he is, eternall, unchangeable, omnipotent, most wise, most  
good. But no sober man would say (I thinke) that God is  
the creator, preserver, conteyner of all thinges by his essence.  
But these attributes belong unto him by the freedome of his  
will. I nothing doubt, but that if the World were a thousand  
times bigger then it is, God should be as intimately coexistent  
to every part of it, as he now is to any part of this Heaven &  
Earthe, which we now see. For all thinges that live or moove  
or have any beinge, doe & must live, & moove, & have their  
beinge in him. But yet, as it is by his will that he made them,  
and not by his essence: so it is by his will, and not by his es-  
sence, that he dothe preserve them.

Anselm.  
Monolog.  
cap. 23.

You pursue the phrasifying of your owne conceytes according to your owne pleasure : But where doe you finde in Tertullian or Philo the penetration of Gods essence thorough all things ? Yet I confesse Anselme saythe, that *Natura Dei penetrando cuncta continet* ; and whether you tooke it hand ever head from him I knowe not : You seeme to make Gods essence a space of some spirituall extension ; to which kinde of conceyte our imagination I confesse, is wonderous prone ; as if it did penetrate all things as light dothe penetrate the ayre, and so fill all things with it selfe, and not only with his multifarious effects as Durand interpreteth it. Nowe this is a dangerous conceyte and obnoxious to a foule error, and opposite to the simplicitie of Gods nature : which you perceave wel enough, and therefore you thinke to checke this error of conceyte, by saying that he is indivisible, as if wordes would serve the turne to salve Gods pure simplicitie.

Durand I am sure professeth against this penetration which you are so enamoured with. Durand. 1. dist. 37. q. *Quando dicimus Deum esse in rebus, non intelligimus eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam, vel intrinsecus penetrantem : sed intelligimus eum esse presentem rei, non solum secundum durationem, quia & quando res sunt, nec secundum contactum corporalem cum non sit corpus nec, virtus in corpore, sed secundum ordinem qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus. In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus situm in corporibus ; quia per situm se habet unum corpus ad aliud immediate quoad sui extremum : sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quodlibet sui ;* For thus he writes, when we say, that God is in things, we doe not understand him to be an intrinsecate part, or that he doth intrinsecatlie penetrate them : but we understand him to be present to the thing, not only according to the duration therof, in being when the things are, nor by corporall touch, seeing he is not a body, nor any qualitie in a body, but according to order, which in Spirits, is answerable to situation in bodies. Which order in Spirits, excels situation in bodies in this respect ; because by situation one body is with another only as touching the extreame parts therof immediately. But by order a Spirit is

Spirit is immediate to a body in respect of every part thereof.

Our imagination, I confesse, is apt to imagine God to be as it were of most subtile quantitie penetrating all. But to conceive so of an Angell is too grosse, how much more of God.

Durand. 1. dist. 37. part. 2. qu. 1. num 17. *Differentia siue non extenduntur ad substantias incorporeas, cuiusmodi sunt Angeli. Huic autem contradicit imaginatio, qua non transcendit quantum & continuum, secundum quod formamus nobis de Angelis aliquod Quantum Subtilissimum. Sed in hoc non est rectum credere imaginationi, quia Angeli abstrahunt secundum rem a quanto, sicut a quali: & ideo sicut non sunt albi aut nigri, frigidi, aut calidi, & sic de ceteris qualitatibus corporalibus: sic non sunt magni vel parvi, quia non sunt quanti, & per consequens hic vel ibi ratione sue essentie, quia he sunt proprietates quanti.*

The proper differences of corporall things saythe Durand are not to be extended to incorporall things, such as Angells are. Imagination contradicteeth this, which dothe not transcend quantities, according wherunto we fashion to our selves Angells, as if they were of a most subtile quantitie. But we doe not well to followe imagination in this. For Angells are natures abstract as well from quantitie as from qualitie; & therfore like as they are not white and black, cold and hott, and so of the rest of corporall qualities: and so they are not great or small, because they have no quantity, & consequently, are not here, or there, in respect of their essence, seeing these differences are proper unto quantitie.

But some may say, If Gods essence be not here, where is it then? I answere that God is as much here as any where, and when I say God is here and every where, I doe not exclude his essence. For by God I understand his essence. But I deny that he is here or any where els *secundum essentiam*, as if his essence had any situation here, which kind of being is proper only to bodies, and not to Spirits, and makes Gods nature subject to extension.

We may be bold to say, that Gods essence is indistant from every thing; For herein we goe along with the Apostle, who  
saythe,

sayth, that *God is not farre from every one of us. For in him we live & moove & have our beinge.* But as for penetration of all things with Gods essence, I leave that phrased to them that like it. As for Gregories trimébred sentence, one part therof alone is to your purpose, namely when he saythe, that *God is intra omnia non inclusus.* And indeede we all say, that God is so in all things as that he rather conteynes them, then is conteyned by them. Now which I pray is the more sober speeche, to say that *Gods essence conteynes all things,* or to say that *Gods power & will conteynes all things,* let every learned and sober Reader judge.

7. Though I deeme it not much woorth the while to searche after this distinction in Anselme, the place wherof you conceale. Yet I have taken that paynes to the ende I might the better consider in what sense, and upon what ground of reason he dothe deliver it. And in his *Monologion* I finde he discourseth of Gods beinge in time and place. But no such distinction can I finde in him, nor any such assertions as you impute vnto him. In his 19. chap. he disputeth that *God is in no place and time.* In the 21. *How he is in all places, and in no place.* In the 22. *That It may be better vnderstood that God is sayde to be allwayes then in all time.* In the 23. *How it may be better vnderstood, that God is sayde to be every where then in all places.* But that it is fitter to be sayde of God that he is *with place,* then *in place,* I finde no where nor in any place in Anselme. Yet you avouche it as the distinction of Anselme, and as well approoved of good writers, but who they are, you keepe to your selfe. Notwithstanding you tell us, that the resolution of doctrine according to the former distinction, is blameable in two respects. 1. For that it conceales much matter of admiration (which the description of immésitie used by Barnard and others, dothe promptly suggest. 2. Because it dothe occasion an erroneous imagination of coextension in the divine essence. As touching the first; I see nothing to the contrary, but that Gods being with every place, dothe every way conteyne the very same matter of admiration, which his being in every place dothe. For the woonderful nature of his immensitie in playne termes is but this, (though it may be

be phrasified diverse wayes as it please the writer) that he conteynes all things and is conteyned in none. Now this may as well be signified, by sayinge *God is with every place*, as by sayinge *God is in every place*. For being with a place is indifferent to admitt, such a manner of being with it, as namely by way of conteyning it. But being in a place, dothe rather incline to signify a beinge conteyned by it. Which is opposite to the active conteyning of it. Place saythe Durand, may be considered two wayes, eyther as a naturall thing, or as conteyning the thing placed. As it is naturall thinge, so God is in every place; but as it conteynes the thinge sayde to be in it, so he is in no place. For he conteynes all, and is conteyned of none. As for the imagination of coextension in the divine essence, to my judgement, your opinion in making the divine essence to penetrate all things, hath bene very prone therunto. And howe to be with every thinge, dothe more include a coextension of nature, then to be in every thinge, I cannot possibly conceive. But I pray in what sense of truth, or truth of sense, can you averre that every body is with every place? You may as well avouche that every worme here on earth is with the Sunne, or with the place of the Sunne. And can the mathematicall dimensions of a bodily substance, be accounted the place, of that bodily substance, that you should say, *Every bodily substance is with the mathematicall dimensions thereof*, and that even there where you speake of a substance his being with a place? And why you should terme them mathematicall dimensions rather then Physicall I knowe not.

You say that Gods being in every place and in every part of every body, so as not to be conteyned in them, dothe exclude all conceyte of coextension. But I see no reason for this assertion: it rather includes an extension of Gods being beyond all things, then hinders or excludes the conceyte of coextension with the things that are: especially whereas you maynteyne that God is in *all things* not only as conteyning them (which cannot be attributed unto God in respect of his essence, as I have shewed, but rather in respect of his power and wil) but by way of penetration thorough all, and that in



respect of his essence, (and not in respect of his power only) like as light is diffused thorough our Hemisphere; which similitude I am bolde to adde, because you sayle in affoording us any resemblance to succour our capacitie of apprehension this way. But I dare not adventure vpon such an apprehension, because in my opinion it is too grosse to be attributed to the nature of God. I content my selfe with this, that as God before the world, was *in himselfe*, so he is in himselfe still according to that old verse,

*Tunc ubi nunc in se quoniam sibi sufficit ipse.*

But then nothing being made, he had nothing to conteyne, & governe, and worke by or in, as now he hath. As touching all other manner of being in all things, I content my selfe with ignorance. You magnify Trismegists definition of Gods immensitie, and much good doe it you. It is suitable with your discourse. But doe you remember what censure Aristotle passed vpon Empedocles, for this figurative & obscure manner of expressions in Philosophicall discourse? And indeede when we take paynes in searching out the truth, why shoulde we encumber our selves with resolving figures into playne speeches, that so we may have something wheron to dispute. Hertofore you tolde us that God was the center of all things, and that of supportance: now out of Trismegist you tell us, that God hath a Center and that every where, but not of supportance passive I thinke, as wherby he shoulde be supported, but of supportance active, wherby he supporteth all things. Now herof we can easily finde bothe a center and a circumference. For Gods supporting of the earth, may well be accounted the Center, and Gods supporting the heavens may well be accounted the Circumference of Gods supporting the earth. In as much as there is no diuine supporting without it, at least of materiall creatures, but all with it. Though it be true, that God coulde & can make the world much bigger then it is. But Gods will hath herein circumscribed himselfe, thus farre to proceede as he dothe,

in

In supporting all things & no farther. I doe not like your phrate of enlarging the actuall coexistence of Gods essence. For dare any sober divine say, that Gods actuall existence hath boundes, and that these boundes may be more or lesse enlarged? And yet the face I confesse of your discourse, lookes hitherwardes. How then doe you say, that the boundes of Gods coexistence with his creatures are or can be enlarged? The only way to helpe it, is to say, that Gods existence is never enlarged, but the existence of creatures, by the encreasing of newe, may be enlarged, and consequently Gods coexistence with them may be sayde to be enlarged, not that his existence is more then it was, but that the existence of created substances, is more then it was. And more creatures coexisting with God, then formerly there did, he doth coexist with more then he did. His existence is no greater then it was, nor hath no larger boundes then it had; but creatures are supposed to exist by the power of God, more then formerly did exist. And yet the omnipotency of God hath pitcht a circumference to Gods coexistence with his creatures, and that is the circumference of the world. For without it God seems to have no coexistence with his creatures but all within. And albeit God could make the world greater and greater, yet still it shoulde be but finite, & as there shoulde be a circumference of all creatures existing, so likewise of Gods coexisting with them. To say, that God only truly is, is one of the paradoxes. That God alone is *id quod est*, that is, that whatsoever is attributed unto God, is essentiall to him, not accidentall, I have often read. But that God only, truly is, I never read but in your writings. *In him we live, and moove, and have our being* saythe Saint Paul: but this by your subtile commentary mult be understood with a distinction: *In him we live* but not truly; *in him we moove* but not truly, *in him we have our being* but not truly. That God conteynes all things, and is not conteyned in any thing, we easily grant. Sphaeres doe conteyne by way of place; but I hope, you will not say, that God in such sort conteynes any thing; though therfore called by the Hebrewes *שפיר*, because he conteynethe all

things. And yet certainly, there is no Spheare conteyne<sup>d</sup> so much, but that a square figure may conteyne as much, though not under the same limits. And can any man make doubt, but God coulde make a World of a square figure, that shoulde conteyne as much as this World dothe, though in this case the Circumference of the World shoulde be greater then now it is? But because that *all things cannot comprehend God*, therefore you say, *He is rightly resembled to a spheare, whose Circumference is no where.*

A proper resemblance of the nature of God to a thing utterly impossible, and fitt matter for Atheists to make themselves sport withall, I say impossible more then one way.

For first, it is a thing impossible, that a body should be infinite.

Secondly it is impossible, that a body infinite should be Sphericall. If you aske, of what figure then shoulde it be? my answer is, it should be of no figure. For figures are the boundes of quantities; & it is contradiction to make a boundles quantitie consist of boundes; or a bounded and figured quantitie without boundes. And yet, if all this were receaved as fitt, and convenient, what shall we gayne thereby, when all this while we imagine him to be merely corporall, who indeede is merely spirituall? For I doe not thinke you looke to finde spheares any other where then among bod<sup>ies</sup>.

We reade and heare of the Spheares of Heaven; but I never read or heard of the Spheares of Angells or Spirits, as if they might be of a round or square figure as bod<sup>ies</sup> are, much lesse is any such figure fitt to resemble God. Yet upon these conceyes as extraordinary atchievements of yours in the way of Metaphysicall discourse, you proceede in the next place to the solution of certeyne difficulties; that so Drisimagist his definition of Gods immensitie, may finde the more easy admittance, into the Articles of our imagination, if not into the Articles of our Creede. Which yet truly I should not have excepted against, but rather have admitted, if to no other end, yet to this, even to cutt off curious speculations about the immensitie of God; had you not so farre magnified it, as if it  
had

had bene some Oracle of natures light, and made use of it, not as a Rhetoricall flashe, and diaculation only, but as a serious maxime to rely upon in Philosophicall discourse; where the best decorum is, to make no use of tropes and figures, but of playne and proper termes, that we may not be to seeke of our owne meaninge.

8. Your former discourse about the Spheare, together with the Center and Circumference (spoken of) of Gods immensitie, you perceave is likely to rayse some Spirits; and therefore aforehand, you shewe a course how to lay them. The first is, *How a Center should be conceived to be every where?* The second *How the indivisibility of Gods presence should be compared to a Center?* To the former, you answere, that *As the Divine essence by reason of absolute infinity hath an absolute necessitie of coexistence, with space or magnitude infinite; so were it possible there should be (as some Divines holde it possible there may be) a magnitude or Spheare actually infinite, this magnitude could have no set point for its center, but of every point designable in it, we might avouche this is the Center: Every point should have the negative properties of a sphericall center, there could be no inequality betweene the distances of severall parts from the Circumference of that, which is infinite, and hath no boundes of magnitude.* So then God by absolute necessitie of nature must coexist with that, which neyther doth exist, nor can exist by the opinion of most. For that an infinite body should exist, is not only by Aristotle and Aquinas proved, but most generally helde to be impossible. But if such a thing be impossible to exist, it is also impossible that God should coexist with it; & consequently most false, is that which you say, namely that by reason of his infinity, it is absolutely necessary, that God should coexist with it.

Now will it not followe herence, that it is absolutely necessary, that God should not exist at all, and that by reason of his infinity? For to coexist with that which is impossible to exist, what is it, but not to exist at all? O what dangerous consequences doe your wilde assertions goe as it were with childe, withall; and howe fitt are such lettice for the lipps of

Atheists? marke how Durand discoursethe against this conceyte of yours, as when you say, that by reason of his infinity God must be every where.

Durand. 1.  
dist. 37. P. 1.  
quest. 1.

*Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse ubique, ita quod infinitas sua substantia sit ei, ratio ubique essendi. Si enim competeret Deo esse ubique ratione sua essentia infinita hinc competi ei esse necessario ubique, vel in loco infinito, & nullo modo finito, sicut a contrario dicitur de Angelo quod ratione sua essentia finite convenit ei esse in loco finito, & nullo modo in infinito.*

By the same reason we must say, it agreeth not to God to be every were, so as that the infinity of his substance, is unto him the reason of his being every where. For if it belonged to God to be every where in regard of his essence infinite, then necessarily he should be every where, or in an infinite place, and by no meanes in a finite place; like as on the contrary, it is sayde of an Angell, that in regard of his essence finite, it agreeth to him, to be in a finite place, by no meanes in a place infinite.

Secondly you tell us, that some Divines holde it possible, there may be a magnitude or materiall spheare actually infinite. But you doe not love to betray your Authors.

Petr. Hurtado de Mendosa. disp. in Vniversam Philosoph. Tract. de Infinito.

I have read in a late Spanish Iesuite a discourse to proove that *infinitum potest dare*. But in this he is a meere mountebanke, and affectator of singularities, I have hertofore read also in Hills Philosophia Lencippæa, Democritica, so bold an assertion as this, *That the World is infinite*; Otherwise, sayth he, the effect were not suitable to the cause. For God the Author of the World is infinite. But he was conscious of this his heterodoxy in the opinion of the World, & therefore would professe (as I have heard) that if in Oxford he should dispute thus, we in the Vniversitie would cry out for a Limitor, for this Infinitor.

And truly these and such like disputes, I reckon not woorthy to be named the same day, with the demonstrations that are brought to the contrary. And I may take libertie to professe thus much, how that observinge the Iesuite before spoken of, Hurtado di Mendosa by name, to affect subtilties and curiositie

curiositie of demonstration, in zeale of maynteyning the truth, which as Austin sometimes sayde, *A Deo dicitur verum quodcumque dicitur*; I tooke leave of my better studies, destinated to the mayntenance of Gods grace against all Pelagian, Iesuiticall, and Arminian oppositions, and to examine the arguments of Hurtado in that point, and went a large way in the solution of them, & confutation of his insolent assertion, until I thought it highe time to returne to such aliene meditations; considering it might be a practise of Satan, to cast a ball of provocation in my way, and thereby to cause a diversion, from more grave, more seasonable and more profitable contemplations. But yet I professe I never heard or read before of any that maynteyned the possibility of a Spheare to be infinite, as that which implyes a manifest contradiction. For figures beinge the boundes of quantities it shoulde imply a bounded quantitie without boundes. But in the fiction proposed, you say, every point shoulde be the center as pertakinge of the negative properties of a Center: that is, there shoulde be no inequality betweene the distances of severall points from the Circumference of that which is infinite as for example. Suppose the world were infinite Eastward, & infinite westward. Nowe consider a direct line passinge over S. Michaels mount to Dover and so forwards Eastward, & in like manner from Dover to Saint Michaels mount, and so forward, westward. From dover Eastward is infinite, and from Saint Michaels Eastward is but infinite. So then these two are equall that is the part is equall to the whole. For the line from Dover Eastward is but a part of the line from Saint Michaels Eastward in infinitum. This contradictious absurdity amongst many other, followeth upon supposition of any body or extension infinite. By the way observe a great incongruity; though you suppose a spheare infinite, yet you conceive it to have a Circumference. But to have a Circumference is not to be infinite. Touching the second difficultie, to witt, how the indivisibility of Gods presence in every place may be compared to a Center: You say, this comparison is right, in as much as God hath no diversitie of parts. And indeede

deede I finde no small uniformitie, betweene the beginning of this your discourse of Gods immensitie, and the end of it. For about the beginnunge you professed; that *No creature, no positive essence no numerably part of this Vniverse, was so like unto God as nothing*; And now you say, he is rightly resembled to a point; which every man knowes, is much about the same proportion, & quantitie of just nothing. For immensitie & eternitie no Angell so like unto God as *nothing*: & agayne for his indivisibilitie, you say he is rightly compared to a point, which is as much as nothing. Of the sobrietie of these your discourses, let the Reader judge. But you thinke to helpe the matter by saying, that *His presence agayne is like to magnitude actually infinite, in that it can have no circumference*. Now consider I pray, How will you make the Majestie of God amendes, for these your injurious comparisons, to witt, in comparing him, to magnitude actually infinite, which indeede is just nothing? For in the most generall opinion of Philosophers & Divines, magnitude actually infinite, is a thinge utterly impossible to have any beinge. And marke withall, how you contradict your selfe. For here you suppose, that magnitude infinite can have no circumference; & but a litle before, your discourse was of an infinite Spheare that had a circumference. At length notwithstanding your former assertion of justifyinge the comparing of Gods indivisible essence vnto a center, or point of magnitude; Nowe you confesse that the indivisibilitie of the one, and indivisibilitie of the other are heterogeneousall, and consequently asymetrical, the best Philosophicall truthe I have hitherto founde in your discourse. But least all this while you should seeme utterly extravagant in your incongruous comparisons of the nature of God to vile thinges, or rather to *Nothings*; first you mince this Philosophicall maxime, as when you say, *They are oftentimes asymetrical*; and then you corrupt it by interpretation as if *asymetrical* signified not absolutely incommensurable, but only not exactly commensurable. Whereas in truthe you shall as soone proove the Diameter of a square commensurable to his, side as to proove the indivisible nature of God commensurable to a point of quantitie. *Est quod-*



*dam indivisibile, (saith Durand, quod est aliquid quantitatis ut pun-* Durand. 1.  
*ctus: Aliud est indivisibile quod est totaliter extra naturam quan-* d. st. 17.  
*titatis, ut Deus.* What an absurd thing were it to compare the quest. 2.  
 soule of man to a point in a quantitie; the soule being so indivisible as to be all in all, & all in every part; how much more so to compare an Angell, most of all the divine Essence? And the soule of man is much fitter to represent God by (man being made after the image of God) and God is all in all, and all in every part of the world, but not as *forma informans*, as the soule is, and consequently neyther extended with the extension of the world, nor mooved at the motion of the world; nor any part therof. Hence you say it is that the most subtile Schoolemen or Metaphysicall Divines as well ancient as moderne, resolve it as a point irresoluble by humane wits, whether a mathematicall point or center, can be the complete, and definitive place of an Angell, albeit they holde the Angelicall natures to be as truly indivisible, as points or centers are.

I doubt there is litle truthe & sobriety in all this. If there be, I must confesse I was never acquainted with any of these concealed Schoolemen or Divines eyther ancient, or moderne, at least in these particulars; For you tell me that, which I never heard or read of before; yet I have bene acquainted with fopperyes more then enoughe, amongst them, & might have bene with more, if I had any minde thereunto. But for the most part I have ever shunned those trifling subtilties. But consider we the particulars, which here you give us a part. For to make your assertion good, you are to shewe, not only that these Schoolemen you intimate, doe holde the point you speake of irresoluble, but also that Hence they doe holde it so; that is, because the indivisibilitie of centers, or points, & of spirituall substances are heterogeneous and asymmetrall, that is, not exactly commensurable.

But let us consider the point it selfe, concerning a Mathematicall point. Now I pray consider this: As Mathematicall quantitie is herein distinct from quantity Physicall, because that is abstract from matter, this is not: so a Mathematicall point, must herein be distinct from a point Physicall, in as

much as that is abstract from matter, this is not.

Now quantity, and points Mathematicall thus abstract from matter, are but only in imagination. And doe the Scholemen, you speake of, maynteyne it as a point irresoluble, whether an Angell may be defined within a point of imagination only? what were this, but to have no being at all but in mans imagination? Wherefore you may be advised, to let the question runne rather of a point physicall, then of a point Mathematicall, unles you looke for some succour, from that rule of course *Mathematici abstrahunt, nec mentiuntur*.

Yet that woulde proove but a broken toothe and sliding foute, to keepe you from errour in this. But I thinke the Nominalls are those most subtile Schoolemen you speake of; I envy not the glory which you give them, be it as great as that which Scaliger passe the upon Scot, Occam, and Sincer. The nominalls are much magnified by Hurtado di Mendosa. And I finde in Gabriel Biel such a question as this, *Whether an Angell may determine unto himselfe a certeyne quantitie of place, in such sort as he cannot consist unto, or be defined by eyther a greater or a lesser*, and the answere is layde to be according to Occam in his *Quodlibets* 1. quest. 4. First that there may be given the greatest place of an Angell, so that he cannot extend himselfe to a greater. Secondly, there cannot be given the least place of an Angell, in such sort that he cannot define himselfe within a lesse. For my part I utterly dislike all these conceytes of an Angells power to extend or confine his owne essence: it seemes so opposite at first sight to a spirituall perfection, and so obnoxious to the imputation of corporall extension unto them. And I manifestly perceave how they puzzle themselves, in labouring to scatter such mists of scruples, as their owne fancies rayle, and are driven to professe, *Nihil in his materiis tam absconditis puto temere afferendum*. But let every man make his owne bed, and lye as soft as he can, I will not hinder any. But we are not hitherunto come to the point; you point at; yet neyther Physicall nor Mathematicall, but that which I meane is your point Philosophicall. (Pardon me, if I picke up by the way some crumes of meryment

Biel. 1.  
dist. 2. q. 1.

Gabriel. 1.  
dist. 2. q. 3.

to refresh my Spirit in so unpleasing an argument.) The reason why the least place, for an Angell to define unto himselfe, cannot be given is, because saythe he, *Possset coassistere loco punctuali pro eo quod ipse est indivisibilis.*

Now you see we are upon the matter; and withall quite off from your assertion. For even these Nominalls doe not holde it to be a point irresoluble, as you speake, but resolvable, and they actually resolve it for the affirmative, to witt Gabriel Biel, after Occam. Nowe what will you say if they resolve it for the negative, and so bothe wayes, namely both negatively and affirmatively, (which you say, they holde for a point irresoluble). And indeede they resolve it bothe wayes: for I have not tolde you all; They interpose a caution, & the caution is this, *Si possibile esset locus indivisibilis*: Whence you may easily guesse what their meaninge is; to witt, that indeede a punctuall and indivisible place cannot be existent, and consequently neyther can an Angell be defined therein, or coassiste therto; there is the resolution negative. But in case such a punctuall place were possible then an Angell might coassiste therto; there have you the resolution affirmative, in both opposite to this assertion of yours.

But who they be you speake of, that holde this point irresoluble, you conceale. And yet it may be, some such there are.

For as Cicero sometimes sayde; there was nothing so absurde, but had bene delivered by some or other of Philosophers: so the like may be verified of Schoolemen also: For amongst all kindes of humane writers there may be some vanities more or lesse, and some thinke most amongst Schoolemen; according to the censure passed upon them, *Ab hoc tempore Philosophia secularis sacram Theologiam sua curiositate multis sedari capit.* From Angells, you proceede to God, and without scruple maynteyne, that he is as properly in every Center as in every place; and I confesse the reason here added why you may say so, is very sounde, *seing we acknowledge him a like incomprehensibly and indivisibly in both.* For surely a man may say, that which he dothe acknowledge; but take no more

Ioan. Trit.  
Abbas  
Sphaerheimensis. P.  
Dialect.

along with you herein, then are willing to accompany you, & upon good termes.

Now Occam and Biel propose certeyne termes, and they are these, *si locus punctualis possibilis esset*. But if such a thing be not possible, to say that God is therein, is to say that God is in *nothing*, and so you returne to your old course of amplifyinge the immensitie, or indivisibilitie of the glorious essence of God that made us. And whereas we are willing to acknowledge that God is in all things as conteyninge them; I doe not finde that a point is of any conteynable nature. As for example, there is *punctus lineam terminans*; now suppose God conteynes the line, and conteynes not the point, shall the line herupon be without an ende? I professe I cannot finde any other thinge in the notion of such a point, but *negatio ulterioris tendentis*, and what neede harke this of the divine power to conteyne it? And surely the point which continueth a line, is nothing more then the center of the earthe, and of that you professe in the next chapter and second section, that it is a matter of nothing. *The manner of Gods indivisibility we conceive* (say you) *by his coexistence to a Center: his incomprehensiblenes, by his coexistence to all spaces imaginable; as much as to say.* The indivisibility and incomprehensiblenes of God, is best conceived, when we conceive his coexistence to such things as are founde only in imagination, or to things that are, but have no realitie in them. Now if God be all in all, and all in every part, is he not better conceived, by comparison with the soule of man, (which is made after the image of God) then by comparison to a base Center, or things in imagination only? especially seeing *Imaginatio non transcendit continuum*. If God were more in a great place then in a lesse; then it would followe that an Asses head shoulde participate the essentiall presence of the deitie (I speake in your owne instance and phrase) in greater measure, then a mans heart dothe. And doe not you affect some popular applause in this discourse of yours, the vulgar sort being apt to conceive the contrary, namely that a mans heart participates the essentiall presence of the deitie in greater measure, then an Asses head: and by the same

simereason; they may conceive that a mans head participates the essentiall presence of the deitie in greater measure, then an asses heart, which yet is as contrary to your assertion, as to the truth. But it is manifest hereby, more then enoughe, that your care is not so much for the investigation of truth, as to give satisfaction unto vulgar conceyte.

9. That Gods immensitie or magnitude, is not like magnitude corporall, as being without all extension of parts, as there is no doubt, so wee neede no great paynes to satisfie reason, how this may be; especially to every Scholar, that knowes but that received Axiome even amongst naturalists concerning the soule, namely, that she is all in all, and all in every part, not only in the least childe newe borne, but in the greatest Anakin that ever was, which in my opinion gives farre better satisfaction, then by multiplyinge bare woordes, as in sayinge *God is unitie it selfe, infinity it selfe, immensitie it selfe, perfection it selfe, power it selfe*, which serve neyther for prooffe nor for illustration. But if we goe about to satisfie imagination, we shall never come to an ende. For *Imagination transcends not that which is continuall*, and hath extension of parts; and all your courtes of illustration hitherunto have inclined this way. You speake in your owne phrase when you say that all these before mentioned, to witt, *unitie, infinity, immensity, perfection, power* are branches of quantitie; whereas we have more just cause to professe that no quantitie is to be found in God, no more then materiall constitution is to be found in him. We make bolde to attribute unto God *quantitatem virtutis*, quantitie of vertue and perfection; but every scholar should knowe that *Analogum per se positum stat pro famosiore significato*. And yet to speake more properly, the quantity of God, which we call *quantitatem virtutis*, and the quantity of bodies, which we call *quantitatem motus*, quantitie of extension, have no proportion at all betweene them; but the terme of quantitie attributed to both, is merely equivocall. It is true, that if God were not, nothing could be, for as much as all other things have their being from him. But it is a very incongruous course, in my judgement, which you take, by multiplyinge of quanti-

tie materiall, to guesse of Gods immensitie. And yet you  
 should have observed a better decorum in your phrase, if in-  
 steede of *multiplication*, you had put in the woord *amplification*.  
 For immensitie is rather magnitude infinite then multitude.  
 I cannot away with that which you subjoine, *that imaginary in-*  
*finity of succession or extension should be a beame of that stable in-*  
*finitenes which God possesseth*. Hertofoe you called it a sha-  
 dowe, nowe a beame. And is this a proper course, to runne  
 out to the imagination of things impossible to represent God  
 by? For wherto tendeth this, but to conceive him infinite,  
 first by way of extension, which is quite contrary to spiritual  
 perfection, and secondly after such a manner as is utterly im-  
 possible to be. Yet such courses, all they must needs take,  
 that seeke out to satisfie imagination. For *imaginatio* as we  
 commonly say in Schooles *non transcendit continuum*. You  
 proceede to shewe how Gods immensitie hath no diversitie  
 of parts; and your argument intends to drawe to an inconve-  
 nience as many as maynteyne the contrary. But the incon-  
 venience which you inferre depends only upon peradventure  
 thus. *A concurrence of all parts in number infinite, would per-*  
*haps be impossible*; why then perhaps it would not be impossi-  
 ble; and what then shall become of your argument. Besides  
 this; the whole frame of your argument is untound. For in-  
 finite natures, such as man is, there is no necessitie of the con-  
 currence of all parts to the performing of all actions, no nor  
 to the performing of any action. As for example if he gives  
 himselfe to study and meditate, there is no necessary use of  
 other then of the inward faculties of his minde. If he playeth  
 upon the Lute, there is no use of his legges and feete. If he  
 fighteth with his enemies, there is no use of his tongue or  
 teethe, nor so much use of his legges as of his handes, though  
 sometimes one payre of leggs is better then two payre of han-  
 des, yet not to fight, but to runne away rather; though *αὐτὸς*  
*ὁ Φεύγων πάλιν μαχίσται*, as Demosthenes sometimes  
 sayde, being put to his witts to save the credite of his cou-  
 rage. Indeepe if God were not as he is, he could not be so  
 omnipotent as he is, we neede no paynes at all to proove  
 this.

10. We are never so safe in matter of divinitie, as when we goe along with scripture, & one place may easily prevent the mistaking of another, if we give our selves to the due consideration of it, and submit unto those meanes which God hath appoynted for our edification. And the Scriptures represent his being every where in respect of two things. 1. In respect of knowinge all things, as *Why sayest thou o Iacob and speakest o Israel. My way is hid from the Lord, and my judgement is passed over my God. Knowest thou not, or hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God the Lord hath created the ends of the Earthe, &c.* 2. In respect of his power conteyning them, as *Whither shall I goe from thy Spirit, or Whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend into Heaven thou art there, &c. Let me take the wings of the Morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea, yet thither shall thine hand lead me, and thy right hand hold me.*

Eccl. 40. 17.  
28.

Psa. 139. 7  
8. 9. 10.

But to talke of Gods essence penetrating and diffused, is to vent such phrased, as I dare not adventure on, I have already tolde you, what I have read to the contrary, in some, naming my Author, as you take libertie to doe the like, without naming of them.

*Quando dicimus (sayth Durand) Deum esse in rebus, non intelligimus eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam, vel intrinsecus rem penetrantem, ut magis infra patebit: sed intelligimus eum esse presentem rei non solum secundum durationem, quia est, quando res sunt nec secundum contactum corporalem, quoniam non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, sed secundum ordinem, qui in Spiritibus tenet locum sicut in corporibus. In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus situm in corporibus, quia persitum se habet unum corpus ad aliud immendiat, quoad sui extremum: sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quod libet sui: saltem non est hoc dubium de Spiritu increato scilicet de Deo, quicquid sit de aliis: propter quod potest dici esse non solum juxta res, sed in rebus. And agayne in a question following, Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse ubique, ita quod infinitas sua substantia sit ei ratio ubique essendi: sed est ubique solum ratione suorum effectuum (ut dictum fuit in precedente questione. Si enim*

Durand. 2.  
dist. 37.  
part. 1. q. 3

Ibid. p. 1.  
q. 1.



*competeret Deo esse ubique ratione sua essentia infinita, tunc competeret ei esse necessario ubique vel in loco infinito, & nullo modo finito, sicut à contrario dicitur de Angelo, quod ratione sua essentia finita convenit ei esse in loco finito, & nullo modo infinito. Esse autem ubique non est esse in loco infinito. Ergo infinitas Divina essentia non est ipsi ratio essendi ubique, quod tamen assumebat ratio aliorum.*

In a word, I have no edge to cast my selfe upon any curious inquisition hereabouts, because errours are dangerous about the nature of God, cyther in denyinge unto him, what is be-  
seeming him, or ascribing such things unto him, as doe un-  
become him; which in the Schooles are accounted cer-  
teyne kindes of blasphemies.

I content my selfe with the simplicitie of Scripture institu-  
tion; which professeth, that God filleth Heaven and Earthe,  
and this undoubtedly is true, as Durand sayth in respect of  
Gods effects, wherewith he filleth all things; as also that  
he knoweth all things, that he cannot be any where as con-  
teyned, but is every where as conteyninge, governing, orde-  
ringe, working the good pleasure of his will, in and by all  
things.

Now whether God conteyneth all things by his penetra-  
tive and diffused essence, and not rather by his power and  
will, let every sober Reader judge.

Before the World was, God was in himselfe, and so he is  
still; how his power is extended to the making and contoy-  
ninge of his creatures, I easily conceive, but how his essence  
is extended, I conceive not. I conclude with those old  
verses,

*Dic ubi tunc esset, cum prater eum nihil esset,*

*Tunc, ubi nunc, in se, quoniam sibi sufficit ipse.*

## CHAP. VI.

*Of Eternity, or of the branch of absolute infinities, whereof Successive Duration of the imaginary infinity of time is the modell.*

I See no reason to subscribe unto the proposition where-  
 with you begin your discourse on this Argument, as tou-  
 ching the exact proportion betweene immensity and eternity.  
 For Gods immēlity is that whereby he is *ubiq;* or every where,  
 like as by his eternity he is *semper* or alwayes: But to be every  
 where supposeth the creations, but to be *semper* alwayes, doth  
 not: For God was alwayes ever before the world: Againe  
 God in proper speech hath true being, and consequently true  
 Duration of Being, which having neyther beginning nor en-  
 ding is properly eternall. But God in proper speech hath no  
 quantity, and consequently neyther extension, and so in proper  
 speech cannot be coumpted immense, which signifieth exten-  
 sion without beginning and end; and having no extension at  
 all, being merely spirituall and not materiall. And ere you  
 turne over a new leafe, your self make doubt, whether Time  
 hath the same proportion to eternity, as magnitude created  
 hath to Divine Immensity. In a word, I doe not beleive you  
 are like to find so many nothings to resemble God by in this  
 argument of eternity as you did devise in the other of *Immen-  
 sitie*. That saying of Tettullia you mention, is no more appliable  
 to Gods eternity as tis sayd *he was to himselfe Time*, then to his  
 immensity, as 'tis therein sayd *he was unto himselfe a World*;  
 And for ought I see, God is so still, and not onely was so be-  
 fore all things; in as much as he hath no more need of them,  
 then before all things he had. You say we cannot properly  
 say God was in time before the world was made; I say such  
 a speech in my judgement seemes to be neyther proper nor  
 improper; but dicetly false, even as false, as to say God was in  
 place before he made the world: For before the world  
 was made there was neyther time nor place: Nowe he is in  
 S neither

neyther as conteyned in them, but only as conteyning both time and place, which before the World, absolutely were not at all, & consequently could not be conteyned by him. I doe not think that Austin himselve was conscious of any acutenes in inferring that God could not have bene before all times, if he had alwayes bene in time; for common sense doth iustifie, that that legge which was ever in the stockes, was never out of the stockes. But whereas you say, that we believe God to be *as truly before all times future, as before all times past*, & seeme to affect it as a subtilty of opinion herein.

I willingly professe, that if it be a subtilty, it is of so subtle a sense, as quite passeth mine intelligence: I had thought it might be avouched of every thing that is past, that it is before all times to come: And that all future things are behind the things that are past.

Neither had I thought any reason needfull to be given of this: because common sense, I think doth iustifie it.

Yet you seeme to make this a peculiar propertie of God, that like as he is before all times past, so also he is before all times to come.

Yet I gesse at your meaning: For we now existent, albeit we are before the things that are to come, yet it is not necessary, that we should be after them. But God as he is before all, so, if it please him, he may be after all; For God is that which was, & is, & is to come; that is, which shall be, and that for ever of himselfe.

Now this phrase, to be after all, in a sublimare streyne of conceyt attributed unto God, is more truly and perfectly to be accompted his being before all, then after all, in your opinion, as it seemes; like as the Heavens invironning the Earth, though they seeme to sense to be under the Earth, and under our Antipodes, yet indeed they are above them; So God in being after all things future, is more properly and truly to be accompted before them.

This mystery I seeme to find by your subsequent discourse and I wonder what you meane to carry your selfe so in the cloudes, when you might have exprest your selfe playnly.

And

And surely it is no glory to affect a lofty understanding of your owne phrase, above the apprehension of your Reader; when your termes are not sufficient to expresse your meaning. This is to equivocate like the Iesuites. Of that conceyt of yours I will prepare my selfe to consider against the time, I shall arrive to your more full discourse thereof, in the parts subsequent of this Chapter.

In the next place you propose a conclusion which is this, *His eternity then is the inexhaustible founteyne or Ocean, from which time or Duration successive doth perpetually flow.*

But I can neither iustifie this inference, nor the truth of the proposition inferred: For I know not from what premises of yours, it can be inferred.

That, which went immediately before, was this: *God is before all times future, as well as all times past;* Now to inferre that God was before all time, therefore all time flowes from his eternity, is no good consequence. You might as well argue thus. God was before all place, therefore all places flowes from Gods eternity. We our selves are before all times that are to come; but herehence it followes not, that all times to come flow from our eternity, or from us.

Suppose Angells had bene made before the World, yet would it not thence followe that the World did flow from them.

Now for the proposition it selfe inferred, it is subject to exceptions divers wayes. The phrase, *to flow*, fauoureth of a natural & necessary emanation, & so much the more when it is resembled by the flowing of water from a founteyne. But nothing created doth in such sort flow from God.

Naturall emanations from God are not to be found but in God, and that in respect of the Persons; the Sonne being naturall and necessarily begotten of the Father, & the H. Ghost naturally and necessarily proceeding both from the Father & the Sonne.

Again, the water that floweth from the founteyne or from the Ocean, is of the same nature with the founteyne, or with the water of the Ocean, so is not time of the same nature,

with eternity from whence, you say, it flows.

Agayne it is untrue that eternitie produceth time or duration of things created : for the duration of them is nothing els, but the continuance of their existence.

Therefore looke what produceth the things themselves, & maynteynes them, being produced, from thence they are to be accounted to have their beginning. Now it is the power and will of God, whereby things are created and preserved, & not the eternitie of God. *By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made, & all the host of them by the breath of his mouth.* We no where read, that by the eternitie of God all things were made, Angells and Men, Heaven and Earth.

Ioh. 1.

And so likewise as by his word he made all things, so by the power of his mighty word he supports all things. Heb. 1. And therefore all things both touching their being and duration, depend upon the mighty word of God : this we have ground for : But that they depend upon his eternitie, we have no ground to affirme ; though it is true that both God, and his Word, and Spirit are eternall, otherwise he could not be the Creator of the World. Vpon the back of this, you come in with a new Paradox, namely that *From all eternitie, there was a possibility for us to be* ; as if it were possible for a creature to be from all eternitie.

Yet I know some Scholemen have maynteyned it (as what will not wild wits dare to undertake) : but doth it therefore become a Divine, to suppose it without all prooffe ? I hold it to be impossible, and Durands reasons to the contrary are more pregnant, in my judgement, then any that are brought for it : to witt, that then, yeares and months, dayes and hours should be equall ; for each of them, even yeares, should be infinite, and dayes, and houres, yea and minutes past, should be but infinite ; whence he inferres, that to every minute should be equall to an yeare, and albeit he invadeth only eternitie of things in motion ; yet I see no reason to the contrary, for the argument is appliable as well to all created things, though not subject to motion, though the evidencie of deduction is not so manifest as in case of motion.

I know

I know well that Aquinas enterteyned the opinion of this possibility, out of zeale to uphold the credit of Aristotle in some measure. But then taking upon him to reconcile seeming contradictions in his opuscula, and one of them being this; If the World were eternall, then the soules of men past were infinite, supposing the immortality of them; according to the opinion of Aristotle: And both Aristot. as well as Aquinas himselfe hold it impossible that there should be *infinitum actu* cyther in number or in magnitude: Mark how he reconciles this, and what course he takes to prevent an infinite number of soules; Though the World, and Man (sayth he) had bene everlasting, yet the first man might have bene preserved without generation for an infinite space of time, & not begin to generate till about six thousand yeares agoe.

By this let every sober man judg to what shifts this great Schoolman was put to salve this opinion of a possibilitie, of the worlds being eternall from contradiction. To this you adde that in like sort *our actuall being or existence whiles it lasts, is composed of a capacity to be what we are, and of the actualization or filling of this capacity*; you might well say so. or in like sort, for there seemes as like truth in this as in the former. Man as he is *unum per se* is sayd to consist *ex potentia et actu*, which is as much as to say *ex materia et forma rationali*; which Maxim had a capacity of receaving this forme, upon whose conjunction doth arise that compositum, which we call a man, and as it had a power, so an appetite thereunto, all which was conteyned under that *principium generationis* which is called *Privatio*. According to that saying *Materia appetit formam sicut femina virum*. But the particular appetite being satisfied with the forme, it no longer remayneth, nor the capacity to receive it, that time being now past. But rather an appetite there is in the matter to a new forme, by corruption of the present compound, which is the naturall ground of mans mortality. And the generall appetite of matter is never satisfied.

Much lesse is this capacity a part, whereof man doth consist. For every Philosopher knowes that the capacity of the

matter belongs to that *principium generationis* which is called *privatio*. Now *Privatio*, though it be *principium generationis* as well as *Materia & forma*; yet is it not *principium compositi*. *Ex tribus principiis Homo generatur? ex duobus tertium componitur?* But perhaps you speake not of the capacity of the matter to receive a forme, which is proper only to compound substances; But of the *possibility of Being*, before they are, which is extended even to Angels. But then I say much lesse is the nature of man to be sayd, composed of such a capacity; for this capacity is not so much as *potentia physica*, but a onely *potentia logica*, to witt, *negatio repugnantia*, as when we say 'twas possible the world should be, before it was, for it implyes no contradiction: For Gods almighty power was able to make it out of nothing. So it was possible that Angels should be before they were. In like sort it was possible, that man should be, before he was. But neyther man nor Angels can be sayd to be composed of such a possibility; or of such a capacity, for that were to say that a reall & positive thing is composed of that which is neyther reall nor positive. And it is impossible that a thing not reall or positive should be a part of that which is reall & positive. But yet, you may say, All created things consist *ex potentia & actu*, be they never so simple and uncompound, as the very Angels themselves, God alone is *Actus purus* voyd of all passive power. But as touching this power by your leave, I take it not to be spoken in respect of the potentiallity going before the Act, which you saye is actuated; but rather in respect of a potentiallity consequent to the Act, or concomitant with it, as we couceave it of such a nature as may cease to be, or be destroyed.

Or last of all, it may proceed in respect of the distinction between essence and existence, which is found in all things beside God himselfe: In which respect they are sayd to consist *ex potentia et actu*, which kind of composition, as I remember, is called *Metaphysica*; and it extends to all created things in distinction from all other compositions whatsoever, which are peculiar to some more then to others. But in what congruity this capacity may be sayd to be filled, when essence is actuated



actuated by existence, I comprehend not. For to be filled, presupposeth the existence of that which is to be filled. And existence seemes rather to conteyne essence, then essence, existence. But most paradoxicall of all is it, that existence should be composed of capacity, and the actuation or filling of it: Whereas existence, in my judgement, is rather the actuation formall of essence, then is composed thereof.

In the next place you tell us, *that life (especially sensitive) is but the motion or progresse of this capacity towards that which fills it; or as it were, a continuall sucking in of present existence, or continuation of actuall being, from somewhat preexistent.* I think there is a liberall error in this, and instead of *life sensitive*, as I take it, there should be *life vegetative*. Now this doctrine of yours is wonderous strange. There is a motion & progresse in life vegetative by waye of augmentation, but not by waye of generation.

Neyther hath the existence of any vegetable, much lesse man, any degrees: Neyther is it of the nature of any substantiall forme, much lesse of a soule, least of all of the reasonable soule, to be brought in, much lesse to be sucked in, by degrees.

And if our existence be present, as you call it, how can it be sucked in? For we suck in that which we have not; not that which we already have. Neyther could we have power to suck in ought, much lesse the actuall sucking in of ought, unless already we had existence: For without existence presupposed there can be no motion. And of degrees of existence, especially of substantiall formes, or of the things compounded of them, I never heard till now: Degrees, or rather a graduall extension of quantity is gotten by that act of vegetation which is called growth or augmentation. So then, not existence, simply, but of quantity rather; nor the existence of quantity neyther, but a greater extension thereof is sucked-in by things that growe: Neyther is this extension sucked in; but rather matter of nourishment is sucked in, which by the peculiar operation of the soule is first fitted for nourishment divers & sundry wayes, and after that converted into nourishment, & appropriated to each part; and after that by another peculiar property

property of the soule, there flowes from it augmentation of quantity; which is not suckt in from without, but only the materials of it: This wild phraſe and manner of ſpeech of yours, if it proceed, is ſufficient to corrupt all Philoſophy, & not Divinity only.

The next point, I confeſſe, is no Paradox, when you ſaye, *Except the vegetables by which our liſt is continued, had exiſtence before they become our nutriment, they could not poſſibly nourish us.* This, I ſay, is moſt true: for if they had not being before, they were juſt nothing; and it is impoſſible that that which is nothing, ſhould nourish any thing.

Naye, if they had not theyr being before, they ſhould have no being at all: for Milk or Bread if it had no being before it nourish us; ſurely it hath no being of milk or bread when it doth nourish us, by being converted into fleſh and bone; for then ſurely, it is neyther milke nor bread. The next aſſertion is very obſcure, if at all it hath any truth in it, as when you ſay, *Theſe vegetables themſelves cannot exiſt, unleſs they did draw theyr exiſtence or continuance of their being, from that which did exiſt before them, and unto which they doe by motion or continuance of theyr being approach:* For you propoſe this of liſe vegetative, which is found in plants as well as men; and the matter of theyr nourishment is only the moyſture or fatnes of the earth; which fatnes of the earth, how it drawes exiſtence or continuance of its being ſo much as in your ſenſe, I cannot conceive; ſc. Matter of mans nourishment, Honey, and ported butter, and poudred beefe, and bacon, and biſker, how they draw it from that whereunto by motion or continuance of theyr being they approch: Wherein you ſeeme to have a ſublimat conceyte, reſolving the continuance of all things into the operation of God: But, by your leave, they doe not draw theyr continuance from God; God gives it rather, and that by naturall meanes, whereby things are preſerved from putrefaction, which is the deſtruction of theyr being: Which preſervation againſt putrefaction, is either in the nature of the things themſelves, which God by an ordinary naturall courſe hath wrought in them; or by the Art of Men: Which

Which you resolving without more ado into the operation of God carry your selfe not like unto a Philosopher; but like unto that Grammarian who being demanded by a gardenier what should be the reason, why weeds thrived so fast notwithstanding all his care to weed them out; and pluck them up by the rootes; when good herbes prospered so slowly notwithstanding all his care, not only to plant them, but being planted to water them, and to manure the ground that bare them; Derived the reason of all this from the providence of God; Whereat a Philosophes standing by laughed, not that he despised the Providence of God, but because he conceived there was a more immediate reason thereof, though it also were subordinate to the providence of God, and that was this. As for the weeds that grow of themselves, the earth is a natural mother unto them; but as for the herbes that were planted in her bosome, she was but a step-mother unto them; & ergo: no merveyle if she mainteyned her owne children, her owne fruits brought forth by her better, then strange children brought unto her to be fostered by her. But be it as you intimate, that all things draw theyr existence and continuation of their being from God; but how will you unfold that mystery of yours that followes, namely, that by motion or continuation of their being they approach unto God? For I have read, that the Crow liveth out nine mens lives (measuring every age to be an 100. yeares) and that the Hart liveth thrice as many yeares as the Crow; and that the Raven trebleth the Harts endurance; whence came that Theophrastus his complaint of natures inequality, that to Harts and Crows had given so long time of continuance, which was denied unto man: what shall we say therfor that these have approached nearer unto God then Man? Perhaps you will say, yes, in respect of Gods eternitie: Why but herein, your selfe shalbe brought to plead against your selfe; For in the eight sect: of your former chap. discoursing how the center of Gods immensity might be sayed to be every where; you gave this reason or exemplification of it; that be supposing a spere infinite, every point is equally removed from the circumference; as per the

T

case,

case, S. Michaells mount should be as neere to the circumference Eastward as Dover, and consequently Dover as far of as S. Michaells mount, though the whole bredth of England lye between them.

And by the same reason the life of a Raven shall be as far of from eternity, as the life of a Hart, and the durance of an Hart as farre from eternity as the Durance of a Crow, though three times as much; & the durance of a Crow as far of from eternity, as the durance of a Man, though nine times as much.

In the next place, as by waye of inference, you adde: *So that future times and all things conteyned in time it selfe, presuppose a fountaine of life.* I will not trouble my selfe with your inference: What such move you to make choyce of future times to instance in, rather of times in generall, whether future, present, or past?

I doubt preexistence to future times is in your imagination a very mysterious point; & such as you are loath your Reader should be acquainted with: For as Aristotle sayeth of Fallacies, *εἰς τὸ εὖ δεικνύμενον*, to discover them, is to solve them; so you may feare, the bare discovery of your conceyt may be enough to discredit it. And yet, to shew how well you please your telfe in it, you say that *this fountayne of life, presupposed to future times, and all things conteyned in them, is as truly preexistent to their future terminations, as it was to their beginnings.*

How will you construe this sentence, and accommodate it to future times, whereupon notwithstanding it proceeds, as well as of things conteyned in time, both touching the terminations of them, which are future, and touching the beginnings of them which are past? Surely you cannot; ergo: the latter part of the sentence must be accomodated not to *future times* wherewith you began this sentence, but to *all things conteyned in time it selfe*. And these indeed have had beginnings which are past, and we doe expect future terminations or imptions of them, according to the parts of future time, so long as time it selfe shall last.

But what is this strang assertion you are impregnated withall, when you deliver it as a rare and curious conceyt, that things conteyned in time doe suppose a fountaine of life not only to the beginnings of them, but allso to their future terminations and motions. Whereas to my poore conceyt, if a founteyne of life be presupposed to things past, it must be presupposed allso to things to come: And there is no curiosity in this; the inference rather is most vulgar; For seeing future things are behind things past, *quod est prius priori* must needs be *prius posteriori*; yet, that which is before a former thinge, must needs be before a latter thinge.

Hence you proceede (whether by following on, or falling of, lett the Reader judge) to censure that common saying, *Tempus edax rerum*, as relishing more of poetickall witt, then of Metaphysicall truth. For which kind of censure delivered by you, I find no just reason; For what? can no truth satisfie you, but that which is Metaphysicall? And why you should make such an opposition I know not; as if what I ever relished not of Metaphysicall truth, were no truth, but rather of Poeticall witt: and whatsoever relished of poetickall witt, did not relish of truth. You maye as well censure Aristotles Physicks, and Ethicks, and Politiques, and Rhetoricks, for surely they doe not relish of Metaphysicall truths; no nor Euclides Mathematicks; no nor of Poeticall witt neyther; belike they are liable to a double censure.

Yet what think you? cannot Poeticall witt have course in conjunction with truth, as well as in separation from it? *Nec fingunt omnia Cretæ*. No nor Poets neyther. And as for this saying, *Tempus edax rerum*: I never knew any sober man; or other except against the truth of it before: But if you will put a construction upon it at your pleasure, to shew your witt in refuting it; you shall therein play the part of a Poet rather then the Philosopher; for some of them have taken a course to shape stories, according to the use they had to make of them, and not to followe the direct truth: and this hath bene sayd to be the difference betweene Sophocles and Euripides: And herein they were like to Mathematicians of whom it is

sayd *Mathematici abstrahunt nec meminiuntur*: And abstracting a line from the matter of it, they may adde to it, or take from it what they list: So you construe this saying, *Tempus edax rerum*, as if it were delivered in proper speech, and not by a figure; whereas the meaning is Synecdochicall; that in course of time things doe consume and wast, not that time it selfe doth wast them; For time being the duration of things; how can the duration of a thing consume it selfe?

Yet is your reason whereby you oppose this common saying very loose, as when you say, *If time did devour things, what could possibly nourish them or continne them from their beginning to their end.* And that in two respects; for neyther the saying signifies that time should devoure the, before the time appoynted for the consumption of them: And though time did consume them, yet some thing els might continue them; For their owne natures wherein God hath made them, are for a time apt to resist that which laboureth to corrupt them. And other meanes also there are for the preservation of the: As man by using meanes for his preservation may hold out longer then he which useth none; neither did the Authors or approvers of that saying, *Tempus edax rerum*, ever conceit that any thing should desire the destruction of it selfe, as you are pleased to rove in impugning it: And look in what sense time doth not destroy, but things are destroyed in time. In the same sense, things temporall have not the continuation of their being from time, but from somewhat els in time. For when things are preserved, by the witt and industry of man from putrefaction, they doe not receive this preservation of theirs from time, but from the wit and industry of man: And ergo: as time doth not wast, so neither doth time preserve from wasting.

It is a paradox if not a manifest untruth, rather to say that the motions of things themselves, and their endeavours, to enjoy or entertaine time approaching, is that which doth wast and consume them; For albeit in man sometimes you find such causes of consumption, yet in all other creatures inferior unto man, as beasts of all sorts, how can you make it good that they

they out of a desire and endeavour to entertheyne time doe wast themselves, who know not so much as what time is? How much lesse will you be able to make it good in vegetables of all sorts, as plants and trees, and in all sorts of mixt bodies? Nay, how will you make it good in man? Some die by course of nature, and that eyther through age or sicknes; when a man of 100. yeares old dieth, what motion or endeavour is there in him to entertheyne that wasted him? and how will you prove, that had not this motion or endeavour of his bene (as all endeavours are voluntary and free) he might have lived longer.

When God sent a pestilence among the Israelites, that in the space of 3. dayes swept away 70. thousand; was it a motion of theirs, or an endeavour to entertheyne time, that consumed them? Nay, when any disease proves mortall, how can it appeare that when one man died of an Ague, another of the Dropsie, another of the squinancy, another of the plurisie, another of the consumption, that all of them died of a certeyn disease, called theyr motions and endeavours to enjoy and entertheyne time approching: A disease, that I think was never knowne to Hipocrates or Galin, or any Physician before or since. I should think the desease of Pastime should wast us more then the desease of enjoying Time. Others come to theyr ends by violent deathes, some in warre, some by course of justice, others by private malice: In all these I find my selfe in the bryers, and cannot possiblie conceive, how mens owne motions and endeavours to enjoy time should wast or consume them; or in case a man makes a waye with himselfe by hanging drowning or poysoning. Not altogether so wild is that conceyt of yours which followeth, in saying *we naturally seeke to catch time*. Yet wild enough; for it is untrue that men catch Time; they catch opportunity, which is *Kairos* and not a litle differing from *Zeiton*. Now opportunity is only an advantage of doing something conveniently offered to us in the course of Time. As it is good to make hay while the sun shineth, ergo; I will roundly sett my selfe to the making of Hay, while this opportunity is offered, wherein I catch not



time but opportunity; for the Time were the same in case it rayned, but the opportunity for making of Hay were not the same, because the wether in that case were not the same; And Hay-making requires sayr wether.

Who they are, who acknowledge no difference between Time and Motion, I know not; I should think no man so blockish as to confound them, seeing motion it selfe may be of more or lesse continuance in respect of Time, as well as any thing els, And in the same Time somethings more or lesse slowly, something more swiftly, some in one kind of motion, some in another: But of divers kinds of time, that should belong to things moved, with divers kinds of motions, I never heard that any Philosopher hath discoursed.

Aristotle I confesse, defines time to be *numerus motus secund. prius & posterius*; but this is not to confound time with motion, but rather to distinguish the one from the other: For he gives a far other definition of motion it selfe: And albeit the time of every temporall thing be the duration of it, whether it resteth or moveth, yet if the questions be made how long such a thing hath continued; or when such a thing beganne to be, or ceased to be; We have no better meanes to answer it, then by numbring the revolution of the Sun, if we will shew how many yeares; or of the Moone, to shew how many moneths; or of the Diurnall motion of the Heavens, to shew how many dayes agoe such a thing was done, or began, or ceased to be; or to shew how many dayes, or moneths, or yeares any thing hath continued: & ergo: Aristotle in his Physicks considering time as the measure, in such sort as hath bene expressed, gives a definition suitable, in saying it was *numerus motus per prius & posterius*. Which definition when your true Philosophie shall med, we shalbe so ingenuous as to give congruous respect unto it.

As you beganne, so you proceed to acquaint us with your subtleties in Philosophie concerning time, *Motion* (you say) in true observation goes one waye, and drives time another way, as the streame which runnes Eastward, turnes the wheele Westward.

This curiositie is worth the examining, it may minister some merry matter of refreshment unto us, which in my judgement, your reader hath no litle need of to take him of from too sad and serious attention in tracking your obscure phrase, and treading out therence some morzell of good meaning.

I thinke you speak of motion circular, and that of the heavens, because nothing so fitt to notifie unto us Time, as that, and of such motion you speak as immediately before you have signified: Well then; The circular motion of the Heavens goeth one way, and drives Time another way: Before you told us that Motion notifies Time, here you say, It drives Time; but how? Not the same way, but another way as the streames which runnes Eastward, drives the wheele Westward: And which way, I pray doth Time passe: Eastward or Westward? As there is a motion of the heavens, that makes the daye, which is from East to west; so there is a motion of the Sun which makes the yeare, and that motion is from West to East; doth each motion drive time a different way or the same way? Again each motion is not onely from East to West, as the first, and from West to East as the second; but the first is againe from West to East, and the second is againe from East to West; You have not told us, which way Time is driven by motion; and ergo: being to seeke, you drive our inquisition divers wayes, and perhaps all different from your owne; And all because you will not acquaint is with the waye you conceave to your selfe, ergo; you drive us other wayes, as the motion drives time: Let us see whether we can have any help from your comparifon.

The streame, you saye, *running Eastward drives the wheele Westward*; Now this seemes to us untrue, & so farre forth as it may be tolerated for true, surely it drivs the wheel no more Westward then Eastward: First I saye it is not true: For the wheele by the streame is turned neyther Eastward nor Westward but round; Now to move Eastward or Westward is to move *motu recto* a streight motion, but to move round is not to move *motu recto*, but *orbiculari*, not by a streight motion, but circular: Yet because circular motions may be sayd to be  
towards

towards the East or towards the West, & so the motion of the wheele may be (as you say it is) Westward; yet then I say it is no more Westward then Eastward, as it is manifest in all circular motions: And indeed the river moving according to his naturall course drives the wheele before it, but the wheele being round, moves round, not onely Eastward as the river goes, but Westward also; For to move circularly towards the East in respect of some parts, is to move circularly towards the West also in respect of other parts, not Westward only or principally so as to give the denomination of a motion Westward, rather then of a motion Eastward.

But all this while we have not found which way Time is driven in your opinion: For sure your meaning is not that time is driven circularly (though I have observed you to discourse of circular duration.) And my reason is this: if the motion from East to West should drive Time another way of motion circular; then seeing that motion which makes the day is contrary to that motion which constitutes the year, it would follow, that the time of the day should goe a way quite contrary to the Time of the year: And as little reason to drive time another way, in respect of direct motion.

For there is no reason whie the way of Time should be towards the East, rather then towards the West, or contrariwise; and why rather eyther of these ways, then towards the North or towards the South.

And no mervayle, seeing the way of place is one thing, & the way of time another: For though the streame run directly Eastward, and turne a wheele round; 'tis nothing strang, sith both are bodies apt to moove, and the streame apt to run downward, and a wheele apt to be turned round. But time is not a bodie that it can move any waie.

And this reflects my thoughtes upon the consideration of another incongruity, as when you say, *motion goes one way*; you might as well have sayd, motion moves one way; whereas it is the bodie that moves, & motion is the act of it, but it selfe moves not.

Yet there is a proper way for a body moving, & so for motion.

motion. And it may be there is a proper way for time: as when that which is to come becomes present time, and present time, becomes past time; as this yeare the last yeare was to come, now it is present, and after a while it will be past: So all the way of time is this, & shalbe, it is, it was: one after another.

And (by your leaves) motion drives it no more then rest: If the Heavens should stand still, yet might things continue still the same time that God hath appointed them, as well as in the case of theys motion.

Neyther is it true; that our *actuell* existence slides from us with time; our being still continueth the same, by your leave, and not our capacity of being onely; For *Socrates senex non differt a Socrate puero* according to our Vniversity learning, which whether it be true Philosophie or no, let the Reader judge; I say, he differs not in substance, I doe not say, he differs not in accidents: I doubt not but Socrates was auncienter in his old age, then in his child-hood, and different both in quantity of bodie, and quality of mind; But I see no reason but his existence was still the same: And as for capacity of being, I see no reason why that should have any place where being allready is: As for substantiall actuation of capacity of Being (which you make to be continuall) after a man hath his being I know none; Neyther am I conscious of any such desire; and it is strang to me, that you should be more privy to my desires then my selfe. I desire to encrease in knowledge, and to grow in grace and goodnes, and in favour with God and man.

But of any desire of actuation or replenishment (as you speak) of the capacity of being, I am nothing conscious to my selfe: Neyther can I acknowledge any new coexistence (with time approaching in respect of any mutation of my existence) but in regard that times doe change and succeed one another, I may be sayd to coexist anew with them, because they coexist anew with me.

Neyther doe I know any such office of time as you devise to be assigned to it by eternitie, as to repayr that ruine which

*tions present or past, have wrought in our corruptible substance.*

No marvel that you could not brook that time should be accounted *edax rerum*: For now I perceive you maynteyne time to be *reparatrix rerum*, yea the curer of diseases; For to repayre the ruines which motion hath made in our corruptible substances, what is it but to cure diseases? So that time is a simple of more sovereigne virtue, then I was ware of; but I know not whether it were ever knowne to Hippocrates or Galen; I doubt it was not; And that *tempus* is *edax rerum*, hath better authority to confirme it I think, then that it is *reparatrix rerum*: And consider in reason; time is the duration of things temporall, whence it cometh to passe, that the very ruines themselves which are wrought in our corruptible substances have theyr time, that is, theyr duration; so have all diseases: Now lett any sober man judge, whether the duration of such a ruine, such a disease, be fitt to repayre it, fitt to cure it; What time then shall cure or repayre it? Take the most sovereigne remedies to repayr such ruines, to cure such diseases, and the duration or time thereof hath no power to repayr or cure it, but the nature of that remedie applied may; which nature and the application therof, is not time, but the remedie hath a duration, which is the time therof, whether it be applied or no.

As for the motions of the heavens numbred according to priority and posteriority, which in a Physicall consideration is the time of every thing, as the fittest measure to measure out the continuance of all things, as little power hath that to repayre ruines or cure diseases, more then to make them.

In the next place you draw us to the consideration of Plotinus his excellent observations. I had rather you would acquaint us with some accurate conclusions and demonstrations of his. Yet these observations which you so magnifie in a Platonick, such as they are wee will consider them. The first is that *the best of our life, the very being of things generable is but as a continuall draught or receipt of being, from the inexhaustible founteyne of life.* This is one of his (so much by you magnified) observations, and a very proper one. As if a man should

should say, the very water, be it the best of waters, is but a streame flowing from the fountayne of waters. Is not this an excellent observation, thinck you? Yet you add some thing of your owne, which partly swerves from truth, and partly marres Plotinus his musick; For you make the very being of things generable, and the best of our life to be all one; whereas the wickedest men that are, are the miserablest things that are, are things generable, and have a being as well as the best; And in the state of our corrupt nature we had a being, & so had Paule when he persecuted the Church of God, and Peter when he denied his M<sup>r</sup>. and David when he committed adultery with Bathsheba and caused Uriah to be slayne with the sword of the children of Ammon; but did this being of theirs, or theyr very being, deserve to be accounted the best of theyr life? Now whereas you say, *Our being is a continuall draught of being from the inexhaustible fountayne of life*: I find no mention at all of any fountayne of life in Plotinus, His words as you cite them are, *Videtur in rebus generabilibus id potissimum essentia esse, scilicet tractus quidam ab ipso esse*, (this is all he hath concerning the inexhaustible founteyne of life as you paraphrase it) *ex generationis initio, quousque ad temporis extrema perveniat*.

And to my understanding his meaning is no other, then that the essence of things generable is as it were *esse fluens*, like as we say, *linea est fluxus puncti in longitudinem*. And ther-upon his first sentence is this, that take away *erit* from things generable, and forthwith they cease to be: And to things that are not such, if you add *erit* to them, it shall befall them a *sode ipsius esse labi*, to slide from the seate of being; All which are but odd streynes of expressions of that which to know is worth just nothing, if at all there be any sound truth in theyr subtleties: But hence he concludes indeed that the being of a thing generable is not naturall unto it; and therefore (you will say) he must have it from something, and what can that be, but from the founteyne of life; as it is well knowne Plato first, and accordingly Platonickes maynteyned, that the world was made by God.

To this I answer, that albeit they attributed the making of the world to God not out of nothing, but out of matter actually preexistent; yet here Plotinus discourseth, not of the creation whereby the world was made, but of generation, whereby the parts of it were continually meyntheyned; Neyther doth he discourse of the efficiency of the being of things generable, but only of the formality thereof: But if over and above a question were moved as touching the efficiency of being, who can doubt but his answer would be either ascribing this to the individuall generating, and *virtus seminalis* as his instrument, working to the extracting of forms *ex potentia materia*; or otherwise to the *Dator formarum*; in neyther of which should he as an heathen man ascend unto the inexhaustible founteyne of life, whither you would draw him, to make the magnifying of his excellent observations the more specious: But what should Christians expect from the Scholar of Ammonius and Mr. of Dorphiry? Now whereas he confines this to things generable, doe you magnifie that also? What think you of Angells? Is not theyr being also a continuall draught or receipt of being from the inexhaustible fountayne of life, as well as the being of things generable?

But proceed we to take notice of the rest of his so excellent observation: *Nature* (sayth he) *hasten's unto that being which is to come, nor can it rest, seing it drawes or sucks in that being which it hath, by doing now this and now that, being moved as it were in a circle, with the desire of essence, or of being what it is.* By this I perceive where you dipt your pen that dropt forth such wild conceits as before in this very section I have encountred with; to wit, in Plotinus his Philosophy, fitt lettice for such lips as like them. And for the obscurity of conceit, your writings, to my thinking are very like unto his; and the rather may men be moved to suspect, there are some rare notions in them which they understand not; Yet by the way you sometimes insperse such glosses as make Plotinus meaning worse then it is; as when Plotinus sayth of a thing generable, that *movetur in orbem quodam essentia desiderio*, that it is moved round with a certeyne desire of essence; you render it this with desire of essence



essence or being what is : Now Plotinus sayth, not of any thing that it hath a desire to be what it is, which is very absurd ; for nothing desires what it hath already, but rather what it hath not : So when Plotinus sayth, that *esse sibi haurit*, it drawes unto it selfe being; you render it thus, It sucks in what it hath; whereas indeed it is a thing impossible for any man to suck in that which he hath, but rather he sucks in that which he hath not.

Nor can I approve this saying of Plotinus, that *A thing generable hastens to that being which is to come*; which Plotinus seemes to understane only of Time; Now we rather on the contrary many times complayne that time passeth away too fast; yet againe some there are, I confesse, that think time never passeth away fast enough : Both are conscious of times hastning more or lesse ; but neyther are conscious of theyr hastning to Times: And the truth is, the swiftest motion and the slowest motion is in respect of the same time, which indeed in neyther swift nor slow, though motions in time may be swift or slow ; yet the swiftest mover no more hastens to time to come, then the slowest mover, how excellent soever Plotinus observation be in your conceit, yet I grant we may be sayd to hasten to a being which is to come, but this being is alwaye accidental never essentiall : A man may make hast to be rich, and such a one sayth Salomon can not be innocent : A man may grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord Iesu Christ, and to make hast therein is commendable : and so for every one to be diligent and quick in the works of his calling: But our essentiall being we hast not unto, it is the same still; for Socrates being old differs not essentially from himselfe being a child : Indeed we labour for the preservation of our being; but all our actions tend not hereunto, they tend to the service of God as well as to the service of our selves.

Pro. 23. 20.

2. Pet. 3. 18

And how in these motions whatsoever we move *in orbem*, or as it were in a circle I know not ; That quaint conceit I leave to Plotinus till your commentary may unfold the meaning of it.

Now you tell us (belike in a suitable proportion unto the

conceits

conceits of Plotinus, or rather in some degree beyond them) that *Nor we men, nor any creatures (specially generable) are permitted to draw or suck so much of our proper being from the founteyne of eternitie at once, or in any one point of time as we list, and that We have our portions of life or self-fruition distributed peece-meale and sparingly unto us, least too much put into our hands at once might make us prodigall of the whole stock.*

It is great pittie the pages of your booke be not stored with the word *Mysterie*; for they are nothing almost but *mysterie*; This is delivered not only of men, but of all creatures generable: Why then, all creatures generable have a list to *drawe or sucke more of their proper being from the fountayne of eternitie*, then they doe or can suck: Surely you charge them with that they are nothing guilty of; For, not to speake of stones and mettalls nor of vegetables; How doth it appeare there is any such desire in brute creatures, whether beasts or birds or fishes that neyther know eternitie, nor their owne proper being, nor what it is to suck more of it at once then is fitt.

And as for my selfe amongst reasonables, one though a poore one, having some knowledge both of eternitie in the waye of Christian Divinity, and of my proper being in the waye of naturall Philosophy; yet what it is to suck more of my portion of being at once then God think fitt, I am utterly ignorant, and therefore cannot be conscious to my selfe of any such transgression: Suppose the durance of my being in the appoyntement of God be betwene 50. and 60. yeares, doe I desire or can I desire to enjoy these 60. yeares in the space of 10. or is it possible by the almighty power of God that I should? I grant the knowledge and goodnes I have arrived unto by Gods grace in the space of 50. yeares, I might have arrived unto in the space of 40. Yet am I not conscious of any desire I had of this: But this is only my accidentall being, and therefore deserveth not simplic to be accompted my proper being.

The like may be as touching the Qualities or Quantitie of my bodie: But my substantiall being, that only deserveth to be accompted simply my *Being*; And this I had all at once,

as I had my organick bodie, and soule all at once; though the continuance of it I had not all at once; For that was impossible I should have, it being a continuance by way of succession of dayes after dayes &c. And if I had had all at once, there had bene no succession; and therefore, in my judgement, it is absurd to say *our portions of life are pee-meale & sparingly distributed unto us, lest too much being put into our hands at once might make us prodigall of the whole stocke.* And which implies, that God could, if it had pleased him, have made us enjoy the whole space of our life at once; For that were to make time past, present and to come, to exist altogether, which, I think, every wise man will judge to be impossible: Yet this case being put; how were it possible to the contrary, but that we must needs spend it all at once? For like as the space of life of 60. yeares must necessarily be spent in 60. yeares: So if we had all this space together in one day, or one yeare, we must needs spend it together in the space of a day, or a yeare: In a word, sith this cannot be true of our essentiall being, which we have all at once undoubtedly; nor of our accidentall being; for that cannot be properly accounted our being; it remaines to be understood onely of the continuance of our being: And to desire to have all this at once, is to desire to have at 7. yeares, as much age as others at 60: But no man desires this, though lately we heare, that after the surrendering of Rochel, maydens, by reason of the famine there during the Seige, of 16. yeares old were found to looke like women of an 100. yeares old. We rather desire in old-age to be young, like unto Moses who being an 100. and 10. his eye was not dimme, nor his naturall strength abated. Yet your conceit is manifestly impossible; for it proceeds not of having the qualities of age in youth, but the very continuance, which is as much as to say, at seven yeares of age to be as old as a man of 60. which no man desires, neither is it possible for God to effect.

This piercing of time, or reduction of many yeares into a small space being as utterly impossible as the penetration of dimension in magnitude, if not much more.

Mens stocks may be spent in one yeare upon as much pleasure as another may be taking in seven yeares : but the continuance of space or time to come, can neyther be taken before the time, nor spent.

2. In the next Section you are more popular ; I do not say more true : For you give me no cause to say so.

For first, in my judgement, it is a manifest untruth to say, that *time is a participation of eternity* : For as immensity is to place or magnitude, so is eternity unto time : But place or magnitude is no participation of immensity, therefore allso time is no participation of eternity.

And like as Gods immensity is without extension, & therefore quite of a different nature from magnitudine corporall ; So his eternity is without succession ; and therefore of a quite different nature from duration corporall.

And whereas you say, that *He should define the severall branches of time most exactly, that could number or decipher that severall actuations, draughts, or replenishments, which are derived from the infinite founteyne of life and being, to fill the capacities or satiate the internall desires of things temporall* ; Here agayne you slip back to the transcendental notions, farre above, not only common sense, but all sobriety of conceit.

You tell us of *actuations, draughts, and replenishments* derived from the founteyne of life to fill capacities, and internall desires ; all which together with the severall branches of time you speake of, and theyr references to the actuations after mentioned, are so many hobgoblins unto me : what are the parts of time, I seeme to understand, time past, time present, and time to come, but what the Severall branches are, I know not.

The founteyne of life is it, that which brings natures possible into act of being ? But how hereby he can be sayd to satiate theyr internall desires, I comprehend not : For while a thing is only possible, it neyther hath, nor can enterteyne any desire of being. Perhaps you may say, that when things are, they may desire continuance : And it is the founteyne of life, that as he made all things, so he doth perpetuate them so long  
as he

as he thinks good. But what mysterie, the deciphering of this actuation or perpetuation doth conteyne, so avaylable to the definition of the severall of time, I therefore know not, because you have not vouchsafed the eucliation hereof unto your Reader.

I find no sense in that which followeth, as when you say *the motion of the Heavens is more uniforme then time* (which you call the *duration of things temporall*): For every part of time is still uniforme, and that in such sort as it impossible to be otherwise; be the motion never so deficient in uniformity. As an houre is still the same, whether motions herein be swift or slow, or both swift and slow (as such different motions may be in the same time without all question) and that according to all variety; yea though one and the same motion, I meane of one and the same subject be partly swifter, partly slower, and that in all variety of degrees.

So is the moneth, so is the yeare most uniforme, taking it to consist of how many dayes and howres soever you will: I grant things in time may dure more or lesse; but time it selfe admits no contraction or dilatation; as for example, a daye cannot be contracted into the space of an houre; nor an houre cannot be dilated into the space of a day; but the motion of a day may be contracted and reduced within the space of an houre; that is, a thing may move as fast in an houre as it doth in a day. I have heard of a Pope, that when his countrey men presuming of his omnipotency, entreated they might have two sommers in a yeare, made answer as Elias did to Elisha, that he had asked a very hard thing; yet it might be obteyned by them upon a condition: And when they beinge eager to obteyne what they desired, shewed theyr willingnes to accept of any condition; Hereupon the Pope told them, that upon condition to accompt 24. monthes to theyr yeare, they should have two sommers every yeare: This was a cunning trick to fill his countrey mens monthes with empty spoones: He was no more able to gratifie his countrey-men in this, then Mark Anthony was the Athenians, who having imposed a double tribute in one yeare, was told by an Oratour, that if he

could give them two Sommers, and two Springs: Within the compasse of one yeare, he might exact two renewes, not otherwise.

I know no such double duration or course of time intended, as you speake of, what if a man be sometimes in health, and sometimes in sickness? the condition of his life, and the quality thereof it diversified, his duration is not; as appears by this: In the same time wherein one is sick, another is not; one in pleasure, another in payne; it is manifest, the time may be the same, though the condition much different.

These conceits of yours are so popular, that they crosse with all: *In glee or payne to thrise time from us*, is but to wish it were shorter then it is; as it is signified, Deut. 28.67. *In the morning, thou shalt say, would God it were evening. and at evening thou shalt say, would God it were morning*: And yet the meaning hereof in effect, is but this, to wish that our payne were shorter, then would we not care though the time were longer. And so our joy to be continued, we desire not the moments of our time to be fixed.

Still you confound a mans condition with the time, as if time it selfe were sweet or sowre. Let every sober man judg, whether it be not an absurd conceyt to affirme, that men desire to prolong their dayes by living the same time over and over againe. As if we could not have the same joy, without living the same time over and over againe: Whereas it is manifest, that in one and the same time, one man may be in ease and joy, another in payne and sorrow.

And yet in sorrow the frustration of our existence is never the lesse perfect, then in times of joy, for joy and sorrow are no parts of existence, for existence is found never a whitte the lesse where joy and sorrow have no place: This you confesse in the next place, where you say; *that the pleasure of borrowed life is as the identity of being, but as water to the pipe through which it runnes*: yet both serve alike to fill up the matter of your discourse, both the confusion of things different, and the correction of such confusion.

*And if the gluts and gushes of pleasure (as you phrase it)*

may

may be at one time much greater then at another, surely they may continue at one time as well as at another, and therefore for the continuance of pleasure, it is not necessary to desire the stay of time, which is a thing impossible: Yet you pleased your selfe not a litle in your former popular discourse of this nature.

The fruition of pleasure may be as intire as our selves; and it is no more true, that they are begotten and die in every moment, then it is true of us, that we are begotten & die in every moment: For this scrupulous nicetie ariseth from no other ground, then the being measured with time, theyr duration is partly past, partly future, and but a moment present: And judge whether this conceit of but a moment present, be not a vayne conceit: For I pray, what is that which followes this present moment immediately? Is it a moment only, or no? if not a moment onely, what is become of your conceit? If a moment only, will it not followe, that time consisteth of nothing but moments? And you may as well say, that magnitude consists of nothing but points, which were indeed, to consist of nothing.

We truly say, this daye is present; this month is present; this yeare is present, like as time is sayd to be present, to wit, by way of succession of parts, which parts are not moments succeeding one another, but times Homogeneall, though according to reason divisible in *infinitum*, as all things continuall are.

3. How the Angells doe account the continuation of theyr duration, I know not; but surely we have no better meanes to account theyr duration past, then by the making of the World, and the number of yearly revolutions of the Heavens, that have bene since. But because we believe, that God could have made Angells, & no visible World; yea and made the Heavens without moving of them; in which case yet I doubt not but their duration, & continuance thereof should be knowne to themselves, but by what meanes I know not.

The Learned doe distinguish of the duration of Angells, from



from the duration of things materiall ; & so accordingly their measures ; making time to be the measure of the duration of the one ; and even of the other : Yet I have no cause to think that theyr duration is a participation of eternity more then time : And like as theyr magnitude spirituall is no participation of immensity ; so neyther is theyr duration any participation of eternity.

Luk. 10.

They are creatures as well as we, though no mortall creatures, and have theyr beginning as well as we ; and the time shall come, when we shall be *ιδύμενοι*, even as the Angells themselves, and continue as long as they, yet never atteyne to any eternity of being, though our being shall never have end: But seeing both theirs, and ours had a beginning ; therefore it is impossible that it should ever grow to be eternall.

I see no reason why Angelis should not be sayd to watch for opportunities of time as well as we.

Meth. 3.

The Divell I am sure is still compassing the earth. Job. 1. & goes about like a roaring Lyon seeking whome he may devoure, and doe they not wayt all opportunities to doe mischief? And why may not Angells as well wayt all opportunities to doe us good, according to the will of theyr and our Heavenly father? Especially considering *they are all ministring Spirits sent forth for the good of them that shall be heires of salvation.*

But I confesse, how this wayting or expectance of opportunity should be sayd to feed them, I am as much to seek, as to define how it is sayd to feed us ; unles in respect of Hope ; & so I see no reason, but that it may be as well sayd to feed them allso ; for surely theyr owne glorie is not at full, & they wayte for the enjoying of that ; neyther our glorie nor grace is yet at full ; & as they rejoyce at the conversion of a sinner ; how much more will they rejoyce at our salvation ; and why may they not be sayd to wait & hope for that allso, & rejoyce in the hope, as we doe?

If a desire to continue what they are doth argue, they have not all that in present possession which is allotted to their compleat duration ; then surely they never shall, nor we neyther, no

ther, no not in the state of glorie, have all in present possession which is allotted to our duration : And what, I pray, is wanting ? You will say the future duration ; but what, I pray, doe we gett by that , when as fast as duration future becomes present, so fast duration present becomes past ? Yet surely by continuing what we are, we loose nothing ; & if by this, that our duration passeth in respect of time, we cannot be sayd to loose any thing ; then surely by this, that duration commeth on as fast, we cannot be sayd to gayne any thing. If indeed we should grow weaker and weaker, and our strength and prosperity should passe with time, then we should be loosers by it, not otherwise ; So if we should grow stronger and stronger, & our strength or prosperity should encrease with time, then we should be gainers by it, and not otherwise.

Now I hope it is without question; that the glory of Heaven shall not encrease, but be at full, at the very first, and so continue without end. And, in my judgement, it is a very poore conceit, to denie that a man hath his whole life together, because the duration of it, is not all at once.

If we had our life by degrees, one part at one time, and another part at another time, this were a manifest imperfection ; but having all of it together, to conceive that the duration & continuance hereof longer & longer is an imperfection, is a very wild conceit in my judgement : This were to cast us upon the deniall of Gods continuance ; For like as our time being upon supposition of 60. yeares, if we should have all of it, within an houre, it should end at an houres end; so likewise, if God should have his continuance all at once, it should end all at once.

But we say, that the Divine essence as it is without beginning, so it is without end : and nothing past with him, nor nothing to come to him, as it is with all creatures, which are subject to motion in some kind or other : if not of corruption, yet of perfection, at least capable of it : if no such thing were, yet as they come from nothing, so they might returne to nothing : But that God, as he gave them their being, so he continueth it. As for God he receaveth not his being from any

thing, no not from himselfe: But is most necessary to exist, and most necessary to continue, without loosing of ought that is in himselfe, no not so much as a thought; nor receaving any thing into himselfe, no not so much as a new thought, or a new affection: All which, and changes in respect thereof are incident unto Angells, though not so much as unto us; who also have materiall motions; as locall, and alteration, & that tending to corruption.

In a word, as mans existence is as it were an accident to his essence; because the nature of a man is only of it selfe passively possible to exist, and God can give existence to such a nature, or make the humane nature to exist, as he hath done; so likewise to Angellicall natures, existence is but an accident.

And as existence is an accident to such essences according to our conceit of them; so is continuance an accident to such existences. In which respect every day and houre, both man and Angell may be sayd to receive a new accident, which before they had not.

But it is quite otherwise with God; For as his existence is all one with his essence; (because it is absolutely impossible his essence should not exist:) so his continuance is no accident to his existence: because it is necessary that God should be, & so be, as to be without beginning and without end: And therefore though our continuance be new to us; as being an accident unto us, and wrought by motions; yet Gods continuance is no accident unto him; For it is impossible, he should not continue, who is of necessary being: But of this, and of the indivisible nature of Gods continuance more hereafter.

I willingly confesse, that because Angells were made of nothing, therefore theyr continuance is meerly at the pleasure of God, and have parts divisible, in regard that God can set an end to them, whensoever it pleateth him.

But I know no cause to denie, that they enjoy an entire self-fruition; For though they have not all theyr continuance at once, yet seeing theyr continuance is no part of their essence, which is a thing indivisible, I see no reason why they should be denied, entirely to enjoy themselves.

Man growes to perfection in parts integrall, though not in parts essentiall, which perfection of parts integrall, as it daily groweth, so it makes him daily more fitt to performe the offices of nature, and duties of his calling; and so may be sayd, not to enjoy himselfe intirely (according to that perfection) which belongeth unto him but by degrees: But it is not so with Angells; yet may they acquire something unto themselves accidentally, which before they had not.

God can acquire nothing: His duration ('tis true) is indivisible; For there is no *prims* nor *posterius* therein; For he is subject to no kind or manner of motion.

I doe not like the manner of your justifying this indivisibility of Duration in God: as when you say, he cannot gayne ought to day, which yesterday he had not; or loose to daye, what yesterday he had: For this, in my judgement, is incident to glorified creatures: For shall not the glorious condition of men and Angells be at full without gayning any new or loosing any old? Yet no doubt, theyr duration notwithstanding shalbe divisible; God is not.

Perhaps you will say, they loose the former dayes existence, and gayne the following dayes existence: And so we doe much more properly in this world, but without impediment to the same-nes of our existence: For to loose the former dayes existence, and gayne the following dayes existence, is but to loose our coexistence with the former day, and gayne a coexistence with the day following: Now this is no impediment to the same-nes of existence in duration; which I prove thus: It is incident to God, yet is he still the same in duration: And that 'tis incident to God, I prove thus; God himselfe was yesterday coexistent to yesterday, and now he is not; for if he were, then yesterday should now exist, which is not only untrue, but impossible to be true, for then time past should be present: And the reason why this is no impeachment to the most perfect same-nes in duration is manifest; for to coexist with some thing yesterday, and not to day, may arise from no variablenes from within, but only from variablenes in something from without: As, namely, therefore God doth not  
coexist

coexist to day, with many things to day, with which he did coexist yesterday, is not because of any change in God, but by reason of change in these outward things, which had a being yesterday, but to day have not.

In that which followes you manifestly betray your cause: For that God hath such fulnes of joy and sweetnes of life, that nothing can be added thereto in joy or sweetnes; doth no way inferre, that therefore, the duration hereof cannot be added unto him, and the continuance thereof: Your comparison utterly overthrowes you: For as in a bodie infinite, though there cannot be a middle nor extreame; yet there are parts without parts by waye of extension; So in infinite life, though it hath, no extremes, as being without beginning and without end, yet this hinders not but that it may have parts going before, and parts comming after by way of succession.

And whereas you say, that *Natures capable of these differences have alwayes the one accomplished by the other*, is either without sense; as if you meane it of the parts of time, as if one were accomplished by the other; For how I pray you, is time past or present accomplished by that which is to come, or that which is present or to come accomplished by that which is past: Or if in respect of natures subject to time, which are perfected by time, or rather in the course of time; thus, as it is sometimes true, so sometimes it is notoriously false: For as there is a time of growth in perfection, so it is wel knowne that there is a time of diminution, & corruption also; And, I pray you, how doth a mans dotage accomplish him either in soule or bodie? And in the Kingdome of Heaven, what accomplishment by time, when our glorious condition shalbe as full and perfect at the first, as in the progresse, for what space imaginable soever.

As for this state, 'tis well knowne, that as there is a time of repaying and encreasing, so there is a time of impaying and decaying: And though perfection cannot be perfected, yet it may be continued; so it is in man, so it is in God; but by necessity of nature continued in God; by the pleasure of his gracious will continued in the creature: And therefore though  
his essence

His essence being infinite excludes such a continuance as is wrought by reiterated acts; yet it excludes not such a continuance as is by necessity of nature, but rather includes it, it being of the nature of life infinite to be as with beginning, so also without end: Even created Angells and Saints shall have no want of continuance in the Kingdome of Heaven; much lesse God the Author of theyr continuance, more then of his owne; Yet shall he continue and that by necessity of nature, both to the worlds end, and after that without end. Yet nothing in him is to come to him; nor nothing from without can come to him; For who should give it him? But the duration both of men and Angells is maynteyned unto them by the will and pleasure of God: And herein consists the true difference betweene the duration of creatures and the Duration of God; For as for *primum & posterius*, past, and to come, this hath his foundation onely in respect of motion, And therefore time is commonly not reputed a fitt measure for the essences of things, but only for individuall substances; and these only generables, not of substances merely spirituall, as you may remember Plotinus hath taught you. What doe you meane by the degrees or acts of life, an infinitie whereof you place in God? We commonly account three sorts of life, and no more, to witt, vegetative, sensive, and ratiounall; Of an infinitie I never hard before in this kind: And as for the degrees of these, I doubt not but there may be degrees in any; as in each kind some may be more quick and vivacious then other. But none of these kinds, much lesse the degrees of the ar found in God formally, but imminently: And as for the plurality in respect of such as are decreed by him, the case is cleare, that they are infinitely farre of from infinitie; for undoubtedly the things decreed by God are but finite. I doe not agree with you to conceive God to be everlasting in referre to perpetuity of succession; for that kind of everlastingnes is a *parte post*: But eternity cheifely consists in being everlasting a *parte ante*, and before there was any succession at all.

But here, by the way, you give me an hint of what you  
 Y make

make your foundation of many wild discourses ; and for which I have looked all along ; And not till now you have bolted it out , as where you say , *Gods interminate existence is present to the whole and every part of succession* : which long agoe hath bene discovered to be a very wayne conceit, though embraced by as great a Schoolman as Aquinas himseife ; who hereupon builds his opinion of the presence of all things in Gods eternity : And his opinion herein is built upon a very plausible comparifon , and devised correspondencie between Gods immensity and eternitie , for like as God by virtue of his immensity doth fill all places, and should coexist with every part of magnitude , although, upon supposition, it were infinite : In like sort God by reason of his eternitie should fill all times , and coexist with all times, and all things that hereafter shall exist in time.

2. Sect. dist:  
39. q. 1.

But the fallacie of this comparifon , and the error of this assertion hath now long agoe bene discovered by Ioannes Scotus : It is true indeed , God must needs coexist with all places and all things in place ; but not untill the place it selfe, and the things therein doe exist : As if the world were twice at bigge as it is, God should coexist in every part of it : But yet God doth not coexist with any such , because , as yet there is not any such to coexist with him : In like sort God shall coexist with all times, and all things existing in all Times ; but when ? Not till these times and the things therein shalbe found to exist : and as they shalbe found to exist , so shall God coexist with them : Now all Times , and all things conteyned in all times doe not exist but by waye of succession , (magnitudes exist otherwise , even all together) and in like sort God shall coexist with them , to witt , by waye of succession : Nor that Gods existence is or shalbe by way of succession ; (for nothing in God is found that succeeds any thing in God) But because both times, and creatures in times doe exist by way of succession , in respect of whose succession and not of any succession in God , God is denominated , and that properly enough , to coexist with them by way of succession , in as much as they exist , and consequently coexist with him by way of succession.



sion: Like as a pole fixed in a river doth coexist with divers parts of the streame by way of succession; not that any motion or succession is found in the pole, but only in the parts of the streame, that succeed in theyr course one after another: *velut unda supervenit undæ*: And albeit Alvarez hath taken great paynes and shewed great witt in justifying the opinion of Aquinas in this (yet no otherwise then upon the supposition of the predetermination of Gods will) and in dissolving the arguments which Scotus brought against it; and that in such sort, that in so spinous of matter I have sometimes thought it a matter very difficult to find out a cleare solution of his reasons; yet (I thanke God) as it was the first worke I undertook after I left the university, before ever I thought of dealing with Arminius, so I seeme to have fully satisfied my selfe therein; and am reasonably perswaded of abilitie to give satisfaction, on that point, to others also.

But to proceed along with you; In the next place you tell us, that God *considered in himself, He is every way indivisibly infinite and interminable; not only, because he had no beginning, nor shall have ending*: Here your attentive reader would expect what is answerable to this *not only*, and when you come in with but also; but here he must hold his breath till you have dispatched your parenthesis; and if he hold his breath till you come to make up this your imperfect sentence, he is likely never to draw it againe: Again when you say, *God is indivisibly infinite and interminable, considered in himselfe*; you leave your Reader to suspect that your opinion is, that God considered not in himselfe, is not indivisibly infinite and interminable, and the meaning thereof I am yet to seeke.

But consider we what you insert in your parenthesis; *For so might time or motion be held interminable, could the heavens have bene created from everlasting*: So they might, as much as to say, as well as that of whome but erst you spake, and that was of none but God: But God, you sayd was indivisibly infinite, and interminable, not terminable: Wherein in making so incongruous a comparison, whether you had forgott your selfe, or streyned to be delivered of some involved conceyt, the

congruity whereof must be farre fett, and deare bought, before a man can meet with it, I know not he obvious meaning which your text ayms at, seemes to be this; *God is infinite and interminable, not only, because he is without beginning and without end; for so the heavens should be infinite and interminable, put case they were created from everlasting, but in an other respect also; which respect or cause you forgett to expresse, to perfect the sentence of yours, which is otherwise very imperfect; Yet in this waye of interpretation of your text, there are faults enough; for to make the heavens like unto God in this, you should putt the case, not only of being created from everlasting; but also of being to be continued without end, otherwise they cannot be like unto God both as he is without beginning, and also as he is without end: Secondly though the case were thus put, yet is it incongruous enough; for albeit herein they should be like unto God in being without beginning, and without end: Yet herein they should be nothing like unto God in being indivisibly infinite, and interminable; whereof notwithstanding proceeds your comparison: we acknowledge a difference in this, & that a mighty one, though the heavens had bene created from everlasting, &c. not because all Gods continuance to come is present, as you devise; but because Gods duration and continuance is impossible to be devided, the continuance of a creature is not: For God can make the continuance of any creature to cease this daye and houre; but it is impossible Gods continuance should cease; for he is of necessary being: As for the conceyt of *primus & posterius* in Gods duration; that is a sory conceyt, for that is to be found no where, but where there is some motion or other, spirituall or corporall, cyther in place, or alteration in quality, or augmentation or diminution in quantity, or generation and corruption: And you may remember that your excellent Mr. Plotinus, whome you so much magnifie, confines his discourse of time to things generable; as if he meant the Angells were free from such a division of duration as is made by *primus and posterius*; How much more God? But of such a division as I speake; the Angells cannot be free from it being creatures,*

creatures; but only God, who is *ens necessarium*, of necessary being; And therefore his continuance or duration is impossible to be divided from his continuance to morrow, because it is absolutely impossible, that it should ever cease: and therefore whensoever time and place, and things conteyned in them shall exist, & as long soever as they shall exist, God must necessarily coexist with them, and it is impossible it should be otherwise: But before time and place had course, though God did exist, yet did he not coexist with them; So likewise before time to come doth exist, and the things that are to exist therein, it is impossible that God should coexist with them.

But whereas you say in your parenthesis, that *had the Heavens bene everlasting, their revolutions neverthelesse should have bene truly numerable, and therefore terminable*; It is true, I confesse, of some of them, as 10. 40. 60. 100. 1000. &c. but impossible that all should; For had the Heavens bene everlasting, their motions undoubtedly had bene innumerable, neyther could we ever come to the first number while we could.

Secondly you say all things conteyned in their circuit should have gotten somewhat which before they had not, and this something, you say is *eyther addition of duration, or (which is all one) continuance of theyr first existence, or new acts of life, or sense, or reason.*

All very odd, and litle or nothing congruous to things gotten by motion, without which nothing at all is gotten: Now every poore Schollar knowes what is gotten by motion; For if it be motion locall, a new site is gotten; If alteration, a new quality, if augmentation or diminution, a new quantity; If generation & corruption, the matter gets a new substantiall forme; Now where none of these are gotten, there is no addition of any new thing: And it is well knowne, that the Divine Essence is capable of none of these, neyther of new place, nor new quality, nor new quantity, nor new forme substantiall; Allbeit he continueth for ever, and consequently there can be nether *primo* nor *posterius* to be divided in God: But yet because you enterreyne a wild conceit of Gods eternity indivisible; you would have his duration so

ind visible, as if both the time past, and the time to come were drawne together within an instant : And therefore, you say, that all other things have eyther addition of duration, or continuance of existence, or some new acts of life, or sense, or reason; the last wherof is only congruous & agreeing with the nature of that motion which is called alteration; as the two last and the first, may have reference also to generation, or augmentation; from all which the case is cleere that God is free, notwithstanding that his continuance which is to come be not sayd, to be present, at which will conceir and the justification thereof you seeme to ayme : But as for the two first, which yet you make to be all one, they have no place of consideration amonge the termes that are acquired by motion: And dare you denie, that God hath continuance of existence or duration? But you will say no new duration is added unto God : Who sayth it is? And what new duration is added unto man by his continuance? God may add something unto him if it please him; but if he continue him in *statu quo*, what addition, I pray? You will say duration : I demand; whether naturally or supernaturally? If supernaturally, then God doth a new create it; But God hath long agoe ceased from creation : againe then not only every day, and houre, but every minute also, and every part of a minute God should create a new duration: If naturally, then by motion corporall, or spirituall; Now I pray devise, if you can, what motion that is whereby duration is procured; Yet I confesse, thus farre God may be sayd to add duration; in as much as he will not sett an end to it, though he can.

\* But as for the duration of God, it is impossible, that should have any end.

But some may say, If Gods future existence be not present, when it is present, something is added to Gods former duration; As for example, when so morrow comes God is a daye older, then he was : I answer, nothing growes older by accesse of time, but that which tooke it being eyther with time, or in processe of time; So did not God.

Secondly, I answer, Gods future existence is nothing els, but his

but his coexistence with time to come, or with things which shall be in time to come; which is an externall denomination, arising from the futurition of things to come; In any other sense it is false to say that God hath any future existence, or past existence.

But his coexistence with time or things in time may be sayd to be past, or to come, as well as present; and in this sense is the Scripture phrase to be understood, when it is sayd that *God is he which is, which was, and which is to come*: That is, when this World, and Angels were first made, then he was, that is, he did coexist with them, and so all along unto this day present; And so shall exist all along with all creatures & times that are to come: Now this existence of God, more properly to be called his coexistence is partly past, partly present, partly to come; not in respect of Gods existence, (who hath neither motion nor shadow of change, & consequently nothing in him is found to be past or to come) but in respect of the existence of creatures which is partly past, partly present, and partly to come.

Henceforth you acquaint us with certeyne definitions of Eternity; The first is out of Boetius, which you commend above that which followes out of Aquinas, belike it fits your turne better in your conceits, then that other of Aquinas; and therefore deserving well at your hands you bestow upon it that preferment which you think good; Well let us consider it: *Eternity* (then in Boetius account) *is the entire or totall possession of interminable life, all at once, or together.*

The scope you aime at, is to prove that in Gods eternall being there is no succession; *Et quis Herculem visuperat?* who ever sayd there was? In man the very life vegetable, sensitive and rationally growes more and more perfect by degrees: No such motion, no not to perfection, is to be found in God; In Angels there may be a succession of thoughts & of affections; no such succession is to be found in God.

Yet doth he and you also maynteyne Gods life to be interminable, that is, of such a continuance as is without end, as well as without succession.

But you

But you shall never be able to prove herehence, that Gods existence is present to every part of succession of other things, as namely, both to that which is past, and also to that which is to come.

Aquinas definition though very artificiall you grant, yet doth not, you say, imprint to lively a character and notion of the everliving God his infinite happines, as the definition given by Boetius doth: *Aeternitas est duratio manens, uniformis, sine principio & fine, mensurâ carens.*

This lettice fits not your lips like to the former; because, belike you cannot find by this, that time past & future should be present unto God; as you conceive to find by the former; but you will never be able to make it good.

4. Yet Plotin is your Oracle in Philosophy beyond all, who gives, as you say, a more deepe apprehension of it in fewer termes, saying *Aeternitas est vita infinita*, which you render thus, *Eternity is infinitie of life*: Like as if when man is defined to be a reasonable creature, you should render it thus, *A man is the reasonableness of a creature.*

We all grant, nothing in God is past, of that which belongs to God by denomination from within, nothing is to come. Only things without God are such as they may be both past, present, and to come, successively. I doe not mislike that sayinge of Plotin, to witt that when we say *God is allwayes*, we breede in our mindes a wandering imagination of pluralitie or divisibility of duration. But yet so long as we understand Gods duration though indivisible yet equivalent to divisible succession in things without, there is no errour, in which respect we may justly say with scripture God was, and is, and is to come, in as much as he was coexistent with things past, when they were existent, is coexistent to things present shall be coexistent to things to come.

And not to say, as you would have us, that God is now coexistent to things past, and to things to come as well as to things present. There is nothing hitherto alleged out of Boetius or Plotin, that can justifie this; no more then in the definition of eternitie made by Aquinas; yet Aquinas had a conceyte

conceyte of the existence of all things both past and to come in Gods eternitie, not only as they are knowne : For that is to exist rather in Gods knowledge then in his eternitie , and that is *esse secundum quid* , and in *esse cognito* only , it is not to exist *simpliciter*, absolutely. I doe not dislike your notification of eternitie, to be that which allwayes is and cannot cease to be, save that I finde no vertue in the word to be extended to this latter clause ; allthough I conceive , that whatsoever allwayes is the same, dothe necessarily imply such a nature , as cannot cease to be.

And therefore the Apostle takes *eternall power* and *Godhead* to be termes equivalent. You say that *in true Philosophicall contemplation it is not onething truly to be & allwayes to be*. There is a typographicall errour in this , if I be not deceived ; and the sentence should runne thus, *It is but one thing truly to be and allwayes to be*. This I take to be your meaning , but I acknowledge no truthe in it. For if this were true, then all creatures should have no true beinge ; for certainly they are not allwayes.

And if they have no true beinge , then they have no being at all , as afterwards yourselfe acknowledge this manner of consequence to be good. And albeit to have a being and to have a true being be all one, yet hence it followes not, that truly to be and allwayes to be is all one. I grant that to be allwayes, without beginninge and without ende, dothe inferre an independent beinge. But even true beings may be dependent ; otherwise the beings of Angells and men made after the image of God were no true beings. For undoubtedly theyr beings are dependent beings.

Another use of the woord *allwayes* is to note (as you say,) *the interminable , indistinguishable , and indivisible power , which needs nothing besides that which is actually & for the present hath.* But I see no congruity in the woord *allwayes* to signify all this. And first I wonder what you mean to leape from Gods life and power ; seing you propose the infinity of each , as severall branches of Gods infinity to be discoursed on a part, Say then it denotes his interminable, and indivisible being or duration:



tion: yet I cannot like this neyther.

For though the terme *allwayes*, dothe continually denote his interminable beinge, to witt, without beginning and without ende: Yet I see not howe it can note his indivisible beinge. I grant this latter may be inferred out of the former, for as much as that which is allwayes, cannot be produced, but must be of necessary beinge and consequently indivisible in such sort, as that the duration of it to day, cannot be divided from the duration therof to morrowe: for then it shoulde cease to be, which is impossible, seinge it is presupposed to be of necessary beinge. We deny not, but God hathe all that belongs to his divine nature; though not for the reason you give to witt, because he truly is. For that were to inferre, that nothing besides God hath any true beinge, which were to deny the being of all creatures.

The divine nature conteynes a totalitie of increated entitie (if a totalitie may be imagined of that which hath no parts.) As for created entitie, that is not to be found in God at all but only from God. All creatures may have neede of some thing els then continuance, as namely theyr natures being capable of greater perfection; then yet they have attained unto. As for continuance, they have only thus farre neede therof, because otherwise they shall cease to be; and so likewise God himself, if he should not continue, he should cease to be. Only here is the difference. The creature may be sayde properly to neede continuance, because he depends upon the free will and pleasure of another, for the obteyning of it, to witt, upon the will of God.

But God depends upon no other for the obteyninge of his continuance; no nor upon his owne will neyther.

And therefore he cannot be sayde to neede continuance, but rather that he must needs be, because he is not *ens contingens*, but *ens necessarium*, of no contingent, but of necessary beinge. By your leave, Eternity conteynes more, then to signify the having of whatsoever is expedient to be had.

For undoubtedly, it signifies also the continuance of all that without beginninge, and without ende.

But

But you after your manner, seeme under these termes whatsoever is expedient to be had, to include and comprehend duration future, as if duration future were already present unto God; which is a groundles conceyte, arising merely from a superficiall interpretation of the nature of eternitie, which is commonly called an instant of duration.

It is true, the duration of God is not to come; For it is present, and incapable of succession as being subject to no manner of mutation.

But there is a duration of time, and of things measured by time to come; which future duration is no way present to God, in respect of his coexistence with it.

It is most true, and proper enough to say with Scripture phrase, that God is he which was, & is, & is to come: which phrase of speeche implies neyther change, nor succession in God, but only in things without God.

Agayne, wisdom, power, and goodnes are expedient to concur in the supream essence: But this eternitie comprehends not, but only the continuance of all these without beginninge, without ende.

That a thing looseth so much of perfection, as it wants of duration, is a wilde assertion; unles under perfection, you comprehend duration; and then your proposition is identical, and no more then to say, that a thing looseth so much of duration, as it wants of duration.

Otherwise I say it is manifestly untrue; not only because Aristotle was bold to say that, *Bonum non ideo melius quia duraturnius*; good is not therefore better because the more lasting, or everlasting, but also, because by the same reason of yours it would follow that a Crowe, an Hart, and a Raven were much more perfect then a Man; if it be true as some write, that a Crowe lives three times as long as a Man, an Hart three times as long as a Crowe, and a Raven three times as long as an Hart.

Sure we are the least starte but continued from the beginninge of the World.

I muse not a litle to see Platonicall and Plotinical Phi-

losophy, so much advanced by an Oxonian: as if Aristotles learning left Logicians perplex in a point of sophistry, and only Plotinical Philosophy would expedite them. And lookinge backe to what you have discoursed of, out of Plotinus, if so be I might light on that parcell of subtiltie suitable to this ende you speake of, I professe, that as I finde no thing in that which you have alleaged out of Plotinus, that is not vulgar, nothing woorthy of that commendation which you bestowe upon him, (therby reflectinge no small commendation upon your owne peculiar studies in Plotinus:) so withall, I cannot imagine what piece of witt that is, the ignorance wherof dothe perplexe eyther any other better Logician, or my selfe eyther, in the resolution of that question, which you propose.

Neyther doe you accommodate any sentence of Plotinus herunto, that might serve as a key to open that Locke, which as you say, is so hard to be opened, but leave your Reader at randon, to pore after it. But whether it be Plotinus his resolution or your owne, let us consider it.

And first the question proposed is, *Whether Socrates in the instant of his dissolution or corruption, be a man or corps, or bothe.* To be both (you say) implies contradiction, and yet you say, *there is as much reason, that in this instant he should be both as eyther.* Thus have we the question and that argued in part. Now followeth your resolution, as it were out of Plotinus, though you alleage no crumme of any sentence of his for it. Now I observe that your solution, thoughte you woulde have it seeme to be but one, yet indeede it is diverse; the one nothing to the purpose, the other something to the purpose, but utterly overthrowing your former assertion, as when you sayde, *There is as much reason he should be both as eyther.* The third overthrowinge the very foundation of the question it selfe, in effect professing that it proceedes from a false ground or supposition.

A manifest evidence that you are still to seeke howe to satisfie your selfe herin, or others in this unprofitable speculation.

And

And if this be to be endoctrinated by Plotinus, make you as much as you will with your knowledge of Plotinus his Philosophy, I shall have no great cause to complayne of my ignorance therein.

Your first resolution is, that *he was a man and shall be a corps*. This I say, is nothing to the question. For the question proposed is, not *what he was*, or *what he shall be*, but *what he is in the instant of his dissolution*.

In the next place you seeme to speake more to the purpose, when you say that in the instant of his dissolution, *he ceaseth to be a man, and beginnes to be a corps*. But even this also, is not fully to the purpose. For the question is not, *what he beginnes to be*, or *what he ceaseth to be*, in that instant, but *what he is*.

Yet because substantiall formes have no degrees as accidentall formes have, and therefore cease to be, or beginne to be all at once; therefore I take your answer at the best to be this; that in the instant of his dissolution, he is a corps, and not a man, which is directly contrary unto that which formerly you affirmed sayinge, *There was as much reason why he should in this instant be both, as eyther*.

Your third resolution different from both the former is this: that the space of dissolution is not in an instant, as the question supposed, but a space of time consisting of parts, which is not to answer the question, but utterly to overthrowe it; and withall it openeth a way to a newe difficulty; for in this case it may well be demanded, what portion of this divisible time shall be allowed to the being of a man, and what to the being of a corps; and take heede least you ascribe one instant to the last of the first forme, and another instant to the beginninge of the succeeding of the second forme.

For seeing two instants cannot be immediate, it will followe herhence that *materia prima*, shall some space of time actually exist without any forme.

As for my selfe, I never slept upon Plotinus his Parnassus, nor was ever acquainted with his muses. Nay, I have bene so long time departed out of the universitie, and while I was

there so long remooved from these kinde of studies, that I may well be sayde to have forgotten Aristotle. *Nunc mihi sunt oblita sophismata.* Yet will I adventure to compare the remnants of my old Peripateticke store with your achievements out of Plotinus.

I say then, the resolution of this question depends upon the resolution of a more general question.

And that is concerning the beginnings and ceasing of formes, now the rules therof most receaved as I remember, are these. The formes we speake of are, eyther permanent, or successive. Formes permanent beginne *per primum sui esse*, by the first instant of theyr beinge; *desinunt per primum sui non esse*, they cease to be, by the first instant of theyr not beinge.

In such sort as to say, that immediately before such an instant they were not, but at such an instant, and in the time following they were. Agayne, touching theyr endinge, you may say, Immediately before such an instant they were; in and after such an instant, they were not.

As for formes successive, such as are time and motion, they are sayde to beginne *per ultimum sui non esse*; by the last instant of theyr not beinge; and to ende *per primum sui non esse*, by the first instant of theyr not beinge.

That is, at such an instant motion (speaking of motion properly as it includes succession) was not: for it cannot be in an instant but immediately after it was.

Agayne touching the ending of motion we may say, at such an instant motion was not, but immediately before, it was. And accordingly, to the question proposed, I answer; Corruption or dissolution is taken eyther in a complicate signification, comprehending the whole alteration that went before the ceasing of the forme, and then all that while, undoubtedly Socrates was a man, and not a carcase.

But if only for the desinency or ceasing of the forme humane. I say, in that instant, wherein he is sayde to *desinere* or cease (it being the first instant of his not being, as before ha bene shewed, to be the manner of desinency or ceasinge of all formes,

forms permanent) he is a corps; but immediately before he was a man.

In the next place you tell us of Plotins conclusion, namely, *That while we seeke to sit that which truly is with any portion of quantity, the life of it being thus divided by us, loseth its indivisible nature.*

First, I like not that assertion, whether it be yours alone or derived from Plotin, in sayinge, that God alone truly is.

I well knowe our beinge is of a quite different nature from Gods being: but to deny that we creatures have a true beinge, is as good as to deny that we have any being at all.

Secondly, I knowe no man; that goethe about to sit Gods nature, with any pportion of quantitie.

Yet we maynteyne, he was coexistent with all things past, is coexistent with all things present, shall be coexistent with all things that are to come in their order, & that without all divisibility, or succession in himselfe: his coexistence after the manner forementioned, implying only divisibilitie and succession in the creatures.

Of time, you say, no part truly is but the present.

So then the present time, at least truly is. Yet but a little before and often hertofore you have professed, that nothing but God truly is.

Now give me leave to maynteyne some paradoxes, as well as you.

I say, all time truly is, and is present, as well as that which you account to be only present.

For how dothe this present houre exist but by succession of parts.

If you account nothing present but an instant; it is well knowne, that an instant deserves no more to be accounted time, then a point deserves to be accounted magnitude.

But if you speake of time properly, it must have parts, which cannot exist together, but only by succession. As for example, this minute of an houre is present but how? only as having a part past, and a part to come.

For thus only to exist is to exist by way of succession. In like

like sort this present houre dothe truly exist; but how tas havinge a part past, and a part to come.

So this present yeare dothe truly exist, as havinge a part past, and a part to come.

In like sort the time of the Gospell, accompting from the day of Pentecost, when the H. Ghost came downe upon the Apostles, unto the ende of the World, may as well be sayde truly to exist, namely this, as havinge a part past, and a part to come.

So dividing the World into two parts; The old world, from the beginning of time by creation unto Noahs flood; and the newe World, computed from Noahs flood to the ende of the World: I say the time of this World dothe only exist, as havinge a part past and a part to come.

So the time of the whole World from the beginning to the ende, may be sayde truly to exist, to witt, by way of succession of parts, havinge one part past and another to come. For not the least part of time dothe exist otherwise, to witt, by coexistence of parts, but only by succession of parts.

They who made doubt, whether navigators were to be accounted amongst the living or amongst the dead, affected more witt then truth. For if Navigators, undoubtedly, they are livinge and not dead; Indeepe after they have sett forth, we are uncerteyne what is become of them: and equally as uncerteyne may we be, what is become of our freindes that are travayled unto China by the way of the Continent. But to make doubt whether time consists rather of being then of not being, is a conceyte litle becomming a Philosopher in my judgement, thoughte it may become such a one as enterteynes a vulgar contemplation of thinges successive, and in motion, whether by Sea or land.

I should thinke that sory imagination, is grounded upon conceavinge that nothing in time is but an instant, which if it were true, woulde inferre that time were nothing but a succession of instants.

But were it so; yet surely the shortnes of continuance of any thinge, nothinge hinders the true beinge therof, when it is.



it. A childe of a day olde, hath as true being, as Methuselah had, who lived till he was, almost a thousand.

It seemes the sent of Plotinus his subtilties, hath perfumed all those that have dwelt under his shadowe; and therefore no merveye if Ficinus commenting upon him, saye ureth herof also. He compares, you say Eternitie to a center, and time to the points or extreamities of the line in the circumference all-waye moovinge about the Center, so that if it were an eye it might viewe them all at once.

I doubt not, but ere we depart from this chapter, we shall meeete with the Circumference of eternitie as well as with the center of it; but not from Plotinus his text, or Ficinus his Commentaries, but from one that will be bolde to adde a Gemora to theyr Talmud.

For it is fitt the World should profite in subtilties as well as in solid points, and not allwayes to stand at a stay. But a woord of this by the way: Though future times, and future things are all knowne to God, yet not by reason of any existence of theyrs in eternitie, or Gods coexistence with them for the present. For how dothe God at this time coexist with them, which at this time have no existence at all?

Agayne, God lookes not out of himselfe for the knowledge of any thinge now, more then he did before the World was made.

For surely the making of the World wrought no change in him as touching the manner of his knowledge, with whom there is no variablenes nor shadowe of change. When you take upon you to tell us how Eternitie is indivisible, to witt, by conteyning all the parts or perfections possible of succession in a more eminent manner then can be conteyned in time it selfe. I pray remember, that in like manner you professed, that God did conteyne all entities even the entities of brute beasts; and you expounded it in this sense, because forsoothe he was able to produce them.

And thus we easily grant God conteynes all perfections of successions, in as much as he can produce them. If to be succession may be coumpted a perfection, wherof but erst you

made doubt, whether it had any being at all. Yet we doubt not, but God can produce them; yea so farre forth as to exceede all that is conteyned in time.

For as much, as he could have made the duration of the World, tenne times more then it is like to be.

I doe not affect to quarrell with Plato his witt; much good doe you with it, and if you please your selfe with such fancies, as namely that time is a *moovable image* of that which is unmooveable; a *divisible image* of that which is indivisible; a successive representation of that which is without all succession; a modell finite, with beginning and ende of that which is infinite, without beginning and ende, you shall not displease me.

You have another sophisme or seeming contradiction to unloose or solve by these rarities of curiositie; and that is, how it may be verified, that *Petrus in aternitate agrotat, & Petrus in aternitate non agrotat*. If this were spoken of the same time, you say it were contradiction; but being spoken of eternitie, you say it is not, and yet you confesse Eternitie is more indivisible, then any time.

Let who will thinke, that you have salved this knott of seeming contradiction, to my understanding you leave it as you finde it. The propositions conteyning a seeming contradiction are bothe absurd.

For Peter cannot be sayde to be sicke in eternitie, as in that which is the measure of duration eyther of himselfe, or of his siknes, but only in time, with which time, eternitie, I confesse, is coexistent, but when? not till the time that Peters sicknes dothe exist, nor after it hath ceased to exist. For coexistence supposeth the existence on both sides. And as the existence of the creature is past, present, or to come; so is Gods coexistence with it, eyther past, present, or to come; which hath bothe Scripture & reason to warrant it; whereas your wilde conceytes are warrantable by neither.

6. *Materia prima*, is ingenerable and incorruptible not because it is no body, but because it is no compound body. But God is ingenerable and incorruptible, because he is no body

body at all : Therefore better it is to liken him unto the Angels who are ingenerable and incorruptible, because they are Spirits.

All things generable come from matter only as touching their materiall parts, not as touching their formes; neyther can they be sayde so properly to spring from it, as to be compounded of it. But from God all things spring in the way of an efficient cause, yea the matter it selfe also, and that out of nothing.

If matter be most unlike him, in wanting the true unitie of entitie, other things belike have this; And if they have unitie of entirie, it is to be hoped they have true entitie also, veritie being the propertie of entitie, as well as unitie, and consequently they may be sayde to have a true beinge, which you hertofore, & that very often have made proper and peculiar unto God.

I wonder why you make the *Creator* and *essence* it selfe to be termes of equall signification; whereas God is not the creator of all things by his essence, but by his freewill rather.

Those things which necessarily belong to God, are usually ascribed unto him, by way of essence, but not such things, as contingently denominate him, arising from the libertie and freedome of his will.

God, you say, is the incomprehensible perfection of all things; doe you meane of things create only, or only of things increate, or of bothe? You cannot meane it of things create: For no create perfection is found in God: Nor of increate; For no imperfection at all is founde in essence increate.

The Earthe is not unmooveable: some have conceived it to moove naturally: Vndoubtedly, it may be mooved, otherwise it were not *Corpus naturale*; And Earthquakes doe manifest as much.

If it cannot be mooved by the force of Man (yet by prayer of faith, Mounteynes may be remooved, and cast into the Sea), yet it may be mooved questionles by the force of Angels, at least by the power of God.

Neyther is infinite vigour of vitalitie required to an immoveable

veable condition in the opinion of greater Clerkes then our selves, as who thinke all Angells to be no way capable of local motion.

Yet you talke of a mobilitie of the Deitie (a prodigious phrase) though you thinke to charme it, by calling it *more then infinite*, and calling the motion thereof a *supermotion*; and this his mobilitie, as well as his immobility formerly spoken of, you make to proceede from the infinite vigour of his vitalitie.

*Nor dothe eternitie* (say you) *receave addition from succession infinite*; Belike it receaves succession (in your opinion) though no addition therby. For if it receaves no succession at all, what sober man could expect, that it should receave addition by it.

At length you come towards that, which I have a long time looked for: Eternitie, you say, is like to a fixed center, because indivisibly immutable, but it is also as you say, like unto a circle, but you tell us not wherein, nor why.

And as Trismegist did define Gods immensitie, by the similitude of a Spheare, whose Center was every where, but his Circumference no where.

So you will take upon you to define Gods Eternitie, neither out of Trismegist, nor out of Plotinus, nor out of Ficinus, but out of your owne invention to be a *Circular duration*, whose *instants are allwayes*, whose *terminations or extremitities never were, never shall be*.

We willingly grant, that Gods eternitie is a duration without beginninge, and without ende; This is nothing strange, nothing remote from vulgar capacitie.

But to say it is a Circular duration, is such an attempt, and so audacious, as I thinke, it never entered into any sober mans brayne eyther sleeping or wakinge, before it was fancied by your selfe.

Lets bid farewell to Aristotles Philosophy, and let Platões Divinitie come in the place of it. Distill Plotinus his Philosophy, and Ficinus Commentaries upon Plotins Enneades throughout, and see whether any such Extract can be made,  
as this

as this Circular duration you dreame of, and commend to the World as some rare notion.

Of Circular motion I have heard and read ; But of Circular duration never.

Nay things that have circular motion, were never affirmed to have Circular duration. For motion may be from space to space in a round figure, returning thither, where it beganne, but duration is neyther round, nor goethe round.

For though the Heavens runne round, yet the time of the Heavens and of the World runnes not round, nor returns to the period of time from whence it beganne.

Yet is duration successive more fit to be accounted duration Circular, then duration constant, which hath no parts succeedinge.

I holde it to be a notorious untruth, to say that eternitie coexists to every parcell of time. For to say it coexists with time to come, is to say, that eternitie existeth, and time to come existeth also, which latter clause is most false. For if it were present, it were not to come.

No time defines eternitie, we say, but rather eternitie sets an ende to time.

But we dare not enterteyne so absurd a conceyte as to say, eternitie circumscribs time; as if time were some lower spheare, and eternitie an upper spheare, and so time shoud be a circular duration as well as eternitie.

Your next sentence beginnes to open the mystery, as when you say, *Though the motions of the Heavens should continue without ende, yet every period of time shall fall within eternitie, now totally existent.*

I marke your phrase well, as when you say, *It shall fall within eternitie*, implyinge that eternitie is beyond it, in respect of time to come; like as it is sayde to be before all time, in respect of time past.

Now to discusse this phrase of yours of *falling within eternitie*: This phrase (I say) here used, is utterly out of his place. For in proper speeche it hath the place only in respect of quantitie continuall, outreaching all other things we speake of.

Thus all things in the World besides the uttermost Spheare, fall within the uttermost spheare; so that the uttermost spheare doth not only extende so farre as they doe, but beyond them.

Now to say that every period of time falls within eternitie, is to suppose, that eternitie extends beyond it so as to exist beyond it; which is true of all time past. For God did both coexist with it, and dothe continue after it.

And as touching time present, it may be justified in this sense, to fall within eternitie, in respect that Gods continuance is not at an ende with this present, but continueth without ende.

But to imagine that at this present Gods continuance doth actually extende farther then this present, is a most absurde conceyte; As if forsooth God had not onely an existence present, but also an existence to come, and that this existence of God to come is present. Whereas neyther of these is true, but each false, and that most absurdly false.

For first God hath no existence to come, for if he had, then he should have also an existence past, and consequently he should be measured with time, and subject unto motion. And whereas the Scriptures doe confesse that God is he which was, and is, and is to come; this is to be understood of his co-existence and not of his existence; as much as to say God doth not onely coexist with all things present, but also did coexist with all things past; that is to say with every one of them in the time of theyr existence, and also shall coexist, with all things to come, that is to say, with every one of them in the time of theyr actuall existence.

Now this coexistence of God with things past, and things to come is not present, onely his coexistence with things present, is present, his coexistence with things past, is past, and in that respect tis sayd he was; so likewise his coexistence with things to come is to come, and in that respect onely it is sayd that God is to come.

By this we may judge of the proposition following which is this.

*God hath bene, is, and ever will be, unto every minute or Scruple of*

*ple of time that hath beene, is, or shall be, alike everlastingly coexistent.* If one word had beene left out (to witt the word everlastingly) it might have admitted an handsome interpretation, and a sober meaning taken respectively thus, *God hath beene coexistent to things that have beene, is coexistent to things that are, shall be coexistent to things that shall be.*

But to apply all these differences of time past, present, and to come, to each of the things mentioned, (as namely to say, that God hath beene, and is, and shall be coexistent to all things that have beene, and is, and shall be, coexistent to all things that shall be) is most absurde.

For the coexistence of God doth as well implye the existence of the things themselves with which God is sayd to exist, as the existence of God.

And therefore though it be true to say, that God was coexistent with all things past, because there was a time when these things did exist and at the same time undoubtedly God did coexist with them; yet it is false to say that God doth or shall coexist with things past; for that saying doth implye, that things past doe now exist; and also are to come. In like sort though it be true: that God doth now coexist with all things that now are, for as much as both these things doe indeed at this time exist, and God must needs coexist with them as the author and preserver of theyr existence; yet it is untrue to say that God doth now coexist with time past or to come, and with the things which were or shall be therein, for if this were true, it would follow that not onely God is now present, but also that time past and time to come, are also present with all things conteyned in them, which every man knows to be most untrue.

Last of all though it be true that God shall coexist with the time to come, and the things therein, because both they shall exist, and consequently God must needs coexist with them, as the author and preserver of them; yet it is most untrue to say that God shall coexist with time past and present and the things therein, for if this were true it would hence follow that both time past, and present with all things conteyned in them  
were



were both to come, which how absurde a speech it is, let every sober man judge.

And yet that this is the meaning appeares by the adding of the word *everlastingly*, which addition makes the proposition untrue in every member of it, though taken respectively, which otherwile as I have shewed might admitt a tolerable interpretation. For though it be true that God was coexistent with Noahs flood, yet is it untrue that he was everlastingly coexistent with it.

At the time of Noahs flood God was coexistent with it by vertue of his eternitie, which makes him necessarily to coexist with all things when they are, like as by vertue of his immensitie he necessarily filleth all places, as soone as there are any places to fill. But God was not everlastingly coexistent with Noahs flood, for as much as neyther before the time of Noahs flood, was God coexistent with it nor after: For to coexist with Noahs flood doth imlye the existence of Noahs flood: But Noahs flood did neyther exist before the time of it nor after.

In like sort to say that God doth now coexist with all things present is true; but to say he doth everlastingly coexist with this time present, and the things therein is most untrue: For if this were true, then it were as true that he did coexist yesterday, with this day and shall coexist to morrow with this present, which is utterly untrue; for if it were true, then yesterday and to morrow should be this present day, Nay it would follow that this present day were everlasting (and not time onely in generall) if to be God did everlastingly coexist, with it.

Last of all it is true that God shall coexist with the fall of Babylon; but it is untrue to say that God shall everlastingly coexist with it, for if that were true, then he should coexist with it both before it were, and after it were past, which is impossible. For it would imply that Babylon should fall, before it shall fall, and after it hath fallen. And all this confusion ariseth from a precipitate and superficially apprehension of the nature of eternitie being commonly accounted but an instant,

stant, which indeed is a truth, because in the nature of God there is no succellion, and that not onely in respect of such motions whereunto bodyes are subject, but in respect of such motions which are incident unto Angells. In regard of which motions the differences of time past, present and to come are attributed unto God, in respect of his coexistence with them, without bringing in such monstrous conceits as are hatched in the fancies of some, though I professe I know not many such, nor never read or heard of the like till now,

So then the reason why God was coexistent with time past and the things therein; is coexistent with time present and the things therein, shall be coexistent with time to come and the things therein, is not onely by reason of his owne indivisible, and in erminable unitye; or rather is not at all by reason of this, for this consideration is rather opposite to the determinations of was, is, and is to come, which you attribute unto God, then any way suitable with it, but rather in regard of his eternitie, in which respect he must necessarily coexist with all times according to theyre severall differences; provided that they have an existence; for otherwise: how shall God be sayd to coexist with them.

But then agayne I say not onely in respect of eternitie are these denominations given unto God, but also in respect of the acquisition of new successive parts, not in himselfe but in time and things containd therein. For because God cannot be sayd to coexist with such things that have no existence at all, And all things without God have not theyre existence at once but some at one time some at another, hence is coexistence with them attributed unto God, according to differences of time past, present, and to come, not by reason of any succession of parts in God, but onely in respect of succession of parts in time, and motions, in all things without God.

But we shall have a mad World quickly, when men shall take upon them doctorally to dictate conclusions unto others from certayne principles (as about the eternitie of God, and the indivisible nature therof) superficially apprehended, and never rightly, much lesse sufficiently understood.

What time you have bestowed in the study of these attributes of God I know not; but as for my selfe I professe I never bestowed any hereabouts as I can remember, but ever contented my selfe with common notions generally received. And whereas I mett sometimes with strange suppositions grounded upon these common notions, I have rather contented my selfe with ignorance how to justify them, then to thinke it worth the while to enter upon the discussion, only in the question about the presence of all things in eternitie maynteyned by Aquinas, I found in Scotus a discovery of that errourous conceite.

And though Alvarez hath laboured to repayre the credits of Aquinas in that particular and to answer Scot, yet the vanitie of that discourse of his, I have laboured to discover, and therein have reasonably well satisfied my selfe.

Now being cast upon these Meditations, by reason of this your discourse, which in the very Epistle dedicatory manifest your affection towards Arminianisme, which I professe I hate as much, as I love the grace of God, and desire to be zealous in the mayntayning of it to my last gaspe; I am driven herewithall to take into consideration your Philosophical discourse concerning the essence of God, and his attributes, and finding therein some prodigious assertions by way of deduction from the received notions of Gods indivisible and yet eternall being; out of the Logickall facultie which I brought with me long agoe, out of the Vniversitie, I make bold to observe well the soundnes of such illations, and finding no ground for them, but rather utter disproportion betwene them, and the principles wherehence they are inserted, in the course hereof I become better acquainted with the nature of Gods eternitie then before; and hope to be better inabled to encounter any unsound assertions, derived therehence and grounded thereupon, then heretofore.

And we are like to be acquainted with your mysteries to the full in the next Section.

7. You suppose duration successively infinite.

In this case 'tis true that God cannot be sayd to be after all duration.

duration successive. For to be after it, is to be when duration hath an end, but you suppose that such duration shall never have end.

And in this case it can neyther properly nor improperly be sayd, that God is after it. For it is manifest contradiction to say, that hath an end which is supposed to have no end.

You seeme to groane in the delivery of some quaint subtiltie when you write thus: *Yet that eternitie now is and ever was as infinitely preexistent to all ages in succession comming towards us one way; it is, and was to the Worlds natiuitie the other way.*

Here you make a full point, whereby it comes to passe, that wanting a principall verbe, the sentence containes a manifest non-sense; & it is the observation of others as well as mine, if diuers such non-sensed propositions have dropped from your penne in this discourse, yet your meaning we see plainly in the sentence following, as when you say, *This is a point which we must beleive, if we beleive God to be eternall, and know what eternitie is.*

So the former speech of yours though imperfect, & indifferently capable of being, pronounced to be a fable as a truth, we perceave to be received by you as a truth, and not so onely but affected also by you as a truth, whose consideration hath not bene so well taken to heart, by those *who have had Gods eternall decrees and the awardest of it most frequently in theyre mouthes and penne*; as it hath bene by your selfe.

Thus you accommodate your selfe to the venting, & your Readers to the expecting of some sublimite and to quintessentiall a conceite, that poore Calvin & Beza, and such like unproficients in Academicall studies, never attained to the depth of any such speculation.

Once before I obserued a certayne gradation tending to this purpose, and that with some wonderment, as when you affirmed in the beginning of this section, that God was as truly before all times future, as before all times past.

As if to be before all times future, were a greater matter then to be before all times past; whereas I had thought that such poore snakes as my selfe might truly be accounted to

be before all times future. So in this place it might well make a man wonder what you meane to affirme in solemne manner that God is and ever was as infinitely preexistent to all ages comming towards us, as to the Worlds nativitie.

As if to be preexistent to the times to come, were as greate a matter as to be preexistent to times past, which might seeme to carry no sobriety in the forehead. For ever the meanest worme that creeps upon the Earth, is preexistent to all ages to come, but none is preexistent to all ages past but God himselfe. But there is, no doubt a myserie in this.

Heretofore I had a sent of it : But now it beginnes to breake forth in greate measure.

For when we say God is preexistent to all ages past, & consequently must needs be preexistent to all ages that are to come, we understand all this but one way according to the course of time from future to the present, from being present to become past, and so that which is first actually existent, is before all that which arrives to actuall existence afterwards. But you tell us of two wayes & that God is preexistent before all ages past one way, & before all ages to come another way, by which other way your meaning seemes to be this, that as God is afore all ages past, so also he is after or behinde all ages to come; which phrase of speech in saying God is after or behind any thing, because you thinke it too ignoble to be attributed unto God, and perhaps in part to astonish your Readers with some strange language being never acquainted with the like; This being after all ages you are pleased to instile & call his being before them, but another way or a different way from his being, before all ages past.

As if a man should say that the Horse goes before the Cart one way, and the Cart may be sayd to goe before the Horse another way, which later is indeede and in substance of sense no other, then to go after the Horse.

In like sort we may say the calling of the Gentiles is before the calling of the Iewes one way, and the calling of Iewes goes before the calling of the Gentiles another way, to witt as it comes after it.

So the

So the rising & flourishing of Antichrist goes before the fall of Antichrist one way, and the fall of Antichrist goeth before the rising and flourishing of Antichrist another way, to wit it followeth after it.

Now if this manner of language doth not goe beyond all Canting, I know not what doth. But take wee your phrase according to this sense, yet there is no truth in this assertion. God indeed was before all ages past, because he was when they had no beginning; but he shall not be after all ages to come, because he shall not be when all ages have an end.

For according to your owne opinion all ages shall never have end. And for this reason in the very beginning of this section your selfe affirmed, that God could not properly be sayd to be after all times and durations to come. For what (sayd you) can be after that which hath no end? To this I added, this could not be affirmed eyther properly or improperly, because there was no truth in it, as that which implied a manifest contradiction.

Much lesse properly or truly can it be sayd that God is pre-existent to all ages to come after a different way from that whereby he is sayd to be preexistent to all ages past.

But let us see whether any greater measure of sobriety, can be found in that which followeth.

In the next place you tell us, that *As he is no Christian Philosopher, much lesse a true Christian divine, that would deny that whatsoever is by God decreed, was so decreed before all worlds: So he is no Christian Philosopher, much lesse a true Christian divine, that shall referre or retract the tenor of this speech, (before all worlds) to that onely which is past before the world beganne, whatsoever can be more properly sayd or conceived to be past, then to be yet to come, or to be in every moment of time designable can have no propertye of eternitie.* So then whosoever shall dare say that it is a more proper speech to affirme, that God did chuse us in Christ before the foundation of the world, then to say that God shall chuse us in Christ after the end of the World, you will be bold to deny him the title both of a Christian Philosopher and of a true Christian divine also.

By the way let me aske yon, what that is which you call past before the World was; for before the World was, nothing at all was but God. Agayne, though we say the decrees of God, were before the world was, yet no divine that I know sayth they were past before the World was; for the decrees of God are nothing but the Counsaile and will of God, which undoubtedly we say continue the same and ever shall. In the last sentence you teach us that it may stand well enough with eternitie, to be sayd to be past, present, and to come; so we doe not affirme it to be more properly past, then present or to come. Yet I promise you, I nothing like to say that God is past, I had rather say he was and is, and is to come. As much as to say, God is of necessary being, and still continueth, and it is impossible he should be otherwise, in which respect we may truly and properly say he was coexistent with every thing that is past, (to witt in the time of its existence,) is co-existent to every thing present, shall be coexistent to every thing that is to come (to witt in the time of the existence of each thing) and all this not by any succession of parts in himselfe, (as who is subject to no motion) but by succession of parts in outward things, with which or whom, he is sayd to coexist, his owne existence being perpetuall and invariable.

These your propositions I can finde reason to make them good in some tolerable construction. Yet you adde a reason of it, which should be more evident then the Conclusion, but indeed is farre more obscure, and when the meaning of it is perceived, is found to have most need of reason to proove it, as being in shew contrary to all reason; yet you content your selfe with dictating it, & thence proceed to a wild goose race of illustration by the heavens that environ both us and the Antipodes; so to make way for the circular duration which formerly you attributed unto God, by comparing it with the heavens turning round (upon supposition) in a moment.

The rationall proposition without reason delivered is this:  
*For that onely is eternall which alwayes is, and so alwayes is, that it hath precedence or preexistence infinite to all successions, which way soever we look upon them or take theyre beginnings, whether*  
*backwards*



*backwards or forwards*: Now this saying of yours is full of incongruities if not rather of foule absurdities.

For first you suppose the beginning of succession may be taken backwards or forwards; but how is this possible? is succession indifferent to beginne backwards or forwards? Is time indifferent to beginne backwards or forwards? The first time is the beginning of it, but as for the last of time will any sober man call that the beginning of it, unlesse you make time like to a pudding, where a man may beginne at which end he will. And surely I see no reason but a pudding may be in better sense, acknowledged to have two ends, then time two beginnings, Especially two such beginnings; as you ascribe unto it, the one backwards and the other forwards; for beginne at which end of a pudding, you will, you may be well sayd to goe forwards and not backwards. Agayne suppose your owne phrases be allowed you, and that the end of time may be taken for the beginning, yet where there is no end to be found how will you devise a beginning? As for example, Time we all know had a beginning but you suppose that time to come shall have no end, for though this world shall have an end, yet men and Angells shall have no end, but live with God for ever.

For the same reason, though God be infinitely prexistent before times past, yet he cannot be sayd no not in your phrase and your meaning, that he is infinitely preexistent to all times to come, the meaning whereof is to continue infinitely longer then all ages to come; for that were to suppose that God shall be when all ages have runne theyre course and are come to an end, which you suppose shall never be. Thus from your Antipodes which you devise in the course of time, I come to the consideration of the Antipodes in respect of place and situation. And hereupon I remember what you delivered in the entrance upon this discourse of eternitie, and it is this; *whatsoever hath, beene or rightly may be conceived of divine immensitie, will in proportion as well suite unto eternitie, and in like manner whatsoever is incident to space of place, the same in porportion may be verified of space of time.* And therefore

therefore like as Antipodes are found in place, so in some proportion Antipodes may be found in time. For when you beginne at the ends of time you seeme to turne the heeles of it upwards.

And like as the roundnes of the heavens environing all, salves this and makes it appeare how the heads every where are uppermost howsoever it seemes otherwise to vulgar capacities: so heere you have a devise of a circular duration to salve the turning of times heeles upwards, for by this it appeares that in truth time hath no heeles to turne upwards, but rather wheelles to turne roundwards; like as eternitie hath a Circular duration, by way of supermotion or a vigorous rest as you phrasifie it.

Well let Lactantius passe with his errour in denying Antipodes, and the vulgar with theyr errour passe, that think the heavens if they be round be under us. Now wee come to the comparison and comparative demonstration, which is this: As the heavens are every way above the earth: so is eternitie every way before all worlds. Suppose there be truth in the parts of this assertion, yet I find no convenience in the resemblance.

It is true that Tiburne is three square, and a Citizens capp is round, but there is no congruities in saying that as Tiburne is three square: so a Citizens capp is round. Yet I find as little accuratenes in the propositions considered by themselves as in saying the Heavens are every way above the earth, for I know no other wayes of the Heavens being above the whole earth which is round, then by compassing it; In my judgement it is more proper to say the heavens are every where above the earth (then every way above it,) and on every side above the earth, or which way soever we goe, whether East, West, North, or South, we shall still find the Heavens to be above the earth.

So likewise I know but one way how eternitie can be sayd to be before all Worlds, and that is by being before they had beginning. As for that other way which you devise as it were an Antipodes in time as well as in place, namely to  
be when

be when all Worlds are at end, that is to be after all Worlds rather then before them.

And yet you flatter your selfe in this erroneous conceite, as if it were some exquisite invention, by another fiction, & that is by conceyting eternitie to compasse and inviron time, as the heavens inviron the earth.

Now because the earth is immoveable, but time hath succession of parts; and the heavens wonderfull nimble in motion, and contrariwise eternitie a constant and permanent instant; therefore you may doe well to salve the *Φαινόμενα* in the Sphære of your discourse to consult with Copernicus about blowing some quicksilver into the dull and tullen earth & set it going round, and on the other side perswade the Heavens to favour themselves and take theyr rest, the modell of eternitie, and time represented by you would be something the more accurate.

Some helpes for this you have, I confesse, of your owne divising, to witt, by supposing the Heavens to move in an instant, leaving it to the Readers judgment: whether to accompt that motion a cessation from motion, or a vigorous rest, besides that of the topp & scourge, which we may have time to consider of in due place. But to proceede; of the beginning of this World past, and the end of it to come, there is no difference betweene us.

To this you adde, that *the eye of eternall providence, looks thorough the World, thorough all the severall ages, successions, or durations in the World, as well from theyr last end, to theyr first beginning, as from theyr first beginning, to theyr last end.*

This World as it had a beginning, so it shall have an end. But successive duration even in your opinion, shall have no end.

And therefore you cannot say without contradiction, that God looks thorough the severall ages thereof from theyr last end to theyr beginning.

Yet this last end, you might have called a beginning according to your phrase and tenent, maynteyning God to be before all ages, not onely before ages past one way, but also

before ages to come another way. Agayne, that all things are knowne to him, as well things to come, as things past, or present, is without all question.

This is to be present unto God, *in esse cognito*. But you have another wilde conceyt of the coexistence, both of things past and of things to come with God, & that for this present, which turne of yours this will nothing serve that God knows all things.

Last of all as touching this manner of knowledge which you attribute unto God, it is nothing decent.

We confesse, we may indifferently consider the course of the World past, cyther from the beginning unto this present day, or from this present day rising upwards unto the beginning of the World; because our understanding is of such a nature, as to consider things in succession one after another. But Gods understanding, as you well know, is of no such nature, as to consider things one after another; for so you should maynteyne succession in the nature of God, and consequently subject him unto time.

Agayne, God doth not looke out of himselfe in knowing the course of the World throughout; for he knew it as well what it might be, and what it should be before the World was made, as now he knowes what it is, yet certainly before the World was, he knew it not by looking without him, for then there was nothing without him to looke into.

And surely since the World was made the manner of Gods knowledge is nothing altered, for with him is no variableness nor shadow of change.

Neyther doe I see any reason why the knowledge of God, whereby he knowes all things, should be called the eye of his Providence: seing Providence beganne with the world, but his knowledge was the same before the world beganne, and by his providence it is more properly sayd, that he governes all things, then that he knowes all things.

Agayne you returne to the devised Circular forme of eternitie (yet that will not warrant a Circular duration thereof, which was your former figment) and tell us that there is no period of

riod of time, which is not so environed with eternitie, as the earth or center is with the Heavens; save onely that the Heavens are finite, and eternitie infinite.

Give me leave to professe the absurditie of this conceyte of yours amongst many others. For what doe you talke of environning that which hath no sides, but onely hath a kind of extension of succession in length of parts one after another.

Every period of time hath eternitie before it, and eternitie after it, but this is not sufficient to maynteyne that eternitie environs time as the Heavens environ the earth.

My selfe was borne before many thousands, whom allso I have outlived, but yet I cannot be sayd to environ them as the Heavens environ the earth.

If a Crowe lives many ages of a Man, and an Hart more then the Crowe, and the Raven mote then the Hart; how many thousands have begunne to breath & ceased to breath within the limits of theyr duration; yet what an absurde thing were it to say, that they environed them all, as the Heavens environ the earth, yet you proceed, sitting upon these addle eggs, to hatch congruous conclusions, you say that in this sense were it possible, the world might have bene created from everlasting, the Eternall, notwithstanding should have bene everlastingly before them. Which as it is most false, so it is most inconsequent. Most false, for like as God cannot be after that which hath no end (as your selfe before in a manner professed) and the reason is manifest. B cause to be after a thing, as for instance to be after the world, is to be after the world is come to his end, which were untrue if the world had no end.

In like sort to be before the world, is to be while the world had yet no being, which is contrary to the supposition of being everlasting.

Neyther doth it follow, that because God is before every period of time which hath a beginning, therefore he should be before such a time which is supposed to have no beginning.

I grant he should be before it by prioritie of cause, and by



priority of dignitie, but he should not be before it by priority of duration, which is the only priority whereof this discourse proceedeth.

Yet you will bring a reason to prove the former assertion, and that is this, *For that period of motion which must terminate the next Million of yeares shall have coexistent with eternity now existent, whose infinity doth not growe with succession, nor extend it selfe with motion; but stands immovable with times present, being eternally before times future, as well in respect of any set draught or point. Whence we imagine time future to come towards us, as in respect of the first revolution of the Heavens when time tooke begininge.*

This reason hath number enough of words; but let us consider what is the weight of sence it carryeth; And this is an hard matter to doe by reason of the obscurity that accompanieth it; one peuliar character of your discourse; For what doe you meane by the next Million of yeares? I know not how to accompt them, whether in respect of the time present; and so they proceede of the next Million that are to come; or rather of the Million of yeares next past; For I presume, you meane it not of the first Million of yeares of the world, in case it were eternall: For if eternall, then it had no begininge, and consequently as it had no first yeare, so neyther had it any first Million of yeares. Therefore I understand it of the next Million of yeares to this present, whether it be the Million next past, or next to come, all is one, and it must be true of both, as well as of either, that they are coexistent with eternity now existent, and what I pray of all this? when comes the forme of Syllogisme, whereby to conclude that God is not only before, but everlastingly before that which is without begininge. And that Gods continuance extends not only beyond, but everlastingly beyond that, which never shall have an end?

Give me leave to helpe you at a dead list, thus; If the next Million of yeares cominge, are coexistent with God, now existent, then also the Million of yeares cominge next to that, shall be coexistent with God now existent: And so all the Millions of

lions of years that are to come, are coexistent with God now existent; But Gods continuance of beinge, doth extend infinitely beyond his now existence: therefore it doth extend infinitely beyond all times to come, though they be without end; So on the other side: If the Million of years next past doth coexist with God now existent, then also the Million of years next past to them, doth coexistent with God now existinge, and so by the same reason all the years past doe coexist with God now existent; But Gods continuance, hath bene infinitely before his now present existence; therefore also it hath bene infinitely beyond all the Millions of yeares, though upon supposition they have bene infinite; This I thinke is the But of argument you shoote at, though you have not expressed so much; whether because your Logicke served you not, beinge used to a confused manner of dictatinge at pleasure what you thinke good, or because you envied so much your Readers facility in apprehendinge your meaninge.

Thus I have helped you in raisinge a Spirit: Now without your helpe I will assay to lay him agayne.

To the Major; I grant it in part, namely that there is as much reason why the two next Millions of years, whether you take them of the time past, or of the time to come, should coexist with God now existent, as well as one Million; but when you proceede and say; therefore by the same reason all that are to come, and all that are past, are coexistent with God now existent, you make an incredible stride or leape, infinitely greater then the stride, not only of Polyphemus, but of the Colossus at Rhodes too: For a Million and a Million, yea & a third Million, yea and though you make the progression in such sort while you will, still the number is but finite, but to leape herehence to all that are to come, is an infinite leape; For all are infinite both wayes, both as touching time past and time to come: in which respect, no progression, from Million to Million, shall ever reach to all, nay it shall never make the number of yeares remaininge, eyther for the time past, or for the time to come, lesse then infinite.

This is the fowle flawe we finde in the major: let us come



to the minor which was this ; But Gods existence extends infinitely further, and was infinitely before his now existence. I answer thus ; By Gods now existence , you understand his existence, eyther in the present instant of time , or in the present instant of eternity ; if of the present instant of time , then the proposition was not true in any one part of it ; For certainly neyther the Million of yeares next past, nor the Million of yeares next to come, are coexistent with God, now existent in instant of time, both because neyther many years can possibly exist in an instant of time ; nor God himselfe ; but rather his existens is in the instant of eternity, though both he and his eternity be coexistent with every instant of time : Now if it be understood of the instant of eternity, I deny that God was before this instant, or shall continue one ace of duration after it ; And no mervyle , seinge both everlastingnesse for the time past, and everlastingnesse for the time to come, are supposed, to coexist in this instant of eternity ; Yet have I not all this while discovered the vanity of the conceyte, which is as a mist before your eyes : You say, the next Million of years doth coexist with eternity now existent ; I say this is notoriously untrue, whether you take it of years past or of years to come , all is one ; for that which is past, and that which is to come, hath no existence with God now existent : And I proove it thus ; That which hath no existence at all at this present, that cannot be sayd to have any coexistence , but things past and things to come have no existence at all at this present , therefore they cannot be sayd to have any coexistence with God ; Things future shall have coexistence with God , to witt , when the time of theyr actuall existence cometh ; Likewise things past have had theyr coexistence with God, to witt , when the time of theyr actuall existence was.

But neyther things past , nor things to come have any coexistence with God now coexistent , for as much as they have no actuall existence at all , the actuall existence of the one beinge past, and that of the other beinge yet to come.

Neyther doth it follow that because Gods infinity doth not grow by succession , therefore things future are now coexistent

existent with God, but because things present and things future are in succession one unto another, therefore they cannot be sayd eyther future things to be present, or things present to be future.

That reason of yours, (namely that Gods infinity doth not grow by Succession, carryeth rather some coulour of prooffe, why Gods coexistence with his creatures or with time, cannot be sayd past or to come, then why things future shall be sayd, to be coexistent with God in this present; Yet your selfe use these formes, as to say, God was coexistent with his creatures that are past, shall be coexistent with such things as are to come; and indeed your reason is too weake to inforce these formes of speeches.

For this coexistence attributed unto God is not in respect of any succession in himselfe, but only in the things without him, which come and goe one after another by succession, & you are in the right, when thereupon you deny all succession in God, because his nature is not subject to any kinde of motion; God was before the World, and is coexistent with and in the World, and shall be after the World, which beinge after time, you in your language, entile his beinge before the end of it; but after another manner, then whereby he is sayd to be before the beginninge of it; But we must give you leave to be as *disertus* as you will in *Lingua tua*; *Nobis non licet esse tam disertis, qui musus columus severiores*; At partinge you give us another paradox; when you tell us *It is impossible to conceive any duration to be without beginninge or endinge without concea-vinge it Circular, or altogether voyd of succession*, on the contrary it is as wonderfull to me, how it should be possible for any man to conceive any duration to be Circular, whether finite or infinite; For the word Circular is a denomination only of forme, and of such a forme as belongs to magnitudes, that have coexistence of parts extended, and of motion in such a forme: But time is neyther any such magnitude, nor capable of motion; In a round figure, I confesse, there is no beginninge nor end of magnitude, But of duration, rounde figures have theyr beginninge, as well as squares. The latter part is as untrue.

untrue. Some have bene of opinion that the World was everlastinge, and the motions of the Heavens everlastinge, as Aristotle and his followers.

And some greate Schoolemen have thought it possible; how much more could they imagine it. For surely we may imagine things altogether impossible; And in the very next lines you confesse, men may imagine so if they list, and over and above you doe them the favour, as to further them in this theyr imagination, to wit by conceitinge the uninterrupted fluxe of an instant; and why not as well I pray, the uninterrupted motion of the heavens; and what is this to the everlastingness thereof, seinge this hath place in the space of a few years? Neyther doe we finde the Peripateticks needed any such helps to conceive the everlastingness of the world; In the last place you tell us, *the stability of eternity may be best conceived, by the retraction of such a perpetuall fluxe into one instante;* And yet before you told us such an everlasting fluxe could not be imagined; sure I am the retraction of it into an instante is utterly impossible; And be not these proper things to represente Gods eternity by, and fitt for Atheists to make merry with? That God is everlastinge, I trust we can demonstrate it, and that he is without succession, why shold that seeme hard to conceive, when it is improbable he shold be subject to any motion?

And now I come to the topp and the scourge whence you derive observations of greate force, *If not for composinge some greate controversies amongst learned men, yet for facilitatinge contemplation in one of the greatest difficulties, that Philosophy Whether sacred or humane affords to the conceyte of the most curious.* At my first cominge to the university, it was a greate comforte and encouragemēt, to me in the studyinge of Predicables to heare a Preacher out of the pulpit deliver that *peccata Iuvenum Predicantur in quales; peccata senum Predicantur in quid.* Shortly after in the Divinity Schoole, I heard a divine in the question, whether the pope were Antichrist make use of that axiome *unum uni opponitur*; and another in the pointe of predestination to alleage, that *Scibile was primum Scientia: To*

nia: To heare such notions which at that time were familiar unto me, so much dignified as to finde use in the pulpit and in the divinity Schoole, it brought me even in love with such learninge, which before seemed to me but course stuffe in comparison to one of Ciceroes Orations especially, that *conspicua divina philippica fama voluitur à prima quæ proxima*, or Ajax Mastigophoros in Sophocles wherewith we were acquainted at winchester.

How much more might a man like topp and scourge the better while he lives, to observe what transcendent use good witts may make of it. And yet by your leave, I finde no such difficulty in conceaving how eternity though Permanent, shall have coexistence with succession or motion.

A Pole fixt in a River hath coexistence with infinite parts of the streame succeedinge one another, without any succession in it selfe.

While I stande still, an army of men may passe by my side, & thereby shall I have coexistence in the same time with every one successively; But if I be not deceived you would devise, how we may conceive eternity to have coexistens with all parts of motion at once; for such a madde coexistence you have devised to your selfe, out of a wilde apprehension of the nature of etern ty, and you will not be beaten from it. And you may as well beate your brains to devise how all parts of time both past and to come, may coexist in one instant, and but erst you did cast us upon such an imagination, namely of the *retraction of a perpetual fluxe into one durable or permanent instant*. I have alredy laboured, *veteres avias a pulmone revellere*, to scatter these vaine conceyts.

But proceed we alonge with you; the topp turnes so swiftly somtimes, that he seemes to sleepe; Indeed we were wont to say that in such a case the topp sleepes; And in turninge round every bright marke seemes to make a circle; what of all this? hence you say *it will be no hard supposall to conceyte that a moover of strength and vigoure infinite, shold be able to moove a body in a momente*. I doe not denye, but a man may conceite so, as they doe conceyte Chymeras; and greate divines som-

times are found to enter teyne such conceys, as are found to be contradictions, such is this: never any question was made of this, rather it hath beene generally received, as a thing impossible that locall motion should be in an instant; And the reason of it in this round motion whereof you speake, is evident for to be in this instant in the same place what it was immediately before, is rather to rest then moove; and so the parts of successiue motion shold not be contracted into unity as you speake, but rather into nullity.

And you your selfe are in doubt whether it were fitt to call it *a cessation from motion or a vigorous rest or supermotion*: you may doe well to put it to Plotinus to resolve this, or Ficinus his Commentaries upon his Enneads. I perceave you have very vigorous conceites, which whether I shold so call them, or rather a cessation from all sober conceyte or a super-conceyte, let the reader judge. In the meane while that must needs be a proper motion which may be called a cessation frō motion, and a rest and that a vigorous one. Yet wonderfull strange is it, that a rest or cessation from motion shold conteyn in it parts of motion successiue infinite, and I confesse it were a very hard thinge to determine what to call it; for it is a certaine kinde of Chimera, that never I thinke was hatched in the conceyte of man or Angell before.

If this were granted you, then you presume the moover wold not moove it more slowly this day or yeare then he shold the former; But consider I pray, the pointe is not of moovinge it in a day or yeare, but in an instant; And because two instants cannot come together, therfore for the time betweene while, it must stand still, and because there be infinite instants in every day and houre, it followeth it shold be mooved about infinite times every day and hower; and infinite times stand still. Take what counse you will, it must stand still as oft as it mooves, and because betweens every two instants of motion there must be a time of rest, and every one infinitely greater then the instant of motion.

For betweene that which is divisible and that which is indivisible, there is no proportion of greatnesse; Now this supposition

position being granted you, (which you professed to be no hard supposition) we shall finde parts successively infinite in one revolution, or revolutions successively infinite in one or the same instant. So likewise Elope would instruct his Master how to drinke up all the waters in the Sea, provided that first all the Rivers might be stopped, from runninge into the Sea, for it was most unreasonable that as fast as he dranke the water out, the Rivers should bee suffered to poure water in againe, and that with a longer and a larger spoone then he had need to use that eates with the devill.

And I see no reason but a man might by ocular inspection discover the world which Galileus hath made report of, in the moone, provided that he might have a stayre case sure enough & high enough & all necessary provisions by the way, & at his journeyes end also, & safe returne, to quitt Lazarus relations of the dead, with celestiall relations of the terra incognita in the moone. And yet I confesse a truth, I doe not finde to what purpose you should say there be parts successively infinite in one revolution. For in the motion of a snayle this is to be found as well as in the motions of the heavens; for every thing that is continuall is divisible without end, to wit into parts proportionall; as for parts quotall, as namely fifts or thirds, or fowerths, or hundreds, these ever in the motion of the heavens are finite, the other are infinite. Whereupon it is that Aristotle denies there is *principium motus*, in the seventh of his phisicks, not speakinge of *principium externum* and *effectivum*, for so the nature of every thinge is the cause, both of his motion and of rest, but he speakes of *principium internum*, and of the integrall parts of motion whereof no part can be assigned to be the first, but that it may be divided in o two parts, whereof the one is before the other; And in the same sense as there is no first of motion, so there is no last; for what part soever you take; it is divisible into two parts, whereof the one is latter then the other.

The like may be sayd of every thinge that is continuall, even of magnitude which is permaneut, as well as of time and motion that consist in succession of parts: but then we must

know too, that these parts proportionall, are not to be accounted actuall, but only potentiall; And so Aristotle dissolves that Achilles of Zeno's arguments, whereby he would proove that motion being allowed to be continuall, the swiftest moover shold never overtake the slowest moover, if he were allowed never so little ground before him because in the time wherein he is to overtake the first space, wherein his fellow moover was before him, that fellow moover will have got some ground more, and while that is in passinge over by the other, he will get some ground more, and so in infinitum; the answer whereunto I never yet found explicated by any.

Hurtado di Mendoza amongst other difficulties, the solution whereof he undertakes, falls upon this also, but most unhappily; for he gives no satisfaction; Aristotles answer unto it, is but this; *partes sunt in toto non actus sed potentia*; it is spoken in reference to parts proportionall; which answer of his seemes a mystery, the right explication and accommodation whereof I never could be so happy as to find in any; but if I be not deceived it contains an admirable and cleare solution of the difficulty; but I doe not affect the ostentation of such subtilties.

I know not well how to give accounte for this very diversion from graver studies. To returne I say it is a poore course to lash out unto the supposall of such impossibilities to shew how in one revolution the parts are successively infinite; whereas this is found in every the meanest motion, which is a true motion and consists in succession; but in your feigned motion an instante, it is indeede not to be founde, because in an instant there can be no succession.

But further you say, that upon this supposall there shall be revolutions successively infinite in one and the same instant. But how this shall be you have not shewed, although I easily conceive how it may be prooved upon this supposall, but in a certeyne kinde which I presume you dreame not of.

And it is this; if it be admitted that a revolution of the heavens may be in an instante, then it is as possible that two revolutions may be in an instant, and in the same instant as well as one,



one, and three as well as two, and three hundred as well as three, yea and looke how many thousand dayes are past, since the World beganne, so many revolutions of the heavens there might have beene in one instant of time. And it is nothing strange if *uno absurdo dato, mille sequantur*; but I doe not find that you once so much as dreame of this; and what your meaning is, I find no where explained, much lesse the deduction thereof manifested. Yet as if you had proved many revolutions, (upon this supposall) to bee possible in one and the same instante, you discourse what they are to bee called; and you will not have them properly to be termed motion, but rather the *producte of motions infinitely swifte united or made up into a vigorous permanency*; and herence to serve your turne in the explication of eternity, you adde *how shold not duration of one or of all these revolutions be accompted as an instant of time, but a kinde of duration indivisibly permanent*. Here is strange language, had not we need of an interpreter, or of some *urinator delius* to dive into the depth, and sound the bettome if it? I remember what a freind of mine pleasantly discoursit in the university, by occasion of a certeine disputants strange manner of disputation; I have longed saith he to heare a scholer dispute eagerly, & distinguish and goe one boldly in schoole termes and phrases which himselfe understoode not. And now to my judgement I have lighted on such a one.

But whether you understand your selfe or noe I know not. I doubt I never shall; yet I will not give over, I will adventure to discusse it, and to shake this rotten stuffe in peices, that at least it may not abute the readers with suspicion of som rare notions, whome they cannot endoctrinate. First you speake of revolutions plurall yea infinite, how you have come by them I know not, unlesse as capons come by chicken; you made supposall of a thinge impossible enough, namely of the revolutions of the heavens in one instante of time, but it was only one revolution, and hereupon you steale up many revolutions, yea infinite, I know not how, neyther doe you once goe about to explicate how.

Secondly you will not have it called motion, but a pro-

duct of motions. Had you sayd you wold not have these revolutions called one motion but many, there had bene some sense in the speech, though litle reason.

For you professe these revolutions to be successive, and no where have you in the least manner signified them to be interrupt or discountinuall.

And if you take them as continuall, why should they not be stiled one motion? But this I thinke is not it, you insit upon; For you dislike the name of motion it selfe; you will rather have it called the product of many motions.

Now here I am at fault, in hunning after the meaninge of your invention, But yet as Plutarke makes the hounde to discourse in hunning after an hare, thus; he went not that way, nor that way, therefore he came this way; so will not I give over, but inquire which way the hare runs.

Now then this your product of motions is to be understood eyther of a product Physicall, or of a product Mathematicall; and I explicate my selfe (as you loue to involve your selfe) thus.

The product of motion Physicall, is the forme that is acquired by motion; As for example, in alteration a quality is produced, in augmentation a certeyne measure of quantity; in locall motion a new place or a new site; Eyther in respect of the whole as it falls out in all direct motions, or only in respect of the parts, as in all motions Circular; which new site is sayd to be new in respect of that which immediately went before.

Now in this motion of the Heavens in an instant supposed by you, there is no such product Physicall, for looke what site every part of the Heavens hath immediately before this instant, the same it hath still; And therefore you call it very significantly (I confesse) a vigorous permanency; which is as much as to say, no motion at all; Neyther doe I thinke that by the product here spoken of, you meane a product Physicall; Let us come therefore to consider, whether it may be verified of a product Mathematicall, that is in the Arithmetical operation of addition: for if two numbers be added together,

gether, it will produce a totall, and that totall shall be the product.

Now here you speake of revolutions infinite, which beinge added to greater, make a product which you call a vigorous permanency; which I professe, in my judgement seemes to be delivered with admirable significancy and congruitye.

For if in teachinge my Schollar Arithmaticque I shall exercise him in addition, and bid him write seven Cyphars in a rewe thus 0000000 and then bid him subscribe seven Cyphers under them thus, 0000000, and then bid him adde one unto the other, and tell me what in the product, & he will tell me that he finds seven Cyphers still, which is as much as just nothinge; In like sort suppose the Heavens standinge still immediately before this instant, and in this instant to be turned round to the place where it was immediately before, this deserves to be called a vigorous permanency: that is no motion rather then a motion: For to be where a body was immediately before, is the definition of rest, and not competible unto motion.

Nay take such an other revolution, and adde unto the former, this also beinge rather a vigorous permanency, and so no motion rather then motion, adde no motion, unto no motion, and what will the product be, but a vigorous permanency; and so *in infinitum*, it shall be a vigorous permanency: For no motion added to no motion while you will, the product shall still be no motion; but a vigorous permanency.

But I see no reason why you should call this vigorous permanency, infinitely swifte.

And yet I confesse by this supposition of yours the Heavens are made to stand still faster, then now they goe or run: albeit they run so incredibly swift, in the judgement of some; that they had rather set the earth goinge, and make the Heavens stand still in a vigorous permanency, though in a sense much different from the vigorous permanency you discourse of: And this calleth to my remembrance one of Bastards Epigrams, which he made of himselfe ridinge on Sarisbury plaine: For beinge overtaken by a gentelman well mounted,

who

who desired to have his company ; Bastard Spurs his cutt, the Gentleman reines his geldinge, yet could Bastard keepe no way with him. Whereupon he complains thus, *What shold I doe that was bestrided so. His Horse stood still faster then mine could goe.*

So the Heavens by your supposall stand still faster then now they goe.

I am not a litle sensible of the construction that some may make of this discourse of mine, as namely a greate deale too light and vayne for a Divine ; especially in a matter of so high a nature, as of the essence of God, and his eternity.

I professe I am often stricken with feare of transgression in this kinde : and have often meditated the relinquishinge of it wholly, I take so litle pleasure in these Schole quircks.

Yet another consideration affrights me more then this, and that is lest comming to calculate the Divine attributes by discourse of reason, in following the course of my weake understanding this way (whereof in this case I am much suspicious) I shoulde be founde to shape the attributes of God in such a manner, as to attribute that unto God, which dothe not become his Majestie, or deny that unto him, which dothe well become him; and thus I may fall upon blasphemy before I am awave.

I had rather submitt unto the acknowledgement of attributes divine, by faith, so farre forth as they are revealed unto us in Gods word ; then curiously inquire into the nature of them, by reason, & quaint Scholasticall argumentation.

But agayne, I consider, that it may please God to make use of that illumination as well Philosophicall as Theologicall, which he hath given me, to cleere some difficult points, concerning the nature of God, & therby to prevent blasphemies each way.

And as, by his grace, I feare to enterteyne any indecent conceyte of the Majestie of God ; so I trust, he will not expose me, to have my feares brought upon me, but rather by exercise perfect those seedes of knowledge of his Divine nature, which have bene sown in me, bothe by the light of nature,

ture, and by the light of grace, and assist me allso even in these discourses, and make them meanes to keepe others from being led away into erroneous opinions & enormous conceytes, concerning his nature, and divine attributes.

And as for the censure of Ighnes, and want of gravitie, passable upon this discourse; let the Reader consider; we are now upon the By, and in consideration of a Monstrous supposition, and most ridiculous prosecutions therupon, and let him judge how such deserve to be enterteyned.

Agayne when we medle with an obscure, perplexe, and intricate manner of discourse, if matter of refreshing both of mine owne, and of my Readers Spirits be offered, especially in that way of an harsh & displeasing discourse; shall I balke it, and in the affectation of a Stoicall gravitie decline the quickning of mine owne, and of my Readers senses? It was wont to be sayde *Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit mile dulci; & agayne Ridentem dicere verum, quis vetat.* In a word; I am at thy judgement Reader, to passe what censure upon me thou pleasest, neyther am I unwilling thou shouldst knowe mine infirmities, as well as my poore sufficiencies, that knowing me to be fleshe and blood, as well as others, thou mayst receive nothing herein for the Authors sake, but only for the evidence it carryeth with it. And that evidence is the worke of God, though the manner of caryinge it be the worke of Man.

Now it is highe time to consider the other member of this sentence followinge, which is this, *So should not the duration of one, or of all these revolutions be accounted as an instant or portion of time, but a kinde of duration indivisibly permanent.*

Nowe I finde no proportion betweene this and the former member, though they be coupled together with a particle of similitude, *So.* For if the revolution be as it is supposed by you, to be in an instant of time, why shoulde not the duration of it allso be accounted in an instant of time? So likewise, if you conceive diverse revolutions, yea infinite revolutions, to be in the same instant of time; what reason is there why their duration should not be accounted allso, in the same

instant of time? For if these infinite revolutions you speake of, have each of them a severall instant, why shoulde not the duration of each be accounted in each severall instant, and the aggregate duration of them all, be reckoned to be, in an aggregation of all the severall instants, in each wherof, one of the former revolutions is founde?

Secondly, you doe not well to joine an instant, and a portion of time together, as termes equipollent, because; no portion of time is an instant, nor is an instant any portion of time; more then a point is a part of magnitude. For every thinge consisteth of its parts; but neyther magnitude consists of points, nor *points* of instants.

Thirdly, much lesse reason is there, why the duration of one or of all these revolutions, shoulde be counted a kinde of Eternitie. First, because there is no kinde of eternitie indivisibly permanent (such as you here speake of) but one, and that is the eternitie of God. Secondly, what an absurd thinge is it to say, that the duration of a thinge in an instant of time and no longer, is fitter to be called eternitie then an instant of time. For the revolution you speake of is but for one instant of time. For the justifying wherof I appeale to your owne supposall.

*It were no hard supposall to conceyte that a moover of strengthe and vigour infinite, shoulde be able to moove a body in a moment:* This cannot be meant of any other moment then of time. For to moove a body in an instant of eternitie, requires not a moover of infinite strengthe; the meanest motion of the meanest moover, is comprehended (as you acknowledge) within the instant of eternitie. Nay all the revolutions you speake of, though successively infinite, are upon your supposition in one and the same instant, which cannot be understood otherwise, then of an instant in time. Now is it fitt, that the duration of such a motion or motions, the beginning and ende wherof are both in a instant of time, shoulde be stiled eternitie?

And how can that be called permanent, which bothe begins and endes in one and the same instant of time? Or how

how can that motion be coumpted indivisible, which hath parts successively infinite as your selfe professe in the sentence immediately before? If these be sober conceytes, I never knewe, what sobrietie in this kinde meaneth. But let us proceede to the next; *The motion of the eighth spheare supposed to be such as hath bene sayde, that is motion infinitely swift, or not divisible by succession; the Sunne mooving successively as now it doth should have locall coexistence to every starre in the eighth spheare, to every point of the eclipticke circle, wherein it mooves, at one and the selfe same instant, or in every least parcell of time.* The substance of this hath reasonable good consequence, from the former supposition of a thinge utterly impossible, and consequently it is not more impossible then the former. Yet by your leave, you erre in many a circumstance.

For first, as touching the mayne intention of this sentence, the Sunne shall not have locall coexistence with every starre or with any starre in the eighth spheare; how can it? there beinge the huge distance of three vast bodies of the Spheares of three planets betwixt the firmament, and the orbe of the Sunne.

But that upon your former supposition he shall coexist in the same line drawne from the North to the Southe I graunt in Astronomical computation, and so by the same computation may be sayde to have locall coexistence with it, though not in computation physicall.

Secondly, marke I pray you, what libertie of speechie you take unto your selfe. For that which even now you called a vigorous permanency, in this place you terme it a motion infinitely swift: as if you should say, the motion is so incredibly swift, that the body indeede stands still and mooves not at all. As much as to say, such a one talkes so fast that he seemes, and that in a vigorous manner to holde his peace.

And indeede I confesse, that sometimes it falleth out, that the faster we ride, the later we come to our journeyes ende; as in case by fast ridinge, our horse playeth the jade, and tyresh under us, and we can hardly make him goe. I had not thought such anomalies and irregularities could have bene



devised in the heavens, as namely, that a motion swift, should become a vigorous rest. In my judgement if the motion of such like discourses of yours were converted into a vigorous rest, it would give farre better satisfaction.

Thirdly you will not have this supposed motion to be divisible by succession, yet you doe impute unto it succession. For but erst you affirmed that *it had parts successively infinite*. Now if it hath succession, how is it possible, but that it should be divisible into parts succeeding one another? For like as magnitude having extension of parts, must needs be divisible in respect of its extension; so motion fluent as it hath succession of parts, so it must needs be divisible in respect of this succession.

Yet you suppose the contrary, like unto the Fryar in Chancer, who to shewe his contentednes with a litle, professed that he desired, but of bread a shiver, and of a goole the liver, and of a pigge the head, but that for him, nothing must be dead. So you will have the motion you speake of, to consist of parts succeeding, yet not divisible into parts succeeding. Lastly, your disjunctive is not good, as when you say, *in the false same instant, or in the least parcell of time*. For your suppositon is of the revolution of the heavens, not in the least parcell of time at all, but in an instant, which you well knowe is no parcell of time.

Yet I thinke to charme the absurditie of your former supposition, which perhaps makes you weary of it, and something confounded in the prosecution thereof, you would sayn turne it into some small parcell of time: but then, all that you builde herupon falls utterly to the ground.

One sentence remaineth to be considered, wherby in prosecuting your former supposition, you desire to lay a ground, for the commodious illustration of Gods eternitie, and that is this: *Every starre in the eyghthe speare should be converted into a permanent circle, and so in one circle there shoulde be circles for number infinite, as many circles as there be points or divisibilities in the eclipticke circle*. All this I may be bolde to say is nothing to the purpose, but proceedeth merely from affectation  
of

of holdinge your Reader in admiration, at the wonderfull conclusions, which yet being not superficially but exactly considered, conteyne most superficiall conceytes; the things you here deliver, so farre forth as they have any truth, are as well verified in respect of every days motion of the heavē; yea as well verified in a tennis ball, at every turning round therof.

For looke how many circles are made, upon the eighth sphere turning round in a moment; so many circles are made, by the turning of it rounde in 24. houres, For the body of the heavens is divisible alike, whether it turne round in a day, or in an houre, or in a moment; savinge that the turning of it round in a moment; deserves rather to be accounted a vigorous rest, and may be called a cessation from motion, as your selfe have professed, and consequently a cessation from making any circles at all.

But howsoever; I say the body of the heavens is alike divisible and that *in infinitum*, because it is *corpus continuum*; and for the same reason a tennis ball is so too & upon his turning rounde, you may as well imagine infinite circles made by him, according as the points therein are infinite.

Now we come to the application of this fiction (persecuted with much varietie, partly of Chimericall, and partly of vulgar inventions) unto eternitie it selfe, as followeth: *Thus in him that is eternall, or being infinite and in eternitie, are actually conteyned durations successively infinite.* *Thus in him*, say you; and what I pray, may an Atheist reply out of that heart of his wherein he sayth *There is no God*. For may he not rejoyne in this manner? And if it be but *Thus*; like as the fiction here supposed by you, is of a thing utterly impossible, so you give us libertie to conceive alike of the Eternitie of your God: not to reiterate the varietie of wayne conceytes, which have bloomed from the severall branches of this your discourse in persecutinge so vile a fiction to represent Gods eternitie thereby. Agayne, how dothe God conteyne durations successively infinite? Not formally, you well knowe, but only eminently, for as much as he can produce them.

But no such thing appeares, nor any modell therof in this

your fiction. For this revolution in an instant, conteynes only it selfe formally it conteynes the motion of no other body, neyther formally, nor eminently.

Yet thus, you say, Gods eternall being conteynes durations successively infinite, though there be no more resemblance betweene them, then betweene harpe and harrowe; a foxe and a ferne bushe, no nor any thing like so much.

Yet you proceede in your accommodation thus: *The former supposition admitted, we could not say, that the inferior orbes mooving as now they doe, did moove after the eighth spheare, but that the times of their motions were continually conteyned in it. For the eighth spheare being mooved in an instant, should loose the divisibilitie of time, and the nature of motion, with all the properties that accompany them, not by defect (as if it no way comprised them) but by swallowing up time or duration successively infinite, into an actuall permanency. To this I answere, first; The Heavens mooving as now they doe, I cannot subscribe unto you intimatinge that the inferior Orbes doe moove after the eighth spheare: But rather as in respect of their proper motion they goe against it (supposing the eighth spheare to be the uppermost Heaven) so in respect of Diurnall motion, they moove not after it, but *motu raptus* are drawne along with it: this is on the By.*

Nowe to the mayne: I deny that upon your supposition, it will followe, that *the times of these inferior orbes motions, were eminently conteyned in the motion of the eighth spheare.*

Your contrary affirmation seemes to me wonderous absurd, neyther can I devise any reason for it, or in what sense you take this phrase, *to conteyne eminently.*

For the common acception of it is this: That conteynes another thinge eminently, which not conteyninge it formally, is able to produce it.

So the Sunne is commonly reputed to conteyne heate eminently, for as much as not being formally hot it selfe, yet is able to produce heate in bodies capable.

So your selfe before have acknowledged all thinges to be in God, not formally (for he is neyther man nor Angell, much lesse

lesse any inferior creature), but yet is able to produce all these.

But it is impossible that the motion of the eighth spheare, supposed to be in an instant, should produce the times of the inferior Orbes motions.

It cannot produce their motions, they mooving as now they doe.

For how should an instantaneous or momentany motion in one body, produce a temporall motion in another body? Much lesse can it produce the times of their motions. For that is only in the power of God.

He alone that gives existence to any thinge, can give duration and time unto it.

Neyther dothe it conteyne their motions formally. For their motions are supposed to be temporall, that is in time, the motion of the eighth spheare is supposed to be momentany, that is in an instant.

But a momentany or instantaneous motion cannot formally conteyne a motion that is made in time.

A swifter motion can conteyne a motion lesse swift, because it is bothe so swift, and swifter allso.

And here by accident, and ere I am aware, I have a glimpse of your meaning; and while I dispute against it, I may seeme to you, to make for it.

For this instantaneous motion is supposed by you, to be infinitely swift, and therefore it may well conteyne the motions of inferior orbes, which are lesse swift, as mooving rounde no soever then in the space of 24. houres; whereas the eighth spheare is supposed to moove round in a moment. I thinke I have sprunge the partridge, now let me see, whether I have not a sprunge to take him: First then I say, this is not to conteyne eminently, but formally rather.

Secondly I say, this swiftnesse of motion which you have invented is too swift, too infinite to serve your turne, to conteyne the revolutions of inferior Orbes. For you have already professed that it deserves to be called a vigorous rest, and that it may be called a cessation from motion.

Now

Now let any sober man judge, whether a cessation from motion, whether rest, and permanency, and that a vigorous one be fitt, eminently to conteyne the true motions of inferior Orbes, which in the space of 24. houres are turned round. Yet if leave were given you to suppose this also, namely that a vigorous rest is so infinitely swift, that it might well be sayde eminently to conteyne the motions of inferior Orbes; yet how woulde it herhence appeare, that it should conteyne the times of them also?

Since this vigorous rest which you make to be infinitely swift, is but in an instant, and the motions of inferior Orbes of like quantitie are performed, in no lesse space then 24. houres.

Is an instant of time fitt to conteyne 24. houres? Yes you may say eminently. For as *fluxus puncti in Longitudinem* makes a line, so *fluxus instantis* for a certeyne space of time, makes 24. houres. Any man hathe reason to give me leave, to refresh my selfe a litle while my witts are dulled about such Ruffe as this. But you labour to shewe how the times of the inferior Orbes motions should be eminently conteyned in the eighth the spheare, if it mooved round in an instant. And that by this reason: For say you the eighth the spheare being mooved in an instant, should loose the divisibilitie of time and the nature of motion, not by defect (as no way comprising them) but by swallowing up time into an actuall permanency.

Tis true, I confesse, that motion, which is made in an instant; looseth the divisibilitie of time, that is, is not made in time. For an instant is no part nor parcell of time; Agayne it is well that you doe so ingenuously confesse, that it looseth the nature of motion, also, and all the properties that accompany it. For you have already professed, that it may be called a cessation from motion, and is to be called a vigorous rest or permanency, rather then motion.

All this I doe not dislike. But yet to make way for the conteynge both of times and motions, you tell us, that all this is not by way of defect, as if it no way comprised them, but by swallowing up time or division successively infinite into an actuall permanency;

*permanency*; which assertion of yours if we should take for a trueth, we should swallowe many a goageon. For first you imply, that what a thing compriseth the not, that it hath not, by way of defect, which is untrue for my hand compriseth the not sixe fingers, yet that it is without a fixt finger is not by way of defect. Secondly you give us to understand that a certeyne mutation may loofe both the nature of time and motion, and all the properties of them, and yet some way comprise them which is contradictious.

For looke what way it compriseth time or motion, surely that way it hath it, and dothe not loofe it. Thirdly it is an absurde thing to say, that an instant of time swalloweth up time. For to swallowe it up is to conteyne it. But it is impossible that an instant should conteyne the space of any time, as the space of 24. houres. For if it be impossible that an houre should conteyne the space of 24. houres, much more impossible is it, that an instant shoulde.

The motion indeede, which you suppose to be in an instant, conteynes an whole revolution of the eighthe spheare, (for upon the fiction of this impossibilitie, you are pleased to descant much:) but surely this supposition of yours, though it be of a thing impossible, yet dothe it not inferre, that this instant shall swallowe up the space of 24. houres, though it swalloweth up the motion, (as you suppose) which usually is made in no lesse space then the space of 24. houres.

Last of all consider I pray the sobrietie of this speeche: *It swalloweth up motion into an actuall permanency* (as much as to say, into an actuall rest) and so it compriseth it, that is, rest conteyneth motion, and that in an instant; how much more shall the space of 24. houres rest, be sufficient to conteyne a motion infinitely greater, then an instant dothe. As for division successively infinite (as it were to make your deductions the more admirable to vulgar capacities) it is a very sory conceyt. For the least time or motion that is, is divisible in infinitum, like as every continuall thing is, though never so small. By this, let the wise Reader judge, of the profitable nature of the improvements you speake of in improving motion infinitely

tely swift into permanency or rest, which is as much as to say, into no motion; and let him well weighe and consider whether this be not to bring a noble unto nine pence, or rather unto no pence: and by such improovements, when you cast up your reckoning at the yeares ende, you may put all your gaynes in your eyes, and never hurt your sight.

After this you come in with a newe way of conceavinge the first moovers eternitie, and that is as *Mathematicians conceive the nature of a spheare*, by imagining it to be produced by the motion of a semicircle upon the *Axis*. There is such a definition, I confesse, of a spheare, which is defined to be *transitum circumferentie* as which transitus I conceive to be emanation rather then motion, like as a line is imagined to be *fluxus puncti in longitudinem*; and a superficies is imagined to be *fluxus linea in latitudinem*. But all these are very wayne imaginations. For neyther is it possible, that such things should have any fluxe, or if they had, that by theyr fluxe they should make eyther lengthe, or breadthe, or thicknes in such a figure; but rather a length so made should consist of points, & a breadth so made shoulde consist of lines, and a spheare so made, shoulde consist of semicircles, which is utterly impossible.

And shall we never linne to compare the nature of God to the wayne imaginations of such wayne thinges? Yet seeing you will take your course, we will take libertie to consider it. And thus you proceede, *For let the eternall be but thus imagined, to be an intellectuall spheare, capable of momentany motion or revolution throughout this World, and the indivisible coexistence of his infinitie to every part of time and place, will be very conceavable.* Very conceavable, you say; but first let us try, whether this conceyte of yours conteyne any conceavable truthes. For if it dothe not, are we not well advanced to the conceaving of Gods eternitie, by comparing it to such impossibilities? And first you were as good bid us imagine God to be an intellectuall body, as to be an intellectuall Spheare.

For a Spheare is a body, eyther physicall or mathematicall, that is, a body at least of quantitative dimensions. The world indeede is Sphericall, and God is in every part of it; but will  
you



you therefore conceive the nature of God to be Sphericall all-so, and his forme altered, upon the making of the World, from that it was before?

Remember I pray, God is in the World and in every part of it but how? as conteyning it, not as being conteyned by it.

Secondly, you will have us imagine God to be capable of *momentany motion, or revolution throughout the World?* Now consider I pray, what a congerie of wilde conceytes are involved here. Is a revolution, a motion throughout the world? Every man knowes a revolution to be a turning round. The orbes of the heavens have theyr revolutions, but doe they therby moove throughout the World? or rather keepe theyr places, & each mooveth only about the bodies that are within the compasse thereof.

Agayne you knowe momentany motion is a thing impossible. And that which dothe so moove round as you would suppose it, dothe rather rest then moove. For to be in the same place where it was immediately before is the definition of locall rest. And your selfe have confessed it may be called a cessation from motion, and doe affect rather to call it a rest, a permanency, a stabilitie.

If it were a motion, is it fitt to attribute motion unto God? Is it fitt to maynteyne that God mooves from place to place? Agayne the motion of an intellectuall nature as intellectuall, is rather the motion of the understanding in knowing things, then motion locall from place to place. And it is true, that all things done in time and place are knowne unto God, but without all motion so much as in the understanding. For even in the understanding of God, there is no change, much lesse motion. Lastly by mooving through the World in an instant, he shall be coexistent to every part of place & that in an instar, but how shall we conceive hereby, any coexistence of his to every part of time, as well to all parts of time past, and time to come, as to the time present?

The light of the Sunne is diffused thorough all, let us suppose, thorough all the world, therefore it shall be coexistent to every place, but not to every part of time, but only to the pre-

sent. But is it not your meaning that Gods eternitie should be diffused not so much thorough the world ; for that belongs to his immensitie ; but rather thorough the time of the world , from the beginning thereof , to the ende of all durations successiue without ende (for you doe mainteyne that successiue duration shall have no ende?) Certainly this seemes to be your meaninge , and then indeede , it is no hard thing to conceave Gods eternitie to coexist with all parts of time past , present & to come , if so be we conceave it diffused thorough them all , as God is coexistent to all parts of this World , if he be diffused thorough them all (which is your phrase , and not mine , and utterly disclaymed by Durandus.)

But then what Meant you to adde coexistence of place to coexistence of time , which are woonderous different , the one belonging to Gods immensitie , this alone to Gods eternitie.

Secondly , what meant you to call this a motion thorough the World , whereas it is rather thorough the duration of the World , or thorough the time of the world , and the parts thereof , from the beginning of it to the ende , and infinitely further. For by the World we usually understand a World of place , and not a world of time.

Thirdly , what meant you to call , this motion throughout all times a revolution , doth time runne round , & by fetching a compasse about returne to the beginning of it from whence it first issued? For this is the nature of revolutions.

Fourthly , what meant you to call it a motion , seeing it can neyther be alteration , nor augmentation , nor generation , nor locall motion , though you seeme to devise a motiō throughout all time , like unto the locall motiō of the eighthe Spheare turning round in a moment. And so you devise as it were a locall motion thorough time but it shall be in an instant , to make up a world of woonders ; that in an instant a motion may be conceived thorough all time , from the beginning of the World to the ende , and infinitely beyond it in duration. Yet this motion thorough so many thousand yeares while the world lasteth , and millions of yeares after that , shall be in an instant.

Fiftly when, I pray, did this motion beginne? was it before the world, or with the beginning of the world? Not before the world: For, as there was then no place for God to penetrate (as you speake) and to fill, so there was no time for him to moove thorough by his eternitie. If with the world, then seing this motion is supposed to be in an instant, in the first instant God mooved thorough all time to come.

But how was that possible, seing like as before the World it could not be, because then there was no time; so in the beginning of the World it could not be, because the time to come as yet was not. If you say, though it were not present, yet it was to come, and therefore God could by vertue of his infinite eternitie moove thorough it in an instant, I answer, that by the same reason, he might as well moove thorough all time before ever the World was. For even then, though there was no time present, yet there was time enoughe to come.

But like as it is absurd to say, that God by his immensitie did fill all places before the world, when as yet there was no place to fill: so it is alike absurd to say, that God by his eternitie did fill all times before the world was, when as yet there was no time to fill. And now I pray, be pleased soberly to consider, what litle neede there is of all this paynes, in streyning our conceytes as it were upon tenter hookes, till they are quite out of joynt: what neede of so many absurd fictions, of so many impossibilities to proove that which is most untrue, and yet confidently supposed by you as a principle out of a superficiall consideration of the nature of Gods eternitie, Namely, that God by vertue of his eternity doth coexist with all times past, present, and to come.

For consider I pray, will you say that God did by vertue of his immensitie coexist with all places before the world was? No sober man I presume, will say this; why then should you affirme, that God by vertue of his eternitie did coexist with all times before the world was? And if the actuall existence of place, be required unto this, that God by vertue of his immensitie should exist with it; why should not

the actuall existence of time as well be required unto this, that God by vertue of his eternitie should coexist therewith? And if before the world was, God did not coexist with times that were to come (like as then he did not coexist with place that was to come:) then surely by the same reason, he shall not at this time present coexist with time that is to come; and consequently, neyther shall he be sayde to coexist with times that are past, like as if the world were destroyed, he shoulde not be sayde to exist with those places, and bodily spaces, which sometimes were, but in this case now were not.

And therefore we have litle neede to trouble our selves with any such wilde and monstrous fictions to maynteyne the coexistence of God with every part of time. For as the parts of time shall be found to exist in theyr order, so shall God be truly sayde to coexist with them, and no otherwise, that is, not to coexist with them all at once, but only in succession, not of Gods duration or of any thing in God, but in succession of time, and of the things conteyned therein.

Gods duration we acknowledge to be eternall without beginning and without ende, yet indivisible; for as much as it is no way subject unto motion, no way subject to any variableness or shadowe of change. For he is of necessary being, and therefore impossible it is, he should not be. Besides, whatsoever he is the same he is essentially, and therefore not subject to any kinde of change, eyther in substance or quality, or quantitie or in place.

And as he is the Author of all things, so both the motions and rests of all things are produced and maynteyned by him, and so may be sayde after an eminent manner to be conteyned in him, and no otherwise. I mislike not Plotins interpretation of Gods *totalitie* of being, in as much as he is able to produce all kindes of beinge. As for eternitie, I had rather rest vpon Aquinas his definition of it, then on yours. For it hathe no parts formally; and as for an eminent conteyning of all parts of duratio, that is in respect of activitie to produce them. Now time, and the duration therof, together with the duration of things therein, is rather produced by the *counsaille* and  
Will

will of God, then by his *eternitie*. And therefore all durations doe flowe rather from Gods will, then from his *eternitie*. To my understanding a body casteth but one shadowe, and not many; which casting of a shadowe is no other thing then the hindring of light from the earthe or water, according to the bodies proportion, which therupon are sayde to be shadowed by it. These diverse shadowes, as you call them, how they vanishe in every moment, as you speake, I professe, I know not, sure I am the fishes in the water doe not eate them, if they did, certainly they would be never a whit the fatter by them.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the Infinity of divine power.*

I Doe not affect to contende with you in point of Rhetoricke, or to call you to an account for stiling *Time, a spectator of all things*. If it be so, it is the more like unto a Philosopher by his account, who comparinge the world unto a market, ranged the people therof into 3. sorts, buyers, sellers, and lookers on, and these were the Philosophers. Only I woulde desier that you woulde give other the like liberty to speake in theyre owne phrased, and not to chalenge them for affecting Poeticall witt more then Metaphysicall truthe; as upon such like termes it was your pleasure to cry downe that common adage *Tempus edax rerum*. For if you admitt time to be a Spectator, you may by as good Rhetoricke admitt it to be a devourer, according to that of good autoritie *Inspexit varias merces oculisque comedit*. In like sort studious scholars are accounted *Helluones librorum*, devourers of bookes, though not for the readinge of them only, but for the apprehension of them, and making them theyre owne.

So Cassius Severus had devoured Labienus his workes, his orations. For when an edicte came forth from the Emperour, for the burning of all his writings. (For as he was an admirable Orator, so he was of an high spirite, and as Seneca  
writes,

writes, *qui in tantâ pace Pompeianos spiritus nondum deposuerat.*) which edicte when it came to Cassius Severus cares; why then saythe he, I muste be burnt alive; for as much as I have learnt them without booke. Yet I could be content to allow you any liberty of phrase, so you woulde be pleased to speake to our understanding; wherof you sayle in your very first sentence, when you tell us, that *all thinges Wantinge place or time or being, present themselves anewe in theyre proper shape or forme*; for how any thinge can present it selfe, wanting both place, and time, and being allso, it is a riddle unto me.

I guesse your meaninge is, that the being of all thinges is produced in place and time, which before the time of theyre production were without both place and time, and beinge; which as it is a trueth, so it is a mosse vulgar trueth, yet obscurly delivered by you, and to no purpose that I can conceave. But be it so, & that every thinge brought forth on this stage, you speake of, acteth one parte or other for the mayntenance of the whole; and therefore is of some power; though in some you thinke it is to be accompted strength and power passive rather then active.

And yet you say the very earth, in that it sustaines weights layde upon it, and resisteth contrary impulsions, *is perhaps of active force or operation*; As for the power of mooving to the center, that you say is no more passive then active but a meane betwixt bothe. I presume you meane by way of participation, and not by abnegation of the extreames. Yet in my judgement to swey or moove to the center is meere active, to be sweyed or mooved is merely passive. Yet other properties there are of the earth, though you pretermitt them. For it is commonly sayde, that it covers the errors of Physicians.

And I remember what a Sexton was wont to say, of all his sick neighbours; that when Physicians have done all they can, yet at lengthe he muste heale them, meaninge by making theyr graves, and with the earth to cover them. I have heard a Mountebanke report, that when a mans legge is stung with a viper, to put that legge into the colde earth is a presēt remedy.

I have

I have heard also what use the Irish sometimes have made of the colde earth, when they have overdrunke themselves with Visquobath. Yet me thinks that power of the earth should not be pretermitted which the Holy Ghoste gives unto it, in saying, *Let the earth bring forth, &c.* But as for the power of assimilating other things to themselves, and of preserving symbolizing qualities, that you say is founde in the dullest bodies. The active force and power motive of windes, vapours and exhalations is well knowne, as also of celestiall bodies especially the Sunne, theyre productive operation cannot be unknowne to any. You conclude that all this power is but finite, and that no created thing is capable of power infinite, which you affirme only with a perhaps, and such cautions are very frequent with you, which in this place I take to be moste needelesse.

Now as time and place were as you sayde shadowes of Gods eternitie and immensitie, So, the power of the creature is a shadowe of Gods infinite power. Yet shadowes we all knowe have proportiōs to the substances shadowed by them, but betwene finite and infinite we commonly say there is no proportion.

2. God, you say, is more infinite in every kinde, then all the united powers of severall natures, though they were for number infinite and each infinitely operative in its owne kinde. But let us not lye for God, as man doth for man to gratify him. True and naturall beauty needeth no painting: And Gods perfection needeth no Mountebanke like amplifications to sett him forth. The powers of the creatures are not formally in God, but eminently, that is, they are sayd to be in God in as much as he can produce them, and theyre effects also. As for example, though he be not hott, yet can he produce heate in greater measure then fier dothe.

But consider I pray you; Can God produce a greater heate, then that which is infinite? or can he produce a greater number then that which is infinite? It is apparent that he cannot, not by reason of any defecte of power in God, but by reason that a greater then that which is infinite to be produced, is a



thing utterly impossible. You are pleased to take notice of a former observation of yours, which was this, *That thinges by nature most imperfecte, doe oftentimes best shadowe divine perfection.*

You have already intreated of Gods immensity and eternity; and therein you have tolde us, *that no positive entity, no numerable parte of this vniuerse, doth so well represent the immensity and eternity of God, as the negation of all thinges, which we describe by the name of Nothinge.* I thinke there never dropt a more vile assertion from the penne of any wise man then this; yet you desire here agayne to commend it unto the Reader as some quainte observation. But what doe you meane to repeate it under such forme, as by calling it *somethinge though imperfecte*. Is *Nothinge*, or *the negation of all thinges*, to be accounted *somethinge though imperfecte*? yet the same observation you will have to have place here also. As if this which we call *nothinge* were the most fitt to represent Gods immensity by, yea and his eternity, yea and his infinite power also.

How neere drawes this to the making of God to consist of nullities, since you say his naturall properties are best resembled unto nullities? well, we have heard what that is which best representeth his immensity and eternity, now we are to expecte what that is which best represents his infinite power. And this after a long deduction, you expresse to be the center of the earth, which you say is matter of nothing.

And thus you maintaine a iust proportion of discourse concerning Gods attributes; for still your witt serveth you to resemble them either to *Nothinge*, or to that which you call *matter of (just) nothinge*. But herein you proceede by degrees. And first you seeme to conceave, that this center of the earth, is in the language of the Holy Ghoste, made to be the foundation of the earth, as in that speeche of the Lord to Iob chap. 38. 4. 5. 6. *Where wast thou, when I layed the foundation of the earth? and whereupon are the foundations therof fastned, who hath layde the corner stone therof?* And first you commend the phrase, as surmounting all poeticall decorum, and will have the

## To the second Section.

the Majesty therof consiste therein, sufficiently testifying that it was metered by God himselfe.

Now hertofore, you have made poetickall witt to stande in opposition unto *Metaphysicall truth*. But of poetickall *decorum*, especially in this place, like enough you have a better opinion. For my part I am perswaded the Majesty of Gods speeche consists in the power of the Spirite, rather then the Wisdome of the wordes. Paule also spake by the Spirite of God, and some have observed greate parts in his very language, but see what Castellio a freind to your opinions writes of Bezaas judgement concerning this in the defence of his translations upon the 2. Cor. 11. 6. *Paulum* (sayth he of Beza) *& grandiloquentiâ Platoni, & vehementia Demostheni, & Methodo Aristoteli atque Galeno anteposit: in quo mihi videtur Pictores imitari, qui Christi matrem dum honorare volunt, regio vestitu pingunt, & eidem tamen ita cogente historia prae sepe in quo jaceat Christum infans appingunt nobili sane solacismo. Quid enim mundanis regibus cum prae se pibus? Maria gloria est paupertas, & pictores eam divitiis exornant. Sic Pauli gloria & gloriatio est Sermonis imperitia.*

But lett the Majesty of the speech passe as nothing pertinent to our present purpose, where doe you find the center of the earth to be mentioned or pointed unto in all this? doth the corner stone there mentioned, signifie so much? or by the foundation there expessed, muste we necessarily understand the center of the earth? The Holy Ghoste seemes rather in this inquisition, to have reference to something without the earth that should uphold it or fasten it, and withall signifieth, that no such supporter can be found. Then you proceede to admiration at this that the center shoulde beare up the earth and all thinges thereon, which center is no body or substance, no not so much as a meere Angle or corner, nay such as forthwith you say is a matter of nothing.

And so in the issue it comes to this, that nothing beares it up, which is true, in the forme of a negative; but not as an affirmative as if there were any power in the center to beare it up. And why should we conceive that the center of the

earth should beare it up, more then the center of a tennis ball beares it up, which also might be the center of all if it lay in the middle of the earth? And if any side of the earth were removed from the center to the heavens, it would forthwith appeare that the center of the earth beares not up the rest; for that which before was the center would now be driven a greate deale higher, and become the outside of the earth. So that the center of the earth will not serve your turne; will you then runne to the center of *vacuum* or of the space imagined to contayne the earth? Yet you distinguish not of *centrum Physicum* and *centrum Mathematicum*. For who doubts, but that one side of the earth may be heavier then an other. Again it was woont to be a received Maxime that *Terra non gravitat in loco suo*; and therefore there is no neede of any thing to beare it up. For the middle of the world is the naturall place of the earth, which when it hath gotten, it swayes not, nor propendes not, nor can be swayed to weighe downwards; which indeede were to weighe upwards which way soever.

And have heavy thinges any neede (thinke you) of supportance to keepe them from weighing upwards? Yet we acknowledge, the whole world and every part of it is from the finger of God. For the very course of nature is the worke of God. That fire doth burne, that the Sunne and starres doe inlighten the earth, that heavy thinges moove downwards, and light thinges upwards, all this I say, we acknowledge to be the worke of God.

And we woonder at the power of God in making all this by his word, and supporting all by his word. But being made and as wonderfully preserved by God, we woonder not at this, that heavy thinges moove downwards, & light things upwards; or how it comes to passe, that the earth without a supporter continueth where it is, seeing if it did not continue where it is, it should moove upwards towards the Heavens lighter then a feather, which is quite contrary to the nature of the earth. We well woonder at the power of God in this, that as he made it by his worde, so with the turning of an  
hands

hande he could sett an ende unto it, if it pleased him. And therefore to talke of *chamberinge up sustentative force* (in the center) multiplied accordinge to the severall portions or divisibilities of magnitude successively immensurable, to speake in proportion to your owne language, is to affect more *Rhetoricall* wize then *Metaphysicall* truths, in plainer termes, is to multiply words without sense.

So then to amplifie the infinite power of God, by surpassing the imaginary sustentative force of a center, which as your selfe confesse is a matter of nothinge and consequently the sustentative force of it must be a matter of nothing, is a very poore amplification of the power of God. If the center were able to supporte the earth not where now it is, but in the hollowe of the moone, that were somewhat to magnifie the sustentative power therof. Yet I make no doubte, but God could doe so by his power. Which case is of farre greater force for the manifesting of his power, then in bearing up the earth where it is, which indeede being created, and preserved in being, hath no neede of supportat<sup>o</sup>n in his owne place, where it can moove no lower; and if it moove by directe motion, it muste needes moove higher; which kinde of motion is more proper for a feather the for the heavy earth, whose wombe is impregnated with stones and mettalls.

And therefore you doe well to take this power of God into consideration as namely of his ability to *tosse this universe with greater ease, then a Gyant doth a tennis ball* (yet I never read or heard before of Gyants playing att tennis ball) *through out the boundlesse courtes of immensitie*. By the way your overlash, in talking of the Courts of immensitie, wherein this motion should be. For as for the immensitie of God, that is no fitt space to toss the world in.

And as for the immensitie corporall, that is a thing utterly impossible; the motion you devise must needes be in vacuo or not att all. Now the force of the center is no way fitt whereby to illustrate this power of God. For certainly if the earth were placed in the hollowe of the Moone, it together with his center would tumble downe againe; as little con-

gruous is it; for the illustration of that power of God, whereby he is able to *dissolve Rocks of Adamant with the phillep of his finger, sooner the bubbles of water with the breath of the Canon*; In all which you seeme to affect not Metaphysicall trueth only, but Rhetoricall if not Poeticall flourishes also. We beleewe that God, as by his word he made all things out of nothing, so by his word he can returne them into nothing; this is plaine English neyther hath his power neede of any Pyrgopolinices bombast eloquence to illustrate the Majesty therof or sett it forth.

3. But from the breath of the Canon you fall congruently upon the consideration of the mother of it, which creature is commonly called *gunpowder*. And here you tell us first that *our admiration of Gods active power may be rayssed by calculating the imaginary degrees of active powers increase in creatures*; that which followeth *divisible as well in quantitie as operation*, is of no importance but only to fill up. The Canon sends forth his bullet with greater violence then the Sacher, like enoughe, and so every Ordinance exceeds other in force of Battery, according to the *quantitie of charge, or length of barrell*, which I leave to the consideration of the Master of the Ordinance. To this you adde that *if the same quantitie of Steele or yron, were possible to be as speedily converted into a fiery vapor as gunpowder is, the blowe would be 10. times more irresistible then it is*. I doe not thinke your meaning is to instruct the world in a new way of making Saltpeter, if it were, Saltpeter men should be your scholars, I would be none of them.

So much Phylosophie I apprehend, that fire is most swifte in mooving upwards, as the Element of earth is most swift in mooving downwards. And like as the contraction of more parts of the earth together makes a bodie the heavier, so likewise the more fiery anything is, so much the more swift in motion upwards. But to say that *the active force or vigour of motion, allwayes increaseth according to the degrees of celerity which it accumulates*, is an idle speech, & as much as to say the more swiftly it mooves, the more vigorously it mooves. It had more shew of congruity to say the more vigorously it is mooved

ved (to witt in respect of the Agents force that mooves it) the more swifely it mooveth.

Now you come to the accommodation of all this, unto the infinite power of God, in this manner, *Though the moste active and powerfull essence cannot be encompassed with walls of brasse, nor chambered up in vaults of Steele albeit much wider then the Heavens, yet doth it every where more strictly girdle it selfe with strength then the least or weakest body can be girted. For what bonds can we prescribe so strict, so close or firme, as is the bond of indivisible unitie, which can not possibly burst, or admitt eruption, wherein notwithstanding infinite power doth as intirely and totally encampe it selfe as in immensitie. How incomparably then doth his active strength exceede all comparison? What a mad comparison is it in illustrating the infinitie of Gods power to say that God girds him selfe with strength more strictly, then the weakest body can be girt? Doe weake persons gird themselves with strength; or is Gods girding of him selfe with strength, like to our girding of our clothes aboute us? By that which followeth it seemes that you have an allusion to Gods girding of him selfe into a narrowe compasse, like Ladies that affect slender waists. For to what other purpose doe you tell us that Gods girding is as strict, as is the bond of indivisible unitie.*

And before you told us that the greater force ariseth from the contraction of parts. Now hath God any parts to be thus contracted and united, that so his vigour might be greater? what base comparisons are these, to represent the infinite power of God by them? Then you roule in your wonted Rhetorick to amplifie the vehemency of his motive power; in that it cannot be exprest by a motion *that should beare tevell from the Sunnes setting in the West, to the Moone rising in the East,* which is a very faire marke I confesse; for the case put, is in plenilunio, when the Moone is att full. Then to cast the fixed starres downe to the center, (belike you meane one after another, otherwise there would be no roome for them in the center;) and hoise the earth up to the Heavens within the twinkling of an eye, or to send both in a moment beyond the extremities of this visible

visible world, into the Wombe of vacuity whence they issued, Would not straine his power motive.

Yet all this you confesse to be lesse then to bring nothing unto something, that is, to take not your words but rather your good meaning, to create out of nothing. Whereby nothing doth not become something, but something hath a being, which before it had not. But here you power out many wilde conceits besides this: first as when you say, *Essence swallowes up infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant*. I had thought rather this had bene the property of eternity, not of essence. You might as well say *essence* swallowes up all places into an indivisible unitie or point. Then how may eternitie be sayde to swallow up that which it doth not containe; neyther formally, (for certeynly there is no formall succession in eternitie) nor eminently. For to conteyne eminently, is to be able to produce succession; but it is not Gods eternitie that denominates him able to produce time, or the existence of things in time, but his power. So neyther his essence nor his eternitie, swallowes up motion for the same reason.

But as for the swallowing up of motion into a vigorous rest, to witt by mooving the eighth spheare round in a moment; Of the nakednesse and absurditie, that is shamefull nakednesse of such an assertion, we have discoursed enough. Again, is it not enough for you to maynteyne motion in *vacuo*; but you must needs affirme that this visible world issued from the *VACUUM* which now we imagine without the extremities of it? where now the world is, was a *VACUUM* before the world was, but yet the world issued not from it, neyther in the kinde of a materiall cause, nor in the kind of a formall cause, nor in the kind of an efficient cause, much lesse did it issue from that *VACUUM*, which you terme without the extremities of this world. Then againe I know no measure of perfection derived unto the creature from Gods immensitie, but only from the counsayle of his will, by his immensitie he fills all places but distributes not the measure of perfections thereby.

When



When you call *Nothing* the mother of Gods creatures, tell mee I pray, did you affect *poeticall* Witt or *Metaphysicall* truth? I had thought *Nothing* had not afforded so much as the matter of any thinge, as the Mother doth the matter (at least) of the childe. It is true; we were not any thing before God made us. And as sure I am that this which we call nothinge, did not contribute any thinge to the creation of men.

The basenes of mans originall is a common place of another nature; Now your text is *the Infinity of Gods power*, but you may squander from it as you please. Whatsoever implies not contradiction, the production thereof is within the compasse of Gods power, and whatsoever God can do, he can doe with ease; His head ake not in the makeing of the World, neyther doth it ake in providing for, and preserving all things. But to talke of the possibilitie of more worlds hand over head, under colour of gratifying God in the amplification of his power, I leave unto them that are not satisfied with the demonstration of his infinite power in this. Yet as touching Gods omnipotency, for the strengthening of our faith, we are promised somethinge hereafter, as if all hitherto tended to the strengthening of our imagination, by comparing it first to the suttérative force of a center which is a matter of nothing, and then to the force of gunpowder which undoubtedly is a matter of something. Whether we are like to meete with a more wise discourse, concerning Gods infinite Wisedome, if others know, yet I know not.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Of the Infinitie of divine Wisedome. That it is as impossible for ought to fall out without Gods knowledge, as to have existence without his power or essential presence.*

1. **I**N the first Section there is nothing that I mislike: we acknowledge God could not be infinite in power, unless he were infinite in Wisedome also. And that power ungoverned

verned by Wisedome, would bring forth very enormous effects. But if a double portion of witt matched with halfe the strength would effecte more then a triple portion of strength with halfe so much witt, surely where the power is equall, & the Wisedome infinitely unequall, there the effects cannot be the like. Yet you have bene bold to affirme in another treatise of yours, not yet extant I confesse, that *If a man had the same infinite power that God hath, he might well thinke he could dispose thus of thinges as God hath disposed, by the Wisedome which man already hath.*

And you give this reason, *for in thinges wee can lay any necessity upon, wee can tell well enough how to dispose of them to the end which we seeke.* As uncouth an assertion as hath passed from the mouth or penne of any man. For we manifestly perceave that the difference of artificiall operations in the World, doth not arise from the difference of mens powers, but merely from the difference of their skill and Wisedome in severall trades.

2. You doe not well to confounde power with strength; for strength is only power naturall; but there is a civill power goeth beyond that. And there is no question to be made, but Wisedome is to be preferred before the strength of the body, by how much the qualities of the minde are to be preferred before the qualities of the body. But where civill power is supreme that ruleth over the wisest Counsaylers. No question God is as infinite in Wisedome as in power. But I take it to be very absurd to say that Gods wisedome is greater then his power. For is it possible that God by his wisedome can thinke of any course fitt to be done for the setting forth of his glory which his power were not able to effect? and seeing you confesse his power to be infinite as well as his wisdome, what should move you to mainteine the one to be greater then the other, I can not devise. Princes have guides to governe them, which yet are not therefore greater then they, but inferior by farre. But in God, his wisdome and power, though different notions, yet the substance of them is all one and precisely one in God. The same is the proportion be-  
tweene

tweene infinite wisdom and power infinite, as betwene finite wisdom and power finite. But finite wisdom doth not evacuate finite power; therefore neither doth infinite wisdom evacuate the necessity of infinite power.

But to save the matter, you add that it evacuates the necessity of power distinct from it. 'Tis true indeede, in God, though the notions of wisdom and power are distinct, yet the things signified are one essence in God. And looke in what manner soever infinite wisdom doth inferre the indistinction of power with it, after the same manner, doth infinite power inferre the indistinction of wisdom with it. For as much as God is essentially wise and powerfull, and therefore infinite in both, & both indistinct in him, whose essence is most simple and admitts no parts. That wisdom is, the father and power the Mother of all Gods workes is such an assertion, that I doe not thinke you can finde any to father it, or mother it but your selfe. Will you not give us leave to accommodate it unto the workes of man and pronounce proportionably that his Wisdom is the Father, and his power the Mother of his actions? I take it to be absurd to inquire after a Father and Mother of workes, save in case, the workes themselves doe admitt these different sexes as being male or female; yet in such a case it hath a Father and Mother only in respect of univocall generations not equivocall.

And as for the proportion to justifie your allegorie, we are content rather to expecte your pleasure to acquainte us with it, then to trouble our wits aboute the devising of it. Yet Philo & the Platonicks are a rubbe in your way, who (as you say; for I confesse I am not so well seene in them,) make knowledge the mother of all Gods workes.

To remove this you acquainte us with your conjecturall dictates. First that tis probable they dreamed of a created knowledge. A most improbable conjecture, that they should conceive, that God brought his works to passe by the knowledge of a creature not by his owne knowledge; Yet that creature by whose created knowledge God is conjectured to have wrought by, in their opinion, being one of Gods workes,

how could that creatures knowledge be possibly accompted his mother in creation. Your second conjecture is, that *under these termes they covered some transformed notion of the second person in the Trinitie.* Such a person more fitt by farre to be the Author of all Gods works in order under God the Father; But equally improbable it is that this second person in Trinitie should be called by them, *The Mother of Gods workes.* Rather *Sapientia* in Latine, and *σοφία* in Greeke being the feminine gender; in this grammaticall notion they might accompt it *matre*, the Mother of all thinges created, which yet is more then my learning will encourage me to ascribe unto them. And Christ you deny not to be the wisdom of the Father, but you adde that he is the wisdom personall; but you speake here not of the *wisdom personall*, but of the wisdom of the Godhead as it is essentially in the whole Trinitie.

Danaus upon the 32. distinction of Peter Lumbards first booke of sentences, professeth the Sonne to be called the wisdom of the Father, for as much as he maketh the Father knowne unto us. But though you speake of wisdom as it is essentiall, and not personall; yet you may remember, that even the essentiall attributes are severally appropriated unto the Person by divines; and in the course of this appropriation, power is attributed to the Father, Wisdom unto the Sonne, Durand. 1. and goodnesse unto the Holy Ghost. How suitable this is of making wisdom the Father of Gods actions, lett every intelligent Reader judge.

Agayne I finde that Gabriell Vasquius proposeth a question, *Whether the power of God doth any manner of way differ from Gods knowledge and his will?* And herein recites the opinion of Durand, mainteyning that Gods wisdom and his will, are but the remote causes of divine actions; and that the power of God is the immediate cause of all. The contrary wherunto he maynteynes, namely that power or execution is needelesly attributed unto God, as distinct from his knowledge and his will; and this he delivers according to the doctrine of Scotus, Bassolis, Ferrariensis, Caietan, and Aquinas.

Neyther

Aquinas. 7.  
q. 39. art. 8.  
Durand. 1.  
dist. 31. q. 3

In 1. q. 25.  
art. 1. disp.  
111.

Neyther of these opinions as I conceive serves your turne in making wisdom the Father, and power the Mother of Gods actions. These flashes of conceyte are farre distante from the conceites of any Schoole divine, that I am acquainted with.

3. *Wisdom* (you say) as all agree, is the excellency of knowledge from which it differs not, save only in the dignitie or usefullnesse of matters known or in the more perfect manner of knowing them. This promisseth no greater depth, yet it passeth my slender capacitie to comprehend your meaning herein, or to make any good sense thereof. You have so long inured your selfe to a phrase of speech and expression beyond the capacitie of your Reader; that I knowe not whether at length you may attaine to such a facultie of speech as may transcend the Authours owne comprehension. Who they are that agree in this, that *Wisdom* is the excellency of knowledge, I professe I know not.

And I wonder you proceede to discourse of wisdom without distinction; seeing it may be taken in some sense by Philosophers, in which it is not taken by Canonick writers. Agayne in some sense it may be taken by Canonick writers, in which it is not taken by Philosophers. There is a wisdom to salvation which the Scriptures communicate to the meanest of Gods children, which kinde of Wisdom was nothing knowne to Philosophers. And there is a Metaphysicall wisdom in knowing *Ens quod ens*, whereabouts Philosophers did busie their braynes, which you shall hardly finde notice taken of throughout the Scriptures. Againe wisdom is sometimes taken for that knowledge, that rest in contemplation; sometimes tis taken for such a knowledge as is not commendable nor right unlesse it be referred to action. Solomons Wisdom it seemes comprehended both. For the Wisdom that he prayed for, was the wisdom of government, which respects action; but God gave him other wisdom also. For this is reckoned up as a parte of his wisdom, that he spake of trees, from the Cedar tree that is in Lebanon, even to the hyssope that springeth out of the wall, he spake also

of beast and of fowles and of creepeing things, and of fishes. And in this respecte it seemes, that hee excelled the wisdome of all the Children of the East, and all the wisdome of Egypt. For of Moses it is sayde that hee was learned in all the wisdome of the Egyptians. Act. 1. 22. And this wisdome I conceive to have bene in sciences contemplative and not practicall. Yet in Scripture phrased as I guesse, it is most generally taken for wisdome practicall, consisting in knowing how to bring about intended ends. And thus you seeme to take it, when you professe that it differs not from knowledge save only in the dignitie or usefullnes of matters knowne; which is an harsh manner of expression.

But I take your meaning to be this, that the difference is in the objecte, and that things of worth and of use are the speciall object of wisdome. For so a wise man by his wisdome discernes these things which are most behoofefull, & advantageous unto him. So then wisdome seemes to be (in your opinion) the knowledge of things usefull and behoofefull, that is, the discerning of what is best to be done to the compassing of this or that ende. Yet by your leave if the ende be not good, such a wisard in Solomons phrase, shall be accounted no better then a foole. And the Holy Ghost hath discovered unto us both in the olde Testament, that many *Are wise to doe evill, but to doe well have no understanding*, Ier. 4. 22. and in the new Testament, that *the children of this World are wiser in theyre generation, then the children of light*. And the unjust Steward had a commendable measure of wisdome in this kinde. Luc. 16. 8. But take it at the best; why should you call this, the excellency of knowledge? Hath not Aristotle delivered the contrary, and professed that felicity of contemplation is more eminent then the felicity of action? And I know no reason to forsake him in this. Doe not we beleeeve that our happinesse in the Kingdome of Heaven shall consist in the vision of God? The knowledge of Gods law is knowledge practicall, and is not this farre inferior to the knowledge of God, and of the mystrie of godlines revealed to us in the Gospell? I confesse the knowledge that we have of

of God in this life doth conferre to action, but that is not enough to make it practicall; The knowledge of things to be practised and put in execution, that and that alone denominates knowledge practicall. Your laste difference of *wisedome* from *knowledge* proposed disiunctively thus, *or in the more perfecte manner of knowinge of them*, I can hardly make any congruouse sense of.

At first I thought the same difference had bene intended though variously expressed, that the Reader might satisfie himselfe with which expression he pleased; little thinkeinge that your selfe who take upon you herein to instructe others, were to seeke, whether *wisedome* differed from *knowledge*, in the object knowne, or in the manner of knowinge things; yet upon seconde thoughts this seemes to be your meaning. But suppose the truth of both concerning *wisedome*, namely that it knowes things of woorth and usefull, and that it knowes them in a perfecte manner; yet I pray consider, what a mad thing is it to say, that herein it differs from *knowledg*. Doth the knowledge of things usefull differ from *knowledge*? well you may say it differs from the knowledge of things lesse usefull, or not usefull at all, but surely it differs not from *knowledge*. So likewise the perfecte manner of knowinge things, may be sayd to differ from an imperfecte manner of knowinge them, but surely it differs not from the knowinge of them. For we doe not use to say that the species is contradistinct from the genus, but rather one species from another. I professe I am touched with no small regret to consider how much time I am like to wast in correctinge such anomalies, if your booke should be too frequent in them.

But to proceede, *Though no man be wise without much knowledge, yet a man may know many things and not be wise*. In this likewise I finde so much confusion, that a man may very well be to seeke in what sense to justifie it. I have heard of a sage Counsaylor, that knewe not a letter in his owne Mother tongue. Comineus as I remember was no scholar, & yet a very wise Counsaylour. The *Turkes* are usually accounted as ignorant



ignorant people as live; yet no doubt the *grand Signior* hath a wise counsaile. And wisdom of government (which now a dayes alone is usually accounted wisdom) is many times accompanied with little learninge.

Achitophell in his time was accounted as an Oracle of God, but of his learninge or greate knowledge we readenot. And in my judgement this kinde of wisdom seemes to be rather a naturall gift, then an habite acquired by knowledge. And it seemes to consist in judging of moste commodious meanes to compasse endes intended, as in the counsailes of Achitophell unto Absalon, as also it appears in Solomons course that he tooke to discerne the true mother of the Child which was in question; and because they may be crossed if they be knowne, therefore to discerne how courses commodious for the compassing of designs may be closely carried undiscovered; as the two hundred men that Absolon tooke with him when he wente to Hebron, are sayde to have accompanied him in the simplicitie of their hearts knowinge nothinge; and thus they were engaged in his treason before they were aware. And the same Absolon by his pretence of payinge his vowe at Hebron signified to his Father, prevented jealousie in his Father, and tooke away all suspicion of treason. On the other side, it is a greate pointe of wisdom to discover the reaches of others in their courses; as Solomon, discerned the trayterous heart of Adoniah, by the motion which he made to have Abishag the Shunemite give him to Wife, which Bethsheba perceaved not, and was very willing to gratifie him in the furtherance of his suite.

This was a naturall perspicacy in Solomon; for at this time he was very younge, and had not as yet sought the Lord for that spirite of wisdom in government, as afterwards he did; And whereas you say, *A man may know many thinges, and not be very wise*; It is a truth, but a very meane truth. For a man may know many things, and yet be a very foole; and that more wayes then one. For firste *few* and *many* are termes of respect; and few things are many in respect of fewer. And though a man knowe never so much as these things, that no-  
thing

thing at all conduce to wisedome; what wise man would expect that he should be any thinge the wiser thereby? Again, nothing denominates a man simply wise, but that which makes him a wise man. Now a man may not only knowe many things, but be also wise in many thinges, and yet not deserve the name of a wise man. He may be a wise painter, a wise graver, wise to worke in handicrafts (which is accounted wisedome, both in the phrase of God, and phrase of Aristotle) and yet all this while be farre enough from a wise man. For he only is a wise man that knowes how to governe himselfe and provide for himselfe.

Now many times witt, & that in greate measure, in trades, is founde to be in a fooles keepinge. Nay what will you say; may not a man be wise to doe evill, Ier. 8. 22. wise to satisfie his lust, wise to compasse theire owne wicked endes; but shall he be accounted the wiser man for this? Hath not Aristotle delivered, that *Incontinens non potest esse prudens*, An incontinent man can not be a wise man? Laste of all suppose that a man knowes all that belongs to true wisedome, but will not practise it, like the Athenians, of whome it was sayde, *sciunt quæ recta sunt sed facere nolunt*, shall not such a one be accounted one of Solomons fooles in his proverbs? For are not the Morall vertues and *recta ratio* knitt together indissolubly? But come we to the wisedome of God, *Knowledge divine*, as it comprehends all thinges, the name of wisedome best befits it, not as restrained to this or that particular. And why should it not be accounted wisedome, restrained to what particular you will, seeing he undoubtedly knowes every particular, in most perfect manner? And but erst you professe that *wisedome differs from knowledge only in the usefullnes of thinges knowne, or in the more perfect manner of knowing them*. The knowledge of God which is of himselfe, is the wisedome of contemplation. His knowledge of other thinges to be produced and ordered by him to the settinge forth of his glory is the wisedome of action.

And the Apostle breakes forth into admiration of the depthe of Gods rich wisedome and knowledge. Piscator

thinks that by wisdom and knowledge one thing is meant. I am not of his opinion. The text seemes to me to make against that construction; For thus it runnes *O the depthe of the riches xi σοφίας xi γνώσεως both of the wisdom and knowledge of God.* In saying both it plainly intimates that wisdom and knowledge are considered as two, and therefore distinct. I take the meaning to be thus. God by his wisdom discerneth courses most convenient; but by his knowledge he comprehendeth all, whether convenient or inconvenient. And because a man may be so farre wise as to discern of courses proposed to the compassing of a certaine ende, which is the most convenient; Yet because he is not able to invent all courses, he may faile in wisdom, therefore I conceive it is sayde that God is rich both in wisdom and knowledge; because he doth not only judge what is fittest amongst few or many, but amongst all; For he knowes all even the most inconvenient and disorderly courses; but by his wisdom he judgeth of the conveniency of them, and according to his good pleasure useth them. Your reason followes to shew why the name of wisdom best befits the knowledge of God, and that is; *For though many things knowne by him, whilest compared with others more notable, seeme base and contemptible; yet not the meanest, but may be the object of divine contemplation to a Christian, that considers not the mere matter or forme or physicall properties, but the Creators power or skill manifested in it.* You undertooke to prove that Gods knowledge of all things might moste fitly be called wisdom; to which purpose, you should prove, that God may justly be accounted wise in knowinge them; that is, that it might affourde juste matter of such contemplation unto God, as might justly be called wisdom. But the reason you bring, medles not at all with the contemplation of God, but with the contemplation of a Christian. For whereas in coherence you should say, *it affords matter of wise contemplation unto God;* you tell us tis an object of divine contemplation to a Christian.

And whereas you would not affirme that Gods knowledge, as restrayned to this or that pecticular, was to be accounted wisdom,

wisedome, but only as it comprehends all things; yet your reason makes shew of provinge what you affirmed, of Gods knowledge restrayned to this or that perticular, and not so only but as restrayned to the meanest perticular; though it endes (as I sayde) not in avouching that such perticulars may be an object of divine contemplation unto God, but only in saying that it may be an object of divine contemplation to a Christian. What incongruities and most unscholasticall solecismes of discourse are these?

And all this while you confine Gods knowledge to the particulars of his owne making. But what thinke you of the particulars of mans or the divills making, in the most wicked, and sinfull courses that have beene, are, or shall be in the World.

Are not these also knowne unto God, and are these likewise matter of divine contemplation in respect of the *Creators power, or skill manifested therein*: We acknowledge the wisdom of God to be excellent in the composition of the meanest worme. Of some likewise we see excellent use as of the bee, & silkworme; of others we doe not, yet we beleive that his wisdom being infinite, he doth nothing in vaine; he hath use of every thing, though we know it not. And we take notice of a double knowledge the one called *scientia visionis*, whereby he knowes all things that are, nor such onely but even all such as have beene, or shall be, the other called *scientia simplicis intelligentia*, whereby he knowes all things possible so farr forth as they are knowable, and betweene these two knowledges, there is a greate deale of difference, though you seeme to confounde them.

4. By usefull knowledge as I take it, you meane the knowledge of usefull things. Of this you say there are two offices, *The one steadfastly to propose a right end: The other to make, and prosecute a right choyse of meanes for effecting it.* By this it appears that you speake onely of that kind of wisdom which is referred to action, and whereby agents are accommodated *ad res gerendas*. From the consideration of humane wisdoms imperfection, you take a course the better to set

forth the perfection of wisdom divine. *Humane wisdom* (you say) *is oftentimes blinde in both, and usually lame in the latter.*

I will endeavour to give some illustration of this. The end, we aime at, is our good. For *Finis, & bonum convertuntur.* Ethic. 1.1. This good is eyther naturall, or supernaturall, both in respect of power to discerne it, as also in respect of power to compass it. The naturall good which every one aimes at, is the preservation of his *esse*, or naturall being, and the acquiring of his *bene esse*, or well being naturall. In both these are found errors enough. For though nothing is a more naturall object of mans desires then the preservation of his being, yet sometimes they are found most unnaturally to affect theyr destruction; sometimes through passion, (and that in divers kinds) in wonderfull manner blinding reason, not onely to avoyde shame or rather the suffering of shame, or to avoyde a worse kind of death, but sometimes out of miserablenes, rather then they will part with a little, they are wilfully set to part with all.

χρὺς δὲν ἀνὴρ εὖ ῥων ἔλιπε βροχόν, αὐτὰρ ὁ χρεῖσον  
ὄν λιπ' ἐν ἄχ' εὖ ῥων ἤψεν ὄν εὖ ῥη βροχόν.

Achitophell whose wisdom was as an oracle of God, went soberly this way, when he saw his counsaile refused: For he went home & set his house in order and hanged himselfe; it seemes his unsanctified wisdom urged him hereunto. For as it is written of Cesar that he alone came *sobrius ad perdendam Rempublicam*. so Achitophell *accessit sobrius ad perdendum seipsum.*

As for the acquiring of well being, this is an end that all affect, but according to theyr severall dispositions. For the good which they affect being *bonum conveniens* agreeing to theyr affections, so it comes to passe, that as men are of different affections, so they propose unto themselves different endes. The luxurious person setteth his wits on worke for compassing the satisfaction of his lust; the covetous person he affecteth to grow rich; the ambitious person to grow  
greate,



world to come, and to this purpose to cleave unto God by faith and love *usque ad contemptum nostri*, even to the contempt of our selves, as touching this temporall life of ours. And to attaine to this end, we neede no consultations with flesh, and blood; God in his word hath chalked out unto us a direct way unto this end, and therefore it is sayd to be a *lanterne unto our feete and a light unto our pathes*. But whatsoever the end be, you tell us that if it bee much affected, the lesse choyse of meanes is left, the more eagerly we apply our selves unto their use, and strive as it were to straine out successe, by close embracing them. And for this reason ignorance, or want of reason to forecast variety of meanes, for bringing about our much desired ends, is the mother of selfe will, and impatience. For what is selfe Will, if a man should define it, but a stiffe adherence to some one, or few particular means, neyther onely, nor cheifly necessary to the maine point. It seemes you are in a streight, and therefore fetch about for matter, though aliene, and here we have mett with a good phrase, of *straining out successe by close embracing the meanes*. Yet even in these unnecessary straines, your discourse is but loose in my judgement. For whether we discern many meanes, or few meanes, all is one as touching the close pursuing of that which we much affect; For if many, we will make choice of the fittest in our judgement, and as close embrace them as others doe, that doe not discern so greate variety.

And as for successe, that is not in our power to be *strayned out*, as you speake, by *close embracing the meanes*, Man is a resistible agent, and easily cross'd in his courses; and the ends we ayme at, in reference to our best meanes, are but of a conjecturall nature, and so of uncertayne issue; Neyther doe I see any reason to the contrary, but that a man may be as selfe willed in the midst of variety of meanes discerned by him, as of few meanes, and if he be crost in them all, much more impatient. For surely the greater variety of meanes is represented, the more the way is open to take hold of that which is neyther onely, nor cheifly necessary, like as where many wayes offer themselves, a travailer is in most danger to mistake the most direct way. Selfe will I confesse is exercised in adherence



to meanes unfit; as may be scene in the rude Irish, that will not be brought off from theyr rude courses, they will tye their ploughes or harrowes to theyr horse tayles, say what the English will to perswade them to another course. But it is as well scene in following different endes. Many will not be také off from theyr uncleane conversation, from their riotous and intemperate courses, *they count it pleasure*, (as S. Peeter speakes) *to live deliciously*; these fruites of selfe-will are not in adhering to meanes so much, as in adhering to evill ends. But you proceede, and tell us in the next place, that *Witts consciours of theyr owne weakenes for conquering what they eagerly desire, presently call in power, wrath or violence as partiall, or mercenary seconds to assist them.* Whereas he that out of fertility of invention can furnish himselfe beforehand with store of likely meanes for accomplishing his purpose, cannot much esteeme the losse or miscarriage of some one or two. These may seeme prety contemplations, and as pretily expressed. 2. Pet. 2.

But I had little thought that selfe will, and impatience joyned with want of witt, had also beene joyned with conscioufnes of selfe weakenes. For *the sluggard though but a foole as Solomon sayth, is as wise in his owne conceit as seven men that can give a reason.* And certainly selfe will, and selfe conceits are companions inseparable. And therefore such commonly make little question of accomplishing, or as you call it, of conquering theyr desires, by theyr owne courses. And yet if they faile hereof, tis nothing strange, since the best meanes are but likely as your self stile them. Pro. 26. 16

I can as hardly beleeeve that fertility of invention is of power to keepe men from impatience. In my opinion patience as all other morall vertues, depends rather upon judgement then invention, though formally it is a quality of the will as all morall vertues are, and not any habitt of the understanding. But suppose he miscarry in all, then a mans patience must needes bidd farewell to invention to support it, and it is high time to relye upon judgement. Yet I trust patience which must *have her perfect worke*, (Iam. 1.) may have course in this case also; though it be an *hard matter* you say to keepe  
from

from fowle play, if the game whereat a man shootes be fayre, and good, and most of his stringes already be broken. It is good they say to have two stringes to a mans bowe. A vertuous man hath more then two, you suppose as much, for you suppose many to be broken yet not all. And surely vertue is not vertue if it keepe not from foule play.

The Stoickes mainteyned that a vertuous man might descend into Phalaris bull, without the interruption of his happines. We Christians are taught, and disciplined to rejoyce even in tribulation, and marke well our bow stringes, because tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope, and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed in our hearts by the Holy Ghost that is given unto us. *πνῆμα δὲ ὁμιλοῦμαι* sayth S. Paule, I am able to endure all thinges by the power of Christ that enables me, and herupon he exhorts Timothy to be partaker of the affliction of the Gospell, to witt by the power of God. The power of Christ, and the power of God are two such stringes to our bowe of patience, as can never be broke. We know his grace to be sufficient for us, and when his power is made perfect in our weakenes, we shall have cause to rejoyce in our infirmities. For when we are weake, then are we strong. In a mans owne strength no man shall be strong. But blessed art thou o people, who art the saved of the Lord, who is the sheild of thy strength, and the sword of our glory. He can make us to be as a Gyants sword, and he is a wall of fire round about Ierusalem. All that fight against it, theyr fleshe shall consume away, though they stand on theyr feete, and theyr eyes shall consume in theyr holes, and theyr tongues shall consume in their mouthes. But to returne. The contingency of the issue is within the horizon of our fore sight.

As for horizons of contrivances, let such as fancy them make themselves merry with them. All this while the matter of your discourse being of Gods infinite wisdom, and to that purpose preluding of the imperfect wisdom of man, I have wondred what you meant to enter upon the consideration of patience; unlesse it were to prepare your reader thereby with a more willing entertaynement of your discourse.

But

But now I perceive you desire to gratify God with a commendation of his patience, which that it might seeme the more congruous, you pretend that the infinitenes of his wisdom carries him herunto. And this patience consists in bearing with sinners which as you say, *every minute of their lives violently thwart, and crosse some particular meanes, ordeyned for his glory and their good.* Gods patience in forbearing us, and our sinnes in provoking him are greate enough in their proper colours, they neede no inconsiderate amplification to bombast them, by saying that *every minute of life we violently crosse them.* For surely cyther you must suppose man, every minute of his life, to be waking, or els you delivered this as it were slumbering.

But to touch upon something more materiall, I pray remember, that you treat of the wisdom of God, as exercised in intending a right end, and prosecuting a right choyse of meanes for the effecting of it. Now would you be so good as to consider, what is the end that God aymes at in this, and particularly whether it be all one, in bearing thus with all, and that of an ambiguous nature, thus, that in case they doe at length repent, and turne unto God, he may magnify his mercy in their salvation; if still they stand out, and dye in impenitency he may magnify himselfe in their just condemnation? And withall I pray consider, whether this be the course of any wisdom finite or infinite, in God, or man to intend ends after this ambiguous manner. I mention no other end of Gods patience, and long suffering, because I know no other end agreeable to your opinion. That which followeth tendes rather to the commendation of the goodnes of Gods will, then the wisdom of his understanding, & therefore so much the more heterogeneous, and extravagant; as when you say out of the Apostle that *He is light and in him is no darknes;* and that *He distinguisheth the fruites of light from fruites of darknes before they are, even before he gave them possibility of being.* An amplification partly idle, partly unsound. For God must cyther distinguish them before they are, or not at all; For there is no change in his understanding; unsound, in saying

God gives them possibility of being. The being of things is from the gift of God, but not the possibility of being. But you proceede in the same stringe. *As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he discernes truly good, as for his infinite essence to shrinke in being.* God indeede cannot shrinke, for he is indivisible, and you well know what thereupon you have wrought for the amplification of his power in the former chapter. But I would you had told us what is that truly good discerned by God, from which you say his will cannot decline. I cannot be satisfied with your concealments in this particular. What I pray is more truly good then the setting forth of Gods glory eyther in his patience, and long suffering, or in ought else whatsoever? And is it impossible thinke you for Gods will to decline this? If so then it were impossible that God should decline the making of the World.

Is not this a faite way to Atheisme? *Many things* (you say) *may and every thing that is evill doth fall out against Gods will, but nothing without his knowledge, or besides his expectation.* In Scripture phrase we find that many things fall out not onely besides, but contrary to Gods expectation as Esa. 5. where God complaineth of the house of Israel, that while he looked for grapes they brought forth wilde grapes. And Arminius urgeth this as if it were spoken in a proper speeche.

By the proposition in this place it must be sayde, that God expects sowre grapes, as well as sweete, for otherwise they shoulde fall out besides his expectation which you here deny. So then God did expect that Shimei should rayle on David, that Absolon should defloure his Fathers Concubines, that Judas should betray his Master, that David should defile his neighbours wife, and cause hir husband to be slayne by the sword of children of Ammon, and that the Iewes should crucify the Holy Sonne of God. Say also if you will that God did with patience, and long suffering expect all this. As for the knowledge of God there is no question about that, all confessing that all things are knowne to God not onely at their falling out, but long before, as David professeth of his thoughts

thoughts that they were knowne to God a farre-off or long before. Psal. 139. 2. But to say that any thinge falls out against the will of God, I had thought it had beene generally received for a notorious untruth. Aquinas I am sure is flatt against you, where he sayth, *Deus neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult permittere mala fieri, & hoc est bonum.* God neyther willeth that evils shall be, nor willeth that evils shall not be, but he will permitt evils to be, & this is good. Part. 1. q. 19. art. 9. Arminius himselfe professeth

*ne minimum quidem fieri præter Dei voluntatem, nempe vel volentem ut fiat, vel volentem non prohibere, sed permittere ut fiat.*

Exam.  
Prædest.  
Perk. p.  
114.

You professe that all evill falls out against Gods will, Arminius professeth that nothing falls out besides the will of God, at least willing not to prohibite it, but to permitt it. And no mervyle, for the Apostle hath given us to understand that nothing can resist the will of God. It is true all evill falleth out against Gods commandement, which usually is called allso the will of God but improperly. For every one knowes that he is well able to sinne, to transgresse, and consequently to resist this will of God.

Rom. 9.

Further you tell us, that *That which in its owne nature (as being made such by his unalterable decree) is absolutely contingent, is not casuall in respect of his providence or eternall wisdom.* You are at length come to the wisdom of God from whence you digressed, but you seeme to bring it in by the eares. For Casuall things are such as fall out *præter intentionem*, besides intention which is an action of the will not of the understanding where wisdom is stated. And how can those things be sayde to fall out, not besides Gods intention, which fall out against his intention, namely against his will, as already you have professed of many things; that they doe fall out against Gods will, though not without his knowledge. I would you had given instance in those absolute contingents which (as you say) are made so by Gods unalterable decree. But because you have neglected it, I will doe it for you. Rayne, to morrow is a thing contingent, in this sense, it shall rayne, or not rayne. For me to walke abroad or ride forth to

morrow is a thing contingent, that is I shall walke or not walke, ride forth or not ride. And accordingly in other of your traditionary writings I have read a discourse of yours touching a certeyne disjunctive decree of God. But I pray be entreated to consider, whether such a contingent before specified, or such a disjunctive proposition be a fit object of Gods decree. Gods decrees I suppose you will say are all voluntary, and free, he could have eyther not decreed at all what he hath decreed, or decreed theyr contraries. Therefore thinges of their owne nature impossible to be otherwise, are no fit object of Gods decrees. Now a disjunctive proposition as above mentioned, is such as it is impossible it should be otherwise. For this disjunctive (it shall raine, or not rayne; my walking shall be, or not be) is of necessary truth, and therefore no more decreable by God to be, then the Godhead it selfe is decreable by him to be.

Agayne may I not be bold to say, that it is too absurde to talke of his unalterable decree, if it proceede by way of distinction, to imply that some of Gods decrees are alterable. All his decrees are more unalterable then the lawes of Medes, and Persians; they are compared to brazen mounteynes Zach. 6. But here followeth a mystery in the next place, and a great mystery: *In that he fully comprehendeth the number of all meanes possible, and can mixe the severall possibilities of theyr miscarriage in what degree or proposition he list, he may, & oftentimes doth infallibly forecast the full accomplishment of his proposed ends, by multiplicity of meanes in themselves not inevitable but contingent.* Adde hereunto all that followes in this Section. The absurdities that you mixe in this mysterious sentence of yours I desire, and will endeavour to discover. Here we have three thinges to be considered.

First certeyne ends proposed by God to be accomplished. Secondly meanes appointed for the accomplishinge of these ends. Thirdly Gods forecast of the accomplishment of these ends. Touching the first I desire some instance of those ends you speake of. One instance you give in the sequence of his action, and it is the apprehension of a Traytor  
which

which you suppose to be ordeyned by God. Yet is this as absolute a contingent as ought else. And contingents are no otherwise ordeyned by God, then to be contingents. For you have already signified that it is by Gods unalterable decree; So then God hath decreed them to be contingents. Therefore this action also to witt the apprehension of a Traytor, God hath ordeyned to be of a contingent nature.

The meaning wherof is no more then this, it may come to passe, it may not come to passe. It shall be, or it shall not be, and accordingly in other treatises of yours you have discoursed of a disjunctive decree of God, so called from the disjunctive object therof, as to say, God hath decreed that such a Traytor eyther shall be apprehended, or shall not be apprehended. Now there is no neede of any meanes to procure the accomplishment of such an ende thus determined. For any man is able to avouch that a Traytor shall be apprehended, or no, and nothing at all to fayle in the truth herof; much lesse neede is there of such variety of meanes, and those mixed with such possibility of miscarriage, as you treat of, to bring to passe such a decree, such an intention of this. But let the end passe as you have shaped it; this being of a contingent nature, and yet absolutely intended by God; for you neyther expresse, nor intimate the signification of any condition, it will hence follow, that any thing of the like nature may be absolutely ordeyned by God notwithstanding the contingency therof. That is, be it never so contingent and free, as the apprehension of a Traytor is a free act of man (for you doe not suppose him to be apprehended by doggs or cats but by men rather) yet notwithstanding God is able absolutely to ordeyne that such a thing shall come to passe. Therefore God is as well able to ordeyne that at such a time a man shall beleive, shall repent, yea or doe any thinge though never so free, notwithstanding the contingent nature thereof. Now I can no where find (though I have perused thoroughly divers of your treatises) that you like of this. Yet here ere you are aware (as it seemes) you are fallen upon it, and take upon you to acquaint us with mysterious conceits of yours, concer-



ning the meanes whereby God doth inevitably accomplish such ends, you may as well say that God can bring to passe inevitably that man shall beleive and repent though I have founde you elswhere to abhorre this. To the consideration of which meanes we are now to proceede. Concerning these meanes you give us to understand, 1. *that they are many possible*, 2. *that God comprehends the number of them all*. 3. *That he can mixe the severall possibilities of theyr miscarriage, in what degree, or proportion he list*. 4. *That in themselves these meanes are not inevitable, but contingent*. I nothing doubt, but the same end God can bring to passe by divers meanes, and that all these meanes are knowne to God but what you meane by *mixing theyr severall possibilities of miscarriage in what degree he list*. I understand not. One kind of meanes is possible to miscarry, so is another, so is every one, for so you acknowledge them all to be in themselves not inevitable, but contingent, the meaning wherof I conceive to be this, they doe not inevitably, but contingently accomplishe the end proposed, this I take to be the meaning though incongruously delivered. But how can God be sayd to mixe these possibilities, unlesse you meane hereby Gods comprehending of them all, which is a truth. For God comprehends them all in his mind, but without mixing of them. But you seeme to project a farther meaning, by the last wordes as when you say *in what degree, and proportion he list*. I take the meaning obscurely delivered to be this; God knowes every degree of theyr possibility to miscarriage, or rather God makes the possibility eyther of each his miscarriage, or of all theyr miscarriage in what degree he list; yet it seemes you acknowledge no degree of possibility of the miscarriage of them all. For you maynteyne it as a thing necessary, that all shall not miscarry in the wordes immediately following. Have you not such a conceite as this? God hath ordeyned the apprehension of a Traytor, eyther by this meanes or by that meanes, or by a third meanes or by a fourth? if it be I would you had spoken out, and told us your minde plainly, yet we may take also that into our consideration in the end. But by the way I see no groundes

groundes of these degrees of possibility which you fancy. For all of the meanes being as you confesse contingent, and evitable as you speake, I see no reason, but every one should be equally possible to miscarry. If you had talked of degrees of probability of miscarriage, I should not have excepted against it, but I seeme to have just reason to except against the degrees of possibility.

Let us come to the third, & that is *Gods inevitable forecast of the full accomplishment of his proposed ends by this multiplicity of meanes*. Now this as it is plaine enough, so it seemes as manifestly to be untrue. For that God should foreknow the issue of thinges by the meanes which have onely a contingent operation, is generally disclayned by School-divines the Iesuites themselves, and Frarius by name in his *Opusculo*; as that which would inferre an uncertayne, and not infallible knowledge in God. For as much as nothing can lay a better grounde of certainty, then the nature of it can afford.

Secondly eyther you suppose that all this multiplicity of meanes you speake of, shall be used or no. If all be not used, then God doth not forecast the full accomplishment of his proposed end by this multiplicity of meanes possible, you speake of, but onely by some of them, namely so many as were used. And indeed it is very strange, that all meanes possible to be used should be used to the accomplishment of every proposed end, or indeede of any proposed end. But if all be used, and all faile save the last, upon what ground can you say that the end proposed must necessarily be accomplished by this last, which is as possible to miscarry as the former; for you have not signified that God alwayes useth this course, as to use the courses first that are most possible to miscarry, and such as are least possible in the last place; nay your selfe professe all the meanes to be alike possible, and probable. To this you seeme to answer in the sentence following, that it comes to passe *by the rules of eternall wisdom*. Namely that if an hundred meanes be appointed for the apprehension of a Traytor, and ninety and nine doe amisse, *the hundredth, and last by the rules of eternall wisdom must of necessity take*. But where these

these rules of eternall wisdome are to be founde, that you doe not tell us, and therefore we take liberty to discourse against it thus; was it not possible for God to have used this meanes in the first, or second, or third, or middle place, or in the place last save one which he useth in the last? you have not manifested the least likelihood to deny this. Now if used in the first place, or in the last place save one it might have miscarried, why not in this, seeing the nature of it is not altered but continueth the same still, working onely contingently unto the producing of the end proposed, and not necessarily? Agayne all other meanes sayling this takes effect (you say) *by the rules of eternall wisdome.* Now I demaunde if none other had beene appointed but this, why could not this alone being used have taken effect by rules of eternall wisdome as well, as now it doth, that is why could not God ordeyne that by this meanes onely used, the effect intended should be brought to passe, as well as by this meanes used after, the use of many other, seeing still the effect coms to passe by his meanes alone and not by any other: For if God can ordeyne that after other meanes have fayled, this meanes alone shall bring about the end intended by God, why could he not as well ordeyne that this meanes alone should doe it, without using of any other meanes before it.

Last of all, what needes Gods forecast runne out to these meanes for a ground of its certeynty, when God himselfe cannot be ignorant of his owne determinations? and therefore having ordeyned such an end, as suppose the apprehension of such a Traytour, upon this ground he may be most certeyne that such a Traytor shall be apprehended. By the way I will take leave to observe some positions that have dropped from your pen in this Section. 1. *That God can ordeyne such a thing to come to passe, which is of a contingent nature, as for example the apprehension of a Traytor.* 2. *That upon such an ordination of God successe to the meanes used hereunto is absolutely necessary, you adde and immutably also, committing a great indecorum therein, immutability being a congruous attribute onely to the ordination of God, and not to the successe of thinges.*

3. *That*

3. That meanes of contingent operation onely shall necessarily take effect. 4. This necessity of taking effect is not absolute but gotten merely by casuall miscarriage of the possibilities of the former meanes, so you expresse it, whereas indeede the possibilities miscarry not; for the meanes are in theyr nature possible, yea and probable too, to produce the end intended as your selfe professe. 5. Though this necessity in the effectuall working of the meanes be not absolute, yet the sucresse of them is absolutely necessary. I say no more but this, the Theſes that Picus Mirandula propoſed at Rome were many of them paradoxicall enough but I doe not find that any of these had place amongſt them.

5. There is a fallacy (you say) though the simplest one that ever was sett to catch any wise man, wherein many excellent witts of these latter ages with some of the former have bene pittifully entangled, yon that have discerned the simplicity thereof in all probabilities, are not like to be entangled therein, for then you were not any wiser then they; yet it seemes all these excellent witts are but woodcokes in compariſon to your selfe; well let us conſider it. The more, wherein it were not possible for any besides themselves to catch them, they thus (you say) frame and sett. Whatſoever God hath decreed muſt of neceſſity come to paſſe; But God hath decreed every thing that is, therefore every thing that is, comes to paſſe of neceſſity. All things are neceſſary at leaſt in reſpect of Gods decree, The extract or Corollary whereof in brieſe is this. It is impoſſible for ought that is not, to be, for ought that hath bene, not to have bene, for ought that is not, to be, impoſſible for ought to be hereafter that ſhall not bee. I promiſe you, you have engaged your ſelfe very farr not onely to looke to it that your ſelfe be not founde to be entangled herein, but for the performance of a very eaſy, and cleare ſolution of this which you terme a fallacy, leaſt your ſelfe be not found as wiſe as they which were entangled herein. Yet I am not ignorant of ſuch a tricke of witt, as firſt to cry downe an argument by diſgracing it, and powring contempt upon it, & thereupon preſuming that any anſwere ſhall ſerve the turne, when the Reader is before hand awed with ſuch a cenſure as to for-

fete the reputation of a scholar, and to be Metamorphosed into a woodcocke, if he doe not applaude it, and perswade himselfe to see a cleere solution of the former argument, which is proclaymed base, and sufficient to discredit all that favour it. Yet some witt is required to catch a woodcocke. But this is so simple a fallacy as the like was never set to catch a wise Man. Now a man would have thought your selfe had beene one of those excellents witts that had beene taken in this snare, if it be a snare; seeing you come but freshly fro' professing that God decreeth such a contingent, as the apprehension of a Traytour. In which case, it is absolutely necessary that it shall come to passe. Now why may not God as well decree every contingent thinge, for ought the contingency can hinder it. For what is more contingent then the apprehension of a Traytour, yet this you say God may ordeine, and in this case it is absolutely necessary that it shall come to passe. But let us consider what you have to say to it. I hope you will remember your owne interpretation of it, namely that it must necessarily come to passe in respect of Gods decree, and so by your owne profession not onely a contingent thinge, but a free action, may be sayd to come to passe necessarily, to witt in respect of Gods decree, as for example, the apprehension of a Traytor which is as free an action as any, you might have beene pleased to have framed the proposition thus, whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe, must necessarily come to passe. For you cannot be ignorant that God doth as well decree that some things shall not come passe, as that other things shall come to passe. As for example Ezek. 20. 31. *O house of Israel as I live sayth the Lord God I will not answer you when I am asked 32. Neyther shall that be done that cometh into your minde: for yee say we will be as the heathen and serve Wood, and stone, and Esay. 37. 33. Thus sayth the Lord concerning the coming of Assur. He shall not enter into this city, nor shoote an arrowe there, nor come before it with sheild, nor cast a mounse against it.* Now we are ready to attend the discovery of this fallacy, this simple fallacy.

First you tell us of an extract or Corollary hercof thus;

*It is impossible for ought that is not to be, &c.* Is this the way you take to discover the simplicity of this fallacy? this savoureth strongly of your fallacious dealing; in as much as by collecting consequences you labour to discredit the syllogisme, this surely is not to answer it. Besides not one of your consequences are sounde, there is no ingenuity in the collection of them. For the conclusion of the former syllogisme being this therefore, *every thing that is comes to passe of necessity*, your selfe have acknowledged this necessity to proceede in respect of Gods decree. And therefore what necessitie of thinges soever you doe inferre herence, you must accordingly understand it in respect of Gods decree not otherwise. Now this necessity is but necessity *secundum quid* not *simpliciter* as the learned call it, and such as may stand with contingency, and possibility to the contrary. Like as the apprehension of a Traytor is a thinge possible not to be and in its owne nature meereley contingent, but upon supposition that God hath ordeyned that such a Traytor shall be apprehended by certeyne meanes, you professe that the successe of those meanes is absolutely necessary, which is as much as to say that the apprehension of that Traytour upon Gods ordeyning it, is absolutely necessary; which is more then the divines whom you impugne as overlasting doe use to say, or can in any sobriety of speech be justified. For if it must necessarily come to passe onely upon supposition of Gods decree, then not absolutely but upon supposition.

But consider we your extracts apart; the first is this. *It is impossible for ought that is, not to be*; Now this proposition cannot at all be deduced out of the former syllogisme, or out of any part thereof. It depends manifestly upon another proposition which is not at all mentioned in the former syllogisme and the proposition is this, *whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not be, it is impossible, that should be or come to passe*. Now let every sober Reader judge, with what ingenuity you call this first proposition of yours an extract of the former syllogisme, or of the conclusion thereof; whereas it is nothing necessary that he who affirms, that *All thinges which*

God hath decreed shall necessarily come to passe, must allso affirm the other, namely that whatsoever God hath not decreed, it is impossible that it should come to passe, wherehce alone is derived the first abstract you speake of. Nay rather if we consider the analogy of propositions aright, we shall find that these propositions are onely proportionall; Whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe, the same shall necessarily come to passe; Whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not come to passe, it is impossible that it should come to passe. These are suitable indeede, and accordingly we professe that it is impossible that any thing which is nor, because God hath decreed that it shall not be, I say it is impossible that it should be. So likewise as touching the second extract we say that every thing which hath beene, so farre forth as God hath decreed the being thereof, it is impossible not to have beene.

Your third extract is of the same nature with the first, and so admitts the same answer. Well I still attend the discovery of the fallacy; It may be we shall meete with it in that which followeth, and that is this, *But if it bee (as I suppose) very consonant to infinite wisdom, altogether consonant to infinite goodnes and to decree contingency as well as necessity a conclusion quite contradictory to that late inferred, will be the onely lawfull issue of the former Maxime or Major proposition matched with a Minor proposition of our owne choosing, &c.* Is this to discover the fallacy of the former syllogisme? Or are you to seeke in the solution of a fallacy? If it be not concluded in moode and figure, you might have signified so much; but indeede no exception can that way be taken against it. If any terme had beene equivocall, the answer had beene by distinction. But no colour of any such just exception; so that every way the forme is unquestionable. And therefore no exception is here to be taken but against the truth of one of the premises.

And I verily beleive there is one of the premises that disliketh you, though you are ashamed plainly, and directly to manifest so much. For so the answer had beene sayre, and facile by denyinge it, if not the Major because thereof you  
make



make use in your owne syllogisme, wherewith you doe as it were requite this, yet at least the Minor which was this, *But God hath decreed every thinge that is.* For I verely beleeeve this is such a dish of lettuce as fitts not your lipps. This you say you might have done, but now the liberty hereof is taken from you, and that by your selfe. For although the Pope never bindes his owne handes, yet you have bound your tongue, and sealed up your owne lipps from taking any such exception as this. For you call the syllogisme a fallacy, and that a simple one. Now fallacies are such formes of argumentation, as offend onely in forme of argumentation, which kind of exception is to justify the matter of it, and the truth of the premises, especially whereas you doe not professe that it offendes both in forme, and matter, nor shew any forwardnes to deny either of the propositions. Well we gave you a syllogisme to answer, in steede of answering it, you thinke to make us amends with another syllogisme. I have read that when one presented Augustus with verses looking for a reward, Augustus in steede of a reward gave him verses of his owne making. The Poet hereupon very liberally bestowed a reward upon Augustus. We expected at your handes not another syllogisme, but the answeare of our owne. But though you sayle so answeare ours, I will not sayle to doe my best inaccommodating an answeare unto yours. You undertake to inferre the contradictory to our conclusion, which is to our face your opposites, and to cry a syllogisme downe without answeareing it.

Yet let us see how well you performe that you undertake. Your syllogisme is this. *Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to passe, but God hath decreed contingency as well as necessity, therefore of necessity there must be contingency.* And for the better strengthening of your discourse or argumentation, you make a motion that an additionall to the Major which is this, *Nothinge can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe.* Now the judge, or Chancelour in Logicall Courts to whome such a motion should be made, would cry out shame upon it. For that pro-

position is an universall affirmative, and you desire that an universall negative should be added to it to make up an entire Maior proposition, which were like a sixth finger upon an hand. And indeed in that case it were neither Categorical nor Hypotheticall. For though two propositions with a copulative have place in some Hypotheticall syllogismes, yet it is alwayes by way of negation thus, *Non & dies est, & nox: sed dies est, ergo non nox*. Againe upon a second consideration, the motion would be rejected as being altogether without witt. For as much as the conclusion intended is well enough inferred without it, and this additionall conferres no strength to improve the inference. I appeale to every schollars judgment in this.

Thirdly the proposition it selfe as touching the latter clause of the disjunctive, hath as little witt as the motion made for the admittance of it. As where it is sayd that *God hath decreed that things may come to passe*, you might as well say that God hath decreed that the World may come to passe. For the possibility of the event of things is not from Gods decree, but rather from Gods omnipotency. For because he is able to produce every thinge that implyes no contradiction, therefore they are denominated possible.

Lastly this proposition which you crave to be admitted is like a Trojan horse, it will doe you more harme then good, as ere we part from this section shall be made manifest. Yet what neede you desire more, your conclusion is granted you, namely that of necessity there must be contingency, supposing Gods decree. For Gods decrees are onely of doing, or suffering some things, as it is free for God whether he will doe them, or suffer them, yea or no. And therefore though God had not at all decreed contingency, yet decreeing any thinge, of necessity there must be contingency, though he had decreed nothing else, but such thinges as we count most necessary, in the course of nature. But we graunt also that God did decree contingency, and decrees necessity in respect of second causes; as for example God did decree to make fire of such a nature as to heate or burne necessarily, the Sunne of such a nature

nature as to enlighten the aire necessarily, heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwardes, and all this necessarily. Necessarily I say in respect of second causes, though this necessity was mere contingency, in respect of the will of God. For he could have chosen whether there should have been any fire, or world at all, yea and can hinder the fire from burninge if it please him, as he did hinder it from taking hold of the three noble children in the furnace of Babylon. And as God hath decreed many things to come to passe necessarily, so hath he decreed many things to come to passe contingently, as in course of nature many things there are that come to passe contingently by the will of God, and especially the actions of men and Angells.

And as for that additionall of yours which you craved to be admitted, *Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed, it shall come to passe*, we are so farr from disliking it, that we cannot beleive that you doe beleive it, and therefore you have taken a course to confound it, as in due time shall appeare. We willingly professe that all thinges beside God, are created entities, and such as whose being must necessarily depend on God, or have no being at all. And not onely doe we subject *res ipsae* to the will and decree of God, but also *modos rerum*. And these *modi rerum* are necessity, and contingency.

Nothing (we say) comes to passe, but what God hath decreed shall come to passe. Againe nothing comes to passe after any manner whatsoever, but that God hath decreed, it to come to passe after that manner; whethet it come to passe necessarily, God hath decreed it shall come to passe necessarily; or whether contingently, God hath decreed it shall come to passe contingently. In a word that which you deliver faulttringly we say plainly *Nothing comes to passe otherwise, then God hath decreed it shall come to passe*. So then I say we graunt your conclusion. But how doth it appeare that this conclusion of yours contradiceth our former conclusion which was this, therefore *Every thinge comes to passe of necessity*. You will say, if every thinge comes to passe of necessity, then nothinge comes

comes to passe contingently. I confesse this consequence is plausible, but to whom? to none but ignorants. Of which number you are not. For your very conclusion it selfe in the very outward face of it utterly contradicth this consequence. For is not your conclusion this, *therefore of necessity there must be contingency*, which manifestly justifieth that necessity and contingency may stand together, and are nothing oppositic. And how, I pray, is this *necessity*, but in respect of the decree of God? And did our conclusion proceede in any other sense? Your selfe have acknowledge that it doth not, though therein somewhat faulting also, as it is your usuall course, in taking notice of any truth that makes against your tenents. For are not these your wordes in interpreting our conclusion, *All things are necessary in respect of Gods decree?* Onely you adde *at least* in this respect as if you would faine drawe it to another meaning. Now our meaning is plaine. All things come not to passe necessarily, nor all things contingently, but some things come to passe necessarily as works of nature, some things contingently as the actions of men. But by your owne received Maxime *Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed they shall come to passe*, therefore God hath decreed that some things shall come to passe necessarily, some things contingently. But by your owne received principle, whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe, that must of necessity come to passe, therefore of necessity it must come to passe that some things shall come to passe necessarily, some things contingently. Now give me leave to represent your owne ill carriage, to your owne eyes. The Maior proposition in our syllogisme, and the Maior proposition in your syllogisme are all one as your selfe acknowledge in these wordes, *Let the Maior proposition stand as it did before*. Now if they be all one why doe you not propose them after one manner? doe you practise to gull your Reader presuming this legier du maine of yours shall not be discovered?

The Maior proposition in both is all one I confesse as touching each part, both the middle tearme, and the greater extreme. But when the greater extreme comes to be repeated in

ted in the conclusion, it is repeated in a farre different manner in our conclusion then in yours. For in the Maior proposition of each syllogisme it runnes thus, *must of necessity come to passe*, but in our conclusion it is corrupted thus, *must come to passe necessarily*. But in your conclusion it is mended thus, *of necessitie there must bee contingency*; which is as much as to say, *of necessitie it must come to passe*. I say in ours it is corrupted; for whereas in these words *must of necessitie come to passe*, the word *necessity* is indifferently to be referred to that which goes before, or that which comes after; and indeed ought to be referred to that which goes before; in the conclusion it is put in the last place, so that it cannot bee referred but to the words *come to passe*. And it is mended in yours, for in the conclusion it is put in the first place of the greater extreame, and so takes away all danger of referring it to the last words, *come to passe*. As for example, had our conclusion beene shaped like yours as touching the *maius extremum* which is the same in both, the harshnes of it had beene qualified, thus, *ergo all things of necessity must come to passe*, which hath a faire, and facile construction thus; though some things come to passe necessarily, and some things contingently, yet all things as being decreed by God, must of necessity come to passe, both those things that come to passe necessarily, and those things that come to passe contingently. In like sort had your conclusion beene shaped by you as ours is, as touching the greater extreame, as indeed it ought, the greater extreame being all one in both, then your conclusion would have seemed as harsh as ours thus, *ergo Contingency must come to passe of necessity* or thus *some effects shall bee contingent of necessitie*, for so runnes the Minor, *God hath decreed contingency, or that some effects shall be contingent as well as some are necessary*. And as for the consequences which hence you make they are nothinge contradictory to those extracts you made from our conclusion. For all those impossibilities deduced from our conclusion, were onely *secundum quid* and upon supposition of Gods decree, which kind of impossibilitie is alwaies joyned with a simple and absolute possibilitie to the contrary,

secluding Gods decree. For even those things which God decreeth to come to passe contingently as the actions of men, must necessarily by the vertue of Gods decree come to passe, in such a manner as joyned with a possibilitie of not comming to passe, otherwise it were impossible they should come to passe contingently. About which truth, namely that God decreeth some things to come to passe contingently, why doe you faulter in this fowle manner? If you like it not, why doe you not in plaine termes contest against it, if you doe approve of it, why doe you not plainly professe it, but carry your selfe in the clouds of generalitie and ambiguity? As first, when you say, *God hath decreed contingency*, here a man might bee apt to conceave, that you doe beleve that God hath decreed that some things shall come to passe contingently. Especially if he understand that God decreeth not only necessity, but also that some things shall necessarily come to passe, which may seeme to urge you in like sort to mainteyne that God decreeth contingency, so he should also decree that some things shall come to passe contingently.

Most of all considering what here you seeme to approve of in your additionall, namely that *Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed*. Now the case is cleere that many things come to passe contingently, therefore it followeth that God also hath decreed, that even those things shall come to passe contingently; But I have had experience of your opinion to the contrary in another treatise of yours, wherein though you confesse that God hath decreed the necessity of things, & the things themselves that necessarily come to passe, and graunt that it cannot bee otherwise, yet on the other side though you graunt that God decreeth contingency, yet you deny that God decreeth the things themselves that doe contingently come to passe. A most prodigious opinion, as if God did bring to passe the contingency of a thing (which is but *modus rei*, and containes no realitie different from the thing it selfe) yet doth not bring to passe the thing it selfe; for if he did he must decree it also. And as directly opposite to the word of God, plainly testifying a multitude of contin-  
gent

gent things to have beene decreed by God. The like ambiguitye you content your selfe withall, when you say that *God hath decreed that some effects shall be contingent*, or as otherwise you expresse it, *that some contingent effects shall bee*, which seemes manifestly to imply as well the being or existence of them to bee decreed by God as the contingent manner of their being.

Yet I say, in another discourse of yours you fly off from this acknowledgement, but withall deliver your selfe with as much confusion and perturbation, as any adversary could expect in an opposite maintaining erroneous points, and crying downe the truth of God. Thus have I taken paines to answer your syllogisme, but as for the discovery of the fallacy of ours wee have hitherto found nothing tending thereunto: What is to come wee are to expect. Yet hereupon as if you had performed some great service, very gravely and magisterially you tell us, that *As ill weeds grow apace, so the late mentioned error once conceived, was quickly delivered of a second which derived the infallible certainty of Gods foreknowing things future, from an infallible necessitie (as they conceived it) layd upon them, (before they had being) by his immutable decree. But every wise decree presupposeth wisdom, and wisdom essentially includeth knowledge.* It seemes you thinke you have sufficiently discharged your selfe of that you undertooke, namely the discovery of the fallacy of our syllogisme, you proceede to the censure of another error, and that both obscurely and unsoundly expressed. It is about the ground of Gods fore-knowing things to come. Now the opinion you taxe for an error, is the opinion of those that maintaine that God foreknowes all things to come, by seeing the determination of his owne will to the producing of every action. This you expresse after your manner thus, *God foreknowes them from an infallible necessitie layd upon them by his immutable decree.* I doe not thinke you can produce any Author of this opinion, that expresseth his opinion in this manner. Besides, it is notoriously untrue. For the Authors of this opinion maintayne, that God by his decree, laieth contingency upon some things, as well as



necessitie upon others. And that as he will have the fire to  
 burne, the Sunne to enlightē necessarily, so he will have, An-  
 gells and men produce their actions contingently and freely.  
 Nay which is more, even they that openly professe, that God  
 doth determine the will of man unto every actiō as touching  
 the substance of the action; doe withall maintayne that God  
 determines the will of man and Angells to worke contin-  
 gently and freely in all their actions, and consequently neither  
 doth hee decree any other wise to determine them, which do-  
 ctrine maintaynes that Gods will and decree doth lay upon  
 all reasonable creatures a contingent manner of operation  
 rather then any necessity. Yet upon supposition of Gods  
 decree, they maintayne that of necessitie such things as God  
 hath decreed shall come to passe, and that after that manner  
 as God hath decreed it to come to passe, that is, either necessa-  
 rily as all the operations of naturall agents, or contingently  
 and freely, as all the actions of reasonable creatures. But this  
 opinion you dislike, and upon what reason? Vndoubtedly it  
 seemes they had need bee weighty ones, considering that this  
 question hath beene abundantly canvassed, by the most lear-  
 ned and subtillest among Schoole-divines. And indeed it is  
 one of the first points whereabout I have beene acquainted  
 with Schoole divinity: Scotus proposeth this questiō, to witt;  
 Now God doth foreknowe future contingents; for thus they  
 in their wisdom thought fitt to propose it, to witt, *of future  
 contingents* in speciall not as you doe, *of future thinges* in gene-  
 rall. And he proposeth two opinions hereabouts which  
 he impugne. The first, is the opinion of Bonaventura,  
 who maintayned that God did foreknowe future contin-  
 gents, by the Ideaes of them in the mind of God. The se-  
 cond is the opinion of Aquinas, who made the ground of  
 Gods foreknowing of future contingents, to bee *Their reall  
 existence in eternitie*. Both these Scotus impugne with such  
 excellent arguments to my judgement at that time, and with-  
 all so cleare, that as I remember this brought me first in love  
 with Schoole divinity. The third opinion is his owne,  
 which there he maintayneth, & that is this, which you invade,  
 namely,

namely, *That God knowes all future contingents by knowing his owne Will and purpose to produce them.* And as touching your objection that God foreknowes the sinnes of men as well as theyr good actions, which yet undoubtedly he did not decree to produce, his answere is, that this also is foreknown by God in as much as he knowes the determination of his will to produce every sinfull act as touching the substance of it, and to permitt the obliquitie of it. The opinion of Calvin maintayning no other ground of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents but this, & that out of Valla is apt to bee exposed to scorne now adayes, not onely amongst Papists but amongst English Protestants also. But as for Scotus who is knowne to maintayne the same opinion, he is reputed to be of sufficiency to beare the brunt of any adversary that in point of Metaphysicall, and Schoole divinity shall encounter him. Yet consider a little farther. The Thomists and Dominicans who stand much upon the tearmes of defence for the credite and reputation of theyr great Master Aquinas, they are apt enough to meete with Scotus his arguments opposing his opinion in laying the ground of Gods foreknowledge upon the reall existence of all things in eternity. But marke how Didacus Alvarer a great Schoole-man carryeth himselfe in this. Aquinas sayth he did never deny Scotus his way of Gods foreknowing future contingents, to witt, by knowing the determination of his owne will. But besides this he devised another, and that was by the reall existence of all future things in eternity. Agayne, in maintaining the opinion of Aquinas concerning the actuall existence of all future things in eternity, he first presupposeth the determination of Gods will for the producing of them, and thereupon makes future contingents to have theyr reall existence, & not otherwise. So that for this opinion which you doe very magisterially censure, as an ill weed hath not onely poore Calvin for the patron of it, and Valla alleaged by him; but Scotus also the Father of the Realls, yea and Didacus Alvarer a Thomist, a sect of Schoole-divines commonly opposite to the Scotists, yet herein professedly concurring with Scotus himselfe,

and avouching allso Aquinas himselfe to bee of the same opinion. You had neede therefore looke well to your tackling in opposing such who I tell you never were reputed Babies, but tall fellows.

But yet I confesse they were but men and may have their marches. But leave your censures, and trust to your sword and dint of arguments, & doe not thinke that words or phrases or figures (much lesse imperious censures) will carry it.

And heere it would bee required, not onely to argue your owne Tenet, but to make answer to theyr Arguments. But you Eagle like and as if they were but flies keepe your state, and will not fly at such inferiour gaine. Wherein your profelyte shall be little beholding to you, whē being possessed with your opinion, hee shall find himselfe left to himselfe to sinke or swimme without any helpe from you to answer theyr arguments, that have maintayned the contrary; They had neede bee of Chrissippus temper, who was wont to pray his Master to give him principles and let him alone to maintayne them; Yet it may bee I am deceived and it was not Chrissippus but Carneades. Yet with one argument you are content to helpe your reader here. Belike it is some cleare demonstration, such as it is, this it is. *Every wise decree presupposeth wisdom, and wisdom includeth knowledge, and what of this?* Nay if any man desires to fare better in the endoctrinating himselfe in this point, he must goe to the Cookes, you have no better entertainment for him. A very short dilpatche (in a controversie of great moment) and a quicke; Never was Schooleman so simple as to doubt, whether wisdom includeth knowledge or a wise decree presupposeth wisdom; yet never any one of them was found to discern any such inference as you imply herhence, as if herhence it did so evidently followe that Gods foreknowing of future things doth not depend upon the determination of his will. For you take no paines to cleere this inference. But let us examine this a little. When we say the foreknowledge of future contingents depends upon the determination of Gods will, the meaning is, therefore God foreknowes them because he purposeth to produce them,

them, so farre as they are good, or to permitt them in case they are evill. Now you in opposition to this, tell us, that Gods knowledge goeth before his decree, and because you doe not specify what knowledge, we have reason to expound it of the knowledge spoken of, that is of the knowledge of future contingents. In like sort because you specifie not of what decree you speake, we have reason to understand it of the decree before spoken of, whereupon those divines, whome you impugne, doe ground the foreknowledge of things to come. So then your meaning must be this in opposition to the Tenet which you censure for an error or weed in opinion. *Whereas some thinke that Gods foreknowledge of things to come is grounded upon Gods decree, as if God ergo did foreknow them, because he purposeth to produce them.* You are of a contrary opinion, namely, that Gods foreknowledge doth goe before his decree, that is, first God foreknowes things to come, and then secondly he purposeth to produce them. For if you meant it of another decree, then that which was spoken of, what an absurd thing is it for you not to specifie it, especially seeing you propose this by way of contradiction to the former opinion? which unlesse it proceedes of the same things is no contradiction. For if I say God doth first decree to produce things, and hereupon he knowes them; and you shall as it were by way of opposition say; No this is not so; but God doth first foresee the actions of men, and thereupon decree to save or damne them, here is no contradiction at all, but an unlearned and foolish shewe of opposition, without any substance of contradiction. Wherefore if you speake to the purpose in this, and that by way of opposition, your meaning must be this; God doth not first decree them and afterwards foreknowe them, but rather he first foreknowes them and then decreeth them; which is as much as to say, that God foreknowing that they will be, doth hereupon decree that they shall be. So that Gods decree of things future contingent proceedeth in this manner, *Seeing they will be, they shall be.* But to consider your reason more closely, *Every wise decree (you say) presupposeth wisdom.* Now this being delivered in opposition to our opinion which maintainne

maintayne that the foreknowledge of future contingents followeth Gods decree; and you saying plainly that wisdom rather goeth before Gods decree then followeth after it, (which indeed is a truth, for God worketh all things according to the counsaile of his will) this discourse of yours (I say) doth imply that this foreknowledge of future contingents, which we make consequent to Gods decree is by us accounted the wisdom of God. For otherwise heere againe were no contradiction, though you make shew of contradicting us; as whereas we say foreknowledge of future things is subsequence to Gods decree, you as it were contradicting us reply, *Nay rather Gods wisdom goeth before his decree, otherwise it were no wise decree.* So that herein you doe manifestly suppose that we by Gods foreknowledge of future things did understand the wisdom of God. It seemes you conceave it to be so, but as for us we take it to be so foule an absurdity that we desire, though you please your own lipps with such lettice, yet untill you have better ground for it you will not charge it upon us. For even for a man to foreknowe what he meaneth to doe is no part of wisdom. For the veryst foole that is may knowe and be privy to what he meaneth to doe. Every man is privy to his owne thoughts and purposes. *No man knoweth the things of man but the Spirit of Man.* 1. Cor. 2. 8. So then the spirit of man is well enough acquainted with the purposes of man. But the wisdom that directeth the will of God is that which the learned call *Scientia simplicis intelligentie*, whereby God knowes what is most fitt to be done for the compassing of his proposed ends, which your selfe confesse to be the part of wisdom in the beginning of the former Section. Where also you made not the least mention of any such part of wisdom as to foreknowe what one meaneth to doe. Now Gods decree of producing future things in theyr season is a decree of the, meanes tending to the end which God hath intended, namely the setting forth of his glory. For *God makes all things for himselfe.* And this wisdom includeth knowledge, it is true the knowledge of all meanes whereby his glory may be  
 set

set forth, and God makes choyce of what he thinkes fitt, and all this knowledge is not the knowledge of what shall be, but onely the knowledge of what may be, or is fitt to be, which all the learned acknowledge to be *scientia simplicis intelligentia*. and they make it distinct from *scientia visionis* which is the knowledge of what shall be. And these knowledges all acknowledge to be so farre different as that the one to witt *scientia simplicis intelligentia* is precedent to Gods decree, the other to witt *scientia visionis* is subsequnt which two knowledges in God, how judiciously and learnedly in the course of your magister all censure you are pleased to confound let the Reader judge. But to proceede, hereupon you betake your selfe to interrogatories.

The first is, *Shall we then graunt that Gods knowledge is antecedent, and his foreknowledge consequent to his decrees?* To this out of that which hath beene formerly delivered may be answered. There is a knowledge goes before Gods will, called *scientia simplicis intelligentia* the knowledge of what may be, or is fitt to be, there is another knowledge called *scientia visionis*, that is the knowledge of what shall be, and this followeth after the will of God; and I know no tolerable divine that did deny it, untill the opinion of *scientia media* rose up; which the Authors themselves confesse to be a new invention; And here as if this opinion were both Law and Gospell unto you, you rise up in grave and supercilious manner to censure the contrary.

Now as for the terme of foreknowledge; I answer the knowledge of what may be, or is fitt to be, goes before the will of God, and so may be called the foreknowledge of God; but the knowledge that things shall be, though it followeth Gods will, yet may it be called foreknowledge in respect of the event of the things themselves. For the things exist in time, but God did know, that they should be, from all eternitie, like as from all eternitie he did decree the futurition of them. Your second interrogatorie is this, *Or shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquitie of Ierushes blasphemy against his Sonne because he did most certainly foreknowe it?* You

never shewed your teeth till now, by this I perceave what you aime at, which hitherto you have beene ashamed to professe in plaine termes, namely, that future contingents which come to passe in the World are not decreed. But what meane you to deny that, in this cunning manner, which you durst not deny openly. For the syllogisme you proposed to answer contained this, in plaine termes in the Minor thus, *All things that come to passe are decreed to come to passe*: which if you had but in plaine termes denied, your solution had beene plaine and brieve, whereas you neglecting that course did fetche a great compasse instead of answering to requite us with another argument whereby to inferre a proposition contradictory to our conclusion.

Secondly though then you might have denied it, yet now you cannot without contradicting your selfe. For you justified the truth of the premises in that syllogisme, in as much as all the exception you tooke against it was against the forme and not against the matter. For you told us, it was a fallacy, a very simple one. Now every Schollar knowes that where no other exception is taken against a syllogisme, but this, that it is a fallacy, this is as much as to justify the truth of each proposition contained therein.

Thirdly, I give another reason why you have prejudiced your selfe from denying this. For you have professed that *Nothing can come to passe otherwise, then God hath decreed it to come to passe*, Iewishe blasphemy against the Sonne of God came to passe contingently and freely, therefore God hath decreed, that that very Iewishe blasphemy against the Sonne of God should come to passe contingently and freely, &c. what followeth hereupon but that therefore God ordeyneth it to come to passe, for to come to passe contingently and freely, is no *terminus diminuens* of coming to passe. You have nothing at all that I knowe to helpe you at this dead list, but to fly to the confused manner of expressing that former proposition of yours, whereupon I take advantage, if so be your heart serve you to take hold thereof, whereof I much doubt. For it is true indeed that that proposition was not proposed categorically



categorically thus, *Nothing shall come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed, it shall come to passe*; whereupon I have taken advantage against you; but disjunctively thus *Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe*. If you will helpe your selfe with this disjunctive you may; but I will be bold to tell you, it is like to prove a shamefull helpe, and such as seemes to be thrust in onely to chaime the dangerous issue of it (whereof it seems you had a glimpse) if it were left out. For consider, is it a sober speech to say that God hath decreed that things may come to passe? The possibilitie of thinges is knowne to God before ever his decrees goe forth. He knowes what he is able to bring to passe before he resolves what shall come to passe: And therefore too too absurde it is, to make the possibilitie of any thing the object of Gods decree. Sticke rather to this, and say, that though God did ordaine, the lewisse blasphemy against his Sonne should come to passe contingently & freely, yet therence it followes not that he did ordaine it should come to passe: Whereabouts when we knowe your mind *è renatâ consilium capiemus*, we will thinke of a convenient answer, in the meane time I will proceede. Therefore in the fourthe place why should it seeme so uncourte that God should decree this very blasphemy, as to be cryed downe at the very hearing of it, especially by Christians who knowe and beleve the oracles of God, and acknowledge that passage. Act. 4. 27. 28. amongst the rest to be dictated by the Spirit of God wherein the Apostles joynly professe in theyr meditations unto God in this manner, *Doublelesse against thy holy Sonne Iesus whome thou hast anointed both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel gathered themselves together, to doe whatsoever thy hand and thy counsaile had determined before to be done*. Iudas that betrayed him, the High-Priests that hired Iudas to betray him, the witnessse that testified against him, the people that cryed away with him, were of the people of Israel; The souldiours that scourged him, crowned him with thornes, spate in his face, crucified him, pierced him with a speare & were of the Gentils, yet all these

together with *Herod* and *Pontius Pilate*, are avouched by the Holy Ghost to have gathered themselves together to do what God had determined to be done; and was there not both Jewish and Gentilish blasphemy against the Sonne of God to be found in all this? and shall wee feare to professe that they did in all this what God had decreed to be done, when the Holy Ghost professeth that *they did what God had determined to be done*? Could you be ignorant of this passage? and dare you in so apparent termes draw your Reader to contradict it, as some blasphemous assertion, without taking any paines to interpret the place, and so free your selfe from manifest contradiction thereunto, as at first sight is obviouse to every Reader, that will but compare this of yours with that of the Acts? Had you ventured upon an interpretation, I would have taken paines to consider it. I have shaken in peeces the rotten interpretation of Bellarmine and Arminius, different each from other. I would have tryed what I could have performed upon yours also. And throughout the Scriptures we may perceiue how jealous God is over the maintaining of his providence throughout, even in the most sinfull things that come to passe, and that in such phrases, which when they are used by us, they are cryed downe for blasphemy; but in the meane time they consider not, that if they be the phrases of the Holy Ghost, ere they are aware they are found to charge the Holy Ghost with blasphemy. And the truth being rightly uttered, is farre enough off even from harshnesse also, as well as from errour, yea from harshnesse unto mens affections, though never so corrupt. As for example, what good soever there is found in such actions, wee acknowledge God to be the author of it, but not of the malice or evill that cleaves to it; yet that also we say God will have come to pass, but onely by his permission. For, *Non aliquid fit nisi volente Deo, Not any thing comes to passe (saith Austin) but God willing it*; and he comprehends both good and evill, as appeares by that which followes, *vel sinendo vt fiat*, as in case it be evill, *vel ipse faciendo*, as in case it be good. But of both these hee pronounceth that not any thing comes to passe but God wil-  
ling

ling it. The like may bee manifested to have beene acknowledged by Anselmus, Hugo de Sancto Victore, and Bradwardine, yea and our greatest adversaries. For Bellarmine even in the midst of his heat against us, professeth, that *Bonum est esse malum, Deo permittente*: It is good that there should bee evill by Gods permission: and if it be good, I pray you why is it not lawfull for GOD to will it, seeing upon the same ground it was affirmed long agoe by St. Austin that God doth will it. But as for Arminius, never any man was knowne to be smitten with the spirit of giddinesse in opposing this truth more then he; for sometimes he professeth, *It was Gods Will that Ahab should fill up the measure of his sinnes*, and how I pray could that be, but by adding sinne unto sinne? Again, hee professeth that it was Gods will that the Jewes should proceed so farre as they did proceed in their ignominious handling of Christ; and every man knowes that they proceeded to a very foule degree of blasphemy and impiety therein. Last of all, it is true that Aquinas and Durandus both oppose this, but herein Aquinas manifestly opposeth Austin, though he names him not. And againe, I desire no better triall of this truth then their oppositions. For if I doe not make it appeare that their arguments are meerly sophisticall, and manifestly unsound, let me be accompted a blasphemers in the maintaining of this Tenet. All which I have already performed, and taken in Valentianus his more copious and frothy exceptions also, but in another language. Lastly, yet were it tolerable if you did onely deny that sinnes of men were decreed by God; but you will have nothing that comes to passe contingently and freely to be decreed by God; contingency you say is decreed, but not the things that fall out contingently: whence it followeth that by your opinion, God did decree no mans faith, no mans repentance, no mans obedience, but onely did decree the contingency of this. This is the mysterious iniquity of your doctrine which you conceale, and make choice rather to give instance in sinne and blasphemy, and to represent the harshnesse of maintaining that to be decreed by God, onely that you may the better insinuate the approbation

Enchirid.  
cap. 96.

Exam.  
praed. Perk.  
pag. 162.  
Ibid. pag.  
114, 115.

of your unlearned Tenets, into vulgar and popular affections. Yet you give me cause to guesse that you would have your reader beleeeve more herein, then you beleeeve your selfe. You would have your Reader beleeeve that God did not decree the Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne, but your beleefe is onely that *God did not decree the obliquity of it*, and yet forthwith you doubt whether the obliquity may bee distinguished from the act. Again, you would have your Reader beleeeve that God did not decree the Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne, but your beleefe here expressed is onely this, that *God did not inevitably decree the Iewish blasphemy*, implying that God did decree it, but not inevitably. And not any of our Divines that I know ever said any more, then that God did decree it.

Enchirid.  
cap 95.

You adde another absurd error hereunto concerning Gods decrees; that forsooth some of them are evitable, some inevitable. Now the meaning of our Divines in saying that God did decree any obliquity, is onely this; God did decree that such an obliquity should come to passe by his permission, directly answering to the professing of Austin; *Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel finendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo*. It is true, Arminius disputes, and that acutely as hee thinkes, that in some actions the obliquity cannot bee distinguished from the actions themselves. I have dealt with him in this point; I am ready to deale with you also. But it is enough for you to shew your affection to Armenius his Tenets; as for your sufficiency to maintaine them, that you doe dispense very sparingly, as if you affected state in this. Further you tell us, to admit your former conclusion, that the eternall foreknows all things because he decreeth them, or that they are absolutely necessary in respect of his decree, (the disjunctive here should be a copulative, for that which followeth is not verified of either of them disjunctively, but copulatively of them both,) were to imprison his infinite wisdom in his selfe-fettered power, to restrain the Eternall Majestie from using such libertie in his everlasting decrees as some earthly Monarches usurpe in causes temporall or civill. For the Pope never ties his hand by any grant, which is a fault in him. But in that Holy One the reservation of such libertie is a point of high

*high perfection.* A little before you told us very gravely, that weedes grow apace, and the former error which you minted, as loath to declare your mind thereon plainly, touching Gods decreeing all things, was *soone delivered of a second*, to wit, the ground of Gods foreknowing things to come to be the determination of his will. You rather thinke, that God foreknowes things to come, before, and without the determination of his will. Whether this opinion of yours bee a tare or good corne, let the Reader judge. And of what nature nor a second is, but seconds are, whereof it seemes you are soone delivered, which now we come to examine. To say that *God foreknowes all things, because he decreeth them*, is (you say) to *imprison his infinite wisdom in his power*. Why it is nothing so: for Gods decree is Gods will, not his power: yet how is Gods wisdom imprisoned in his will, more then his power? For as God knoweth more things possible to be done, and fit to be done then he doeth, so hee can doe more then he doeth, and therefore his wisdom is no more imprisoned thereby then his power. But besides this, you take your aime quite amisse. For the foreknowledge of what things God will bring to passe, is no part of wisdom. For, for a man to be privie to his owne purposes, is no part of wisdom, for it is incident even to silly creatures. Again, to know what I meane to doe, what a senselesse thing it is to say that this is to imprison my knowledge? and as like senselesse a thing it is to say that Gods knowledge or wisdom is imprisoned, by being privie to his owne purposes? Again, how is Gods power fettered by his will? Seeing the power of every creature is to be ordered by his will without fettering of it? you signifie that his liberty is hereby restrained; wherein? in his everlasting decrees. A most senselesse speech. Is it possible that by making an everlasting decree, Gods libertie of making an everlasting decree shall be restrained? Perhaps you may say, by making it he cannot alter it. I answer, if he should alter it after he hath made it, this decree by way of alteration should not be everlasting: but you suppose the contrary, namely, that Gods decrees are everlasting. Or if God should for a while suspend

suspend his decrees, and not make them with the first, how is it possible they could be everlasting? This favoureth strongly of an affection to maintayne that Gods decrees may be not everlasting with Vorstius, though you are ashamed to professe it, and therefore hand over head you thrust in the denomination of everlasting upon the decrees though quite contrary to your intention. For you would have God still indifferent to decree this or that, as the Pope is who by no gaunt bindes his hands.

And why so? is it, that upon emergent occasions, God might decree a newe as he thinkes fitt? why but consider, all these emergent occasions were from everlasting knowne to God. So that if God at ths time were indifferent to decree, he would decree no otherwise then he hath from everlasting. For from everlasting he knewe all that now he doth, and at this present his will is no otherwise then from everlasting it was. For with him is no variableness nor shadow of change.

Iam. 1. 17.

The wilderness of your inventions, I well perceave is not at an end. I wonder whither the wantonnes of our witts would bring us in the end. Neither are Gods judgements yet at an end in giving men over to illusions to belcive lyes, and that for not embracing his truth with love. And who can looke for better from them who shamefully oppose the gace of God. Is it marvaile if God infatuate them? As for the being of things absolutely necessary by reason of Gods decree, this is your language, not ours, in the last period of your former Section. We say, looke what God hath decreed, that of necessitie must come to passe, but how, not alwayes necessarily, but sometimes contingently. Only the workes of nature doe by the decree of God come to passe necessarily; but as for the actions of men they come to passe by the decree of God contingently and freely. But whether workes of nature, or actions of men, they of necessitie must come to passe, if God hath decreed them, and that after such a manner as God hath decreed them to come to passe, that is, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently.

6. As a man or Angell having free power to doe this or that, by producing any thing subject to the freedome of his will, doth therewithall produce contingency without decreeing it, (for in as much as he workes freely the worke must needs be freely wrought, that is contingently,) In like sort God being free to produce any worke without him, upon the producing of such a worke doth produce contingency without decreeing it. For the worke cannot be wrought by God but freely, and consequently it must needs come to passe contingently.

To produce this or that, is the object of Gods decree, because he can choose whether he will produce this or that; but to worke contingently is no object of Gods decree; for it is not in Gods power to choose whether he will worke contingently or necessarily. If he doth worke at all *ad extra* he must needs worke freely that is contingently. For as it is of the perfection of the divine nature ~~to be~~ necessarily, so it is the perfection of divine nature ~~to worke~~ not necessarily in the producing of ought without him, but freely & contingently. But the divine nature differeth from the nature Angellical and humane, that he not only worketh freely, but also is able to create creatures herein like himselfe, that can worke freely as namely Angells and men; like as he can and hath produced other creatures that worke in all things necessarily.

Agayne, considering that necessitie and contingency are but *modi rerum* certaine manners of bringing things to passe, & therefore cannot exist without the things themselves which are sayd to exist and to be brought to passe either necessarily or contingently. Therefore it cannot be sayd that God doth produce the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular, unlesse he produceth the particular it selfe; neither can he be sayd to decree the contingency or necessity of this or that particular, except he decree the thing it selfe. So that for God to decree the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular, is nothing else then to decree that this particular shall necessarily come to passe, or such a particular shall contingently come to passe.



Neither is it reasonable to affirme, that God doth decree necessitie or contingency in generall, but not the necessitie of this particular, or the contingency of this particular. For like as generalls cannot exist but in particulars, so neither can generalls be otherwise produced then by producing particulars. So it is impossible that God should decree the producing of generalls otherwise then by producing of particulars. Now there is a contingency taken in another sense, which doth not accompany the existence of any thing but only the essence of it, and denominates it before it doth exist, as when we say raine to morrow is contingent, it is as much as to say it is possible to raine, it is possible not to raine. So touching the actions of men, of any action we may say it is contingent, for as much as it is in the power of man to doe it or no. Now this kind of contingency is not alwayes the object of Gods decree. For in this sense the continuation of the World is a contingent thing; for it may continue or no. So before the World was made, it was possible to be and not to be, and so the making of it contingent, but not by the decree of God. For nothing is such by the decree of God but it might be altered, for Gods decree is a free act. But it was impossible that the World should not be of a contingent nature, like as it is impossible that God should not have power to make the World, or not to make it according to his will. Nay the very workes of men and Angells in this kind of contingency are not the object of Gods decree; for in as much as they are sayd to be possible to be or not to be, this is not from the decree of God but rather from the nature of God, as all necessary truthe is derived therefrom.

Neither is it in the power of God to make that the workes of men and Angells should not be possible to be or not to be. But if the possibilitie were the object of Gods decree, it might be otherwise. For Gods decree passeth forely upon every thing wheren pon it passeth, so that if he decree them to be possible, he might have decreed them not to be possible. Yet you seeme to speake of contingents in no other sense then this, as when you say, *God hath decreed that some effects shall*

*shall be contingent*, although I confesse it is so obscurely delivered that a man can hardly discern your meaning. But for farther discourse hereof you put us over to the article of creation. So likewise for the contingency of humane actions as decreed by God; your confirmation thereof we must expect, when you come to treat of mans fall. This, thus by fetching compasse expressed by you, I doubt will prove no more then this, that *God decreed to make man a free agent*; yet you deliver it as if the demonstration hereof did require, and promise some exquisite performance. And I am verily persuaded you have a reach at such a kind of freedome, as to make it good, will surpass the performance of any Schoole divine that ever was, from the dayes of Anselmus to the dayes wherein we live.

But of the nature of your performances we have had reasonable experience. You may remember what he sayd while he was shearing his hogges, *Here is a great deale of cry and a little wooll.* In the next place you dictate your parallels wherein it seemes you take great pleasure. That Gods wisdom is infinite we nothing doubt; but to make it consist in knowing what he is able to doe, we take to be a very hungry description of it. For is either man or Angell any thing the wiser for knowing what he is able to doe? Gods immensitie consists in filling all places which are but finite, neyther is it possible they should be infinite, yet beyond things that are, this immensitie is not extended. And you have already denyed precisely that God is in vacuo. But as for Gods eternity that doth not only coexist with all time, but had existence before it actually and that without all beginning. In a word Gods immensitie is not in respect of any *quantitas molis*, quantitie of extension, but only in respect of *quantitas virtutis*. And what is this different from his infinite power. And indeed God is not in place after the manner of being contained in any thing, but only after the way of containing and supporting all things. And looke by what quantitie he made all things, by the same quantitie he supports all things, and that is the quantitie of his power.

A very weak amplification it is in my judgement of Gods incircumscribable presence, (which yet is nothing els but his immensitie) to say it is not circumscribed by the coexistence of his creatures. For coexistence is of no apt nature to circumscribe. For the thing circumscribed coexists with that which circumscribes it, as well as that which circumscribes it, coexists with that which is circumscribed by it.

As for your Mathematicall conceyts of center and circumference, I have already discovered in their places the vanity of them. To say that eternity is more then commensurable to time, is to graunt that it is commensurable thereunto, which is very absurde. And how is it possible, that should be commensurable to a thing mensurable, which indeed is immensurable as being without beginning and without end. You say it is in all durations; not as contained in them (I hope) if as containing them, this also is untrue. For like as it is not Gods eternity whereby he made the World but by his power, so it is not by his eternity that he maintayneth the duration of it but by his power. What noone tide is we know and acknowledge to be some thing, but as for fluent instants we knowe none. For fluent is as much as succedent, and succession is not but in respect of parts, and an instant hath no parts. Yet if we give way to such imaginations, like as *fluxus puncti in Longitudinem* is not containd in the line, but is the line; so *fluxus instantis* is not containd in a set time, but is the very set time it selfe. Nor is it a part of it as noone-tide is of the day; And a most absurd thing it is to make the duration of the creature in respect of Gods eternitie, to resemble the proportion that is betweene the part of time and the whole time, you may say as well the World is contained in Gods immensitie, like as halfe the yard is containd in the whole yard. Your last position is more sober in all the parts of it then the rest; the proportion of the least beame of light, to the light of the World may be expressed; the proportion of things that are, to the things that God is able to produce cannot, the first is finite, this is infinite. Yet by your leave, there is no greater disproportion betweene Gods wisdom manifested and manifestable,

manifestable, then betweene his power manifested and manifestable. In a word, God hath so farre manifested his power and wisdom, that wee plainly discern both of them to be infinite; and doe you thinke God can so manifest either of them, or both of them, that we may discern them to be more then infinite? And if his wisdom manifestable doth but so farre exceed his wisdom manifested, as his power manifestable doth exceed that which is already manifested, &c. what meant you to say that *Least of all may his infinite wisdom be comprehended within those effects produced.* For if there be but a parity of proportion, then no disproportion. You proceed to amplify the wisdom of God above all that can be gathered by this Vniverse, after your manner.

But I pray consider, was it possible for God to take a more wise and convenient course for the salvation of the world then he hath done? I am sure Austin flatly denyes it, *Aug. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap. 10. Ostendamus non alium modum possibilem Deo defuisse cuius potestate cuncta equaliter subjacent, sed sanande nostra miseria convenientiorem modum alium non fuisse, nec esse oportuisse.* I am apt enough to conceive, that God could have made and governed the world after another manner then hee hath done, and that after as wise a manner as hee hath done, but I dare not say that hee could doe it after a wiser manner then he hath done. Many other particulars might be instanced in, that might stagger the course of your amplifications, which yet sometimes are wondrous vulgar, as when you say, *God knowes what might have beene and what may be, as perfectly as he knowes the things that are.* Which is as much as to say, God knoweth as well what he can do, as what he doth. Now is this strange in a silly man to know what hee doth, or what he can doe? And it were a vaine exception to say that God knowes as well things done by others as by himselfe; seeing not onely their power of doing is from God, but the very doing it selfe is by you acknowledged to be by the concurrence of God. As for the manner of Gods concurrence, if you conceit it to be upon supposition of Gods foresight of mans endeavour first, you doe not well to propose your errours or

any other Iesuiticall paradoxes for principles and grounds to build upon.

7. The incomprehensible wisdom of God doth appeare more you say, *in the harmony or mixture of necessity and contingency.* And this you say is most *conspicuous in moderating the free thoughts of men or Angels, and ordering them to the certaine accomplishment of his glory.* In the fourth Section you told us that the parts of wisdom were two; the one in intending the right end, the other in ordering right meanes. So then the prescription of right meanes is a part of wisdom, but why it should affect the mixture of necessity with contingency in accomplishing the end intended I see no reason. Nay rather I finde that wisdom alwaies affecteth the most certaine meanes that can bee had for the compassing of the end intended. As for example, all manuell Arts doe expresse their wisdom by meanes used by them which are altogether of necessary operation. In the art of physicke also the meanes used by physitians as all sorts of medicines doe all worke by necessity of nature. In the Art of Oratory, the end is wholly conjecturall, and the meanes they use being arguments of perswasion, there no necessity at all hath place. No where doe I finde that any wisdom affecteth the mixture of necessity with contingency, as you speake. Come we to the consideration of the wisdom of God. How is Gods wisdom scene in the contexture of a mans body, and every part thereof? *Who knoweth the breeding of young bones?* saith Solomon. *I am fearfully and wonderfully made,* saith David. Galen in consideration of the body of man anatomized, was driven to acknowledge the Divine providence. Now what mixture of necessity with contingency did God affect in this? The fashioning of the body in the wombe being meerly an operation of nature, not of any free agent. Yet even this necessary operation of nature is contingent I confesse unto God; for as much as he could either suspend the course of nature, or alter it, or set an end unto it. So on the contrary the most free actions of men doe of necessity come to passe in their kinde and after their manner, as well as workes of nature in their kinde

kinde and after their manner. For to abstaine from the breacking of Christs bones was a free action of the Souldiers; so was Iosiahs action in burning the Priests bones upon the Altar; so was Cyrus his action in restoring the Iewes unto their country; so was the crucifying of Christ Iesus, and other foule actions committed against him by Iewes and Gentiles, yet were all these decreed and determined by God, as the Scriptures plainly testifie; and therefore as your selfe acknowledge, of necessity they come to passe. Yet how God doth moderate the thoughts of men and Angels, you are not over hasty to communicate unto us. Solomon speakes plainly when he saith, *The hearts of the Kings are in the hands of God, and he turneth them, &c.* and both the preparations of the heart, and answer of the tongue are from the Lord: and that many seeke the face of the Ruler, but every mans judgement commeth of the Lord. But in what sense you say God moderates mens thoughts, and ordaines them for the accomplishment of his glory, you doe not love to discover: and I doubt all this will desinere in piscene, in the end, and come to nothing. But although the means which man may use may be successively infinite, yet the ends (you say) which God doth forecast in their creation shall by any course which they take be inevitably brought to passe; what these ends are which God did forecast in their creation, you come very soberly to expresse, or rather leave to the Reader to collect out of these wordes, *the award of every thought is determined by Gods eternall decree*, that is to bring you to playne termes either *Salvation* or *Damnation*. These then are the wayes whereby they shall accomplish Gods glory in the end, what course soever they take; And herein consists the infinite wisdom of God.

PROV. 21.1  
PROV. 16.1  
PROV. 29.  
26.

Now let us examine the sobriety of all this. First you told us of courses infinite, by which notwithstanding all theyre varieties and inconstancies, Gods ends should be accomplished. Now all these courses in reference unto the issue of damnation or salvation whereby Gods glory shall be illustrated, (wherof you speake as of the end that shall be accomplished.) I say al these courses in reference hereunto are but two: good, and

and bad answerably to Hercules his bivium, and Pythagoras his Y; according to that of Esay. *Say yee surely it shall be well with the just, for they shall eat the fruite of theyre workes; woe be to the wicked, it shall be evill with him, for the reward of his handes shall be given him.* Esa. 3. 10. 11.

Secondly, if this be all the fruite of Gods wisdome, wherein doth this exceede the wisdome of every Magistrate; who ordeynes rewards for the good and punishment, for the wicked? Agayne what need is there of moderatinge mens thoughts unto this end; whereas though he never moderates any mans thoughts, yet his wisdome shall appeare never a whitte the lesse in setting forth his glory in punishing the one and rewarding the other.

Consider yet farther what I pray you, was the end of Iudas, which God did forecast in his creation? No doubt the setting forth of his owne glory, but I desire to know whether he did intend to set it forth in Iudas his salvation, or damnation. So likewise I desire to know what end God did forecast of Paul the Apostle in his creation? his glory I doubt not, but whether in his salvation or damnation. It seemes by the genius of your Tenet, that God did neither intend the salvation of the one, nor the damnation of the other in their creation; but indifferently intended each of them should be saved or damned accordingly as they departed this life, either in impenitency or in repentance. Now if God did not intend the salvation of Paul, nor the condemnation of Iudas at the time of their creation. I pray when did he begin to intend it? Say what you will, it followeth that these intentions of God were not eternall, and consequently neither the decrees of God are eternall; yet commonly you professe of Gods decrees that they are eternall and everlasting. Yet here I confesse you may play fast and loose, and say they are eternall so farre forth as they are without end, but they are not eternall so farre forth as to bee without beginning. But what meane you so directly to contradict the word of God, as you doe if this be your opinion? For the Apostle professeth that mans election was made before the foundation of the world: yea  
and



and touching the wicked, King Solomon professeth, that *Pro. 16. 4.* God made him against the day of evill.

As for the similitude, you use to represent unto us the wisdom of God by comparing of him unto a bird catcher, though you father it upon Austine, yet in this case it is nothing worth. For though it be more then humane after many birds formerly caught to catch them all againe; yet for God it is nothing. who is everywhere, and in whom every thing hath that being, that life, that motion which they enjoy. The hayres of our head we know are numbred; and therefore nothing strange that our thoughts should bee, considering that our thoughts shall come into judgement, but our hairees shall not. And if wee shall give an account of every idle word, as *Mat. 12. 36* our Saviour hath professed unto us, why not as well of every idle thought? Hee shall make the counsels of the heart manifest, *1 Cor. 4. 5.* But that the award of every thought is defined by God, I cannot tell how to beleeve: my reason is, because evill thoughts are not fit to be rewarded; and as for the evill thoughts of Gods children, shall not they bee pardoned as well as their evill words and outward actions are, to wit, upon their repentance? For if wee acknowledge our sinnes, God is faithfull and just to forgive us our sinnes, *1 Ioh. 1. 9.* And Peter signified as much to Simon Magus conceiving evill thoughts also, when he said unto him, *Repent of this thy wickednesse, and pray unto God, that if it bee possible the thoughts of thine heart might be forgiven thee, Act. 8. 22.*

8. Free it was for you to have done something the last yeare, which you did not, and every minute thereof, in case every minute thereof you were waking. For that a man hath free will in his sleepe I never heard. But how thereby *the whole frame of your cogitations or actions might have beene altered,* is a myltery unto mee. Yet I doubt not but the whole frame of your cogitations and actions this yeare might have beene altered. For actions free and contingent could not justly bee accounted free and contingent, were they not accompanied with a possibility of being otherwise. And God you acknowledge to be the cause of *this alteration, and of every thought and*

*deed thus altered.* So then if there had beene another course of your thoughts and actions, God had beene the cause of it, and of every thought and deed. What thinke you of that course which hath beene of your thoughts and actions; is God the true and principall cause of this also, and of every thought and deed of yours this yeare? I see no reason to the contrary, but it stands you upou to justify this also, as well as the former; and as of your selfe, so as concerning the actions of all o her both men and Angels: and if for one yeare, why not for every yeare from the beginning unto this day? And so I see no colour of reason why you should not as freely acknowledge that all things are decreed by God; for if God hath decreed all the thoughts and actions of men, it will bee no hard matter to grant that God hath decreed all things that in their times and seasons doe successively come to passe. And if God be the true and principall cause of them, did hee not decree that he would be the true and principall cause of them? that is, that he would in due time indeed and principally produce them, notwithstanding all the evill that doth accompany them? For I doe not thinke that you take upon you so much perfection as to avouch that amongst all your thoughts and actions for a yeare together, there was no evill thought, no evill action among them. For if you stand upon it that God cannot be the true and principall cause of any evill thought or action, we must not yeeld unto you that God was the true and principall cause of all the thoughts and actions that were conceived in you, or derived from you that yeare or yeares wherein you were hatching this booke of yours, which I take to be a fardell of erroneous conceits both in Philosophy and Divinity.

Neither if you did maintaine that God is the true and principall cause of every free action, would wee object that then you make Gods will to depend on ours; for there is no colour for any such objection; there is colour for the contrary, as namely, if he be the principall cause, then his will doth not depend on mine, but rather mine on his: and consequently our liberty seemes to be infringed by making God the principall

clpall cause of all our actions. Yet you take no notice of this objection, (much lesse take paynes to answer it) but goe on desperately (in shewe and that against your owne tenet) to maintayne, that our will is necessarily subiect unto his. But whether you meane in producing thoughts & actions, (which alone is to the purpose) or in some other sense and respect you betray not.

Yet by the way what meane you to say that our will is contingently free; seeing this is as much as to say, it is possible that the will of man should not be free. But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps therby, we may perceyve to what issue of tolerable sence your present discourse may be brought. And the reason is this: *For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent possible, a correspondent consequent, which needes no other cause or meanes to produce it but only the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into act.* For what way soever (of many equally possible) mans will doth incline, Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it. I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours, namely, that *God is the true and principall cause of every action, and deede that hath passed from you this yeere, like as he had beene the cause (as you say) of every thought and action that might have passed from you, if the frame of your thoughts and actions had beene altered.*

The other assertion was that our will is necessarily subiect unto Gods will, which also is delivered in reference to the former assertion. I say I looked for an elucidation of these by this following sentence wherein you pretend to give a reason of the former. But this performes nothing lesse. If you had done something the last yeere which you did not as you might, then the whole frame of your thoughts and actions this yeere had beene altered, and God had beene the cause of this alteration and of every thought and action therein. And the reason is this, *For unto every cogitation possible God hath decreed, a determinate end.* But I pray you consider,

der, are the thoughts and actions of men this yeare the proportioned end of something that you did the last yeare? Or are they correspondent consequents to our antecedent actions the last yeare? Many man the last yeare was an opposite unto goodnes, he is reformed this yeare and become a proselyte. Is grace the proportionate end of the state of sinne? The last yeare many a man was a formall professour; this yeare it may be he is turned Papist, or Turke, is this a correspondent consequent to that antecedent? Yet many continue formall professours still, without any such alteration; some have changed theyr formalitie into realitie. It may be some man the last yeare hath satisfied anothers filthy lust, and this yeare is advanced by it.

Call you this a correspondent consequent destined by God? Some have prospered by imposterion of others and proceeded in their sinfull courses so much the more, without controll. In a word by the last Clause it appeares that by proportionate end, & correspondent consequents, you meane only the good and evill, that doe befall men according to their former workes, according to that *God will reward every man according to his workes.* But by your leave this hath no proportion to prove that God is the Authour of every thought and action of man this yeare, which you made to be consequent to some thing done the last yeare; and God to be the true and principall cause of every one of those thoughts, and actions. For what? Are mens thoughts and actions this yeare, the rewardes and punishments of the same mens actions the other yeare? What a ridiculous conceyte in this? Well; still we holde you engaged to maintayne, that, which you have plainly avouched, namely that *God is the true and principall cause of every action, and thought of man for a yeare together, yea and of every thought and action of yours for the yeare past;* which you have delivered without any explication. I have manifested the incongruity of your whole discourse, in generall. In particular consider further: you say that *mans will is necessarily subiect unto God;* this we understood in respect of operation in proportion to what you delivered in  
sentence

sentence before going; but you understand it in respecte of rewardes or punishments succeeding, proportionably unto former actions whether good, or bad. But by your leave it is not mans will, but his person rather that herin is necessarily subject unto God. For no wise man useth to say that mans will is rewarded or punished, but his person rather. Agayne, suppose God decreeth not the actions of men, but the rewards of them, yet you have not explicated how in this case Gods will depends not upon the will of man, the true explanation whereof that I know is only this; that the execution of his will may depend upon mans will to wit in rewarding, or punishing, but not the will of God himselve: Yet if good or evill actions of men be foreseene by God before he hath decreed either to reward or punish; neither have you offered to cleare Gods will in this case from dependance upon the will of man, neither are you able to performe it. Agayne it is false to say that God hath decreed a proportionate end to every cogitation possible. For many cogitations are possible which shall never be; And it is absurde to say God hath decreed an end to that which shall never bee. Agayne by this proportionate end and correspondent consequent, you understand rewardes, or punishments; But it is false to say that God hath ordayned to every cogitation a reward or punishment. For to the evill thoughts and words, and deeds of Gods children he hath ordayned neither reward nor punishment to befall them, but his purpose is to pardon them.

Agayne punishments for the sinnes of men are many times inflicted by the sinnes of men; So Sennacherib that blasphemmer of the God of Israel, was slayne by the sword of his owne children; Davids adultery was punished by the filthy actions of his owne Sonne Absolon deflouring his fathers Concubines.

If these were proportionate ends to former sinnes, and correspondent consequents, and everlastingly decreed by God, what hindereth but that in your opinion, actions notoriously sinnefull may be sayd to be decreed by God? You say *the producing of these consequents and proportionate ends, needs no*

Exam. præ-  
dest. Perk.  
p. 162.

other cause or meanes but only the reducing of possibilitie (granted by his decree) into acte: Which is plaine gibrish; you instance in nothing for illustration sake, not as if your discourse were so plaine that it needed it not, but rather it is so unsound, that you might well feare it: And darkenesse is fittest for them that hate the light: I will give instance for you; Absolons deflouring his fathers Concubines was a disproportionate end, and correspondent consequent to Davids defiling his neighbours wife; for God punished David hereby; and Arminius acknowledgeth that this fact of Absolon *Interiit castigando Davidi*: Now this fact of Absolon by your doctrine in this place, needed no other cause or meanes to produce it, but only the reducing of possibilitie (granted by Gods decree) into act. Now what possibility doe you meane? the possibility of Davids defiling Bethsheba? It is manifestly untrue: first in generall, that to produce a reward, and punishment, no cause is required but the producing of the fact, which is to bee rewarded or punished, Consequents naturall follow I confesse upon antecedents naturall, but it is not so with consequents morall, such as are rewards and punishments. And in particular the case is cleare, that something else was required to Absolons defiling Davids Concubines, then Davids defiling of Bethsheba. For both the counsell of Achitophel, and Absolons corruption in yeelding thereto, and the punishing hand of God herein, were found in this; and none of all these was found in Davids sinne.

Or doe you meane this of the possibility of Absolons sinning as he did? so that to the punishing of David no other thing was required but Absolons reducing his power of defiling his father Concubines into act. Now this I confesse is a truth, but such a truth as might make any wise man ashamed to accommodate himselfe to the grave profession of it, though he did not affect any singularity of conceit therein. For tis as much as to say, that to defile Davids Concubines no other thing was required then to defile them; for this is to reduce possibility granted (as you say) by Gods decree into act, and that is enough. But by your leave, it is not enough to salve your credit,

credit, to say that a possibility hereof was granted by Gods decree. For you have plainly professed that God hath decreed not *a possibility of a proportionate end, or correspondent consequent to every cogitation, but a proportionate end, and correspondent consequent.* And therefore if the defiling of Davids concubines by Absolon, was a proportionate end, or correspondent consequent to Davids former cogitations and actions, then by your doctrine this defiling of Davids concubines by Absolon his sonne, was everlastingly decreed by God, and not the possibility of it. And how absurd a thing it is to say, that God decreed the possibility of any thing, whereas all contingent things are possible in their owne nature without the decree of God, as the whole world was possible, and that not by the decree of God? But it seemes you have reference to the possibility, not of the punishment, but of the time, for which correspondent punishment is decreed, as appeares by that which followes: as when you say, *Did we that which we doe not, but might doe, many things would immediately follow, which now doe not:* which though it be granted you, yet here-hence it would not follow, that *No other cause should be requi-red to the producing of them, then our producing of the antecedent.* But by this you iustifie that upon Davids adultery, Absolon his defiling Davids concubines; and upon Sennacheribs blas-phemy against the God of Israel; Adramelech and Sharezar his sonnes slaying him with the sword in the Temple of Nis-roch his god, did inevitably follow. For these things did be-fall them, and those things which doe befall you and us doe come to passe, as you professe in the next place, though not as *absolutely decreed by God, and in the first place, yet because he de-creed them as the inevitable consequents of some things which hee knew he would doe.* By all which it cannot be avoided but that Absolon defiling his fathes concubines in speciall, and all the sinnes of man whereby God doth punish former sinnes in generall, are by this your opinion decreed by God as inevi-table consequents of some things which God knew would be done.

Now let us examine this a little further. You speake in-differently



differently of good and evill that doth befall men; And these indifferently you professe to be ordayned by God upon the foresight of some thing in man; So then like as the damnation of any man is ordayned by God not absolutely, and in the first place but upon the foresight of some evill thing in the person damned; so the saluation of any man is not decreed absolutely by God, and in the first place, but upon the foresight of some good in the person, saved or to be saved, which good must be cyther faith or good workes or both; or which is worst of all some thing which is lesse evill (as suppose naturall humilitie) in the state of nature. Yet you will not seeme to be an abetter of their opinion, that maintayne election to be upon the foresight of faith or workes.

Yet let me have one bout with you more in the point of reprobation also. God foreseeing some evill in man (say you) doth purpose to condemne him: Now because like as no evill can exist without Gods permission; so God could not foresee evill but upon presupposall of his purpose to permit it, it followeth that the decree to permit sinne, is before the decree of God to damne for sinne, therefore permission of sinne is in Gods intention before damnation, and consequently it must be after it, in execution, as much as to say; God doth first damne men for sinne, and afterwards permit them to sinne. Hereupon you will reſt. & upon us with an interrogatorie saying; Will you maintayne that God did first decree to damne men for sinne, and secondly to permit them to sinne? I answer; If I did maintayne this, I should looke to be confuted by reason, and not to be cried downe without reason, or contrarie to all reason. Nay I had rather maintayne an harsh opinion according unto reason, then a plausible opinion in contradiction unto manifest reason.

Secondly, I answer by negation; For I doe not maintayne either of these to be subordinate unto other in Gods intention, but rather coordinate; because neither of these things decreed is the end of the other, but both joyntly make up an integrall meanes tending to the manifestation of Gods glorie in the way of justice, according to that of Aquinas, who professeth

feffeth that reprobation includeth the will of God of permitting sinne, and of inferring damnation for sinne. Now let us proceed to that which followes. It is absurde to say we have a possibilitie to doe what we doe not; but rather you should say we have an abilitie to doe what we doe not. For possibilitie is of a passive signification, nor active: And abilitie to obey God, I confesse we had in Adam, and in Adam we have lost it. That which you call the *absolute necessitie of Gods decree*, is not in respect of Gods act in decreeing. For his decrees are most free, but in respect of the event ensuing upon supposition of Gods decree. So then things freely decreed upon this supposition must necessarily come to passe. *Both that which should and that which doth befall us floweth alike* (you say) *from the absolute necessitie of Gods decree*. Now because your present discourse is not of Gods power, but of his wisdom that you might not seeme beside the text, you tell us in the close, that herein is scene Gods *incomprehensible wisdom*, that nothing falls out without the circumference of it; whereas that all things fall out as God hath decreed, it is rather the fruit of his power then his wisdom. And if you referre it to Gods knowledge, yet it is no parte of Gods wisdom. For what wisdom is it to know what he hath decreed, or what he meaneth to bring to passe, whereas any man though simple may know what himselfe meaneth to doe? But to know what is fitt to be done for the setting forth of his owne glorie, and to directe all things most conveniently hereunto, herin consists the wisdom of God. You content not your selfe with ascribing, a Circumference unto Gods wisdom, within which all things fall out, but you call it *actuell*, also as if there were two sortes of circumferences, the one potentia, the other actuell.

9. It seemes you doe not please your selfe so well in this Argument of *Gods infinite wisdom*, as in the former; neither is it your happines to light upon such quaint straines of invention, and expresseion here, as in the point of Gods immensitie, and eternitie: It may be the matter will not afforde it; For if it did, why should not you that seeke after it, be acquainted with

it as soone as another? Therefore, I guesse, it is that you break forth into such a profession: the *Christian writers are more able and apt both to conceive right, and to speake more consequently to what they rightly conceive concerning other branches of divine absolute infinitenesse, then concerning his infinite knowledge.* And because you are bold by a confident supposition to put this out of question, (whereas yet I know no reason, save that you finde no place in this argument for such Chimæricall fictions as you vented in other points, especially in the point of Gods immensitie and eternitie) you take upon you to give certaine reasons hereof. Now because to my understanding Gods immensitie and eternitie are farre more obscure to treat of then Gods wisdom, I am very willing to weigh well the weight of these your reasons. They are in number two. The first is this: *All creatures are participant of Gods other attributes besides his wisdom and knowledge; but of his knowledge and wisdom men and Angels are of all his creatures the onely participants: and those rules are alwaies the most cleare and certaine, and most easily gathered, which are gathered from an uniform identitie of particulars in variety of subjects: Those universall rules are hardly gathered, or are lesse certaine, which can be experienced onely in some one or fewer subjects.* In this argument there is little or nothng found. For (as touching the maine) though creatures inferiour unto man doe not worke by wisdom and knowledge of their owne, yet the wisdom of God appears no lesse in their workes then in the workes of man, even to the admiration of man himselfe.

What art, what industry is found in the little Bee in the gathering of his waxe, in the fashioning of his combes, in the gathering of honey of divers sorts, every one following and plying his proper and peculiar flowre, and afterwards tempering it, the liquid stuffe brought in their bottles, with the grosser stuffe brought upon their thighes, and bringing it to that perfection which wee see and use both for dainty food, and wholesome physicke: then their government under one King as the Ancients conceived, but indeed under one Queen rather, as later writers even of these dayes have elegantly observed,

served, and the exquisite manner of a common wealth among them. Is not the wisdom of God observable in this? And as it was said of such as suddenly became Prophets, *But who is their father?* so may we aske concerning these, *Who is their father, or who their Schoolemaster* that instructed them, and bred them up in this occupation? I say the wisdom of God doth appeare more in these then in the actions of men. For wee know by what meanes men usually attaine to wisdom, as namely, by instruction and by observation, but no such thing to be found in Bees; therefore this wonderfull worke being a worke of nature, must necessarily be ascribed to the God of nature. But suppose the wisdom of God were to be observed no where but in the actions of men, is not the world of men sufficient to afford particulars sufficient for induction thereupon to conclude generall rules?

1 Sam. 10.  
12.

The wisdom of Arts and liberall professions are growne now adayes to great perfection, and all these what are they but the searching out, and by searching the discoverie of the wisdom of God, even in those creatures which are not participants of the wisdom and knowledge of God?

The science of Astronomy, how hath it displayed unto the world the wisdom of God in the various motions of the heavens? and still they are searching, as having not yet attained to the full discovery thereof. So likewise the naturall Philosopher in searching out the nature of the whole world; what is this but an inquirie after the wisdom of God in the whole and parts of this Universe? and albeit still there is enough to be discovered, yet that which is discovered, is it not sufficient to draw us to adore the wisdom of God, and that so much the more, because that though God hath set the World in mans heart, yet can hee not finde out the Workes that hee hath wrought from the beginning to the end?

The Physician, what divine wisdom doth he finde in the contexture of the body of man? Was not Galen hereupon driven to acknowledge a divine providence? Then in searching after the nature of Herbes and other simples, and considering the power and virtuous operation of them, both of

each apart, and of severals together in composition fitting for the cure of every malady and disease of the body of man: what report can they make unto us of the wisdom of God even in those things which are not participants of the wisdom and knowledge of God? But come wee to Arts manuell, of mans invention, and wherein indeed wee are more apt to derogate from God, then to give him the glory of them; yet both from the wisdom of man wee may the better ascend to the contemplation of the wisdom of God, and also the wisdom of man is from God, who as we are taught instructeth all, as well the meane husbandman, Esay 28. 26. as the most curious artificer, Exod. 31. In the Turkish History I read of a present sent to the Grand Signiour Achmat that Turkish Emperour; all the particulars (save three Birds of Paradise of rare and precious plumes, wonderfull goodly to behold, and valued at 800. pound sterling,) were handicrafts worke, as namely, two vessels of Cristall, wonderfull rich and beautifull: foure other vessels made of fishes bones, whereas the art seemed miraculous in the graving: forty peeces of cloth of golde of diverse colours; five peeces of silke; five of Damaske; five of silke watered and five plaine; A staffe of an Elephants tooth graven with admirable industry; A Parret set in a cage of Cristall so artificially done as no man could discern the entrie; And many faire and rich table clothes of Holland cloth most parte poudred with flowers to the life, and wrought in their lively colours. The which (it is sayd) the Sultan did accepte with admiration. The Author addes in the close: All these things shew sufficiently that the Estates from the beginning, or loone after have rayfed handy workes as well as trafique and navigation to the highest point of perfection. This calls to my remembrance the rich presents, which the same Estates presented the Lady Elisabeth in her entertainment at the Hage, in her way out of England, unto the Palatinate being most of curious handicraft. First a Carcanet enriched with 36. Diamonds all of facet stones. 2. Two great hanging pearles weighing 35. Carals, and one grayne. 3. A chaine of pearles of 52. pee-

ces, orientall water. 4. A golde needle enriched with a great Diamand, in forme of a table, having 4. Diamants round about, wherof the three out hanging were facet stones. All this layd in a little trunke of cloth of golde, betwixt a perfumed cushion. 5. A great looking glasse inclosed in a silver quilted brimme enriched with faire inlaid workes. 6. Ten peeces of Tapestry of Francis Spierick, wherof two peeces were to be sent after unto her highnes. 7. Six peeces more-over of Tapistry for a Cabinet of the same Master, wherof two were to be sent after to her highnes. 8. Diverse sorts of linnen Damas workes packed up in cases, rated numero. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. according to the workes layd in every case. 9. Workes of Spanish waxe made according to the fashion of the East-Indies, wherof were diverse particulars. 1. A cover of a bed standing on 4. pillars not playne but round. 2. A Cupboorde. 3. A Table. 4. Two great trunks, 5. A middle trunke. 6. Five little trunks. 7. Two casket standishes. 8. Foure and twenty middle dishes. 9. Nine and twentie little dishes. 10. Twelve fruit dishes. 11. Six Saucers. But come we from the wisdom of Manuall artes, to wisdom morall and politicall. David was wise as an Angell of God. 2. Sam. 14. 17. Yet he feared the wisdom of Achitophell, whose counsell was accounted as an Oracle of God in those dayes. 2. Sam. 16. 23. And David prayed unto God to turne his counsell into foolishnes, and the Lord heard him, and shewed his wonderfull wisdom in making that counsell of Achitophell, (which had soone dispatched David if it had binne followed) seeme foolishnes in the judgement of Absolon, by the meanes of Hushai sent only to crosse Achitophel. Yet Solomon was wiser then they both, and it was God that gave him a large heart, like unto the sand of the Sea shore; So that his wisdom excelled all the wisdom of the children of the East, and all the wisdom of Egypt. Wise heades there were, many it seemes in those dayes both in Egypt, and in the East, yet Salomon was wiser then they all; And the Queene of the South came from the uttermost part of the earth to heare the wisdom of King Salomon. Since there have binne

men famous in this kinde, that have boasted.

*Consilijis nostris laus est attonsa Laconum.*

Tiberius his governments had it binne matched with as much honestie as wisdome it had binne admirable. It was wonte to be sayd that the French got more upon us by parle then by the sword: Yet Henrie the I V, of France was wonte to say, he feared but two men in the World, and that was for their wits; the one was (as he called him) the fox of the mountaynes; the other was the lacke an apes of the Iles. Yet some say the Spaniards herein outreach the French, and the Italian the Spaniards. And that of all the Italians the Florentines have beene most cunning; and of all the Florentines the house de Med ces. And indeed Laurentius de Medices was accounted the chiefest ballancer of States in his time, if *Newes from Parnassus* speake true. But the world of men (as you complaine) are not sufficient to give presidents of wisdome fit to raise us to the contemplation of the infinite wisdome of God. Yet if you were acquainted with all the wisdome of the world, you might finde matter enough of admiration thereat, and of adoration of the wisdome of God, that goeth infinitely beyond it.

But whereas you say that all creatures are participants of Gods other attributes, in as much as they have some being, some power, some duration, some quantity; and therefore the knowledge of them conferres something to the knowledge of those attributes of God. Neither the antecedent is true, nor the consequent sound. For what doth the quantity of a gnat confer to the knowledge of Gods immensity? or what doth the duration of creatures that live but a day or a yeare conferre to the knowledge of Gods eternity? or the being of a flea, to the discerning of the power of God? Again, the antecedent is likewise false. No creature that hath quantity is partaker of Gods immensity. For the quantity of a creature is *quantitas ymaginis*, quantity of extension; but Gods quantity is *quantitas virtutis*, quantity of spirituall and immateriall perfection, and it is impossible



possible that one should be a part of the other : nay Gods immensity hath no parts, so neither hath his eternity, nor his almighty power, and therefore no creature can partake of any of these. It is true, God produceth the being, and maintaineth the duration of all things, but it is not by his essence he produceth their being, nor by his eternity he maintaineth their duration, but all is done by the power and counsell of his will.

We come to your second reason ; *Why wee cannot conceive and speake so right concerning Gods knowledge, as concerning other attributes, and that is, say you, because we want fit termes to expresse it.* But how doe you prove that we have more fit termes to expresse Gods other attributes then this? you doe not once goe about to prove this ; the instance you give is in the *prescience of God*, concerning which Gregory makes a question how it can bee attributed unto God ; seeing nothing but future things are said to be foreknowne, and unto God nothing is future, but all things present. And for the same reason Augustine (you say) would have Gods knowledge of things to come to be termed rather science then prescience, *seeing all things are present unto God.* Now if this change of termes will serve the turne to avoid incongruity concerning the right apprehension of Gods knowledge, what cause is there to complaine of the unfitnessse of termes, when as with so little adoe the unfitnessse we speake of, may be corrected ? It is like enough upon such conceits as these, some have entertained an opinion that *all things are actually existent in eternity, not onely things present, but things past also still are, and things future already are existent in eternity :* and you your selfe also have already manifested your approbation of this Tenet in the Chapter of eternity : The more I wonder to reade you except against this doctrine of Gregories and Austines, as neither cleare, nor accurate enough : And here first you tell us that we may not say, *nor did Saint Augustine, or Saint Gregory thinke that God doth not, or cannot know a distinction between times past, present, or to come.* Neither indeed doe I see any colour why any man should entertaine a conceit of any such meaning of Augustine or Gregory;

ne ther

neither doe they denie that God knowes all these things and consequently the differences of them, one from another; Only Gregorie makes a doubt how the knowledge of future things in God should be called prescience. And Austine (as you say) had rather call it Science. But then you demande *how it is sayd by Gregorie that nothing to him is future, nothing past.* Your selfe have heretofore layd downe that which may answer this; as when you sayd all things are coexistent in eternitie, but not in time: And therefore God may know things to be so differenced in respect of such a course of eternitie. In a word, that God knowes the things that are past, present and to come, so called in respect of man who is measured with time, but not so called in respect of God who is measured with eternitie. But though they are altogether present unto God, yet it followes not herence that they are all one (as you inferre) much lesse that *they are so in respect of Gods eternall knowledge*, as if Gods knowledge did make them one, which in themselves and in their owne natures are not. As God himselfe, so his knowledg is before all worlds, as worlds doe exist in time. But you may remember what you have formerly maintayned, that both all worlds which have an existence successively in time, and time it selfe is actually existent in eternitie, and so not only present in respect of Gods knowledge of them which ever was, but also in respect of their owne existence (as you have accompted it) in eternitie, which Aquinas makes the ground of Gods knowledge of them. Then you dispute, and prove that foreknowledge is to be attributed unto God; because he foiknowes them before they are, which is as much as to say, while they are yet to come. To this I answer out of your owne doctrine thus; Allbeit Gods knowledge be before them, yet if the same also be to come, and that as much after them as before them, what reason, why it should be called foreknowledge, rather then *together knowledge, or after knowledge.*

But what knowledge soever we attribute to God, it can no more be sayd to be past, than to come according to your doctrine pag. 77. your wordes are these. *Whatsoever can be*

*more*

more properly sayd or conceived to be past than to be yet to come, or to be in every moment of time designable, can have no properties of eternitie. And in very truth Gods knowledge is not altered, but one and the same knowledge it is which God hath of things without him, before they were, when they are, and after they were. In the things themselves an alteration is found, but not in Gods knowledge of them: And therefore the knowing of all things that are, were, and are to come is commonly called *Scientia visionis*, in distinction from *Scientia simplicis Intelligentie*, whereby God knowes all necessary truths, and all things possible.

Your conclusion is, that God foreknowes, and Man foreknowes but with a difference, such as, you say, is oftentimes not well expressed by Teachers, nor duely considered by Readers; the identitie of the word whereby we expresse both Gods foreknowledge, and mans foreknowledge making us apt to confound the different meaning of them. Which confusion of things arising from communion of the same terme, you say is a fertile nursery of many errors in this Argument. And is it not, I pray, as well in other Arguments as in this? But I beare with you, for if you had professed so much, you had utterly broken the necke of your second Argument. Yet we are like to be beholding to you in good time. For the displanting of these errors. For you promise to endeavour this, and therein to imitate Heralds, who give the same Coate to diverse parties, but alwayes with a difference.

Thus we have gained a flourish of allusion unto the practise of Heralds, and with this Kickshewes we must be merry till more substantiall provision commeth. As for my opinion, I acknowledge no existence of things in eternitie, nor coexistence with eternitie untill the time of their actual production commeth. And so accordingly their coexistence with eternitie first was to come, then is, afterwards is past, and ceaseth to be; and so accordinglie foreknowledge, cknowledge, and after-knowledge of the same things may be attributed to God, all which are externall denominatives attributed unto the knowledge of God, from the various condition

Iam. 8.

of things knowne by him ; who lookes not out of himselfe for the knowing of any thing. For how could he, before any thing was ? yet then he knew all things that were to come, as well as now he doth, yet without any change : *For with him is no variablenesse, nor shadow of change.*

10. Here you enter upon the explication of the difference betweene mans knowledge and Gods. *Our knowledge (say you) of things to come is many wayes imperfect (and foreknowledge onely) because the duration neither of our knowledge, nor of our selves as yet can reach unto that point of time wherein things so knowne get first existence.* No soundnesse of truth in all this.

For first our foreknowledge of things to come, is not foreknowledge onely, save so long as the things themselves are to come ; but when they come, wee know them never a whit the lesse, and after they are gone and past. As the Eclipse of the Sunne and Moone is knowne by us before it comes, when it comes, and after it is past. It is true, before they come, the knowledge of things is onely foreknowledge, and not in man onely, but God also. When they doe coexist with God, then Gods knowledge is no longer foreknowledge, but till they doe coexist with God, his knowledge of them is foreknowledge of them, as well as ours. For it is before them, and onely before them ; for it is neither with them, nor after them. Not with them, for then they should coexist with God, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue. For if they did coexist with God, then they did exist, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue. Much lesse is it after them. For if so, then their coexistence with God were past, but we suppose it to be to come. And impossible it is that the same things should at once bee both past, and also to come. And as for the duration of our knowledge, whereas you say it doth not reach to the things that are to come ; I say neither doth the duration of Gods knowledge reach thither. For if the duration of Gods knowledge did reach unto things to come, then Gods knowledge should in this present coexist with things to come, which is untrue. For if Gods knowledge did coexist with things to come, at this present, then  
things

things to come at this present should coexist with the knowledge of God, and consequently they should exist, that is, they should be present, and not to come. It is no way required to knowledge to coexist with things knowne. In like sort neither doth Gods duration at this present reach unto things to come any more the ours. For if God did at this present coexist with things to come, then at this present things to come should coexist with God; for coexistence includes existence on both sides. But things to come doe not at this present coexist with God, for if they did coexist, then they should exist, and consequently they should be said to be present, and not to come. And in a word, to maintaine that God coexists with all things to come, is to maintaine by just consequence, that the world did exist from all eternity. It is true, God shall coexist with things to come, because his yeares cannot faile, they endure for ever: but our yeares and dayes are as swift as a post, in compariton. But this makes no difference in the point of foreknowledge. But with such like wilde conceits of yours as touching Gods eternity, we are now reasonably well acquainted, they doe so much the lesse move us, or trouble us. We have continuance of being for a time, God hath continuance of being for ever. God hath the continuance of his being from none, wee have the continuance of our being from God. But as God by continuing doth not get continuance of being, so neither doe we. Onely we have it so, as that God couldse t an end to it every day and houre; but it is impossible any end should bee set to the continuance of Gods being, because he is of necessary being. But this is it that deceiveth you; wee get many things by continuance, as growth and strength of body, encrease of knowledge, and grace, and this maketh you affirme that we get continuance. Whereas indeed we get not continuance, but wee get something else by continuing. Yet wee may continue the same that we were; sure I am we shall so continue in the world to come.

Sometimes againe we lose by continuance both health and strength, and memory, and so grow towards our graves; and this

this is Alteration, so that we are still in motion. But God getts nothing by continuance, for there is no motion, no change in God. And where motion and change is not, there time is not, but either *Ævum* or Eternitie. It is true, contingent things are not foreknowne by us; and herein is a great difference betweene Gods foreknowledge and ours. But this is a materiall difference only, but now we dispute of the forme of foreknowledge, wherof hitherto you have shewed no sound difference. No question but God precisely knowes future contingents, we doe not; And it is as true, that this is just nothing to the present purpose. Yet now you are fallen upon it, we must give due regard to your carriage in this. Of the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents questions, have beene ventilated amongst Schoole-divines for many hundred yeeres continuance.

The most flourishing opinion at this day, and wherein the Sects in other points very opposite of Scotists and Thomists doe agree, is, that God foreknowes them by seeing the determination of his owne will, touching their coming to passe; this you invade both elswhere and here; how well and scholastically you have carryed your self herein hertofore we have considered; now what else you have to vet against this tenent, we are ready to entertaine as it shall deserve.

But in the first place you fall upon it to my judgement very indecently, as when you say: *If we shall mould the manner of Gods foreknowlede of things future in our owne conceit or foreknowledge of them, we shall erroneously collect, that seeing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents so neither could they be infallibly foreknowne by God, if to him or in respect of his decree they were contingent, and not necessarily predetermined.* For first the question only was, whether foreknowledge might be properly attributed unto God in respect of things to come. Now I see no reason but it may, as well as it is attributed unto man; which question is only about the formall denomination of it, not at all as touching the extent of Gods foreknowledge in comparifon unto mans foreknowledge, or in respect of the ground of it.

Secondly,

Secondly, the comparison made by you hath no congruity in the members of it. For the first member is proposed absolutely, the second conditionally; whereas in reason, either both should be proposed absolutely thus. *Seeing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents, so neither could they be infallibly foreseen by God*: which is so absurd an Argument, that any sober man might be ashamed to obtrude upon any adversary.

Ψευδοίμεν αὖτις· ἂν περὶ τοῦ ἀκέραιου.

If I would feine, I would feine things probable at the least. Or both should runne conditionally, thus: *Seeing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents, if in respect of our decree they be contingents, and not necessarily determined, so neither can they be infallibly foreknowne by God, if to him, or in respect of his decree they were contingents, and not necessarily predetermined.* Yet if the comparison had runne thus, it had bin incongruous inough; For Mans foreknowledge is not usually accounted in respect of things determinable by his will, Sometime it may be, as I remember Erastus observes that Bel-lantius Senensis prophcyed of Savanarola his death, but it was after notice was taken of him at Rome, as of an Heretique. So likewise I have read that the fruites of the Gunpowder Treason was prophcyed of in a certeine Liturgy, then of purpose prescribed for the use of Papists, but it was after those English bou-te-feux were knowne to have been engaged in that conspiracy.

But usually mans foreknowledge of things to come is accounted in respect of things naturall, and such as are out of the power of the determination of his owne will. And as for such things as are subject to his will, it is an undoubted truth, that he cannot infallibly foreknowe such things upon the knowledge of his purpose to produce them; and that for two reasons. First, because his will is mutable from within. Secondly, because his power is resistible from without. But give we you leave to proccede.



In the next place you tell us, *That some push our pronenesse to this error forward, by another, not distinguishing betweene contingency and uncertainty; who argue thus, That which is in it selfe uncertaine, cannot certainly be knowne. Every future contingent is in it selfe uncertaine, Ergo it is not possible that a future contingent should certainly be knowne.* Thus another Hare is started by the way, which hindreth the pursuing of our first game, where we might have experience of your performance in opposing the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents, layd in the determination of his will, whereof God cannot be ignorant. And first you addresse your selfe to the removing of this new rub, by a distinction of a twofold uncertainty, one formally relative, another onely denominative or fundamentall. And, as if these termes needed no explication, you proceed to a resolution thus; *That which is relatively uncertaine, cannot be certainly knowne, for so it should be certaine to him, to whom it is uncertaine: But a future contingent, as it is contingent, doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty, although it usually be in part the foundation or cofounder of it.* By relative uncertainty you understand uncertainty in relation to knowledge, in which sense to be uncertaine, is to be such as whereof there cannot be certaine knowledge. In which sense if the proposition proceeded, it were very idle, and indenticall, as if it were exprest thus; *That which cannot certainly be known, cannot certainly be knowne:* And they undoubtedly are very prone to errour, that suffer themselves to be pushed forwards thereinto by such arguments as these, and thus interpreted. But we were wont to distinguish of *Certitudo scientia, & certitudo rei scite, or scibilis*; and you intimate such a distinction. For the relative uncertainty you speake of is the uncertainty of the knowledge, and the fundamentall uncertainty is the uncertainty of the thing it selfe, and indeed the foundation of the uncertainty of knowledge. Now the argument proceeds manifestly from the one to the other, and the *Medius terminus* manifests its owne meaning to bee of fundamentall uncertainty, whence it doth infer uncertainty of knowledge, for it proceeds thus: *That which is uncertaine in it selfe cannot*  
*bee*

*be certainly knowne.* Now that which is uncertaine in it selfe, is not relatively uncertaine, but rather absolutely. For whereas the most certaine thing that is may be relatively uncertaine, that is uncertaine unto some, yet this shall never be called uncertaine in it selfe.

So then the syllogisme corruptly interpreted by you, and the truth of it oblcured by a preposterous distinction, take it in its proper vigour and force, is thus; *That which in it selfe hath no foundation of certainty, cannot bee certainly knowne.* But every future contingent hath in it selfe no foundation of certaintie: therefore it cannot certainly be knowne. Therefore if you will answer aright, shew what foundation of certainty is found in future contingents, if you please to deny the Minor; or if you please to deny the Major, professe your minde plainly, and say, that *That which hath no foundation of certainty in it selfe, may nevertheless be certainly knowne*, which indeed is your course. For you professe plainly, that *future contingents cannot bee certainly knowne, of a finite and imperfect knowledge, but they may be knowne by an infinite knowledge*, such as is the knowledge of God.

And thus you might have answered the former syllogisme plainly, without the helpe of your former distinction, in this manner: *That, which is in it selfe uncertaine, cannot bee certainly knowne.* It is true in respect of a finite knowledge, such as is the knowledge of man; but it is not true in respect of knowledge infinite, such as is the knowledge of God. But whereas you put it indifferent to answer by way of distinction, either of knowledge finite and infinite, or of knowledge fallible and infallible; herein you are very wide. For a very absurd issue would be of this latter distinction, after this manner: *That which is uncertaine in it selfe, cannot be certainly knowne by knowledge fallible, but it may be certainly knowne by knowledge infallible*: which were as much as to say, It cannot bee certainly knowne by knowledge that may erre in knowing it, but it may bee certainly knowne by knowledge that cannot erre in knowing it. And yet it will not serve your turne neither; For, though Gods knowledge bee infallible, yet it will not follow that  
God

God knowes this infallibility; because, though he infallibly knowes whatsoever he knowes, yet perhaps this is a thing not knowable at all. for to know that such a thing certainly shall be, which in its owne nature is no more certaine to be than not to be, is not to know, but rather to erre: and so the argument still holds good, and no way answered by you, but boldly outfaced by a meere begging of that which is in question. Yet nothing possible shall be uncertaine unto God, for he knowes it to bee possible, and that most certainly. But with what colour can you inferre, that because it is possible to be, therefore God most certainly knowes that it shall be? For, consider, is it not as well possible, not to bee? and may not I by the same liberty of argumentation, which you usurpe unto your selfe, conclude, therefore God most certainly knowes that it shall not bee? In a word, things must bee to come, before they can be knowne to be to come. But seeing future contingents are in their own nature onely possible, and indifferent to be to come, or not to come; I pray consider by what activitie or operation, they have passed from the condition of things possible, to the condition of things future? for if they have not passed into this condition, they are not as yet knowable to be future; and no infallibility of knowledge can make the knowledge extend to the comprehending of such things as are not knowable. Possible they are, and are most certainly knowne of God that they are possible. But as yet future they are not, (unlesse by some alteration they have beene translated from the condition of things meere possible to the condition of things future, which it stands you upon to shew, if you maintaine it,) therefore as yet they are not knowable to be future.

That which you adde concerning the nature of Gods knowledge, as being without succession, is nothing to the purpose. For though our knowledge be subject to succession, yet this nothing hindreth us from foreknowing things to come, so they be knowable, whether by naturall reason, or by divine revelation. On the other side, though Gods knowledge be not capable of succession, yet things not knowable

he cannot knowe ; things impossible he cannot know to be possible, and things which are only possible, and not future he cannot know to be future. And such a manner of knowledge, is no knowledge indeed, but error rather.

And as for your termes of *interposed*, and *expiring acts*, and *interminable knowledge*; well they may serve to conjure your Reader from understanding you, but they have no force either of illustration, or probation of ought. In the close you acquaint us with a \* new mystery, as if Gods knowledge were like the suspending of a mans judgement, for as much as the act of knowledge in God doth not expire. A vile conceit and ridiculous, were it not concerning the nature of God. For what? because Gods knowledge and judgement doth not expire, but continueth without alteration, shall he therefore be sayd to suspend his judgement? Belike Daniel was cast into the Lyons denne not by judgement, but by suspension of judgement; For the Lawes of the Medes and Persians were unalterable.

\* See Rogers upon the Articles of the Church of England, the 17. Art.

So likewise the judgement, and counsaile, and purpose of God, concerning the salvation of his elect, because it continueth without expiration, therefore it is suspended. In the same proportion of pietie you say our ignorance resembles Gods knowledge best, as heretofore you professed, that *In respect of immensity and eternity; nothing was so like to God as nothing.* But it may be everlasting, and upon better consideration, *The imperfection of our knowledge or judgement while it is in suspense is rather ignorance, (you say) than Error.* And this imperfection taken away it shall better resemble divine knowledge, than our actual resolutions and determinations doe. But then, I pray, what is this that shall resemble the divine knowledge? is it our knowledge while it is in suspense? why, but if I am in suspense, how am I sayd to knowe? O, but you will have this imperfection taken away, but then I say, if the suspension be taken away, how shall it be in suspense, which you suppose? Agayne, how can suspension of judgement be taken away, but by resolution this way or that way? but this you deny to be that which resembles divine knowledge.

The truth is, the sentence is so perplex, that I can divide no issue out of it. Yet I have reason to conceive that your opinion is, that ignorance best resembles the knowledge of God. For the comparison is between resolution and the opposite therunto? and you plainly signifie that the opposite to resolution doth better resemble Gods knowledge, than resolution. Now what is opposite to resolution but suspension of judgement; and this suspension of judgement you plainly professe is to be called *ignorance, rather than error*. Wherefore ignorance consisting in suspension of judgement by your doctrine in this place, doth better resemble the wisdom of God, than our actuall resolutions and determinations doe; yet our actuall resolutions and determinations may be found both in knowledge naturall, and knowledge Theologicall, whereas ignorance or suspension of judgement is no knowledge at all. Onely whereas you positively affirme, that *Without the interposition of some determining or expiring acts there can be no error*, I understand that plainly to be a notorious untruth. For determining or expiring actes are no more required unto error, than unto truth.

And, *sa* man continue, as many doe, to their lives end in Popery, in Mahumetisme, in Heathenisme, their errors are never a whit the lesse.

It is true indeed that we can understand but one thing at once, and therefore the consideration of one thing must expire before we can passe to the consideration of another. This is the condition of Mans knowledge in generall, not of an erroneous apprehension in speciall.

11. What you discourse of knowledge conjecturall which man may have of things contingent, cannot have of things casuall, I leave it as I find it, I come to the cause why we cannot foreknow future contingents, and this you say is *because our essence, and knowledge are but finite; so that things contingent are not so continued in us, that if we could perfectly know our selves we might perfectly know them*; Thus you are content to dictate at pleasure, without affoording one mite of reason, for the establishing of your proselytes faith in this. As finite as our knowledge

knowledge is, we know contingents to be contingents. But to know that a thing meerly contingent which denomination includes only a possibilitie of comming to passe, or not comming to passe, I say to know that such a thing shall come to passe, exceeds the reach of knowledge infinite. For infinite knowledge doth extend no farther than to things knowable. But, for a contingent, which both in his owne nature, and from without doth yet continue indifferent to be or not to be, is not a thing, at all knowable, that it shall come to passe. For it must be a thing future, before it can be knowne to be future. But the contingents, you speake of, are supposed both in their owne nature to be only possible, that is indifferent to be or not be, and as yet determined by no outward agent to be. In which case they still continue under the condition of things meerly possible. And so farre they are knowable, and no farther. And accordingly so farre they are indeed knowne by God, by that knowledge which is commonly called *Scientia simplicis intelligentia*. But the knowledge of things future is called *Scientia visionis*. And things meerly possible, till some determination doth come unto them from without, are not as yet future, and consequently cannot be knowne, to be future, yet notwithstanding you are bold to say, that *In the dyvine essence, all reall effects, all events possible, whether necessary, casuall or contingent, are eminently contained; The perfect knowledge of his owne essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge, not only of all thinges, that have been, are, or shall bee, but of all things that might have beene, or possibly may bee.* A most ridiculous amplification? For it is as much, as to say, that God knowes not only all contingent truthes, but all necessary truthes also. As if it were a harder matter to know things necessary, than to know things contingent. Whereas it is in the power of the Creature to know things necessary, and perhaps all things that are of necessary truth; but to knowe those things whose existence is only of a contingent nature, that belongs only unto God.

Now what is possible, and what is not, we have a generall rule to know that, as namely, whatsoever implieth no contra-

diction is possible, that which doth imply contradiction is impossible. And were it a sober speech for a divine to affirm; that God not only knows all things that have been, are or shall be, but also he knowes what implies contradiction, & what doth not? you seeme to fumble here at the novel doctrine of the I. suites concerning Gods foreknowledge of future contingents conditionate; and you doe but fumble at it.

Secondly you say that in the divine essence all reall effects are contained eminently; Now hertofore you told us, that *For all things to be in God, is no more than that he alone can produce them.* (Ch. 4. num. 2. If this be your meaning in this place, as it seemes, when you say they are in him eminently, for so we say that heate is in the Sunne eminently, for as much as he doth produce heate in bodies capable; Then, I say, we deny not but all reall effects are in God.

But how doth this agree with your tenet, seeing herhence it followes that God can produce any act of Mans freewill, any casuall thinge, and if he can so doe, what hindereth but that he could from everlasting decree to produce them? Yet not alone as formerly you have interpreted what it is for things to be in God. For it is impossible that God should produce the act of mans will without man. For if without man, then it is not the act of mans will, which is an immanente act of the will.

Thirdly, it is false to say that the perfect knowledge of Gods essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge of all things that have beene, are, or shall bee. It includes I confesse the knowledge of all necessary truthes, and of all things possible; but as for the knowledge of contingent truthes, and of these to come, it includes not that; unlesse under the essence of God, you comprehend the will of God. And so to distinguish as to say that all necessary truthes God knoweth by necessity of nature, but all contingent truthes he knoweth by the determination of his owne will; which indeed is a truth, but flatt opposite to your opinion. But that things contingent cannot be knowne to be future, but upon the determination of Gods will, I prove thus. Things cannot



cannot be knowne to be future untill they are future ; ( for to apprehend or conceive things to be future, when they are not future, is not to know, but to erre,) but contingent things, and onely possible to be or not to be, doe not become future till the determination of Gods will hath made them future. Therefore contingent things cannot be knowne to be future but upon the determination of God will.

The minor I prove thus: Of their owne nature they are not future, but onely possible ; and they cannot passe from the condition of things meerly possible, to the condition of things future, without a cause from without. And no cause of this translation can be devised, but the will of God. Which I prove thus. If some other cause, then either without God, or within God ; not without God, for these things were future from everlasting ; but from everlasting there was no cause at all existent without God ; Therefore the cause hereof, if any where to be found, must be found within God. Wee say it is his will ; which if you deny, you must shew what else can be the cause: you commonly flee to Gods knowledge, and the infinity thereof, but in vaine, for already they are supposed to bee future before God knoweth them. And indeed it belongs to knowledge to know all things that are to come, not to make them to be to come.

Fourthly, it is possible that Antichrist shall fall in the year 1630, it is possible that he should fall the year before, it is possible he should fall the year after: it was possible he should have fallen ten yeares agoe ; it is possible hee should fall ten yeares hence: all these being reall effects possible, must by your doctrine be found eminently in the divine essence, and God knowing his divine essence, must know them all, and not onely that they are possible, but that they shall all come to passe: For in this sense you speake of Gods knowledge of future contingents, namely, of knowing that they shall come to passe, and when they shall come to passe.

Againe, set we the fall of Antichrist at an hundred different points of time, whereof let us suppose one to bee true, and the other false; yet all in their owne nature alike possible:

why should the fall of Antichrist in the true point of time be included in Gods essence more then the other, all being alike possible; and that very instante wherein the fall of Antichrist shall be, it being as possible that it should not be, and that possibility also being included in the essence of God, as well as any other? Perhaps you will say that this being a truth is included in the essence of God, and not the others, being untruths. But then I demand how this became to be a truth, that Antichrist should fall at such a time, rather then at another, it being as possible to fall out at any other time as at this, and as possible not to fall out at this time as at any other, and all these possibilities equally included in the essence of God I say againe, how came this to be a truth, answer mee, not of its owne nature, for the contrary hereunto is supposed on both sides, namely, that of his owne nature it was onely possible: therefore you must assigne some cause from without; and because you like not to acknowledg the determination of Gods will to be the cause hereof, you must alledge some other cause. I see you usually flye to the infinitie of Gods knowledge, but in vaine; for Gods knowledge is to know truths, and not to make them.

Lastly, by this doctrine of yours it will follow that God knew the world would be made, before ever God determined to make it, to wit, by vertue of his infinite knowledge. Now what a faire way this openeth unto Atheisme, let the wile and learned Reader judge indifferently. Heretofore I confesse you seemed to maintaine the existence of all things from everlasting in eternitie; which if it were true, then this might minister an apparent ground of Gods knowledge of all things, be they never so contingent, for as much as they are supposed to exist before him. But here you have assigned nothing for the ground hereof hitherunto, but onely the infinity of Gods knowledge. But in the next sentence I thinke you cast about for this also. As Balaam did many wayes to serve his turne in the course of his divinations; and all is fish that comes to your net; so it may serve your turne to oppose in this question, the determination of Gods will. Well, thus  
it is:

it is: For as Gods essence is present in every place as it were an ubiquitarie center, (for indeed if a body were infinite, everywhere might be imagined a center: and you doe much affect to compare the nature of God to impossibilities, and sometimes preferre him so farre, as to compare him to just nothing,) so is his eternity or infinite duration coexistent to every part of succession, and yet withall is round about. Hee it is that drives things future upon us, being from eternity as well beyond as on this side of them. Wee have bene acquainted with these absurd paradoxes of yours heretofore, so that now wee cease to admire them. But first we do deny the comparative coherence So, which hath force of an argument by way of comparison: but it hath no force here, because there is no proportion betwixt the things compared. Gods presence is in every place, no marvell, for all places doe exist together. And so if all times did exist together, God eternity should coexist with all times: But it is impossible that all times should exist together, because time consists in succession of parts: But as one time and the things therein shall exist after another, so God shall coexist with them. So then Gods presence is in every place, and Gods eternity coexists with every time, and that indivisibly: but with a great difference: for God all at once coexists with every place, but not all at once doth he coexist with every time, but successively; for as much as time doth not otherwise exist then successively. Nay the comparison is flat against you. For like as God not onely coexisteth at this present with every place that is existent, but shall coexist with a world tenne times as big, whensoever by the will of God such a world shall have existence, but for the present coexisteth onely with the places that are: In like sort God for the present coexisteth only with time present, and with all things in time present, but shall by vertue of eternity coexist also with all times to come, and all things therein tenne times longer then the world shall last, if so be that by the will of God the world should last ten times longer then it shall: but for the present he doth coexist onely with the time present, and the things contained therein.

Yet this ariseth not from any divisible succession in God, in whom as there is no shadow of change, so there can be no succession; but only from the divisible succession of things without God, both time and motion, & things subject thereunto, with all which God doth and still shall coexist in their courses of succession, without succession in himselfe; Like unto a Pole fixed in a river that coexisteth with severall parts of water succeeding one another it selfe being unmoveable. Now that God doth not coexist at once by vertue of his eternity with all parts of time and the things therein, I demonstrate thus. If God at this time present did coexist with all parts of time, then all parts of time should at this present coexist with God, both time past and time to come; And by the same reason, before ever the World was, you might say that the whole course of time did coexist with God, And if coexist, then surely it did exist; and so time had an eternall existence as well as Gods eternity it selfe. It is true some have conceited that eterni y doth *ambire tempus*, but only in this sence, that as it was before it, so it is after it; If they had sayd so it shall be after it, it were tolerable. For we be lieve the World shall have an end. But I never yet heard or read of any but your selfe that made eternity to be round about it, so to make way for your *circular duration*: For in this sence time shall not only have two ends but two sides also, or rather neither end nor side as if it were rounde as a tennis ball.

In the prosecution of the same wild phrase, you tell us that God, by vertue of his eternity, is as well beyond all things to come, as on this side of them. Belike as the Heavens are on either side of the earth, so eternity is on either side of time. And indeed if the parts of time were coexistent as the parts of heaven and earth are, it were to the purpose; but the succession of time in the parts thereof marres the play and discovers the wildnesse of this fiction. That which we call beyond in space of place applied to time is rather longe before then longe after; & the reason is, because to be beyond, doth suppose existence either being as in place, or having bene as in time. But as for things that are to come hereafter, they  
neither

neither have existence at this present, nor ever had. But let it be applied as you will, so you speake plainly, that so we may encounter men and not shadows. Say that God is after all things to come; I say this is false, and thus I prove it. To be after another is to suppose the existence of that other thing precedent. But things to come have not yet had hiers existence, therefore God cannot be sayd to be after them. It is true to say that God shall be after all things to come in this World, for as much as after they are come and gone, Gods existence shall continue.

It is true as you say, *Though God should create other creatures without the circumference of this World, they should be all within his presence.* In like sorte though the World should last ten times longer then God hath appointed it, yet should God by vertue of his eternitie coexist with it: Herein the comparison holds with good congruity. But like as Gods presence is not with a greater circumference till such a circumference doth actually exist; in like sorte Gods duration doth not coexist with any duration to come, untill it existeth. And in each case it is true that he gaines not any new existence, but only takes a denomination of coexistence with them; But not untill they doe exist; for till they exist they cannot be sayd to have any existence with him, which before they had not. And this your selfe make the ground of denomination of Gods coexistence with them. We doe not only acknowledge that things when they come to passe, doe fall within the Spheare of Gods actuall knowledge, but also before they come to passe, we say, they are knowne to God, and the precise time when every thing shall come to passe. I have already shewed the absurdity of that conceit of yours of environing succession. Now I say it is directly false to say that Gods knowledge is coexistent to every successive act. And the reason is not farre off but at hand. For if God or his knowledge were coexistent to every successive act the every successive act were also coexistent to Gods knowledge and to God himselfe; and if coexistent, then existent; and so both time past and time to come and all things in them should at this present be-existent.

And but erst your selfe professed that God takes the denomination of coexistence with his creatures upon their existence in him, which before they had not: which is manifestly contradictory to those wilde assertions which you have so often scattered, namely, that God is coexistent with every successive act, and with all times.

Likewise in the next sentence you acknowledge that the creature gets coexistence with eternity anew; therefore it had not alwaies coexistence with it, nor it with the creature: Gods knowledge is still the same, and therefore not so much as in this respect is there any motion or change in God; and consequently no succession, though the things that are known may succeed in their coexistence to one another, and consequently in their coexistence with God.

The Scripture without distinction professeth that God both is, and was, and is to come: which yet is not to signifie any priority or posteriority in him in respect of any things succeeding in him, but onely in respect of things succeeding without him. For as much as the things that are past did coexist with God at the time of their being, and things long before them also were not before God. In like sort things to come, whensoever they come shall finde God coexistent with them, and whensoever they vanish, shall leave Gods existence still continuing the same behinde them. It is true, Gods knowledge may bee said to containe our knowledge, in as much as he knowes all that we know, and much more: but it is absurd to say that his knowledge resembles ours; for there is no likenesse betweene them.

But whereas you touch by the way that things to come to us are onely to come, thereby you imply one of your well known paradoxes, that things to come are not onely to come unto God; the meaning is, that they are not onely to come to him, but present to him also. It is enough for you to dictate mysteries. By the same proportion of truth, things past, which are onely past to us, are not so onely to him, but unto him they are not onely past, but present also; this is good hobgoblin stuffe, whether you count it Philosophy or Divinity.

In

In the next place you tell us that *For us to apprehend a thing past as contingent, is not impossible.* About the coherence I will not question you; you take libertie to discourse at pleasure. In the very next page you say that it is in our power to make a thing necessary to morrow, which is truly contingent this day. As I take it, it proceeds in congruity to that Maxime, *Quicquid est quando est necesse est esse.* And therefore if once I doe that which is in my power to doe, when I once have done it, it is necessary, whereas before it was contingent. But here on the contrary you will have it not impossible to apprehend a thing as contingent after it is done and past, whereas this was wont to bee held impossible to God himselfe to make undone that which was already done. In a word it is held flat contradiction. For to be contingent is to be indifferent to be or not to be. But that which is, neither is nor possibly can be indifferent to be or not to be. Yet herehence it followeth not, that it came to passe necessarily there is no colour for any such inference. For what? doth nothing come to passe but necessarily? but whether it comes to passe necessarily or contingently, being once come to passe the contingency of it is at an end, and past irrecoverably. For it is no longer indifferent to be or not to be. And your caution is very idle that you put in, *lest upon the passing of a contingent thing we should conceive it to come to passe necessarily.* Yet notwithstanding that which comes to passe contingently in respect of the manner of existence, may of necessity come to passe upon supposition of Gods decree, as the calling of the Iewes, the destruction of Antichrist which we looke for. So the restoring of the Iewes out of the captivity of Babylon, the burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar by Iosiah, the killing of Sennacherib by his owne children, the taking of Zedechiah and carrying him into Babylon, yet so as he could never see it, for his eyes should be pulled out first.

Againe, though they come to passe contingently, yet why should you deny, or would not have us conceive that they fall out certainly? though uncertainly to man, yet undoubtedly whatsoever comes to passe, comes to passe most certainly unto



God : yet no doubt but the production of it was contingent, yea and sometimes casuall in respect of second causes. The event is not necessary in respect of the manner of producing it. But being produced, now it must needs be produced, and it is impossible it should be otherwise.

Neither doth our knowledge of any thing change the nature of it. Neither is our knowledge necessary (though you say so) of things past or present but merely contingent in the generation therof also; Though as of all other contingents, so of our knowledge also, it is true that when once it is, it is impossible it should not be, or not have bene at all. In a word upon the existence therof, the indifferency therof, to be or not be, is utterly vanished. But herence to inferre the like, not of Gods foreknowledge only but of his decrees also, is a very wilde inference. Yet we willingly grant that Gods knowledge of things doth no way alter the nature of them, or of the manner of their existence. No nor his decree neither. For though he decreed to make the World, yet the World we say came to passe never a whit the lesse contingently. And though God hath decreed the fall of Antichrist, and that Babylon shall be burnt with fire: yet these shall come to passe never a whit the lesse contingently. For God decrees not onely *res ipsas*, but *modum rerum*, to witt that some things shall come to passe necessarily, and somethings contingently. And so the effectuall will of God in Aquinas his judgement is the rate of all contingency. But yet notwithstanding even from the foreknowledge of God there riseth a necessitie of consequence as thus: If God foreknowes such a thing shall come to passe, then it is necessary it shall come to passe, though perhaps he knowes it shall come to passe not necessarily but contingently. How much more doth such a necessitie arise from the decree of God as thus. If God hath decreed the World should have an end, it is necessary the World should have an end, yet not necessarily but contingently. For as God did worke freely in making the World, so shall he worke as freely in setting an end unto it. So farre are we from saying that Gods decrees take away contingency from

from any thing, as that rather we averre that it doth maintayne it.

And you shewe either a great deale of ignorance in not understanding aright your adversaries tenets which you impugne, or that which is a great deale worse in dissembling and corrupting it. But I beare with you, it may be you fashion it in such a kinde as may best give way to some conceytes of yours, and very few arguments. Yet by your leave the more infallible any knowledge is, either of God, Angell or man, the more fit it shall be to found a necessitie of consequence thereupon thus; *It is infallibly foreknowne, ergo it is necessary that it should be.* Here followeth another extravagant of yours, for insteede of opposing that opinion which maintaynes the ground of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents to be the determination of his will, you leave that and oppose the derivaiton of Gods infallibilitie from the absolute necessitie of the event. An opinion that I never knewe any man patronize; but it seemes you would draw their opinion unto this, who maintayne that God foreknowes all things by seeing the determination of his owne will concerning the futurition of them. Now, I pray you, of those that take this course who ever sayd that the events decreed by God were of absolute necessitie? Yourselfe I have observed to professe, that upon Gods decree touching the futurition of a contingent thing, as namely, the apprehensio of a Traytour, the successe of the meanes tending thereunto is absolutely necessary as in this very chapter in the end of the first Section. But never was I acquainted with any of our divines that sayd so much. We professe that the producing of contingents is absolutely contingent, only this contingent production they holde to be necessary upon supposition of the will of God. And Durand wondereth that any should conceive things to fall out necessarily in respect of the will of God, whereas on the contrary he conceaves it to be a cleare thing, that not only contingent things but even necessary things also (as we call them) doe come to passe, all contingently in respect of the will of God.

They that ground Gods foreknowledge of future contingents upon things without God, doe usually ground it not upon any absolute necessity of the events themselves, as upon the causes producing them, which though they worke contingently and not necessarily, yet this they thinke nothing hindreth the infallibility of God knowledge, because hee is able to comprehend all failings possible, and to discern in what case they take place, and in what not; which in effect is to rest upon the condition of Gods knowledge in it selfe, as you here doe: and because it is infinite therence to conclude that it is infallible. An invention of late yeares, and brought in by the Iesuits, together with their doctrine concerning *scientia media*.

For whereas before there was onely a double knowledge found in God, the one antecedent to his will which they called *scientia simplicis intelligentia*, whereby hee understood his owne essence, and therewithall all necessary truths, and all things possible; the other subsequent to the will of God, which they called *scientia visionis*, and hereby he knoweth all things past, present, and to come, all which they acknowledge to be dependant upon the will of God; the Iesuits have of late yeares devised a middle knowledge betweene these two, and it consists in knowing not things necessary, nor things contingent, that have beene, are, or shall be, but in knowing what would be in such or such a case; as for example, what a man in such a case, thus or thus moved and induced unto good or evill, would doe or not doe.

And the ground hereof they make the infinitie of Gods knowledge, as I remember Vatquius expressly professeth so much, and so (as well they may) make this infinitie of Gods knowledge the ground of knowing all future contingents. For although Suarez takes upon him to confute Palavius, who as he hath maintained that God knowes future contingents by reason of the efficacy of his knowledge, yet judge I pray, whether himselfe differ from him when he come to prove his owne opinion, which is this: *In Deo sola essentia ejus est sufficiens ratio cujuscunque cognitionis possibilis, cum in virtute & efficacia*

De absol.  
scientia fut.  
conting. l. 1.  
c. 5.

Ibid. c. 8.

*cacitate intelligendi sit simpliciter infinita.* In God his essence alone is a sufficient cause of all knowledge possible, considering that virtue and efficacy of knowing it is simply infinite: So Vasquez; *Deus, quia sua est infinitas, efficacitate sui intellectus omnia intelligibilia intellectu suo penetrat:* and againe, *Quia divinus intellectus infinita virtutis est, quicquid intelligibile est necessario debet amplecti & intelligere.* Nam si aliquid ab ipso infinito intellectu non posset intelligi, à quo alio posset? And indeed were future contingents intelligible, there were no further question to be made, but that his knowledge were sufficient to comprehend them. But it is apparent that no such contingent is knowable as a thing to come, more than as a thing not to come in its owne nature, and consequently God can no more know that it is to come, then that it is not to come; unlesse that which in its owne nature is onely possible be determined this way or that way, and consequently made future or not future.

This objection Suarez foreseeth and proposeth: *Sicut divina potentia non potest facere id quod de se non est factibile, ita nec scientia divina scire potest id quod ex se scibile non est, neque certum iudicium ferre de eo quod in se omnino incertum est: Nam neque scientia potest ferri extra objectum suum, neque potest suo modo non commensurari illi in certitudine, & infallibilitate, quia requirit adequationem.* And to this purpose he alledgeith Thomas, saying; *Scientiam non posse esse necessariam, nisi objectum sub aliqua ratione qua attingitur, necessitatem habeat. Et hoc modo dici potest requiri ex parte objecti certitudinem objectivam, id est, talem modum veritatis, qua apta sit, ut certum & infallibile iudicium feratur, quod sane habet omnis veritas hoc ipso quod determinata est.* In which latter words he gives in briefe a better and fairer answer, then in the whole distinction following, if he be able to make good what he saith. For indeed every truth determinate is a sufficient object of knowledge.

But I would know of him or you, how comes it to bee true that such a contingent shall exist, whereas in his owne nature it is onely possible to exist, and indifferent as well not to exist as to exist. As for example, how is it true that to morrow it shall

Lib. de sci-  
en fut. con-  
ting.

it shall rayne, rather then that to morrowe it shall not rayne, seeing in it selfe it is no more inclinable to the one then to the other. If the one were true and the other false, then there were no question, but God should knowe the one to be true and the other to be false. But seeing there is no reason given by Suarez, why the one should be true rather then the other; there is no reason why one should be knowne of God to be true more then the other. And therefore Suarez layeth for a ground that future contingents have from all eternitie a determinate truth, but shewes not how they come to have their truthes; nor how thinges merely possible in themselves come to be future, which as it is apparēt, could not possibly be without a cause. But had he gone about this worke, which indeede was most necessary, the truth would soone have appeared in his colours. For it will soone be found that nothing could be the cause hercof but the will of God. Which was the opinion as he professeth both of Ricardus, and of Scotus, and in effect of Cajetan and of many of the Thomists; and that Alexander of Hales favoureth it.

Neither could he be ignorant that Alvarez maintaynes it to have bene the opinion of Aquinas also. To the same opinion Durand not only inclines as Vasquius writes in 1. disp. 65. cap. 1. but to it only adheres as the same Vasquius notes in the same disputation, cap. 2. Durands words are playne; Not only Gods prescience of a thing to come is joyned with his will to have it come, in 1. dist. 35. q. 3. num. 25. *Deum prescire. A fore, coexistit. Deum velle, A fore.* But also that his prescience is built hereupon ibidem dist. 39. q. 1. num. 10. in these words. *Representatur res fore vel non fore per essentiam divinam, non ut est solum essentia virtualiter rem omnem continens, sed ut est volens rem possibilem fore, & quia libere vult rem fore.* And Vasquius himselfe not only acknowledgeth that from the decree of Gods will may sufficiently be gathered the certaintie of knowledge which God hath of future contingents, in 1. disp. 65. cap. 4. but also proposing the same objection that Suarez doth above mentioned, and weareth it not as Suarez doth by saying, *Things contingent have a determinate truth,*

*truth*, as touching their being for the the time to come, whereof we nothing doubt, but shewes whence they have it, which point Suarez declined wholly *tanquam precipitium* as a break-neck to his owne opinion.

But Vasquius deales more plainly, and professeth that future things of merely possible become future by vertue of the decree of God. *Observandum est* (sayth he) *futurum ita esse obiectum scientie Dei infallibilis eo ipso quod re ipsa futurum est, ut tamen nostro modo intelligendi supponat decretum Dei, tanquam causam ante quam nihil intelligitur vere esse futurum.* In 1. dist. 65. cap. 4. num. 22. And agayne, *Quia nulla res ex se futura est, sed ex voluntate & omnipotentia Dei, ideo antequam intelligantur futura, supponitur Dei voluntas ut causa illius non quidem durationis ordine sed rationis, & num. 23.* Sicut creatura nondum possibilis est, donec Deus intelligatur esse, qui est primum omnium eius, si. etiam creatura nondum est futura donec decretum voluntatis esse intelligatur, ex quo ut ex causa futura est. Thus Vasquius mainteyning the infinity of Gods knowledge to be the ground of his knowledge of future contingents, as well as you doe, yet doth not make use of this his opinion to oppose the forgoing of the determination of Gods will as you doe. Yet what have you conferred to the overthrowe of that opinion which you impugne, that deserves to be named the same day with the least part of the meanest of those that have mainteyned it. You only shewe your teethe, and proceede confidently in dictating what pleaseth you without any evidence of reason to confirme what you so boldly propos. I long to come to an end of this.

In the next place you give some reason for your assertion. As when you say. *We are able by Gods permission to lay a necessitie upon contingents and so to foreknowe them, yet our knowledge still is but finite.* Hence you seeme willing to inferre that therefore God seeing his knowledge is infinite is able to know future contingents without laying any necessitie upon them, by the determination of his will. I am very glad to heare you reason, because it is so rare with you herein like to Hector Nævianus, *Qui Philosophari volebat sed paucis.*

Henry the seventh of England was wont to say he desired

to look his dangers in the face: so I desire to know what my opposit hath to say against the truth I defend. I have been so long exercised in these points, and encountred such champions, that I have no cause to feare your colours, nor powder and shot neither: wherefore in the first place I answer, that the difference betweene knowledge finite and infinite doth not require that infinite knowledge should extend so farre as to know things unknowable, for that were to extend beyond his object. But rather herein they differ, of things knowable, finite knowledge takes notice onely of some; infinite knowledge comprehends all. Now things contingent till they are determined to come to passe, or not to come to passe, are not knowable that they shall come to passe, nor are knowable that they shall not come to passe; and consequently cannot be knowne that they shall come to passe, or knowne that they shall not come to passe.

For if the understanding of man doth apprehend a thing as future which is not future, herein he cannot be said to know but to erre rather. Now that which in its owne nature is onely possible, cannot passe from this condition into the condition of a thing future, without some cause. Now you have shewed no cause of this alteration, nor you list not to inquire into it, it is too hot for your fingers. For by inquirie it would be found that no cause hereof can be assigned, but onely the will of God.

Secondly, I deny that God by determining things contingent, and in their nature meerly possible, making them future, doth lay any necessity upon them, but rather decreeth a contingent manner of production unto them, answerable unto their natures. For as hee decreeth that necessary things shall come to passe necessarily, so hee decreeth that contingent things shall come to passe contingently.

Thirdly, as touching your antecedent, I desire to know what things contingent those are, whereupon we can lay any necessity, whereby to foretell them, for it passeth my imagination to divine. This may well goe for your owne. I have been acquainted with many disputants in this argument, I never met



met with any argument of any kinne to this. Certainly there is some exquisite curiosity in it. For you suppose men may doubt of this, and therefore you undertake to prove it: but when? *In your treatise of the divine providence*, that I heare is newly printed, we shall heare of it belike ere long, in case you doe not forget what you promised: and the reason why I may doubt hereof is this; In the end of the fifth Section of this Chapter you told us that you were *anon* to intimate, that *the reservation of such liberty unto God himselfe*, (as never to passe any decree whereby to binde his owne hands) is a point of high perfection. Now this *anon* of yours is yet to come, for hitherto since we parted from that section wee have received no intimation hereof. But be it, that you will bee as good as your word, what is that which you undertake to demonstrate? *That some events which are to day truly contingent, may by our industrie become to morrow truly necessary*. But this needs no demonstration. For whatsoever I doe, by doing it, I make that necessary, which before was contingent. For every Sophister knowes out of Aristotle, and out of common sence also, that *Omne quod est quando est necesse est esse*. But this is nothing to your purpose. For you speake of such a necessity laid upon contingents, as whereby we might foreknow them. But by doing things I cannot foreknow them; for knowledge of things upon the doing of them, is rather after-knowledge then foreknowledge.

And therefore though heretofore I thought of no other meaning of these words of yours then this, yet now by pondering better upon it I conceive you have a farther reach, and that of a mysterious nature: for as much as you are loath to utter it, and give an instance of that which you deliver. Yet why should you be loath to utter that which you presume no intelligent Christian will deny? This makes me looke back againe upon your words, to try whether I can start the mystrie. And hereupon I discover other mysteries, though not the maine; as when you say, *We are able (after this necessity layd upon them by ourselves) infallibly to foreknow and foretell*. Now this speech is mysterious and imperfect: for you doe not tell

us what we may foreknowe and foretell whether it be the things themselves whereupon we have layd the necessitie spoken of, or rather some thinges els; but neither of these thinges doe you acquaint us with here. For if you had I should make no question, but if we might foreknowe them, whatsoever they be, we might without any more adoe foretell them, if we were not tonguetied.

Now no necessitie can we lay upon any thing but by doing it, and such a thing cannot be sayd hereupon to be foreknowne, therefore undoubtedly your meaning is, that by doing something before contingent, and thereby laying a necessitie upon, it we may foreknowe another thing. Now this may prove nothing to your present purpose; and your selfe in this argumentation quite besides the cushion. For Gods foreknowledge which you impugne is the foreknowledge of a thing contingent, by willing it.

But this foreknowledge of man, shall be the foreknowledge of one thing by willing and doing of another; now these are no more suitable then the hares head and the goose giblets. And to proceede a litle further in my conjectures, because your concealments put me to it, I say your concealment is most unseasonable. For as much as you conceale that whereupon your argument depends, like unto a Physitian that giving a Medicine to his patient, he should tell him there is one necessary ingredient more belonging to it, and he must suspend the taking of it, untill he goeth to the East-Indies to fetch it. In which case his patient may have his greene cap on his head before he returne.

Suppose faith and repentance be those contingent things upon which I may lay a necessitie by beleiving and repenting; will you say hereupon I may foretell my salvation? If this be it, this againe is nothing to the purpose in a second respect. For the assurance of my salvation is not so much built upon my faith and repentance, as upon my perseverance in faith and repentance unto the end. And I cannot hereupon foreknowe or foretell my salvation untill I am dead, which is not to foreknowe it, much lesse to foretell it.

Agayne my assurance of salvation depends not so much upon my faith and repentance, and perseverance in both, as upon the revelation that God hath made, that as many as finally believe and repent shall be saved; and also that if once I believe and repent truly I shall continue therein to the end; which I have cause to doubt whether you believe. Agayne doe you thinke indeede, that it is by Gods permission only that men doe believe and repent? and doe you thinke good to deny that God doth effectually worke them unto faith and repentance? You must needs take this course. For if God be indeede the Authour of faith & repentance, the he did decree to give men faith & repentance, & so contingents should be decreed by God, and God should foreknowe them by seeing the purpose of his owne will to bestowe them.

Thus I have ventured to bould out the mysteries which you conceale. If I have missed of the marke, I will aime at it no more. and give it over with a *mysterium quare*, as Schoolemen sometimes when they have hunted themselves out of breathe they have ended their discourse with a *Responsionem quare*. Yet we have not finished this Section. The very next sentence is a Crevecœur unto me, I can make no sense of it: *Succession is a seroule* (as we imagine it) *containing severall columns of contingency or indifferent possibilities, of which only so many or so much of any as in revolution of time take inke and are unfolded become visible to men and Angells.* Alas, what disaster hath befallen me, that I should divert from other studies wherein I fought the Lords battayles against forren enemies, and encountred with errors plainly sett forthe nothing involved with affected phrases, or streynes of expression in farre fetcht Metaphors, but strengthened with such armes as witt could afford without Rhetoricall painting. their manner of sight well knowne unto me, and in confuting whereof I profited mysele and gained increase of knowledge and of ability in mainteining the truthe of God. And now to be cast upon such discourses the opening of the meaning, whereof in one sentence sometimes costs me more paines then the answering of their best argument, and all this without any

profit redounding unto my selfe, my time wasted, my knowledge no whit bettered : well, *jacta est alea*, we must proceed, and since our hand is put to this plough, though oftentimes I looke backe, and come to a parle about not intermission only but interruption also, yet I must not breake off. Succession is as much as time, and thus you compare to a scroule containing possibilities. Out upon the shallownesse of my wits, that can comprehend no analogie in this comparison. For though all changeable things are said to bee in time, yet nothing like unto writing which is in a scroule, as in the subject of it. For time is rather an antecedent to things durable, then things durable an antecedent to time. But to say that time contains possibilities, is a wilder speech then the former. For before ever any time was, possibilities were as many as now, and more also. For the world was possible, and every part of it, and every thing that since hath beene, or shall be, even before the world was, was possible like as the world was. Again, the duration of possibilities hath no succession ; for if it had, then time should have beene before the world was.

By unfolding of these possibilities, I thinke you intend the bringing of them into act, and this is to take ink, as you phrase it. Now I had thought the scroule had contained onely those things that are written in it, and so the things brought forth in it, and not those things that are not written, and so accordingly neither time is to be accounted to containe possibilities. Yet all things that are brought forth, surely are not visible to men, howsoever they are to Angels. So that when the painting with a great deale of intention of spirit and consideration, is washed off, the face of the sentence is but this. In time many things before possible are brought forth into act : what is mine understanding the better for this, or my readers either ?

Then you returne to your former mad paradoxes, and tell us againe, (to inure us to your bugbeares, that hereafter wee might be the lesse affrighted with them,) that *the Almightye lookes on all things as well from that end of time which is to come, as from that which is past ; and that his infinite and eternall wise-*  
dome

*dome doth not only encompasse all things that come to pass, as the circumference doth the center, but penetrates the whole sircle of succession from end to end, more clearly then the Sunnes brightnesse doth the perspicuous ayre.* To this I answer, that it is indifferent unto man in the course of his knowledge, to take notice of things that have beene either from the beginning of the world to Noahs flood, or from Noahs flood to the beginning of the world. So likewise it is indifferent unto us to take notice of things done from this day upwards to the beginning of the world, or from the beginning of the world to this day.

As for things to come they are unknowne unto us. But if they were knowne unto us, as by revelation they may, it were as easie for us to take notice of them successively from the end of the world, rising upwards unto this day, or proceeding from this day unto the end of the world. As for notice of them all at once, it is impossible to be taken by us, our nature disposeth us to understand things onely successively one after another. Now it is without question that all things are knowne to God that have beene from the beginning of the world unto this day, and that shall bee from this day to the end of the world. And therefore if God were to take notice of them, and that in a successive manner as we doe, it were indifferent for him to take into consideration first the things that have been the first yeare of this world, then those things that came to passe the next yeare, and so forwards unto this present yeare, and so successively to take notice of what shall be the next yeare, and so onwards unto the end of the world. Or otherwise he might begin to take notice of those things that shall come to passe the last yeare of the world, then what shall come to passe the yeare before it, and so upwards unto this yeare, and thence proceed to consider what hath beene the last yeare, and so upwards unto the first yeare of the world.

But albeit this kind of successive consideration be incident unto man, yet it is not so with God. He hath from everlasting knowne what from the beginning of the world unto the  
end

end should come to passe, and that not successively but all at once. For his whole knowledge and every part of it is everlasting. And therefore it is absurd to say that God knowes things from the beginning of the world unto the end, unlesse in this sence, God knowes all things, which things come to passe from the beginning of the World unto the end, thereby denoting the succession of things in the World, not in the knowledge of God. But much more absurd is it to say that God knowes all things from the end of the World to the beginning of it: becaule this speech can admit no tolerable congruity of explication, like the former, namely by applying it, not to any succession in the knowledge of God, but to the succession of things in the World. For albeit that we may well say that things doe succeed in course from the beginning of the World to the end; yet it were absurd to say that things doe succeed in course from the end of the World to the beginning. You may as well say, A mans life hath continued not only from the beginning to the end, but also from the end unto the beginning, which is as much as to turn a mans heeles upwards, and place them where the head should be.

As for Gods incompassing of time as the circumference doth the center (wherunto you may adde the circular duration formerly spoken of) and the penetrating of the whole scroll of succession from end to end, wherein you so much please your selfe as in rare notions, I take them to be no better then ticke mens dreames: we have naused enough upon them, you needed not to have repeated them, yet you will have these conceits of yours to be receyved for precious truths, as Mountebanks commend their oyles and balmes, and not so only, but to be as cleere as the Sunne also. It is well that paper blusheth not. Every man seeth how the brightness of the Sunne doth pierce the ayre, doth every man acknowledge God to incompass time by his eternitie? Sure I am Durand censures this conceit as absurd. Yet I deny not but that others might doate upon it as well as your selfe, taking it upon trust without examination.

And

And the corruptnes of mans mind may appeare in this very vanity, that he pleaseth himselfe many times in such notions as he understands not. Againe, doth every man that clearly sees how the same peirceth the ayre, as clearly see how Gods eternitie doth penetrate all time both all that is past and that which is to come, in such fort as indivisibly (for eternitie is indivisible) to coexist with it? For hitherto tends the reach of your meaning. A most absurd conceyte. For therefore it would follow that all parts of time past, and all parts of time to come doe coexist together at this present; For if eternity doth now coexist with them, then at this present they must needs coexist with it, and consequently they must exist at this present, (otherwise how could they coexist) whence it followeth that both time past should be present, and also time to come, As absurd and voyd of all reason is that speeche of yours, whē you say that Gods finger hath drawne columbus of possibilities. God knowes things possible, I confesse, but his finger hath not drawne these possibilities, no more thē he hath drawne himselfe and his owne omnipotent nature. For nothing is required to the denomination of the possibilities of any thing, but this, that God is armed with allmightie power, whereby he is able to bring it to passe. Now amongst possible things some are brought forth immediately by God, some by second causes, whether by God or by second causes, they are all knowne to God, and who doubts now adayes of this? yet this is the whole contents of your last sentence, which you have commended unto usso embroydered with art, and with the need'e worke of quilting eloquence, as if you travayled in childbirth to be delivered of words and phrases, which many times vent untruthes, commonly deliver but vulgar sence, and sometimes end in no sence. Yet when a man or oxe or asse brings forth any thing that is possible; you say it is like the embroyderer who fills the drawers obscure patterne with conspicuous branches of silke, gold, or silver, which yet notwithstanding is fulfilled in bringing forth that which is accompted the eighth deadly sinne among the Irishe; were ever quaint terms and silken similitudes worse bestowed?



by the way forgetting that the Embroiderer himselfe is a second cause in bringing forth things possible into act, as well as a boy doth in playing at Top and scourge. And you may as well compare the Embroiderer to a boy playing at Top and scourge, as a boy playing at top and scourge to an Embroiderer. *Turpe est difficiles habere nugas*: If any man prove an ounce the wiser for this, he may soone prove as wise as Pauls steeple. I remember in the beginning you called this discourse of yours a paradise of contemplation, and I confesse I finde many flowres of Rhetoricke growing therein, and especially pretty similitudes, but by applying them they are utterly cast away, for commonly they serve either for the illustration of untruths, or very vulgar truths. And great pittie but they should finde a place among the toyes in London.

12. In the last place for a congruous explication of Austines and Gregories meaning, in passag: s before mentioned, you commend unto us certaine observations as necessary extracts of what hath hitherto beene delivered. This necessity I presume was no impeachment to the liberty of your will in broaching them, for my part I see no necessity at all of them, nor of this whole discourse of yours. In like sort as little necessary it was that my braines should be surbeaten so often in hunting after the involved sense of many sentences, thorow the thickets of wilde phrases and figures, and affected obscure expressions.

As touching the perfection of Gods knowledge incapable of addition, therein we argue with you. Your next position is worthy of consideration; *As Gods knowledge doth not make things to be, so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge make things so knowne by him to be immutable, or absolutely necessarie either in themselves, or in respect of his eternall knowledge.* To this I answer, first to the first member of your sentence, that great Divines from Austines daies to these daies have maintaine'd that the knowledge of God is the cause of things. And the reason they give is this; because the knowledge of God is *scientia artificis*, the knowledge of a craftsmaster. Now the case is cleare, that craftsmasters by their know-

knowledge doe worke and cause things. Yet I am content to helpe you with a distinction, if you will be pleased to accept of it. That the knowledge of God which is the knowledge of an artificer, is the *scientia simplicis intelligentie*, whereby hee knowes all things possible, and how to order all things most conveniently to their ends. But the knowledge you speak of here proceeds of *scientia visionis*, whereby God ever knew what should come to passe: and this knowledge indeed is not the cause of things. But as for the later member of this your sentence, it might have beene so carried as to give your selfe satisfaction (if I be not deceived) and us also: as thus, So the certainty of Gods knowledge doth not make things certaine; or if you would adde the word *necessarie* we could have bene with it, though it marreth the proportion; which precisely is this, As knowledge doth not make things to be, so certaine knowledge doth not make things certainly to be. But you leaving out the word *certainly*, take away all evidence of proportion. Belike you would acknowledge that certaine knowledge doth make things certainly to be. But I doe not like the proposition, and the genius of your argument drawn from proportion, if it hath any force any way, hath force against it.

Now if I doe not acknowledge that certaine knowledge makes things certainly to bee, much lesse would I acknowledge that it makes things necessarily to be. There is so manifest reason against it, considering that all those things that fall out contingently, are as certainly knowne to God, as those things that come to passe certainly. Yet you (as timorous men never thinke themselves sure enough,) are not content with this, but clogge your inference with other needlesse circumstances, as in saying, *absolutely necessary*, and *that not in respect of themselves, but of Gods knowledge also*: whereas without these the comparison was incongruous enough. And these circumstances I say are needlesse, because I would grant what you desire without these. But by your addition of these I perceive your meaning: for hereby you imply that it is necessary that things knowne by God shall come to passe: for though know-

ledge doth not make them to be, much lesse to be necessary, yet upon supposition of Gods knowledge, it followeth necessarily by way of argument, that such things as God foreknows shall come to passe. This is of an undoubted truth, which kind of necessitie is not any necessitie of being in the things themselves, but only of externall denomination upon supposition of Gods foreknowledge. And you doe in vaine seeme to strive against this; For can you deny this argument? God foreknowes that Antichrist shall be destroyed; therefore it is necessary that Antichrist shall be destroyed according to the time foreseene by God, neither will it herence followe, that therefore it is absolutely necessary that Antichrist should be destroyed, as you very weakly suppose. For necessitie upon suppositiō onely, commonly called necessitie of consequence was never yet taken for absolute necessitie by any that I knowe. I medle not with the terme immutable, because it is nothinge congruous in the application. For applyed to Gods knowledge, it signifieth that knowledge which havinge being cannot be altered, but applyed in this sence to the event that commeth to passe is untrue. For no event, especially contingent, after it comes to passe is immutable. If applyed to the manner of coming to passe, yet it is not congruous. For God knowing that it shall come to passe in a mutable manner (that is in a contingent manner, for if that be not your meaning, I know not what is) the immutability of Gods knowledge doth rather confirme the contingency of the event, then diminish it.

Yet you suppose some would inferre the contrary: but I assure you I am none of them, and that for the reason before mentioned. Yet still it holds good, that if God foreseeeth such a thing shall come to passe; It followeth of necessity that the same thing shall come to passe, albeit not necessarily but contingently; when you say, *Gods knowledge of things mutable* (that is of the futurition of contingents; give me leave to construe you so, that I may fayrely understand you) is *absolutely necessary*, all Schoolemen I thinke that ever write are directly against you. And for good reason; for like as it was not at

all necessary that such a course of contingent things should be in the world as now is, so neither was it necessary, much lesse absolutely necessary, that God should know this course; for if he had ordeyned another course of things (as it was very possible) then he had also knowne another course. But your meaning though incommodiouly expressed I conceyve to be this: Vpon supposition that thing should come to passe, it was necessary that God should know those things. For it is impossible that he should be ignorant of any thing that is to come: And this is a truth. But you have marred it by adding the word, *absolutely*. For to be necessary in the sense before mentioned, is to be necessary upon supposition only and not absolutely. Thus you see I would fayne have healed the incongruity of your position, but it will not be healed.

Agayne you tell us, that *It is most true which S. Gregory sayth that things future doe not come upon God, as they doe upon us, that things present doe not passe from him or by him, as they doe from us.* That which you take to be most true, I take to be most false, in the sense wherein you deliver it. For like as they passe from us by ceasing to coexist with us, so they passe also from God as ceasing to coexist with him. And as they come upon us by beginning anew to coexist with us, so they come upon God also, as beginning anew to coexist with him. The conforming of space of time, with space of place, doth abuse your understanding, and cast you into error ere you are aware, though you will not be perswaded of it. In space of place it is true things both comming towards us yet doe not come towards God; and passing by us and from us, yet doe not passe by God or from God.

The reason whereof is, because God doth coexist with all places, and filleth all but man doth not. And no marveile. For all places doe actually exist, and God existing too, they are truly sayd to coexist together.

But as for all the parts of time they doe not exist together; and therefore consequent'y cannot bee said to coexist with God, neither God at once to coexist with them. But as they

doe exist by succession one after another, so is God said to coexist with them, not by reason of any succession in God, but onely in the creature, and as wee lose our coexistence with creatures that cease to be, so doth God. For coexistence is an externall denomination attributed unto God from the existence of the creatures. In which sence he is said to be *He that was, and is, and is to come*; to wit, in respect of his coexistence which was with things that are past, and which is with things that are present, and which shall bee with things that are to come, to wit, when they are come.

But besides this succession in man of coexistence with other creatures, there is also a succession in man which is not in God. For he groweth or diminisheth in the quantity of his body, he is changed and altered to and fro in the qualities both of body and soule. In body sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometime faire, sometimes foule. In soule he hath for a while a growth in knowledge, afterward hee doareth and decayeth in knowledge. As for the duration of his cllence, that is without succession, as the Angels are. And to continue the same as God doth, is not to gaine ought, but to keepe that which he hath. God is alwayes; so are Angels since the time they have beene. The manner of Gods duration is indivisible; such also is reputed the duration of Angels; whom Schoolemen acknowledge, not to be measured by time, but by *Aevum* as touching their substance; onely as touching their thoughts, whereof there may be a succession, they have invented a *discreet time* to be the measure thereof. God loseth no existence by antiquity: man neither loseth nor gets existence by continuance. For how should the continuation of existence be the losing of it? and how can hee get that which he hath already? Accidents are gotten and lost, I confesse, nothing so in God. Thus your fancies cast about to gaine some confirmation of your former erroneous conceit, of Gods coexistence with all parts of time; but nothing serves your turne. If by continuance alone we did gaine any thing, which before we had not, God himselve should gaine something which before he had not. For without doubt hee hath  
 conti-

continuance. *Times passing* (you say) *exonerate themselves into the Ocean of his infinite duration without enlarging it; Times consuming incessantlie flowe from it without diminution of it.* No doubt you please your selfe in these expressions: To me they are worse then Empedocles his *Andropora* were to Aristotle. There is no canting like unto this. The waters that run into the Sea, are a part of the Sea; thence they came, and thither they returne, as Salomon telleth us. And therefore no marvel if the Sea neither is diminished by their egressse, nor by their regressse enlarged. No creatures duration is a part of Gods duration, as the rivers are part of the sea. And how doth our duration flow from Gods, but as an efficient cause, and that equivocall, that is wholly different? but water doth not come from the Sea, as from an efficient, much lesse equivocall, but as a part from the whole. Neither indeed doth our duration proceed from Gods duration, but from his will. For our duration is our existence continued, and this from the will of God. For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will. Eccles. 7.

Thus we can devise how our duration comes from God, though farre different from the flowing of the water from the Sea: but how our durations doe exonerate themselves into God, or into his duration, it surpasseth the sphere of my imagination to devise. I doe not thinke *Paracelsus* was ever able to interpret this. Yet some say he heard the devill reade a lecture through a grate in the Vniversity of *Toledo*. Yet you have not done traversing your ground. *Times future* (you say) *are said to come upon us, or to meet us, because our duration or existence cannot reach to future things whilest they are future.* Your figure *Catachresis* when will it be at an end? when we talke of reaching, we suppose the thing to have existence whereat we reach, but time future as yet exists not. Yet you thinke God doth reach it by coexistence with it. Yet I marke of late you forbear the phrase. Is it not because it doth manifestly discover the error of your conceit? For to coexist with things future, doth imply that things future coexist, and consequently exist, and so they are present, and not future. *The very Angels*

*gells are not of so long standing to day as they shall be to morrow.* This I confesse is something, but I would gladlie know what inference you make herehence.

Angells have had a beginning ; God hath not : if God had a beginning, as Angells have had , every day he should be of longer duration then he was the former , yet without any change, and consequently without succession. But will you inferre herehence, therefore God hath coexistence with things future? A consequence of no coulour of probability; and the consequent in it selfe implying manifest contradiction as before I have shewed. Till future things exist, we have no coexistence with them ; nor God neither. For if God did coexist with them, they should coexist with God, & consequently exist , and so cease to be future, and forthwith become present. Yet you labour to prove the contrary; and so you may, and swate too , and be never a whit the nearer to that you seeke for. *God is every way before time,* (you say) that is, not onely before it , as we accompt (he is before that which is to come and so are we also , but he was before all Worlds) but after it and behind it also. For that which we accompt after or behind time, you call before it ; that so with the better grace you may attribute it unto God. But we like plaine fellows, love to speake plainlie, and to call a spade a spade. And in the like language we deny that God is after time to come, and prove it thus. To be in durat on after any thing is to be while that other thing is past , or at least , the first existence of it ; but God in this sence cannot be sayd to be after time to come, because time to come is neither yet past nor yet existent. Yet at length when divinations will not serve your turne, you thinke to have gotten a text of Scripture for it. Gods duration you say is *Tuesday* , *to day* *to morrowe* and the *same for ever*. It is well you did not quote Scripture, least so your penne might have bene censured as *Corruptor stilus* for putting into the text *to morrowe*, and that in small letters suitable with the former. Perhaps you may say, why may he not be as well sayd to be *to morrowe* , as to be *Tuesday*. I grant the proportion of truth in both ; but where doe you find it,  
to be



to be sayd of God that *He is yesterday*. Take heed of *adulter sensus* which may be as bad as *Corruptor stilus*. Not in the Hebrewes where it is onely sayd that Christ is *the same yesterday, and to day and for ever*. Not that he is *Yesterday*, nor that he is *To morrow*; but rather to the contrary thus, *He was, he is, and he is to come*: But still the same in opposition to alteration, more wayes then you have exprest; nor to alteration onely, but to all possibilitie of alteration. For he is of necessary being. Tis false to say, that *In his duration all thinges are*. It beeing neither true formally as it is manifest (for time is no part of eternity) nor eminently. For it is not Gods eternity that produceth things, or mainstayeth the duration of things, but the will of God armed with power and wisdom to doe every thing. At first sight, I thought to have made no exception, against the last sentence; but upon second thoughts two members of the three seeme to be as faultie as any. For things future have no being at all *in esse reali*, as touching reali being, they are *in esse cognito* and *esse voluto*, knowne by God and decreed to come to passe in due time. So likewise things past have no being at all, only they are knowne of, and were decreed by God, to be in such a time as now is past. And how can they be sayd to be in God? Not formally as is manifest; nor eminently, for he cannot produce things past. For that were to make them not to be past. Yet you end in a truth, that *Things present cannot subsist without him*. I would you had both begun, and continued so. Yet this you corrupt with a needlesse amplification, *That presence cannot subsist without him*, which being but a relation requires no distinct operation, to susteyne it, distinct from that which susteyneth the foundation.

In the end of the fifth Section you promised to intimate a certaine point of high perfection in God consisting in the reservation of his libertie; but since that time we never heard of it more.

## CHAP. IX.

*Of Divine Immutability.*

**I**N the first place you tell us that some Schoolemen would *Immutability* in the same conceit with *eternity*, and that others make that the off-spring of this; but you conceale your Authors. I see no reason for either, but manifest reason I have against the first. For if the conceit of eternity were one and the same with the conceit of immutability, then no man could conceive a thing to bee eternall, but forthwith he must conceive it to be immutable. But this is most untrue. For Aristotle conceived the heavens and elements to be eternall both waies, without beginning, and without end; yet did not conceive them to be immutable, for as much as hee acknowledged them to be all under motion; and the elements also, as touching their parts subject to corruption. Plato though he maintained the world to have had a beginning, yet hee acknowledged it to be eternall one way, that is, without end, yet did not conceive it to be immutable. The first matter was generally held to be eternall both wayes, yet none maintained it to be immutable. And no marvell. For mutation comprehends all kinde of motion, and consequently immutability excludes all possibility of motion, but eternity signifieth only continuance for ever.

Now like as continuance for seven yeares, or an hundred yeares, &c. doth not require that the same thing should bee without all change for seven yeares or an hundred yeares, &c. much lesse doth it include the notion of immutability for such a space of yeares in the conceit thereof: so neither doth continuance for ever include the notion of being without all change for ever in the conceit thereof.

Adam was made immortall, and so had continued if he had not sinned, yet should he not have been free from all change. The Angels are eternall; that is, such as shall continue for ever,

ever, and so were made, yet neither are they now, nor were they made immutable. Indeed there are divers kindes of motions, some are in qualitie, called alterations; some in quantitie, called augmentation and diminution; some in place, called locall motion; some in substance, as generation and corruption. Immutability in this last kinde commeth nearest to the conceit of eternity, yet there is a difference. For eternity signifieth onely an everlasting continuance which may be joynd with a possibility of not-continuance, as in Angels, and the soules of men, and our bodies also in the world to come; but immutability cannot bee joynd with such a possibility; therefore the conceit of eternity and the conceit of immutabilitie are much different. And for the same reason immutability cannot be the off-spring of eternity, rather eternity is the off-spring of immutability. I thinke both immediately flow from the manner of his being, which is necessarie. The like judgement may be made of that you avouch in the next place, to wit, That the true explication of the former containes the truth of this. If by the former you meane eternity, as I thinke you doe, (though some while I referred it to your discourse immediately preceding of Gods infinite wisdom, which you chieflie place in foreknowing all things, which is a good reason of the unchangeable nature of his will.) In my judgement immutability rather confirms eternity, then eternity confirms immutabilitie: and the knowledge of Gods eternity is the off-spring of the knowledge of his immutability, rather then on the contrary; and that for the reasons before given, to wit, because immutability inferres eternity, eternity doth not inferre immutability.

2. That God is unchangeable I nothing doubt, but in my judgement you doe not well to prove it from the infiniteness of his essence; First because this consequent carryeth no evidence with it. That nothing can bee added to that which is infinite carryeth some evidence, but that nothing can be diminished from it, doth not. Some have maintayned that God can make an infinite magnitude, and a number infinite as *Hurtado di Mendoza* disputes. Secondly your argumen-

tation is rather à *Posteriori* then à *Priori*. For if by essence infinite you understand infinite in duration, which is as much as eternity, I have already shewed that immutability better infers eternity then eternity doth inferre immutability. But as for the necessitie of Gods being that doth manifestly and à *Priori* inferre his eternall being, and that it is impossible he should cease to be. And Bradwardine maintaynes that this attribute of God *ens necessarium* is the first attribute, as whence all other perfections are manifestly derived. For that a lesse perfect nature should have a necessitie of being, and a more perfect nature should have a contingent being is most absurd and impossible. For so that which is more perfect should have his dependance of being from that which is lesse perfect. Wherefore seeing God is of necessary being, it followeth manifestly that he must be most perfect. Yet I have cause to doubt of your sinceritie in affirming, that *To infinite perfection nothing can accrewe*. It is well knowne what conceyt Vorstius intertayned hereabouts, as namely that Gods decrees are not everlasting; in which case some new act of will doth accrew to God, which before was not found in him. And I fear you will be found to be of the same opinion. And I pray what meant you in the former chapter and 5. Section to maintayne that it is a point of high perfection for God, to reserve his libertie, and what libertie is this but of decreeing? Yet in the same Section you stile Gods decrees everlasting. But that denomination comes in against the hayre, as if it were only to choak your reader and hinder him from laying that to your charge which this reservation of libertie, (which you attribute to God, as a point of high perfection) doth manifestly import.

When you say, that *From infinite perfection nothing can fall but must fall into God*, or in *o* infinite perfection seeing that he is in being infinite, in such a conceyt steyned to high, that it breakes into non-sence and flat contradiction. For if it fall from him, it falls not into him; if into him, it falls not from him. In like sort in saying that *God is indivisibly and totally in every space that can be imagined*, you contradict that which formerly

formerly you have delivered in the chapter of Gods immensitie. For hence it followeth that God is *in vacuo* which you in plaine termes denied there.

3. In the next place you propose a difficultie, and that is this: *How Gods Will or counsell should be eternally immutable, and yet everlastingly free.* And in stead of answer you tell us, *You see not what appearance of difficultie can present it selfe, at least to such as beare the two former principles before mentioned leuell in their mindes and thoughts.* So then two principles will serve the turne to cleare all this, provided that we keepe them leuell in our mindes and thoughts: otherwise woe bee to the *funambulus* if he swerve never so little awry. Now these principles you say are first, *That God is absolutely infinite in being,* the other, *That he is absolutely perfect according to all the branches of being or perfection by us conceivable or more then all these, perfection it selfe.* If you will believe me, I assure you, I doe believe all this, and yet I am as farre to seeke for clearing of the former difficultie as ever. If the reason be because I doe not keepe them so leuell in my minde and thought as I should, I assure you, I would willingly helpe this also if I knew how. I would doe any thing for a quiet life, and to cleare such a difficultie as this which in my opinion is a wondrous one, if rightly understood. But I much doubt whether every one that proposeth it, rightly understandeth it.

For I have found by experience that many talke of the libertie of Gods will in proportion to our libertie; Now our libertie consisteth in an indifferency of intertayning different acts of will. But we shall sowly erre if we intertaine any such conceyt of the libertie of Gods will. For the act of Gods will being all one with Gods will, and Gods will being his essence, and his essence being one most simple act, it was ever impossible that there should be any thing found in God which now is not, or that any thing should not be found in God which now is. You will say then was it not possible that other things might have bene decreed by God then are? Yes undoubtedly even *Ludas* might have bene an elect, and *Paul* a reprobate. Yet other things thus decreed should not

have been decreed by any other act in God then now is in God, for the reason above specified, and that for ought I know so received by Schoole Divines, as denied by none. And this is a mystery I confesse, wherein we must content our selves with the *scilicet*, & leave to inquire how this may be; for we are incapable of that. Onely we can prove that the course of things that now is, in whole and part hath no necessary derivation from God, but meerly contingent, and accordingly proceeded from the free will of God, yet everlastingly determining this course of things that now we see; and having everlastingly determined it, this will of God concerning this course of things, hath everlastingly continued immutable unto this day, and so shall for ever.

As for your principles how they conferre to the clearing of this, I perswade my selfe you are not able to manifest. And what need, I pray, of making a difference betweene these principles which seeme to be all one; and your selfe have coupled them together, as all one in the former section, and in that argument of yours whereby you proved the immutability of God. Yet these principles must bee helpt with another supposition, that so they may doe the deed; that is, *That absolute contingency, or possibilities equipendent betwixt many effects, may as truly be the object of Gods eternall decree, as necessity in other workes of nature.*

Which supposition to raise your readers thoughts to an admiration of the momentous nature thereof, you say, *You have often promised, and once for all by Gods assistance shall undoubtedly prove:* whereas you might well spare your paines in this, no man being so simple as to question it, were it not that you do intoxicate your readers thoughts in the delivering of it with wilde phrases, in calling the contingency of things *possibilities equipendent*. enough to stagger a man at the very noise of such cracking of thornes. Wee maintaine that God decreeth not

Es. 45. 13. onely contingency, but things contingent; as namely Cyrus his restoring of the Jewes, and giving them liberty to returne to their owne country: the burning of the Prophets bones  
 1 King. 19. 2. by Iosiah upon the Altar; yea and the crucifying of Christ  
 Act 4. 28. Iesus,

Iesus, the Apostles with one voice directly expressing so much, Act. 4. And such decrees of God though free, continue immutable, and that from everlasting, as indeed being from everlasting. And wee say there is no reason why God should alter what he hath decreed, considering that he knoweth no more now then he did from everlasting.

In that which followeth we agree with you, that immutabilitie is a perfection, & mutability an imperfection; likewise that to worke freely is a perfection, to worke necessarily is an imperfection; and where both immutability and freedome of operation meet, the perfection of that nature is so much the greater. But this I finde not so scholastically expressed, when you say, *That if man were as immortall as the heavens are, hee would be more perfect then they can be.* This I say wants much of accuratenesse. For the heavens are not immortall. Aristotle conceived them to be incorruptible, but not immortall. For like as in case they were corruptible, yet could they not bee counted mortall, because they have no life to lose; so though they be granted to be incorruptible, yet could they not thereupon be accounted immortall, and that for the same reason, because they have not life, which alone makes a thing capable of the denomination of immortall, and for want of life, the meanest of creatures having life doe in excellency surpasse the heavens.

And if Aristotle had lived in our dayes to bee acquainted with such Astronomicall observations as we are, of so many Comets and blazing Starres in the celestiaall Region, not only above the Moone, but even in the firmament it selfe, and that of long continuance, and at length wasted and consumed; it is more then probable that his opinion concerning the incorruptibility of the heavens would have beene changed, considering his apologies and excuses in his bookes *De Celo*, that the bodie of the heavens being so farre remote, and little certaine experience (whereupon all naturall reason is grounded) to be had of such things as might discover the nature thereof: therefore his discourse thereof whatsoever to bee taken in the better part, and extraordinary performances thereabouts



not to be expected from a naturall Philosopher. And concluding his discourse concerning the incorruptibilitie of the heavens, he professeth that all experience did justifie his opinion in that point, for as much as there was never knowne any alteration there. So then, had he knowne of any alterations there, this might justly have altered the case with Aristotle, and that no alteration was then knowne, was to be attributed to the weake nature of Astronomicall observations in those dayes, whereabouts he was to depend upon the credit of others in their professions, being no Astronomer himselfe. In the next place you tell us, that *Though freedome in it selfe be a great perfection, yet to be free to doe evill is a branch of imperfection, which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedome.* This deserves well the scanning. Adam in his innocency was free to doe evill was he not? Yet was he made very good, and after the image of God, and no sinne had yet estranged him from the life of God, and therefore his state and condition deserved to be accounted a state of perfection rather then of imperfection. Although I deny not but there be greater perfections then this of Adam.

As the perfection of God is above the perfection of any, of all creatures. The perfection of Angells is above the perfection of man. The perfection of men in the state of glory above the perfection of man in the state of innocency. Yet I see no cause why Adams state in creation should be counted a state of imperfection, rather then of perfection. And for ought I see, freedom unto evill is no more favouring of imperfection then freedome unto good, considering that they both make but one morall freedome. For to be morallly free to doe good *quoad exercitium* is to be free to choose whether a man will doe good or no, and *quoad specificationem*, is to be free to choose whether he will doe good or evill. So to be morallly free to evill *quoad exercitium* is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or no; *quoad specificationem* is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or good. This discourse of mine hath proceeded according to your owne phrase, that speaks of freedom unto evill, but to speak in mine

owne phraſe, I ſhould not haſtily ſpeake of any freedome of the will of man to evill. You may ſay as well that the will of man in the uſe of the eye is free to behold either colours or ſounds which he will, or in the uſe of the eare is free to judge of ſounds or colours as he will. There is a Common ſenſe within, I confeſſe, whereby the will is able to judge of theſe, but by the eye or eare ſhe cannot.

The reaſon is, no facultie extends beyond his object. Within the compaſſe of his owne object it may be extended to any kind or particular, but it reacheth not beyond his object; Now the object of the eye is onely colour, and the object of the eare is onely ſound. And a man may looke upon what colours he will of many, that are preſented unto him, ſo by the eare take notice of any ſounds that are, but neither the eye can behold that which is not coloured, nor the eare apprehend ought that is not of the nature of ſound. In like ſort the will within the compaſſe of her owne object, may ſettle upon what ſhe will, but beyond her object ſhe cannot extend.

Now the object of the will is good not evill, and therefore ſhe is of free choyce to ſettle upon what good ſhe will, but not upon evill. But here ſome may ſay how then can any evill be committed? I anſwere two wayes: Firſt by error of judgement. For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgement of the underſtanding, therefore it is called a reaſonable appetite. Secondly, by preferring a leſſe good before a greater, as in making choiſe of doing ſomething becauſe it is profitable, or pleaſurable, or ſome way or other advantageous for the preſent, notwithstanding that it is diſhoneſt, and ſuch as will bring a farre greater damage unto us for the time to come. Or thus; becauſe we make choiſe of ſomething as before mentioned notwithstanding a ſuperiour authority hath forbidden it; both becauſe an evill inclination makes us preferre things preſently pleaſing and profitable, and withall proude that we cannot endure to be in ſubjection to lawfull authority, ſuch as undoubtedlie is the authority of God.

Hence it comes to paſſe, that we are ſayd alſo to be free to good or evill, which we may call a morall liberty in diſtin-

tion from the former, which is liberty naturall, and consisteth in being indifferent to doe ought that lyes in our power to be done, provided that it may seeme convenient to be done. As for that morall liberty, it scarce ever was to bee found in the world. For it consisteth in an indifferent inclination neither vicious nor virtuous. Now where was ever such a disposition to be found? Not in man before his fall. For hee was created good and holy, and inclined onely to delight in that which was truly good and pleasing in the sight of God. Some will say, then how could he sinne? I answer, his sinne was the actuating of his naturall indifferency to the doing of any naturall thing. As to eate an Apple, or not eate it, or to eate this or that, a thing meerelie indifferent, had not God forbidden it, and in this case restrayned his libertie: which prohibition of Gods, he hearkening too much to the tentations of Satan, by the ministry of Eve, who before had tasted of the forbidden fruit, without any damage discernable, and upon her commendation of it inconsiderately transgressed. Since the fall of Adam a vicious inclination hath possessed all, which even in the regenerate continueth in part, though a supernaturall vertuous or religious inclination hath possessed them, whereby it comes to passe that both carnall things are pleasing to them as they are flesh, and the will of God is pleasing unto them according to the spirit.

Still the naturall liberty continueth in all, to doe any naturall thing, whether commanded or forbidden of God. For even in the regenerate there is a power to doe any naturall thing, though God hath forbidden it, and too great a propension to the doing of it, (and that because God hath forbidden it) in respect of the flesh. And in the unregenerate a power also to doe any naturall thing which God hath commanded, and an affectation to doe it also because God hath commanded it; but in the way of hypocrisie to further their owne carnall ends and courses, yet have they no religious inclination to honour God. How freedome to evill is said by you to spring from the mutability of the creatures freedome, I doe not yet understand.

First, what meane you by the creatures freedome? Do you meane it of his freedome to good, or freedome to evill, or such freedome as is neither to good nor evill? I thinke your meaning is of the creatures freedom to good.

Secondly, what meane you by the change of this freedome of the creature? If you speake of the creatures freedome unto good, how is it changed? or into what is it changed? here is nothing to answer, but by saying, that his freedome unto good is changed into a freedome unto evill. Which if it bee your meaning, it was verie absurd to say, that his freedome to evill did spring from his change into freedome unto evill. For thus the selfe same thing shali bee both before and after it selfe. Yet you say not, I confesse, that this freedome to evill springs from the mutation of the creatures freedome, but from the mutability; that is, from the possibility of change. But that is as absurd. For change cannot be said to spring from a possibility of change, but rather from the agent that changeth. Why did you not say plainly, it sprang from the will of man disobeying his Creator? I see a reason of this. First because freedome to evill doth rather goe before disobedience then follow after it. Why but then if this state of imperfection came not from the creatures delinquency, whence came it? The truth is, not freedome to doe evill, but bondage unto sin proceeded from the prevarication of the creature against God his Maker. And this is a state of great imperfection indeed, or rather of great misery, as whereby all mankind are borne children of wrath, and such as deserve to be made the generation of Gods curse. And are you pleased to mince it thus, calling it onely a freedome to doe evill, whereas if yet we are onely free to doe it; yea and free also to doe good, which freedom is now adaies found in none but those whom the Sonne hath freed, according to that of our Saviour, *If the Sonne hath made you free, then are you free indeed.* Ioh. 8.

But let us proceed with you. *It was, I doubt not, the will and pleasure of God to make his creatures mutable before they be immutably happy.* But hence it followeth not, that this mutability

was necessarily prerrequied. For how can that be said to bee necessarily, which depended meereley upon the free will and pleasure of God, without specification of so much as a congruous end intended by God, upon supposition whereof, this mutability of the creature might be said to be necessarily prerrequied before their happinesse? Now what kinne this is to the immutability of God, or to the reconciling thereof to his freedome, let the Reader judge. As also of the sobriety of that which followeth; *God in that he is absolutely perfect is essentially immutable, essentially free and immutably happy, because infinitely good.* Then followes the order of *immutability* and *freedom*; that the ground of this, this the perfection of that. Yet many creatures are free without any such growne as immutability, and where the one is wanting, the other cannot be the perfection thereof. And if we speake of immutabilitie in respect of second causes, is it not in the power of God to make the heavens, the Sunne, Moone and Starres immutable; which notwithstanding should not be any free agents. And undoubtedly, the immutability of Gods will rather supposeth the freedome thereof, then is presupposed by it. But these are matters of no great moment, that which followeth is of more, though you doe but touche, and away, like the dogge at the River Nilus, who feares the Crocodile, and it may be herein you feare some bug-bear also. *Freedome it selfe (you say) were no absolute perfection unlesse it were immutably wedded unto goodnesse.* Gods freedome then, you will have wedded unto goodnesse. In what sence is this delivered? I am of opinion that whatsoever God doth, it is impossible it should be otherwise then good. For it is impossible that God should transgresse; As who hath no superior to give lawes to him, but rather his will gives lawes to all, yet in giving lawes to others he gives none to himselfe.

And if his will were a law unto himselfe, it were impossible he should transgresse it in doing ought. For as much as whatsoever he doth, he doth according to the counsayle of his owne will. But you I doubt have some other sence which I will labour to start out if I can. You signify *his freedome*  
must

*must be wedded to goodnes.* When a man is wedded to his wife, he is restrayned from all others, and must keep himselfe only unto her.

So belike amongst diverse things whereunto Gods power doth extend, his freedome must not extend to all, but be confined to that which is good. As if there were some rules of good and evill prescribed unto God, and he were confined to the one, and restrayned from the other. This is Arminius his language, upon which occasion, I have bene bold to encounter their opinion in two digressions, who maintayne that there is a justice that doth oblige the will of God. If you would deale plainly in setting downe your opinion, and Scholastically, in taking paynes to dispute for it, and not in some tory manner to begge the question, I should be ready with the help of God to enter into the lists in this point with you also.

And at this time, had you named any thing that God cannot doe in the way of justice, which otherwise he hath power to doe, I would have taken the paines, not to consider it only, but to confute it. For I hold that tenent not farre from blasphemy. And I doe well observe that in expressing this your opinion, you doe not signify that Gods freedome must be wedded to his goodnesse, but that *freedome must be wedded to goodnesse.* And indeed the freedome of men and Angells is to be limited by the lawes of God, who is their Creator, and may and doth give lawes unto them. But as for any law of obedience that God is bound unto, I know none, no not to his owne goodnesse as being neither bound to manifest it nor to communicate it: but by necessity of nature he loves it, that is, himselfe, and by necessity of nature whatsoever he doth, he must doe for himselfe, and for the setting foorth of his owne glory, as he shall thinke good, and not to any other end.

He that is the supream efficient, must necessarily be the supream end of all things. So *from him and by him, and for him are all thinges.* Much lesse is he bound to the rules of any goodnesse or justice without him. But it may be of this we shall heare more from you hereafter.

In the next place you returne to shew, how immutability and freedome may stand together; and in stead of proving it you tell us, that we may easily conceive it, provided *that they be rightly joyned or sorted.* And hereupon you take occasion to discourse somewhat at large of the ill sorting of them, and that in such a kind as none would ever prove so mad as to sort them so; (yet that serves for matter of your discourse,) but as touching the right sorting of them, I doubt we shall never heare of in such a manner as you promise, to wit, that our conceits shall easily comprehend it, no more then wee have heard of that *reservation of libertie* which you promised to intimate as a point of very *high perfection* in God.

Well, the ill sorting of them seemes to bee the conceiving of God to be freely immutable, and that you say implicth contradiction, *if not unto the nature of immutability, yet unto the nature of absolute perfection, or to our true conceit of infinite being.* I know no congruity of this discourse of yours. For freedome is onely in resp<sup>t</sup> of operation, not in respect of being. For freedome supposeth being according to the kinde and nature of the thing which is said to bee free. It were a very absurd thing to discourse that man is not freely a man, or that he were not freely reasonable. And no lesse absurd is it to tell us that God is not freely immutable. You might as well tell us that God is not freely God. And yet if we list to walke along with you in the like vanity of discourse, we might maintaine that God is freely immutable, freely of absolute perfection, freely of infinite perfection, if you take freedome in opposition to coaction. For God is not immutable by coaction, nor of absolute perfection by coaction, nor of infinite being by coaction. And to be that which a man is freely, is better then to be that which he is by coaction.

To be freely immutable in your sense, is not a branch of imperfection, but rather of impossibility. For it is neither possible to the Creator, nor possible to the creature. But imperfections imply a possibility, rather then include any impossibility. But suppose there were any such freedome in God, yet it followeth nor, that it should put all those perfe-  
ctions



tions which are contained in his nature upon the hazard. For how improbable were it, that God by his will should chööfe to be imperfect rather then perfect? Possible indeed it were upon this supposition; but yet in respect of his wisdom and goodnesse, it were as good as impossible hee should will any such thing, though he were free to will it. But God by necessity of nature is immutable, and impossible it is he should be otherwise; & in this nature of his the will of God deligh- teth. And accordingly we may judg of the nature of these your extravagant suppositions: yet by your leave, mutability is not alwaies charged with possibility of doing amisse, but onely in creatures reasonable, yet is mutability found as well in creatures unreasonable, yea and without sense and life also, as in creatures reasonable. But to proceed: as it is impossible God should be freely immutable, so is it impossible he should be mutably free.

But why you should account it the period of perfection I know no reason, more then to be immutably wise, immutably powerfull, immutably good. Neither doe I like your inference herence, namely that therefore God is unchangeable in freedome, as in power, wisdom, or goodnesse; like as because God is immutably wise, and powerfull, and good, it is no good consequence to say therefore he is as unchangeable in wisdom, power, and goodnesse, as he is in freedome. The consequences, that is, the propositions themselves I approve, but I cannot approve your deduction of the one from the other. Now because God is immutably free, therefore hee was, and is, and shall be eternally free, to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodnesse. All this we grant, and by all which you seeme to goe a birding, and if your tackling hold, you are like to catch something ere long; and if I mistake not, the next sentence discovereth the mystery you hawked after so long: *Free it is (you say) for him from everlasting to everlasting omnipotently to decree as well a mutability in the actions of some things created, as a necessity or immutability in the course or operation of nature inanimate.* In which words by that time I come to the end of transcribing of them, I finde more then  
at

at first blush I dreamed of. For that which you hunt after as now I perceive, is a sory conceit, and such as being granted you, will yeeld your cause as much support as a bulrush; what need you thus travell to be delivered of such a principle as no man thinks worth the asking. Onely you carrie it in such a phrase of ob'scurity, as if you desired your reader to conceive it to be some great mystery, whereas if it were plainly delivered, and that in a sober sense, it is no more then this, God hath decreed that some things shall worke contingently and freely, as namely, men and Angels; like as hee hath decreed that other things, to wit, naturall agents, shall worke necessarily.

And can you tell who is ignorant of this? or can you shew that ever any was found to call this into question amongst Christians? All Naturalists acknowledge this difference betweene naturall agents and voluntary agents; and no Christian denieth but all this proceeds from Gods inward decree, and outward operation according to this decree. But what if you have a further ayme then this, and the obscurity of your expression in this particular serves onely to amuse your reader in that which is of no worth, that so in the meane time his intention may overslip the observation of foule things broached by you in a few words? For consider I pray, would you have your reader swallow such a goageon as this, that God is at this time free to decree this? Why doe you not say as well that God is at this time free to decree the salvation or dammation of any man? For why should not one decree of God be temporary as well as another? and how contradictory is this to your owne often profession of Gods everlasting decrees, and also to your present doctrine of Gods immutabilitie? For if he be now free to decree this or that, then may some decree of God begin to be, which before was not, and consequently there shall bee a change in God. For as much as some act shall be found in God which before was not. And if Gods decrees be everlasting, and yet to this day he continueth free to reverse these decrees, then is God free to change. Perhaps you will say, Gods liberty is eternall, (for otherwise I know not

not to what purpose you discourse here of Gods eternall liberty.) I answer, God is still and ever shall be free, but in respect of what? In respect of those things that are possible and indifferent to be done by him or no. But that Gods eternal decrees should be at this time indifferent to bee made by him or no, is a thing utterly impossible. God alone cannot doe this, as Philosophers were wont to say, to make that which is done to be undone, it being a thing implying manifest contradiction.

Againe, the libertie of God is not like unto the liberty of his creatures, whether Angels or men, which yet notwithstanding you very confidently confound, manifesting no sense of so uncouth an assertion. Liberty in the creature is unto different acts of will, as either to will this, or to will that; but no such libertie is to be found in God. It was and is impossible there should bee any other act in God then there is, because God is a simple act, and that act is his very essence, and as his essence cannot, nor could not bee otherwise then it is, so neither could any other act of will be in him then there is. Gods liberty is only to different objects, not to different acts, though you passe over this without any distinction.

Againe, in the sentence going before you told us, God was free to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodnesse; which is most true: but when in the next place you tell us he is free to decree, this is nothing answerable to the former. For to decree is no exercise of his power, nor communication of his goodnesse. For if it were, then seeing his decrees have beene free from everlasting, from everlasting there should be an exercise of his power, and communication of his goodnesse. Which is as much as to say that the world was everlasting.

Your next sentence is as wilde as the former, or rather more, not to speake of the coherence of them. For it seemes you have no more care of that, then as if you were dictating proverbs. *That the course of mans life, or the fmall doome awarded to every man (though that must be awarded to all according to the diversity of their courses) should be immutable, because they are*

foreſet by an immutable omnipotent decree hath no more colour of truth, then to ſay the omnipotent creator muſt needs be blacke, be-  
 cauſe he made the crows and Ebony black, &c. And this compa-  
 riſon you enlarge with multiplicity of inſtances, as the courſe  
 of your ſtile is to exuberate in matters of no moment. You  
 might as well have ſayed that there is no colour of truth, why  
 God that made a crowe ſhould be a crowe, or that made the  
 ſwanne ſhould be a ſwanne. And indeed there is no colour  
 of truth in this. For indeed a painter makes a fayre picture,  
 but it no way followeth herehence that he ſhould be a fayre  
 picture, or ſo much as fayre.

And though a pewterer makes a chamber-pot, yet no co-  
 lour of truth, that he ſhould be therefore a chamber port, or  
 that becauſe a Chimny-ſweeper makes a cleane chimney, ther-  
 fore himſelfe ſhould be a cleane chimney. Never was any  
 knowne to be ſo abſurde, as to deviſe any ſuch inferences.  
 Like as I think never any before your ſelfe was knowne to  
 affirme, that there was as litle colour of truth in collecting,  
 that things decreed by God ſhould be immutable, becauſe his  
 decree is immutable. For I pray, what proportion doe you  
 find in theſe? the efficient cauſe that is equivocall, is not of  
 the ſame nature with the effect produced, therefore the thing  
 decreed is not immutable, by reaſon of the immutability of  
 the decree whereby it is decreed.

Let every Reader judge whether there be ſo much like-  
 neſſe betweene theſe, as betweene a foxe and a Fearne-buſh.  
 Yet you give no reaſon but the bare proportion it ſelfe to  
 beare it out. Now the former inference which you denye, is  
 drawne from the cauſe to the effect, the later inference which  
 you denye is drawne from the effect to the cauſe. Yet theſe  
 inferences you make proportionable. If you would make  
 them ſuitable, after ſome ſuch manner as this, it ſhould pro-  
 ceed. God makes crows black; herhence it followeth not  
 that God himſelfe is black, ſo God decreed to damne Iuda;  
 herhence it followeth nor, and what I pray? I am aſhamed to  
 follow the proportion of your inference leaſt ſo I ſhould ut-  
 ter that which in modeſtie is not fit, or thus. God makes Iu-  
 das

as his damnation immutable; herhence it followeth not that God is immutable, or to helpe you with a proportioned case fitter for your turne. God makes Iudas his damnation mutable, herhence it followeth not that God or his decree is mutable.

This I say better serves your turne, but this is not the inference whereupon you passe your denyall, but rather quite eam as we say; Gods decree is immutable; herhence it followeth not that Iudas his damnation, though forset by God is immutable. Yet as for that inference proposed, which I sayd was more fitter for your turne, who ever sayd that God decreed Iudas his damnation to be mutable, or the damnation of reprobates to be mutable? Who ever sayd that God decreed the salvation of Peter or Paul, or of any one of Gods elect to be mutable?

And indeed, it were very absurd to say so: For the mutability of a thing supposeth the being of a thing. Now hath God ordained that the salvation of Gods elect, after they have obtained it, or the damnation of the reprobates after they suffer it, shall be mutable? Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touch ng his elect, that they *shall ever be with the Lord,* and as touching the reprobate that *their worme shall never dye,* and *their fire never be extinguished?* Yet I confesse either is simply mutable, in respect that God hath power to alter it. But this kind of mutability is not the object of Gods decree. For God doth not decreec to take unto himselfe power to doe this or that. Yet it is true, that by vertue of Gods decree some things come to passe contingently, and some things necessarily. But this is onely in respect of the agency of second causes, some of them being made by God, agents naturall working necessarily, some agents rationall and free, working contingently and freely: Not in respect of Gods owne agency, for whatsoever God doth work outwardly, that must needs come to passe contingently or freely: for it is not in the power of God to worke necessarily; it is the perfection of God unalterable, to be necessarily, to worke freely. Now the doome of any man is the work of God, and so is the condemnation

*Thess. 4,  
Marc. 9.  
44.*

both of men and Angels, and not the worke of second causes : and therefore the contingent being thereof is not the object of Gods decree. God doth not decree, that to fall out contingently, much lesse doth he decree that after it is, it shall be mutable : speake your minde plainly, and tell us whether the damnation of Iudas, or of the Angels that fell, or of any reprobate that is departed this life is mutable. I presume you dare not affirme this : and what is the reason ? not because God wants power to alter, but because his will is that it shall not be otherwise, and his will can neither bee changed from within, nor resisted from without, because it is omnipotent. In this case therefore this consequence is good : God hath decreed the damnation of Iudas, and his decree is immutable, and omnipotent, therefore the damnation of Iudas is immutable, to wit, supposing the foresaid decree of God.

Now consider wee the damnation of wicked men not yet departed this life ; hath God decreed it, or no ? if no, then his decrees are not everlasting, the contrary whereunto you have hitherto professed in words, though I feare your meaning is otherwise.

Againe, if God hath not yet decreed it, then hereafter he shall decree it, (for he must first will their damnation before he damnes them) and consequently there shall be a change in God, and something found in him which before was not, contrary to that which you have delivered in this Chapter, sect. 2. in these words, *Vnto infinite perfection what can accree?* If then God hath decreed it, and his decree or will of God cannot be changed, for you confesse it is immutable, nor can be resisted, for you confesse it is omnipotent ; will it not necessarily follow herehence, that the damnation of such wicked men yet surviving is immutable ? This I speake in your phrase, but in mine owne phrase I say onely that herehence it necessarily followeth, that all such shall bee damned, which necessity is meerly upon supposition of Gods decree : and therefore not necessity simply so called, but onely *secundum quid*, and upon supposition,

So likewise concerning the salvation of Gods Elect, who  
are

are yet surviving, if God hath decreed it, seeing his will is both unchangeable, and unresistible, their salvation must needs bee immutable, to speake in your phrase, but to speake in mine owne phrase, it necessarily followeth herehence that they shall be saved.

There is to way to help this, but by maintaining that Gods decrees are not absolute but conditionall; but it seemes you dare not venture upon this assertion in plaine termes, though the face of your tenet bespeakes such a course: And in another Treatise of yours you talked of a certaine disjunctive decree of God. It were a commendable thing in you to deliver your selfe plainly of your meaning; for otherwise you will be guilty of something else besides a corrupt judgement. And indeed if you would deale plainly, and maintaine that God hath decreed salvation or damnation to none absolutely, but to all conditionally, and withall by sound arguments confirme it, there should be no further question; we would willingly subscribe that no mans salvation should come to passe immutably, as you speake, or necessarily, as we speake; no not so much as in respect of Gods decree; if so be God hath decreed salvation to no man absolutely, but conditionally; and that in such sort as that he may bee either saved or damned as he will. But then withall you must maintaine that God hath decreed to give no man faith and repentance more then another; but left it indifferently to their free wills whether they will beleeve and repent or no.

For albeit God hath ordained salvation to befall men upon ther finall perseverance in faith and repentance; yet if God hath withall decreed to give some men faith and repentance, and finall perseverance therein, and deny all this unto others; herehence it will follow that God in effect hath ordained some men absolutely unto salvation, and not other; and it will necessarily follow herehence, that as many as to whom God hath decreed to give faith and repentance, and perseverance, they shall be saved; and as necessarily, that all others shall not be saved to whom God hath decreed the deniall of the like grace, unlesse you will say that though God doth not



give any such grace, yet they may believe and repent if they will, and therein persevere unto the end : I see no reason to the contrary, but this must be upon your opinion, as before hath been specified, albeit you are not very forward in plaine termes to expresse as much. And in this place you scatter something that seemes to me directly contrary hereunto.

For consider, though Gods decree concerning the doome of every man be immutable, yet you deny that herence it followes, their doome shall be immutable. Now this of a conditionall decree is evidently untrue, as I presume will appeare of it selfe. For if God hath no other decree concerning Peters doome then this ; *If thou beleevest, thou shalt be saved, if not, thou shalt be damned* ; the case is cleare that this doome is immutable, not salvation absolutely nor damnation absolutely, but either salvation or damnation disjunctively as elsewhere I have found you to discourse of a disjunctive decree of God. Therefore seeing you speake of such a doome which you deny to be immutable, it followeth that you cannot understand it of a disjunctive doome, as salvation, or damnation; but you must needs understand it of a single doome by it selfe, as the salvation of Peter by it selfe, or the damnation of Iudas by it selfe.

And withall you doe acknowledge this doome to be *forset by the decree of God*, which is as much as to acknowledge that it is decreed by God. Now I say if it be decreed by God, seeing his decrees cannot be changed, no: his omnipotent will resisted, it must necessarily follow that every one so destinated to salvation shall be saved, every one so destinated to damnation shall be damned. The best helpe you have against this, and whereupon this discourse of yours doth most runne, is, that the object of Gods decree is contingency, or mutability, (for so you are pleased to confound things that differ.) But you are nothing wary to keepe your selfe from contradicting your selfe. For when you say that God decreeth contingency, you doe withall deny that God doth decree the thing contingent; as you have expressly professed in your treatise upon Ier. 26. *Did not Hezekiah feare before the Lord, &c.*  
And

And withall to make your meaning the more plaine, you have professed that albeit God doth not decree necessity, but withall decreeing the things that come to passe necessarily; yet in decreeing contingency, you deny that he decreeth withall the things contingent.

But in this place you have plainly signified that the doome it selfe of every man is foreset by the immutable decree of God, and not onely the contingency of it; And no mervayle, For albeit as touching the actions of men, ther may be some colour for the exempting of them from being the objects of Gods decrees, yet the doomes of men being the actions of God himselfe, there is no colour at all for the exempting of them from being the object of Gods decrees. And therefore this distinction of Gods decreeing contingency, or mutability, but not the things contingent themselves, will nothing avayle you in this place. For you plainly professe that the doome of every one is foreset by the decree of God: and it is impossible it should be otherwise. For God could not execute it, unlesse he did will it. He cannot execute the salvation of Peter, unles he did first will it, nor the damnation of Iudas except he did first will it, and his will was everlasting, otherwise there should be a change in God.

And seeing his will can neither change, nor be resisted, therefore it necessarily followeth, that whose salvation he did from everlasting will or decree, they must be saved, and whose damnation he did from everlasting will or decree, they must be damned. And thus much as touching the doome of every man foreset by Gods decree. You adde unto this, *The course of every mans life*, and affirme, that it also is foreset by Gods decree; And this course of every mans life you understand in respect of good and evill morall, as appears by this, that you proportion mens doomes unto the courses of their lives: which can beare no other interpretation then in respect of mens good and evill actions.

Now at the first I wondred what you meant to bring so unequall heyfers to plow under the same yoke, considering that the courses of mens lifes in this sense are the actions or  
workes

workes of men ; but the doomes of men according to their courses of life , are the actions or workes of God, much more have I cause to wonder to reade you professing them all indifferently to be foreset by the decree of God. For as for the good, yea the most gracious actions of men, according to your opinion, they are not foreset by the decree of God. For your profession is (and that as of some singular subtilty and invention) that God decreeth contingency, but not the things contingent ; whence it followeth , that as touching the most gracious actions of men, even faith and repentance (they being onely contingent things) that God decreeth them not, but onely the contingency of them. How much lesse fit is it for you (according to the tenour of your opinion) to joyne all the courses of mens lives, even the evill courses as well as good with the doomes proportionall , and to consider them as fore-set by an immutable and omnipotent decree of God, as here you doe ? Yet I see how some one in your behalfe might plead for you, namely, that this is delivered by you onely by way of supposition, not positively affirmed; but I see no likelihood that you would plead thus for your selfe, but rather give your self to the emulating of Gods decree by some frivolous distinctions. For you acknowledge Gods concurrence to every action.

And in the preface you make shew not so much of excepting against the doctrine of Gods decreeing all things, as against the manner of decreeing them. And when you speake of the worst courses of mens lives, as of Jewish blasphemy against the Sonne of God, and amplifie the harmfulnesse of their opinion, that maintaine it to have been decreed by God, you rather except against the manner of decreeing it, to wit, *inevitably*, and that as touching the *obliquity* of it onely, then simply against the decreeing of it. Your words are these, ch. 1. sect. 5. *Shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquity of Jewish blasphemy ?* Which cautions whereunto they tend I know not, unlesse to make some declination from manifest contradiction to the words of the Holy Ghost, Act. 4. 18. delivered with one mouth by the Apostles in their meditation

unto God, saying, *Verily against thy holy Sonne Iesus both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israel, are gathered together to doe what thy hand and thy counsell had determined before to be done.* And indeed it is nothing but ignorance, or wilfulnes in some, and trafty perverting the state of the truth in others, that makes those things seeme harsh, which yet notwithstanding their harshnes, are manifestly commended to us in the word of God. For what harshnes I pray is in this: God determined that all the evill that was done to Christ should be done by his permission? And none give better evidence unto this truth ere they are aware, then they that with might and mayne oppose it, as *Arminius*, who professeth that the Iewes proceeded so farre in their ignominious handling of Christ, as God would have them, and this he delivers without all temperament.

And Bellarmine professeth, that it is good that evill should be by Gods permission. And yet herein we say no more then Austin professed 1200. yeares agoe, saying, *Non aliquid fit nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo.* And your selfe in this place joyne the doome of every man with the course of every mans life in good or evill, and suppose them to be foreset by the immutable and omnipotent decree of God. Wherefore it is not for your positive dictates and wild resemblances without all proportion that we doe beleewe God to be eternally and immutably free; yet wee doe beleewe he is so, not to decree a new, (for Gods decrees are eternall, not temporary) but to doe any thing that is possible to be done, and to bring forth some creatures, agents naturall to worke necessarily, others, agents rationall to worke contingently and freely. As for the resemblance of Gods freedome and immutability, your talke of it is like your other discourses; For what resemblance doe you find of Gods freedome in the mutability of the elements, in the generation and corruption of mixt bodyes? The best resemblance of Gods freedome is in the freedome of creatures rationall, which are to be found as well in the superior, as in this inferior World. And why should any mutability be a resem-

Enchirid.  
cap. 95.

blance of Gods freedome, who is immutable throughout? And as for the resemblance of his immutability in the Heavens, to make that good you had need devise a quintessence first, and deny all those apparances of comets, breeding and wasting in the Heavens, even in the firmament, the acknowledgement whereof is now commonly received by frequent observations.

Sure I am the Prophet plainly professeth of the heavens, that *they all wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture God shall change them, and they shall be changed, but God is the same, and his yeares fayle not.* You may doe well to deny the Heavens motion also, & so you may the better free them from all change, for as I take it, all motion is mutation, though all mutation be not motion. That God is both immutable, and irresistible our opinions manifest, so doe not yours, but dangerously prejudice them both. But I knowe no reason why his irresistiblenes should flow from his immutability. For if his immutability be conceived as free from all possibility of change from within, there is no coherence at all betweene this and his irresistiblenes, which is in respect of agents from without. The essence of spirits is immutable from within, and so were the Heavens, if a simple essence, or quintessence as some call it; but hence it followeth not that any of these are irresistible from without. But if immutability be spoken of in respect of freedome from all change as from without, in as much as no outward thing is able to worke any change in the nature of God, then it is onely immutability passive, but irresistibility in God is in respect of his power active, able to bow and breake all things without resistance, so that in this sense also there is no coherence betweene these two attributes, as if one could be sayd to flow from an other.

To the preventing of wise contrivances is required not onely wisdom to discover them, and meanes to prevent them, but also power for the execution of this prevention. And that Gods contrivances are not prevented, it is a worke of his power, as well as of his wisdom.

As for the rule of Gods decree, I know no goodnes of God

God to be the rule thereof, but that goodnes wherby he is inclined to the setting forth of his owne glory, for *He hath made all things for himselfe.* Prov. 1. 16. 4. And seeing *All things are from him and by him.* Ro:m. 11. ver. last. There is great reason why all things should be *for him* also, even referred to his glory as to the end. What other goodnes you dreame of, as the rule of Gods decrees, I know not, neither doe the Scriptures teach any other, but it is generally your course to dictate much, and to prove wonderous litle; Whether your ability that way be the more in store and reserved for some speciall subject to shew it selfe therein, I know not.

CHAP. X.

*Of the eternall and Immutable decree.*

Vpon this you enter with a fayre promise of betteringe or rectifying our apprehensions of Gods absolute and omnipotent decree. I hope we shall never be unwilling to learne of any, much lesse of your selfe. For why should we not affect to have our apprehensions if they sweve from the the truth to be rectified, and though in good propension thereunto, yet to have them bettered. For though good be good, yet better is better, especially in so precious a point of divinity as about the decree of God. Most of all if it be true (as you say) that in all ages it hath beene most difficult, and is to common in this, *that no divine can adventure upon any other service profitable, but he must eyther enforce his passage thorough it, or come so nigh, as to doe homage to it.* As for the difficulty you speake of, as you give me no edge to imbrace it, so I profess I have no edge to oppose it. But as touchinge the commons thereof in such sort as in all profitable services to the Church, we must be driven to take notice of it, and that with appropriation to this age above all ages that went before possesseth me with admiration. For what reason can be devised why divines and fathers in former ages could

handle diverse worthy points of divinity without touching upon Gods decree, and our divines in this age can not? I doubt your care in this sentence was to vent more phrases then truthes. Three attributes you give us of Gods decree, namely, that it is *immutable*. 2. *Irresistible*. 3. *Eternall*. But the first of these you choake with strange cautions, a manifest signe that you have some stich or spleene against this attribute. The first proviso is, *if we take it in the abstract*; and you give no instance to explaine your meaning. I had thought this word, *the decree of God* had beene an abstract, and of abstract signification alone, and not indifferent to signification abstract & concrete also. *Decretum*, I confesse in the Latine is indifferent to signifie either in the abstract *Gods decree*, or in the concrete *a thing decreed*. But *Gods decree* in the English admitteth of no such equivocacion, but is of abstract signification onely and not concrete.

Your other caution by way of exegeris and interpretation of the former is no lesse strange, as when you say, *Or as it is in God*, implying that Gods decree may be taken two wayes, either as it is in God, and so it is immutable, or as it is out of God, and so it is not immutable. Now I doe not find it possible that Gods decree can be any where but in God, it being an action immanent, or intramaneant, not passing forth of God, but abyding within him, such as are all actions called elicit both in men and Angels, as the actions of their understanding, and the acts of their wills. Yet (you say) it is not agreed upon by all, either what a decree is or what to be eternall; at least the most part doe not perfectly beare in minde the true importances of an eternall decree. With these differences which you intimate, I never was acquainted, but am ready to be, as soone as you shall enforme me of them. I had thought no man had doubted what Gods decree is, as namely his purpose or resolution of will that something shall be brought forth in time, either immediately by himselfe, or by second causes and the agency of his creatures.

And as for eternity, I had thought that all had agreed in this, that to be eternall is to be either without beginning or without



without end, or both; and as applyed to Gods decree, it signifieth the being of it without beginning. But it may be you travell in childbirth to be delivered of some subtilties, which you call here the *importances of an eternall decree*. We are ready to entertaine them as soone as they come to light, with such consideration as becomes our poore abilities, in Philosophicall or Theologicall speculations.

First you tell us that to this purpose your former speculations concerning eternity of Gods infinite wisdom, have beene premised; that is to prepare for the delivery of the child: you fore-saw belike you were like to have an hard labour of it, an hard bargain. Yet if a manchild prove to bee borne, this hardnesse may well be endured, and will soone be forgotten. By the way it seemes the *importances* you speake of doe concerne as well the wisdom of Gods decree; as the eternity thereof; and therefore it is that you have premised the speculations of Gods infinite wisdom, as well as of his eternitie. And all to prevent a mischief, to wit, lest by the incogitant use of these and the like Scripture phrases (God fore-knowes, or hath decreed all things from eternity) that slumber might creepe upon the unvigilant and unattentive reader, with whose dreames many deceived have spoken of Gods decree or predetermination of things to come, as of acts already irrevocably finished and accomplished; and by a consequent error, resolve that it is as impossible for any thing to be otherwise then it is, wil be, or hath been, as it is to recall that again which is already past. The child is born, but a monster, rather then a perfect child. For the doctrine you propose savoureth strongly of making Gods decrees to be of a revocable nature. Well, let us consider it peece meale. First, the proposition, then the consequent deduced therfrom. You are jealous over your reader, & that for his good as you pretend, & that is, lest Scripture phrases should cary him too far through incogitancy, and unvigilancy, and unattentivenes, wherupon a slumber may overtake him, & he may dream of Gods decree, as of an act already irrevocably finished & accomplished. Well then to conceive of Gods decree as of an act already finished or accomplished, is but a dreame as you censure it. And dreames have great liberty to

erre from truth. Let us scanne this a little. First, doth it like you to affirme that Gods decrees are finished and accomplished, provided that they be of a revocable nature, and may bee altered? If this please you, what need you except against the conceiving of Gods decree as an act past or finished? For though it be past and finished, yet if it bee of a revocable nature it will serve your turne well enough. But if you deny it, positively and simply to be finished, what meant you to put in *irrevocably*, which manifestly implyes an acknowledgement of the finishing of Gods decree, though not irrevocably, but so as it may be revoked.

Againe, as touching the word accomplished, that is very ambiguous. For like as Gods promises which are not eternall but in time, and the significations of Gods decrees may justly be said not to be accomplished untill they be fulfilled; in like sort Gods decrees may be said in a good sense not to bee accomplished untill they be executed by performing that which God hath decreed. But you speake of the finishing of Gods decree *actu interno*, not *actu externo*. For you oppose them that maintaine that Gods decrees of things to come are already (that is, before the things decreed doe come to passe) finished. Now never any man was knowue to dreame waking any such dreame, as to thinke or affirme that Gods decrees were finished *actu externo*, that is in plaine termes executed before the things decreed were brought to passe.

Now lets examine your opinion cleared from ambiguities. I say the decrees of God were finished *actu interno* before the World was made; And I prove it thus. Every decree is finished *actu interno* when it is made and hath existence. But the decrees of God were made and had their existence before the World was (otherwise they should not be eternall) therefore the decrees of God are not onely already finished but were finished before the World was made. And the Major I farther prove thus. If before the World things were decreed by God, then also before the World, Gods decrees were made and had existence, but before the World many things were decreed by God, therefore before the World, Gods decrees were

were made and had existence.

Agayne I prove that Gods decrees are already finished *actu interno*. Every thing that hath intire and full existence is to be accompted finished, but Gods decrees already have their entire and full existence, even as God himselfe, and so had before the World was; therefore Gods decrees are already finished and so were before the World was.

Thirdly if Gods decrees be yet unfinished I demaund when they shall be finished or whether they shall for ever continue unfinished. If for ever they shall continue unfinished; then Gods executions of his decrees shall be finished before his decrees are; for they eternally shall be finished, these upon supposition never shall. If one day Gods decrees shall be finished then either before the execution of them, or with the execution of them, or after the execution. If before the execution of them, then either for a certaine space of time before the execution of them, or from eternity before them. If for a certaine space before, name that space, and give a reason why such a space of time, rather then a greater or a lesser.

Secondly shew what hath accrewed to Gods decrees whereby after a certeyne space of time they are sayd to be finished, for want whereof they could not be sayd to be finished before.

Thirdly it is manifest, this cannot holde, as touchinge the decree of creation. For as much as there was no space of time before the execution of that decree. And therefore if that decree were finished at all before the execution of it, it was finished from everlasting before it. And if that decree were finished before the World was made, then also all the decrees of God were finished before the World was made. For all Gods decrees are alike everlasting as your selfe (I thinke) will not denye. And here you propose not, this doctrine of any decree of God in speciall, but of his decrees in generall, implying thereby that it is as true of one as of another, and consequently if it holds not in any one, it fayles in all. If Gods decrees are finished from everlasting before the execution of them, this is flatly contradictory to your assertion: But if you  
thinke

thinke to say that Gods decrees are not finished *actu interno* untill they are executed *actu externo*; then they had not their full and entire existence till the execution of them; and consequently they are temporall, not eternall; and though man finisheth his decrees before hee executes them, yet God doth not.

Secondly, if nothing doth accrew to the constitution of Gods eternall decrees by the execution of them more then before; then Gods decrees cannot bee said to have their full and entire constitution more at the time of execution then before. But nothing doth accrew hereby to the constitution of Gods decree. For the execution is temporall, the decree eternall, but that which is temporall cannot belong to the constitution of that which is eternall.

If they bee not finished till after the execution, then God shall be said to execute things before hee hath fully decreed them. Adde unto this what Mr. Rogers writes in his Analysis of the Articles of the Church of England, printed by authority, and dedicated to D. Bamcroft Archiep. of Canterbury, upon the 17. Article, propos. 2. *Those wrangling Sophisters then are deceived, who because God is not included within the compasse of any time, but hath all things to come, as present continually before his eyes; doe say that God he did not in the time or age past onely, but still in the present time likewise, doth predestinate.* Thus I have considered your uncouth assertion, now I come to the consequence you draw herehence; and that is this, *It is as impossible for any thing to be otherwise then it is, will be, or hath beene, as it is to recall that againe which is already past.* But I say this consequence is unsound, and I prove it thus: To recall that againe which is past, is absolutely impossible, as implying manifest contradiction; but the impossibility of a thing to be otherwise then God hath decreed it, is meerly *secundum quid*, & *ex suppositione*. And dare you deny that Gods decrees had existence at the very beginning of the world; and is not that time long since past, though Gods decrees continue like as God himselfe, for his will is unchangeable as well as his nature? And supposing things to be decreed by God to  
come

come to passe, dare you deny but it necessarily followeth herehence, that they shall come to passe? Yet I confesse that of this consequence of yours there is some colour, but that which followeth is as wilde as ever entred into a sicke mans braine to conceive: as when you say, to make Gods decrees already finished, is to involve, *That God by his eternall and powerfull decree, did set the course of nature a going with an irresistable and irretractable swinge, and since onely lookes upon it with an awfull eye, as masters sometimes watch their servants, whether they goe the way they are commanded.* Thus it pleaseth you confidently to dēcate, and positively without all reason, that which hath neither truth nor colour of truth, as it may be made manifest in each member.

For as touching the first member; God doth not onely set the course of nature going, but continueth it going, and that not onely in working necessarily, but also contingently and freely, which manner of working is alwaies joyned with a possiblity of the contrary, and that not onely by way of resistance, but even of naturall propension also, as appeares manifestly in all free agents, whether Angels or men.

In a word, both course of nature, and course of free will is not irresistable, as appeares by the issue. For the most determinate course of nature hath beene resisted, for the Sunne and Moone hath sometimes stood still; nay sometimes the Sunne hath gone backward, and that tenne degrees in the Diall of Ahaz; the river Iordan hath stood still, and the red Sea hath beene divided; and the fire it selfe hath beene restrained from burning the three noble children cast into the fierie furnace. Onely upon supposition of the will of God, it necessarily followeth that the course of nature shall have its course, or be restrained from having his course without resistance. For who hath resisted the will of God?

Ios. 10. 12.  
13.  
2 King. 20.  
20. 11.  
Iob. 3. 13.  
Exod. 14.  
Dan. 3.

Rom. 9. 19

As touching the second member, how absurd is it to inferre that God onely lookes upon the course of nature, if the will of God concerning it be already finished. Whereas Gods will is for the continuance of the course of nature, either with disturbance or without disturbance, not of it selfe, but by the

A.C. 17.

Ioh. 5. 17.

assistance, influence, and operation of God. For in him all things live, and move, and have their being. *Pater meus usq; hodie operatur, & ego operor*, saith our Saviour. So farre are we from denying that there is as much use of power and wisdom infinite in the manning of it, as in the making of it. What odde conceits possessed you to shape so absurd a consequence from this assertion, that the decrees of God are already finished, that is, that already they have their existence? In the next line you discover the originall of this absurd fancy of yours, when you say, *And as he ceaseth not to worke, so doth he never cease to decree*. By this I perceive, you would faine have your reader confound Gods working with his decreeing, as you doe.

Indeede if we had sayde that Gods works are already finished; it would followe that he should be a spectator only and not a worker for the time to come. But we say no such thing, we say that his decrees are finished and that from everlasting, we doe not say his workes are finished. Though you are pleased to confound these to make unto you matter of extravagant discourse, yet I pray give us leave to distinguish them; Yet here you seeme to give a reason why God doth never cease to decree, and that drawne out of the Ephes. 1. 11. He worketh all things accordinge to the counsaile of his will: when I consider that which went immediately before, I thought you had hereby gone about to prove, that God ceaseth not still to decree, which is as much as to make decrees; But when I looke upon the collection you make herhence, I finde you have no such meaning: For your inference is onely this: *So that albeit the counsaile of his Will by which he worketh, be eternall; yet all things are not yet wrought by it*. Now of this no man maketh any question.

But the question in present is not whether Gods works be already finished, but whether his decrees be already finished. We say they are and were from everlasting, because from everlasting they did exist. You say they are not, but as God doth not cease to work, so he doth not cease to decree. Which in my judgement is a strange assertion, and the comparison is without

without all proportion; For Gods works are temporall, and God brings forth new works one after another dayly. But Gods decrees are eternall and therefore cannot he be sayd to bring forth new decrees dayly one after another.

And though all his workes he brings forth according to the counsaile of his will, yet both this counsaile and this will of his is eternall. Here you propose a question, *shall we say then, he hath not decreed whatsoever doth or shall befall us?* And you answer it affirmatively in a certaine sense which is this, *He doth not now first beginne to decree them.* Now I appeale to every judicious Reader to determine, whether this interpretation of yours be not plainly contradictory to the manifest meaning of that assertion which you interpret. For if God doth not now beginne to decree those things that befall us, doth it not manifestly follow herehence that he hath already decreed them, rather then that he hath not decreed them already? We willingly grant that Gods decrees have no end but continue the same still, but you would have us thinke that they are still in making.

As God himselfe was from everlasting and still continueth unto everlasting, in like sort Gods decree or will was from everlasting, and the same will of his continueth still without any alteration or shadowe of change. But albeit Gods will continueth the same without change and end, yet I finde no example to justify this phrase of yours, in saying God now decreeth the things that befall us; and you may as well say that God shall decree the things that doe befall us; and that by the same reason; for his decree hath no end. And is it a sober speech thinke you to affirme, that God doth now decree the creation of the World, or the fall of Angells, or the turning of Adam out of Paradise, or Noahs flood, or the burning of Sodome and Gomotrah with fire and brimstone? You say *it is much safer to thinke on Gods decree as present to the whole course of our life, then as it was before the World: for so we shall thinke of them as of acts past and finished, more irrevocable then the lawes of the Medes and Persians.* Well then you deny not that these decrees were before the World, if this be as much as to be



now past and finished, then also it is true, that they are acts past and finished; which you deny; If to be before the world be not to be past and finished, then to thinke of them as they were before the World, is not to thinke of them as acts past & finished, which yet you say it is, but without al reason in this case. And I pray what think you? are Gods decrees, which you dare not to deny to have had their existence before the world, of a revocable nature? Certainly they are no more alterable then that which is past irrevocable. But like as God cannot be sayd to be past, though he was before the World: Because he still continueth and shall continue for ever: So the decrees of God cannot be sayd to be past, though they were before the World; because the same will whereby he decreed all things, doth continue without all change and shall continue for ever, though the things decreed and willed by him doe change from things to come to things present, from things present to things past. *But the lawes of men suppose liberty in the makers while they are in making, which they utterly take from them being enacted.* Very well observed, and therefore let us think it fit to mainteyne that Gods decrees are still in making, and none of them made, no not the decree of creation, nor of redemption, nor of sanctification, of al the holy Parriarchs & Prophets that ever were; lest otherwise we should spoile God of his liberty. By the same reason let us maintain that God is a doing still, but never doth any thing, lest after he hath done it he have no longer any libertie to doe it or leave it undone. These conceites have as much wisdom as sobriety in them, being equally removed from both. For what sober man would make doubt but that Methusaleh was as free and had as greate liberty of will the last yeare of his age as he was or had when he was but 10. yeares old, notwithstanding many things had beene done by him in the space of 900. yeares, which to doe or not to doe in the last yeare of his age was not a thing indifferent unto him. And were it not a madde thing to affirme that the longer a man lives the more he loseth of his liberty? or that the more idley a man liveth, the more liberty he keepes in store, and the more painfull hee is, the more his liberty

liberty perisheth?

2. Gods decrees are infinitely more unalterable then the lawes of the Medes and Persians. For God cannot change, man can change. Gods will cannot bee resisted, the will of man may be resisted, even the will of the greatest Princes, by God himselfe, by his Angels, by men, by forreine enemies, by their owne subjects. The evils which by decrees are made either evitable or inevitable, are either evils of sinne, or evils of punishment; you will not say evils of sinne. For you acknowledge no such evils to be objects of Gods decrees. If evils of punishment, it is false to say that Gods decrees doe not make them as inevitable as the decrees of men. For no decrees of men doe make evils of men inevitable, but upon supposition of transgression.

Naw it is of an undoubted truth, that punishment designed by the decrees of God, is infinitely more inevitable by transgressors then punishment designed by the decree of men. For many malefactors escape the hands of men, but it is impossible they should escape the hands of God. Of the wicked in respect of the certainty of Gods judgements to overtake them, it is said, that sudden destruction shall come upon them as travaile upon a woman with childe, and they shall not escape. 1 Thess. You are besides the truth when you say that *Wisedome hath just warrant to make decrees for men*; this belongs to power and authority, not to wisedome.

The subject many times may be wiser then the Prince; yet hath he not therefore any authority over his Prince, to make lawes to binde him, but rather the Prince though inferiour in wisedome, hath power over him. But the wiser men are, the fitter they are to governe, and the more willingly and joyfully should others submit unto them, supposing the wisedome of the governour to be bound to aime at the good of the subject. But no such obligation is found in God, who as he is the Creator of all, so he made all things for himselfe. And good reason that seeing all things are from him, therefore all things should be for him. *Qui dedisti esse, quo sine essent habuisti potestatem.* When you say that, *too strict obligement unto lawes positive*

Aug. de  
prad. & gra.

or decrees unalterable, deprives both law-givers and others of their native libertie and opportunity of doing good, I finde nothing sound in all this. For you confound the libertie of nature, which is equally common to all, with liberty of condition, which is greater by farre in one then in another. Secondly, you range God the supreme Law-giver, with other law-givers which have onely power deputed unto them; no obligation unto lawes doth deprive any man of liberty naturall. For whatsoever is forbidden any man, yet is hee never a whit the lesse naturally free to the doing of it then before, though in case he transgresse, he is subject to censure and punishment. And of this naturall libertie you speake of hitherunto, as being most proper for the nature of decrees, that is, liberty from coaction and naturall necessitation, though now you divert from this unto civill liberty, which is onely liberty from subjection.

As touching the lawes of men, it is fit there should be a Court of Chancery for mitigation, because men cannot foresee all cases that may fall out, and by too strict observation of lawes, *summum jus* may prove *summa injuria*. But this cannot without great absurdity be applyed unto the decrees of God, who from everlasting was ignorant of nothing, but foresaw all things that were to come. And by the way, what doe you manifest hereby, but a strange fancy, that in some respects it were fit Gods decrees should be alterable, lest otherwise hee might be deprived of liberty, in taking opportunity of doing good: implying withall, that God in course of time takes notice of something, whereof from everlasting hee was not conscious. And though the Pope in reserving to himselfe power and liberty to send them forth or call them in againe, doth take upon him more authority then is fit, because hee hath neither wisdom nor integrity answerable to so great authority: yet seeing God wants neither wisdom nor integrity, it seemes fit in your judgement (as may appeare by the tenour of this sentence) that he should make decrees, and recall them at his pleasure. And so though at the first entrance upon this discourse, and since also you professed that Gods  
decrees

decrees were unalterable ; yet here you plainly signifie that Gods wisedome and integrity may well beare him out in exercising such authority as the Pope usurpes , to wit in making grants at pleasure, and at pleasure to revoke them. Which I confesse the Pope doth with a great deale more ease, then he doth draw in the same breath, which once hee hath breathed out ; which if he doth, yet certainly it is more then it is in his power to doe at his pleasure, unlesse hee hath some extraordinary device that I know not of. I doubt your mysteries are not yet full ; you seeme to commend the condition of mutability, as a condition besitting the wisedome and integrity of God ; it remaines that you doe as much disgrace immutability and count it an impotent condition, that so with the better grace you may reject it, as unbecoming the nature of God. In the next sentence you utterly forsake your text, and whereas in congruity to the precedent discourse you should shew how alteration of decrees is no signe of a fickle disposition, you nothing to the purpose tell us that the alteration of awards is no signe of a fickle disposition. For by the same decree may different awards be executed, without any revocation or alteration of the decree. It was long agoe the saying of Gregory, that *Deus mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam*. But by the way you signifie that the former practice of Popes in making grants and recalling of them, is no signe of mutability. A manifest untruth. Nay your selfe laboured to justifie such a change, as to make grants and to revoke them as an apparant change: but you justified it by the opportunity to doe the greater good thereby, provided that wisedome and integrity bee answerable. So that though it be no vicious change as you would have it, yet apparantly there is a change. But the administration sometimes of rewards, sometimes of punishments doth argue I confesse no mutability in decrees. One and the selfe same lawes of men doe cause the different administration of rewards and punishments to divers persons, yea and to the selfe same persons at different times, without all colour of change in the lawes themselves.

Greg. in  
Iob. l. 16.  
Mat. cap. 6.

Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which  
went

went before, I will not enquire, for what doe I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets. But in my judgement you doe not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by lawes then by the wils of men. For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good lawes, as from governing well by will and pleasure. But if men are to chuse, the reason in my opinion why they will chuse to be governed by lawes, is because by lawes they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice, and accordingly judge thereof, and if they like and approve it, they may the better submit unto it. But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute, they cannot judge of executions before they come, because they know them not, they being left to the pleasure of men, and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them, if they prove evill. And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give lawes and to execute justice thereby, then to bee trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure; because such men come indifferent to the making of lawes, which may bee particularly interested in the manner of execution. For executions are only in particular cases, which particular cases may in speciall concerne them that have the execution of justice. As for example, the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himselfe, or a brother, or neare of kinne, which is a shrewd temptation to provoke him (though otherwise vncorrupt and fit enough to make generall lawes) in this particular case to strain a good conscience, and by partialitie to corrupt the course of justice.

Secondly, in case government is by succession; lawes are most necessary, because the most wise and uncorrupt Prince is not sure to beget one like to himselfe, or if hee should yet is it not in his power to leave it unto him at such a time as by ripenes of age and experience he shall be fit for government: and by experience wee finde that many times good government in the father doth degenerate into tyrannie in the sonne. And it is true that good Princes as true fathers of their countrie and people, have sometimes remitted off their absolute-  
 selfe,

nelle, the better to enjoy the heartes of their subjects (which is the best maintenance of perpetuity) then by force to compell them. Yet by your leave every Act, wherunto princes passe their consent doth not reſtraine them of their former liberty, or abate ſomething of their preſent greatnes. For unto all acts of Parliament the King conſents; yet in conſenting to give him 5. Subſidies in a yeare, or reſtoring and conſirming unto him the cuſtomes called runnage and poundage, I doe not find that hereby he either remitts of his former liberty, or abates any thing of his preſent greatnes.

It is true the lawes of men can have no greater perfection then men that make them; and therefore they are ſayd *non cavere de particularibus*; for it is impoſſible that they ſhould comprehend all occurrences, yet in this caſe there is an helpe in Chriſtian ſtates having a court of chancery eſtabliſhed for the remedying of ſuch inconveniences; without ſo much as taking any notice of the Pope, as the Chancellor of Chriſtendome. For if S. Peter himſelfe were alive and Biſhop of Rome, yet what ſhould he have to doe with governing of States? Our Saviour would not meddle with dividing of inheritances, and profeſſed his Kingdom was not of this world, & Peter is commanded out of his love to his Maſter to feede his ſheepe, not with any civill coercitive power and authority to governe them. Yet Popes have layd title I confeſſe to both ſwordes: but the unfitteſt that ever were to manage either, ſuch abominable abuſes and corruptions have beene found amongſt them in the managing of both, as I think are without example.

But that rule of the Canonists, *Papa nunquam ſibi ligat manus* doth much inamour you, and greate zeale both inflame you to applye it unto God, to free him from *impotent immutability*, as hereafter you call it, and that his decrees may not oblige him, and indeed they doe not; for how can he be ſayd to be tyed or reſtrayned that is confined to nothing againſt his will, but to every thing according to his will? But to free God from an impotent immutability, you would have his decrees, not alterable, (for you dare not profeſſe ſo much) but

something els, I know not what, which you call *reservation of liberty*, and to be still as it were in making decrees, but not having decreed any thinge till the time of execution or afterward: mysterious inventions of your owne braine, which if perhaps you seeme to understand your selfe, I assure you I doe not: but hence it is that you discourse so much of the Pope in this.

3. In this Section, you beginne with telling us *that God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction*. This is a truth and will nothing serve the turne of your reaches. By the way you deliver unto us the object of Gods foreknowledge, and that you say is whatsoever will be; and the object of Gods decree, and that you say is whatsoever may be, which later is a most absurd position. Looke we upon the decrees of men the wisest of men, were they ever knowne to decree that a thing may be done? But rather supposing many things may be done they make choyce to decree the doing of such courses, as seeme most convenient. Things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is possible unto God which God can doe, or which he hath power to cause, that it be brought to passe. As for example, before the World was made it was possible that the World should be made, was this by vertue of Gods decree? Did God decree it to be possible? If he did, seeing his decrees are free it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been possible or no.

Againe, was not the creation of the World, is not the end of the World decreed by God, the rewarding of the godly & the punishing of the wicked, are they not decreed by God? What move you then to make only things possible the object of Gods decree, and the things that will or shall be onely the object of his foreknowledge? This witt of yours is able to make us a newe World of Divinity and Philosophy both, if it be let alone to runne a wilde goose race at pleasure. Well, *God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction*. What of this? In the next place, you tell us that,

what



*what grant or promise soever he makes cannot binde the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time: they last no longer then Durante beneplacito: seeing gracious equitie, and only it, is his everlasting pleasure.* Be it to that gracious equity is his everlasting pleasure; and will it not follow herehence that seeing all his promises doe proceed from his gracious equitie, and this you say is his everlasting pleasure, and his grants and promises must last you confesse during his good pleasure, is not this enough to assure us that whatsoever grants and promises God doth make, they doe so farre bind God to performance, that we may assure our selves they shall stand good for ever and never be reversed? Onely you discourse that they shall last no longer. And what sober man would expect or desire that they should last longer then for eternitie? Or what wisdom is found in such discourse as laboureth to prove that Gods grants shall last no longer then during pleasure, and willall confesse that his pleasure is everlasting. But no promise you say, *bindes the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time*: It is fit to consider this. To my judgement Gods promises binde him as much, as our promises bind us; the force of which obligation is not to bind our liberty, but to keepe our honestie: For what promise soever he makes, he is still free naturally whether he will performe what he hath promised or no; but if he breaks his promise he shall be untrue. In like sort God if he should doe otherwise then he hath promised, he should be untrue, though never a whit the lesse free. And in doing what he hath promised he is both true and never a whit the lesse free.

For even men doe freely keep their promises though not alwayes willingly, because when they promised they might be of one judgement and disposition, and when they come to performance they may be of another. But all such change and alteration is not to be found in God. Every honest Magistrate is free to recompence every man according to his evill ways; for it becomes him not to make any such promise that whatsoever he committs, he will not punish him. And looke what a good Magistrate resolves upon, when facts are

committed eyther good orevill; the like may God decree from everlasting. For no Magistrate knowes so well what man hath committed, as God from everlasting knows what he will commit. And more then that, God knowes how to keepe man from evill courses, or to expose him to evill courses, by having mercy on whom he will, and hardening whom he will; which power and wisdom is not incident to a creature. Besides all this, a Magistrate is bound by duty, to recompence every man according to his works. But God is not bound by any such duty, to any such course. He can pardon one and punish another; have mercy on one and deale severely with another. Of many men taken in the same transgression he can give repentance to some, deny repentance unto others. And if he hath made any such promise as this. If his children forsake my lawe and walke not in my judgements, if they break my statutes and keep not my commandements; then will I visite their transgressions with the rodd and their iniquity with strokes, yet my loving kindnes will I not take fro him, neither will I falsify my truth; they to whome such promises are made, may be assured hereby that God is bound to perform as much, bound I say by morall obligation in such sort, as it is impossible he should doe otherwise, yet shall he perform it never a whit the lesse freely; First in respect that he doth it not by coaction and necessitation, and because he is as well pleased still to doe it as to promise it. For as much as looke of what judgement and disposition he was when he promised, of the same he is when he makes it good; and consequently performs it as willingly as he made it.

It is not alwayes so with man in the execution of his promises. If Gods *one and indivisibly everlasting decree without any variety or shadow of change fits all the changes, severall dispositions and contingent actions of men and Angels, as exactly as if he did conceive and shape a new Law for every one of them*; what moved you heretofore to profess that the reservation of libertie, and that to make grants and to revoke them, is a point of so high perfection, as that you would faine bestow it upon the nature of God? What meane you here to profess that

God

Psal. 49.  
30. 31. 32.  
33. 34.

God ceaseth not to decree, which to my understanding sounds as if the meaning were, that God is still in making of new decrees. Gods decrees continue I confesse as God himselfe continueth, and more unalterable then lawes of Medes and Persians. But neither could they bee said in this respect not to cease to make lawes, so neither can God bee said not to cease to make decrees. For like as while lawes are in making, they are not yet made; so to intimate that Gods decrees are in making (as you doe while you say God ceaseth not to decree) is to imply that Gods decrees are not yet made; which you doe more plainly signifie in the words following, when you say, *They are conceived and brought forth as well besitting them as the skinne doth the body, which nature hath enwrapped in it.* Wherby you manifestly profess that Gods decrees are brought forth in time, not onely the executions of them, and thus howsoever you flatter your readers eare with bestowing on Gods decrees the title of *everlasting*, yet you plainly declare your minde that they are brought forth in time, together with the execution of them.

And hereto properly tends that *reservation of libertie* which you magnified as an *high perfection*, and the *power of the Popes to make grants and revoke them*, as a power onely fit for God. And to this purpose you seeme to discourse of eternall liberty, making use thereof to draw his decrees to a temporall condition, lest if they were eternall, they should deprive God of liberty. Let every indifferent reader judge whether this bee not the language of your heart, disclosed by the tenour of your discourses, howsoever you stile Gods decrees eternall; herein like unto boat-men, that looke one way and row another.

Besides, by this discourse of yours you seeme to acknowledge no other decrees of God then in rewarding them according to their workes; for hitherto tends the congruity of Gods decrees, which after your manner you amplify as no lesse congruous to the actions of men, then the skinne to the body. A very good resemblance by the way, that as the skin doth besit the body, so Gods recompences doe besit mens

2f. 45. 13.  
1 King.  
13. 2.  
Gen. 15. 14  
Ex. 3. 20.

workes. Yet this you apply most incongruously to Gods decrees (for thereof runnes your discourte) and not to the executions of them, and withall as touching the actions of men, though never so gracious, though actions of faith, love, repentance, these I say are not objects of Gods decrees in your Divinity; but onely the rewards of them. No not Cyrus his restoring of the Iewes, nor Iosiahs burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar, nor the children of Israels comming out of Ægypt, nor Pharaohs dimission of them; and infinite the like, God decreed none of these by your doctrine. He decreed onely the contingency of these actions, not the actions themselves.

Which doctrine of yours you are not willing to take notice of, when in the next words according to your course of argumentation, you tell us, *No man living (as you take it) will avouch any absolute necessity from all eternity, that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line from the priesthood, or his two sonnes destructions by the Philistims.* For here you seeme to imply a grant that God decreed it; but not inevitably, and that upon his decree there followed a necessity of his deposition, but not absolute. Now it is well knowne that Solomon deposed Elies house in Abiathar freely, and the Philistims by free actions of theirs were the death of Elies sonnes. And therefore if God decreed them, the very free actions of men are the objects of Gods decrees; and consequently no action by the freedome thereof is any way hindred from being the object of Gods decrees. All which is directly contrary to your opinion, who maintaine contingency to bee the object of Gods decree, and not the thing contingent, as you have plainly exprest and professed in another Treatise; and but erst you made the decrees of God to be brought forth suitable to the actions of men, as if the actions of men were no objects at all of Gods decrees.

Again, is it a sober distinction which here you imply, as if the decrees of God were some evitable, some inevitable; well it may be accommodated to the executions of Gods decrees, but most absurdly to Gods decrees, which being everlasting

lasting as you confesse, were before any thing could have existence to avoid them. Yet we plainly professe that God decreeth some things to come to passe necessarily as workes of nature, some things contingently as the actions of men. Againe, some things to come to passe inevitably, as the end of the world, some things to come to passe evitably, as the judgments of God, which may bee avoided by repentance. But you desiring to speake home, tell us that no man will avouch that it was necessary that God should decree the deposition of Elies house. Indeed decrees are free, or else they are no decrees. Neither the making of the world, nor the ending of the world was necessarily decreed by God, but freely. Yet you come very soberly to this asseveration, and adde very cautiously (I take it) implying this to bee your opinion, not daring too confidently to avouch it to be the opinion of others, And as if you were fearfull lest you should deliver something unawares that might lie open to exception, you propose it of absolute necessity; and so you think *That no man living* (whether of them that be dead any have thought otherwise, that matters not) *will avouch that from all eternity there was an absolute necessity that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line.* So that though a man should say that it was necessary that God should decree such a deposition, yet if hee doth not say that it was absolutely necessarie; or if hee doth say it was absolutely necessary that God should decree it; yet if hee doth not say that this was so from all eternitie, or though he should say this also, yet he shall not contradict you, provided he do not say that God did inevitably decree it.

And surely I cannot but commend your wary proceeding in this, and if you had used the like warinesse in everie sentence, he had need rise betime that would goe beyond you in this kinde of warinesse and circumspection; yet to make all sure, you give a reason of it, saying, *For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternall liberty.* And herein you say verie true, for if it were absolutelie necessarie for him to decree this, surely it were not absolutelie free for him whether to decree it or no.

Yet

Yet I finde some in opinion have transgressed in this later, but never any in the former. For Aristotle a great Philosopher hath denied God to be a free agent, and conceived him to be a necessary agent, yet never beleevved that it was necessarie for him to decree the deposition of Elies house, or ought else. And therefore you doe not well to prove a more plaine thing by that which is lesse manifest. We have as good stufte in the next. *To say that before Elies dayes God past any act that could constrain his eternall libertie of honouring Elies family, as well as any others, were impiety, because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immutability.* Herehence are certaine Aphorismes to be selected, worthy our consideration. 1. *God is not to be charged with any thing that is impotent; but there is a kinde of immutability that is impotent; therefore God is not to be charged with such an immutability.* Now to attribute unto God hat which doth not become him, is a kinde of blasphemy. The contradictorie hereunto doth become God, and must be attributed unto him, to wit, immutability. For mutability and immutability are termes contradictorie; and it is one of the most generall principles that are, that one of two contradictorie termes may be attributed to any thing, therefore if it be blasphemy to say God is immutable, it is no blasphemy to say that God in some cases at least is mutable. And in *hac Amphiatra sub terram abdita*? Old Prophet Ma'achy dost thou heare this, that hast instructed us this to be the voice of God, I the Lord am not changed? And thou Iames the Apostle, how hast thou deceived us in telling, that *with God there is no variableness nor shadow of change*? Yet now we are taught that it is no lesse then blasphemy to say that God is altogether immutable, yea it is to ascribe impotencie unto him. Hee must be mutable that he may be potent.

Mal. 3. 6.  
Iac. 1. 17.

Well, let us consider wherein this impotent immutability doth consist, to wit, *in not being able to reverse his owne act*: so then potent mutability consists in being able to reverse his owne act. Here by the way it is acknowledged that Gods decrees are acts past, otherwise in doing contrary thereto there were no colour of mutability. Yet hitherto it hath beene denied

denyed, that Gods decrees were acts past. And by not passing of them there was conceited a reservation of liberty. For so you thought better to discourse, then at the first to professe any revocable nature of Gods decrees. But now that conceyte not fadging, and your selfe as it seemes not throughly satisfied, you plainly breake forth, and adventure to mainteyne that notwithstanding Gods decrees are acts past, yet he can change them, and thus farre he is mutable, and to say that God is immutable herein, is to charge him with impotency.

From the first I looked for this, and at length the partridge is sprunge. But you will say, otherwise his liberty is restrained. I answer, this is a vayne fiction, proceeding from the vayne consideration of mans infirmities, and attributing them unto God. For man after he hath promised a thing, afterwards would fayne break his promise, either because he made it improvidently, or because he is of a fickle disposition; and therefore in performing his promise he doth it in a sort against his will. But no such improvidence is found in God, no such fickle disposition is incident to him. And therefore his will being the same still and that for good cause, his liberty is the same still. For liberty extends no farther then to doe what we can or will.

Now though God can doe otherwise absolutely, yet he will not doe otherwise; and supposing that he hath decreed to doe this it is impossible that he should doe otherwise. For God cannot change his will, for as much as all change of will in the creature, proceeds from such imperfections as are not incident to the nature of God, as namely, improvidence, or forgetfullnes, or sicklenes or the like, and yet doe not we say that *the deposition of Elies race, or the death of his Sonnes* were absolutely necessary.

But God had ordained them to come to passe contingently that is with a possibility to the contrary, and upon supposition not only of their miscarriage, but also of the will of God thus to punish their miscarriage. If you rest your selfe upon such a decree of God, *They that dishonour me them will I disho-* 1. Sam. 2.  
30.

now what need you trouble the World with such distastfull



speculations, as to affirme that to say God is immutable, is to charge him with Impotency? But this is an indefinite proposition, and if this be all the decree you acknowledge in God, you must deny that the will of God to depose Elies line in particular from the Priesthood, was eternall, and affirme thus it had its beginning by way of reservation of liberty, but not to doe it untill Ely had dishonoured God. And such proposition as these undoubtedly are the best grounds for these your extravagant speculations; and these doe farre better suite with your first course, namely as touching reservation of liberty, and suspension of resolution, then with revocation of his decrees considered as acts past.

But the common and generall opinion of making Gods decrees eternall made you to shuffle in that a long time; and at length plainly to fall fowle upon the liberty to revoke them lest otherwise, Gods liberty should be restrayned. Of Cicero Austin sayth, that *dum homines fecit liberos, fecit sacrilegos*. And you to make God free make him immutable; and think to helpe it by giving us to understand that some kind of mutability is potent, like as there is an immutability which is impotent as you conceive.

4. In conclusion you tell us, that to think of Gods eternall decree Without admiration voyd of danger; We must conceive it as the immediate axis or center, upon which every successive or contingent, all revolves. And I professe I cannot think on this which you deliver without admiration. And the object of my admiration is, upon what axis or center your witt did revolve when you pleased your selfe with this resemblance. Yet I think there is no great danger in your meaning to make a man an hereticke. For it had neede be understood first. And he deserves to be one of your worthiest disciples that understands you in this. For like as he was a worthy Scholar that bid his Master give him positions and let him alone to prove them; so no lesse worthy a Scholar is he also, that gives his Master leave to speake what gibbrish he will, yet nothing doubts of understanding him; In this Section hereafter you say that *Gods eternall decree is coexistent to each humane thought or act on.*  
But

But in what sense it is, your *axis or center whereupon every contingent act doth revolve*, you no where explain that I know. As how every act (many of them being instantaneall) hath a revolution, or how the whole body of contingent actions being drawne into one by aggregation may be sayd to turne round. As if time from the beginning of the World unto this day did turne, and the change of things to come into things present, & of things present into things to come, were a sphericall change; or lastly how Gods decree is the center hereof, and yet coexist with every part of the circumference; These are mysteries I confesse which we cannot think upon without admiration, yet no other danger herein doe I finde in hast, besides the wasting of precious time in the consideration of so wilde and extravagant speculations. Yet one word more of this before we part. Every contingent act revolves you say upon the axis of Gods decree.

Now I demaund whether these contingent acts are the objects of Gods decrees or no. If not, what hath Gods decree to doe with them? or they with the decree of God? let them rather be thought fitt (if you please) to revolve upon the axis of Gods knowledge, and that will be with farre lesse danger unto your tenet. For this revolution of contingent acts upon the axis of Gods decree, doth favour strongly of making them the object of Gods decrees. But this you may remember is directly opposite to your tenet, who mainteyne that God decreeth contingency but not the contingent things themselves.

The next member of the first sentence in this Section had beene very mysticall, had we not beene already reasonably well acquainted with this dialect of yours in the chapter of eternity. And upon my remembrance of that your discourse, I take that, *wherein the whole frame of succession and contingency is fully comprehended*, to be no other then that precious creature called time, wherein all contingent things come to passe, and so are comprehended therein as in the measure of their existence and duration. For of such a comprehension (as I take it) you doe discourse, not of substantiall or integrall comprehension; For I see no reason why the decree of God should

not be the axis of the whole body of contingent things as well as of any particular of them, wheron to revolve. But you make a *farre greater quiescent* to be the axis of this, by which *greater quiescent*, I think you meane *Gods eternity*. For that alone is it, as heretofore you have expounded it, which *drawes all the successive parts of motion into an indivisible unity of duration permanent*. I am now almost growne as perfect in this canting language as your selfe.

But herein I had neede of your helpe for satisfaction, as touching certaine points. As namely, why *time* should be accounted by you, *an unconstant and moveable sphere*. Time I confesse cannot be conceived without motion, but it is neither motion it selfe, nor a thing moveable. Yet in the course of it to my understanding it is most constant; for things never so differēt in constancy or inconstancy are still measured with the same time; as whether motion be uniforme or difforme, swift or slow, the same or different, yet the time wherein motion is, is still the same.

But least of all doe I see any reason, why you should account time a *Sphere*. For a sphericall forme is proper unto bodyes, & such bodyes moving round are sayd to move spherically, but of sphericall time I see no congruity. Again, why should you account eternity a *farre greater quiescent*, then the decree of God, you may as well say that eternity is a *greater quiescent* then God himselfe. Eternity as it is *duratio manens*, without beginning and without end, so it is of Gods decrees also.

Thirdly it is impossible that all the successive parts of motion should be drawn into an indivisible unity of duration permanent. For motion can neither be made indivisible nor permanent. Well it may cease, but it cannot be drawne into permanency, or indivisibility. Again, duration permanent of indivisible unity (if I understand the language aright,) is eternity. But motion cannot be drawne into eternity, no more then eternity can be drawne into motion. To swallowe up motion into a vigorous rest, I understand right well what it is, I am pretty well acquainted with this language.

It is for a Sphere of Heaven to turne round in a moment, that is to turne so swiftly, as to stand stocke still. For to be where it was immediately before this instant is to stand still. Yet if such a revolution should be in an instant, then every part of the larger Sphere should have coexistence locall with all and every part of the lower Sphere under it, provided you understand it aright, & so shall every part of the lower sphere have coexistence with all and every part of the Sphere above it, without any paynes more then ordinary. And that whether it move swiftly or slowly; to wit, in an instant. This is sober discourse, is it not? For if one body may move twise so fast as another in an instant; then in halfe an instant it may move as fast as the other in an whole instant.

In the next place you tell us, that Gods foreknowledge is included in the conceyte of his eternall decree. And you speake of the foreknowledge of things contingent. For of no other things but contingent have you spoken in reference to Gods decree; hence it followeth that contingent things are the object of Gods decree, and that therefore he foreknows them, because he hath decreed them; otherwise how could the foreknowledge of such things be included in the conceite of Gods decree? But that the foreknowledge of such things depends upon Gods decree, is a thing which you impugn'd in the 8. chap. and 5. Sect. pag. 96. 97. Gods ubiquitary presence you have heretofore compared sometimes to a center, sometimes to a Sphere. And there must be an analogy as here you signify, betweene his decree and his ubiquitary presence, and therefore we must believe the decree of God to be as the axis or center upon which every contingent act revolves, but you doe not inferre that therefore it must be as a Sphere also; yet analogy requires this as well as that.

Neither did you tell us that Gods ubiquitary presence was as a center wherupon all things did revolve; though here you tell us thus much of Gods decree in respect of contingent acts. The profitable nature of this admirable conceyte is (you say) to free us from sul, icion that his necessary foreknowledge should lay a necessary upon our actions, or take away all possibility of doing  
 Ecc 3 otherwise.

*otherwise.* Now to prevent this suspicion, we have no need of these quaint fictions of yours, as in conceiving Gods decree (or fore-knowledge rather) *as an axis whereon every contingent act revolves.* We say that by vertue and efficacy of Gods decree, not onely some things come to passe necessarily, as the workes of naturall agents: but other things also come to passe contingently, that is, with all possibility of being otherwise, as the free actions of men, onely upon supposition of Gods decree, we say it necessarily followeth that such things how contingent soever, shall come to passe: but how? not necessarily, but contingently.

In like sort supposing Gods foreknowledge of things to come, (which foreknowledge of God not onely is to day, but was before the world was made, though it continueth in the notion of foreknowledge till the things are, and afterward also with the notion of knowledge) it necessarily followeth that all such things shall come to passe; but how? not necessarily but contingently. Here follows a list of what you will prove, when time serves: 1. *That the Omnipotent doth eternally decree an absolute contingency in most humane acts.* I pray tell me, had not this decree of God existence in the beginning of the world, and before that also? If it had, what meane you to say he doth decree it, as if this decree of God which yet you call eternall, had not existence till now? why doe you not or may you not as well say that God doth eternally decree the creating of the world, the turning of man out of Paradise, the drowning of the world in the dayes of Noah; the destruction of Sodome, and the like, for you have no colour of reason to justify your phrasiologie herein, but onely this, that though (Gods) decrees bee eternall, yet they still continue. Now this is as true of the decree of creation, and the rest above mentioned, as of any other decree. Secondly, what meane you to qualifie your assertion, by saying *In most humane acts*: as if you durst not avouch it of all? Are not all humane acts of a contingent nature, and consequently have a contingency in them? and why should not their contingency be decreed as well as others? It may be that herein you have refe-

rence to the Iesuits distinction, of future contingents absolutely that shall be, and future contingents conditionall that should be, if and in case some condition were put in *esse*. But how then will you prove, that the acts of men that shall be, are of a greater number, then those that might or should be, in some case? For you suppose that this absolute contingency decreed, is in most humane acts. I have a manifest reason to the contrary. For the number of things that might be upon supposition, is farre greater then the number of things that are, have beene, and shall be; for in case the world had beene made twice bigger then it is, and twice as many men as there are, and should last twice as long, the number of humane acts would be farre greater then these are, wherein God hath decreed an absolute contingency.

Againe, the Iesuits maintaine that God hath not onely decreed contingencie in humane acts, but the humane acts themselves, which you doe not: we maintaine that God decreeth the actions of men themselves, that they shall come to passe contingently and consequently; decreeth the contingency of them, but not that onely, but the actions themselves. As Pharaohs dimission of the children of Israel, God decreed not onely the contingency of it, but the act it selfe, that it should come to passe in a contingent manner. Iosiahs burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar, God decreed not onely the contingencie of this act, but the act it selfe, to wit, to come to passe in a contingent manner. So Cyrus his restoring of the Iewes out of captivitie, to their countrie, was an humane contingent act, and God decreed not onely the contingencie hereof, but the act it selfe, to come to passe in a contingent manner.

2. The second Aphorisme is, that *Gods eternall decree doth coexist to each humane action throughout the whole succession of time*. This we doe not deny, no more then wee denie Gods coexistence with every action: but heretofore you have professed, that God doth at this present coexist with all things, not onely with all things present, but with all things that are to come: and this we denie, because God cannot coexist with  
that

that which doth not coexist with him: and therefore seeing things past, and things to come, doe not at all exist at this present, and consequently doe not coexist with God, therefore we professe that God at this present doth not coexist with them.

In the next place you say, that *Gods decree doth inspire them With contingency in their choice.* It was wont to bee said, that *predestinatio nihil ponit in predestinato*; rather the execution of his decree doth bring things forth, then his decree; for his decree was from all eternitie, yet nothing was inspired into man, till the creation, nor into us men, untill we are brought forth, and grow capable of inspirations. When you talke of contingency in our choice, you might have spoken plainly and called it libertie in our choice. But doth God continually inspire this? It is too absurd: to inspire, is to bring forth something anew: as when God doth inspire good motions into us. You might as well say that God doth continually inspire a reasonable nature into us, as libertie of choice; more congruous it had beene to say, that God continually preserves it as he doth our natures. For as we are reasonable creatures we have essentially a libertie of choice in all that we doe; and he moves us so, as that we may move our selves more waies then one. But when doth he move us thus? in the very time of doing ought, or before? and so doth he move us by perswasion onely, or by mediate operation on the will? For all this whereabouts alone there is question now adaies amongst Divines, we have nothing but blankes here: you are yet onely upon the promise of performance, and not upon any performance it selfe.

*Yet whilst it moves them, it withall inevitably effecteth the proportioned consequents, which were foreordained, to the choices which we make, whether they be good or evill.* That is, God doth inevitably decree that they that die in faith and repentance shall be saved, they that die in impenitencie shall be damned. Wherein you nothing doubt to acknowledge an inevitable decree of God, to wit, of an indefinite nature, thus, *Whosoever beleeveth shall be saved, whosoever beleeveth not, shall be damned.* But that these



these men in particular shall beleeeve, and repent, and so, be saved; others shall neither beleeeve, nor repent, nor bee saved, you will be wise and wary enough to keepe your selfe from the acknowledgement of any such decree, unlesse it be provided that God be not charged with any such *impotent immutabilitie*, as not to be able to revoke his decrees. For though the Pope wants wisdom and integrity sufficient to manage such an authority and power as he challengeth to himselfe, as namely, of making grants, and againe revoking them; yet God doth not.

## CHAP. XI.

*Of transcendentall goodnesse, and of the infinitie of it in the divine nature.*

I Professe I have no desire to oppose ought in this, or in the Chapter following; yet having begunne this worke of examination it is fit to consider these also, if it be but to take notice of what you deliver, and rightly to understand the meaning thereof.

They which fetch light beyond the Sunne, must bee content with Starre-light; and they which cannot satisfie themselves with day light, but seeke for starre-light, they are well enough served if they goe to bed darkling. Wee commonly say, *Life is sweet*, and it is a truth, not because it is a principall stemme of being, in my judgment, (for reason is a more principall stemme of being then it) and yet is life as sweet to creatures unreasonable, as to creatures reasonable. And you confesse that the appetite of preservation, of it selfe is naturall unto all; yet it cannot be denyed but that life is subject to foure things as well as sweet: whereupon some have said, *Non est vivere sed valere vita*. And *αρετὴν αἰὶν ἀδελφὴν ἡ πορνεία*. Better eye out then alwaies akeing; and better out dead then alwaies dying. Nay the hope of a better state, with-

out all others consideration, may make this life of ours distastefull unto us, *I desire to be dissolved, sayth S. Paule, and to be*  
 Phil. i. 23. *With Christ*, I am not of your opinion, in your construction of the Maxime, *Omne ens qua ens est bonum*, as if the meaning were, that it is good it selfe, for that which is good; and that whereunto a thing is good, should be rather different then the same, for the termes of relation, must be distinct. Your instances, are very incongruous, you should say, that poyson is good to it selfe, not to the aspe, for the aspe is a different thing from his owne poyson, and so is the Adders sting, from the Adder. And as sure I am that even of poyson, good use may be made for the service of man; And the Scorpion cures the wound, that is made by his owne sting: And even of the Adders sting, God the Creator of it, hath a good use evē in stinging, and the heathen Man in this kind observes the providence of God when he sayth:

Τοις γὰρ ἀλτρεοις,  
 εἰν ἀλὶ καὶ γαίῃ κακὰ μύρια θηκατο δαίμων.

Dionys.  
 peri ego  
 five dis-  
 criptio or-  
 bis.

If naturall qualities of contrary nature, doe fight for the maintenance of their owne being, it seemes being to them, is as sweete, as life is to us, though life be a principall stemme of being. How transcendentall goodnes, should be equally communicated by God to all, and not equally participated, by all, I understand not: the contrary seemes true to my opinion, for as much as like as there can be no communication, where there is no participation, so there can be no equall communication, where there is no equall participation; And though a lesse vessell, may be as full as a greater, yet there is no equall communication of water unto them both; and the comparison is no way congruous, for as much as it is an easy thing, to distinguish betweene the water and the vessell, filled with it, but not so easy to distinguish betweene the thing, and the being of it. Rather thus. God doth fitt every thing with qualities, or parts according to the being thereof, or as it shall require, like as every vessell small and great are filled with water.

water. The being of a fly, of a man, of every thing is good in it selfe, and as it may be, and is referred to the glory of God, for *God made all things for himselfe.*

Prov. 16.4

But in the things that God hath created, there are degrees of perfection, some creatures have onely being, some being and life also, some adde sense unto them both, some have reason over and above them all. The degree of entitative goodnesse, cannot arise from the specificall nature of it, for so it should arise from it selfe, for the degree of entitative goodnesse in any thing and the specificall nature thereof is all one; Your other derivation of the degree of entitative goodnesse is as bad or worse, as when you derive it from the degree of their specificall nature: As if the specificall nature of a thing had degrees, which is untrue, as I remember; Aristotle compares specificall natures or formes of substances to numbers, that admit no intention or remission; three flyes are as truly three, as three Elephants.

The difference of individualls under the same species, is merely accidentall not essentiall; Thus, that one is not so happy as another, is an accidentall difference, not entitative or essentiall; It is true, sensitive appetites cannot be satisfied all at once, yet I have heard of a Russian Englishman, that in one night at Venice bestowed five hundred pounds, upon his five senses. It is not the fruition of goodnesse incident to one sense that defeates another for the time, of that it most desires, but rather want fruition thereof by your instances. For if the belly be satisfied, it is free to delight in musick also, if pinshed with hunger not so, yet too much feeding I confesse may bring a man asleepe, and make him unfit for taking any pleasure in the exercise, either of body or minde. On the other side deepe contemplation, as you say pines the body, and is occasion of farre worse accidents also sometimes; as in Archimedes whole plodding upon his Mathematicall operations, made him neglect the Souldiour that came upon him, and by neglect provoked him to set an immature and bloody end to all his studies, to the great greife of *Marcellus* the Generall, who had given chardge to the contrary. The gain-

ving of Archimedes safe into his hands, though by his art a most mischievous enemy to him, had been more worth, to an ingenuous Conquerour, then the taking of Syracusa. I have great cause to be sensible, of that of Solomons, *of making many books there is no end*, for I think if I should live Methusalehs yeares, yet I should not make an end. Much study is a wearinesse unto the fleshe, but by the goodnesse of God I find this wearinesse, with a litle refreshing quickly to vanish, and I returne unto it with as great vivacity of minde and Spirit, as ever I did before. I desire to doe the taske, which God hath appointed for me. And if death prevent me, yet it is good to dy doing something. I should put it out of doubt that *the more knowledge we get, the more is our reasonable desire of knowledge satisfied*, yet it is true I confesse the more we increase in knowledge, the greater is our immediate capacity of knowledge. For the more we know the better is our understanding and judgement, enabled to proceed in knowledge. And this capacity of ours will never be thoroughly satisfied, till the enjoying of God himselfe, yet I see not how the nature hereof hitherunto can be sayd to hinder the *entire possession of our selves*, whether contemplation be vaine or not vaine, whether it be used as a pledge of a better life to come or no, I see no reason why it hindrieth or furthereth the possession of our selves, though it hinder or further our possessing of God.

Certainly that life to come is no part of our selves, like as eternall death is no part of the damned selves. But eternall life is a condition that God bestowes upon us, and everlasting death is a iuste recompence, which God inflicts upon others. Yet in what sense contemplation may be used (as you say) as a pledge of a better life to come, I am to seeke. The Spirit of God and the fruits of sanctification, are the pledges and earnest penyes hereof, but contemplations are not; How Angels are sayd entirely to possesse their angelicall natures, and men not to possesse their natures entirely hath neede of explanation. Angels have no bodies, and consequently are not capable of augmentation as we are. In this sense I conceive how we by degrees attaine to a fulnes of age, Angels doe  
not;

not. There is a growth of our soules in knowledge also, Eph. 4. 13. in grace, 2 Pet. 3. last. This fulnesse of age is not all at once in us; you suppose it is so in Angels, but without distinction; for there are Angels of darknesse, as well as Angels of light. What thinke you of Angels of darknesse, doe they entirely possesse their Angelicall nature, or no? I should thinke they differ not in nature Angelicall, though their accidentall condition bee much different. As for the elect Angels, doe you thinke they doe already possesse all that may belong unto them, either in respect of knowledge or glory? It appears Eph. 3. 10. that the verie Angels themselves doe encrease in knowledge, and that by the Church. It seemes also, that though they are void of sinne, and so void of sorrow, in respect of themselves, yet that all teares are not wiped from their eyes in respect of us; for if there bee joy in heaven for one sinner that repenteth, what is there in respect of the falls of Gods children? No question but the nature of man at best is inferiour to the nature of an Angell. And on the other side, as little question is to be made (I should thinke) whether man shall not be as happie in his kinde as the elect Angels in their kinde: in the 20. of Luke, our Saviour professeth, that the time shall come when we shall be *ισαγγελοι*, like unto the Angels.

Gods infinity is nothing pertinent to the comparison of men and Angels, from whom Angels as well as men are infinitely distant, as the creature from the Creator; yet this infinity of Gods joy is vainly amplified, by saying, he wanteth no moment of time to enlarge or perfect it by continuance, whereas time is no measure suitable with the being of God, no nor with the being of Angels. Yet God hath continuance, it cannot be denied, both without beginning, and in respect of being, without end, which is an essentiall perfection of God, as much as any, as being but the interpretation of his necessary being, whereas all the being of a creature is meerly by the free will of God, and yet continuance to the creature addes no perfection. For will you say that the Angels and Saints of God in heaven doe grow more and more perfect

by continuance. In this world for a while we grow more and more perfect by continuance. But then againe it is as true, that by continuance we decay more and more both in body and minde.

Aristotle hath said, that *Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius*. But of the transcendentall goodnesse of God (you say) you now intreat not, but of the transcendentall goodnesse of the creature, which you make to consist in doing good to others: and withall you deliver another maxime, namely, that *amongst visible creatures, the better every one is in its kinde, or according to its entitative perfection, the more good it doth to others*. And I confesse this latter stands in much congruity with the former. But I have already shewed my dislike of the former, and given reason for it, and I see no reason to embrace the latter. A Lyon is the king of beasts, but of more good hee doth to others, then the inferiour beasts whereon he preyeth, I am nothing conscious. An Eagle is the king of birds, yet we commonly say, that a Larke is better then a Kite. What creature more profitable then the Sunne, yet I pray consider, doth not a Mouse, or an Emmet, or a Fly, in entitative perfection go beyond it? for these are animate, the Sun is not, though God sends him forth as his most conspicuous and goodly messenger every morning like a bridegroom bedeckt with light & comelines, as you are pleased to expatiate or take the aire, & breath your self in a rhetoricall flourish. God himselfe to the contemplation of whom the Sunne you say doth invite us, though from the boundlesse Ocean of his internall joy and happinesse (as you say) sweet streames of perpetuall joy and comfort more unceasingly issue, then light from the Sunne, to refresh this vale of misery. Yet I hope you will not say, his entitative goodnes consists in doing good to others.

For before he made the world, he was no lesse good, then since the creation; and though he had never made it, yet had he continued every way as good as now he is. And in that dispensation of this his goodnesse, which proceeds not from his joy and happinesse, though you say so, but from the counsell and freedome of his will; though as touching the comforts  
of

of this life, God maketh his raine to fall, and Sun to shine as well upon the wicked as upon the righteous ; yet as touching the dispensation of his grace, though he be most good, that way also, yet it is but towards whom he will ; for that Oracle of God, *I will have mercy on whom I will* ; and againe, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*, must sway more with us, then any vaine conceit or imagination of man to the contrary. And why doe you call this world a vale of misery ? is it not in respect of Gods jugements, as well as in respect of sinne ? which jugements of God have their course as well as mercies, how then doth perpetuall joy and comfort more necessarily issue from him, then light from the Sunne, to refresh this vale of misery ? Surely as the Prophet said, his song should bee of mercy and of judgement : so doth God also sometimes mourne unto us, that we may weepe, as well as at other times draw us to dance after his pipe.

You conclude with telling us the causes why men are not so happy as they might be. The one is, you say, *That they doe not beleve the eternall happinesse of their Creator to bee absolutely infinite, as his other attributes are*. The other, *That they doe not consider that the absolute infinitie of this his eternall happinesse, is an essentiall cause of goodnesse unto all others, so farre as they are capable of it*. As for the first of these, what Heathen Philosopher, that acknowledged the making of the world, that acknowledged a God, did ever doubt of his eternall happinesse, and that as infinite as any other of his attributes. As touching the other, doth not Callimachus acknowledge as much, when he saith, *Θεοῦ δ' ὀνείμας ἰδών* ? Doth not Aristotle acknowledge felicity to be from God ; and did this make them as happy as they might be ? It is true indeed, their goodnesse they conceived to be from themselves.

*Des vitam dei apes, animam mihi ipse parabo.*

And doe not you I pray concurre with them in this, even in this place ? For although you carry it in generall termes, when you say, he is the cause of all goodnesse, yet by that which fol-  
2
loweth



loweth it is manifest that you limit this unto the happy condition that followeth man upon his goodnesse; as when you say, *God is a cause of goodnesse to all that are capable of it, and capable of it all reasonable creatures by creation are, none but themselves can make them incapable of happinesse.* And where is any mention of Christ Iesus in all this? where any mention of the grace of God for the performing of this, which you make sufficient to bring them unto happinesse? It is true, God cannot be the author of evil of sin, but God forbid that we should so maintaine God to be no Author of evil, as withall to deny him to be the author of good.

Speake plainly, doe you beleeve that God is the author of faith, that God it is who gives repentance, that workes in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure? if you beleeve this, then you must beleeve that God did decree to give men faith and repentance. But this is contrary to the articles of your Creed, who professe that God doth decree contingency, but not things contingent. And who doubts but the faith of Peter, and his repentance, the faith of Paul and his repentance, were contingents? and if God did never decree them, surely he was not the author of them; for God doth nothing in time, but what he decreed to doe before all time.

And in case you did truly acknowledge God to bee the cause of all goodnesse, we would not quarrell with you about the terme *essentiall*, which with what learning you deliver, I professe I know not; but I observe you are very liberall of your words and phraises; we were never acquainted with any more then foure causes, can you tell us which of them is called by any *essentiall*, unlesse matter and forme be called essentiall, because they constitute the essence of that, whose matter and forme they are. Bnt I hope you will not say that God, in this sense, is the essentiall cause of all our goodnesse.

## CHAP. XII.

*Of the infinity and immutability of divine goodnesse,  
or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the  
creature.*

I doe not like this Title, the disjunctive argueth, that Gods goodnesse communicative as communicative, is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature, I know no patterne of morall goodnesse, which we must imitate, but that which is commended unto us in Gods Law, Gods communicative goodnesse was exercised in making of the World, and us; Is this a fitt patterne for us to imitate? As touching his providence, whereby he governs the World, we are called by our Saviour, to imitate him in some particulars, as when he suffereth his rayne to fall, and Sunne to shine on the bad, as well as on the good.

But in most particulars we can not, in many we may not imitate him; He caused two shee beares to come out of the wood, and teare 42. children that mocked Elisha, we must not imitate God in the like, we must still blesse them that curse us, and pray for them, that persecute us. 2. King. 2.  
Matth. 5.

The sense of imbecillity and indigence in our selves, even in this corrupt state of man, doth only provoke us the more, to shewe pittie unto others, in the time of their calamity according to that of Q. Dido, *Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco*: But it doth not breede it, for it is manifest that men litle exercised with the Crosse, or not at all, may shewe more mercy, then such as have beene in great misery themselves. Yet these mercifull natures having tasted of misery themselves, will be the more provoked to shew compassion unto men in misery.

2. And this is true, not onely in the corrupt state of man, but even in the state of integrity, for is it not sayd of our Saviour, that being tempted himselfe, he knew how to succour

Ggg

them,

Pfal. 107.

9.

Math. 10.

29.

Ez. k. 16.

6.9.

Rom 9.

them, that are tempted? It is now a dayes without question, among divines, that mercy and pity as they signify passions are not in God, but attributed unto him, per *αὐθαρσῶ μαθεῖται* as are the members of our body also. But the will of succouring creatures in their necessity, may with propriety enough be attributed unto God, for he heareth the cry of Ravens when they call upon him, and not a sparrowe falleth to the ground, without the providence of our heavenly Father, how much more, is his love enlarged towards man, who when they were sinners, sent his Sonne to dy for them, and when they lay weltring in their blood, sayd unto them, live, And *washed them with water, yea washed away their blood from them, and anoynted them with oyle*: Thus God hath a will to succour man in misery, and this will, and grace, and favour of God is in Scripture phrased, called mercy. *But he sheweth this mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*, I wonder you should applaud that saying; *Nemo sponte malus*, which hath no colour of truth; Save in respect of originall sinne, traduced to Adams posterity of which originall sinne, the Author of that saying was utterly ignorant; And you in another sense treading the authors stepps, seeme to mainteyne it, not in respect of any naturall corruption that hath sowed our natures, but in respect, rather of the perfection of our soules, and their native inclination unto good, *for externall things, you say, doe so captivate the humane soule, that she cannot doe, as she would, but these strings, being cut, she followeth her native sway*: And hereupon you come in with the approbation of this, *Nemo sponte malus*, manifesting thereby, that you acknowledge the native sway of the soule to be unto good.

But by the way you cast your selfe upon an erroneous assertion, convictable of untruth, by the very light of nature; as when you say, that externall things doe captivate the soule; as if the object had power to the will, which is a conceipt contrary to all Philosophy and Divinity. And nothing indeed, but a mans owne corruption is it that captivates him unto evil. For let Ioseph be tempted with a wanton Mistris, yet is lust be mortified within him, her wanton invitation, shall never

never captivate Ioseph. No nor the ladies admitted to his  
 presence, could inflame Scipio Adricanus, though a man of  
 warre, with a lustfull appetit. Shewe a Lyon grasse he is  
 nothing affected with it sayth Decumenius, because it is not  
 the dyet of a Lyon, but of an Oxe; Shew an Oxe flesh, he hath  
 no appetite unto it, for fleshe is no diet for an Oxe, but for a  
 Lyon rather; *every man is tempted, (sayth S. Iames) when he is  
 drawne away by his owne concupiscence and entised.* And by wor-  
 king upon this concupiscence, it is that the Divell leades men  
 captive, to doe his will, no such matter could he finde in our  
 Saviour.

Decum. u-  
 pon the pa-  
 rable of the  
 fower that  
 went forth  
 to sow.  
 Iam. i. 14.  
 2 Tim. 2.  
 last.

And so much some conceived to be signified, when he  
 sayth: *The Prince of the World commeth and findes nought in me:*  
 Yet cannot the Divell certainly prevaile to every particular,  
 nor to any particular, so as to iustifie, that man doth not that  
 evill which he doth *sponte*; for even beasts doe *sponte* whatfoe-  
 ver they doe, and man even the worst of men doth not onely  
 of his owne accord, that which he doth but voluntarily also,  
 yea and freely too; And yet the Divell is none of those exter-  
 nall things you speake of, with farre more colour of reason  
 did they proceed, who mainteyned, that looke what me did of  
 passion, they did not voluntarily, fetching the restraynt of  
 doeing voluntarily, not from things externall, but internall ra-  
 ther even from the passion themselves, but even this also is  
 learnedly confuted by Aristotle long agoe.

Eth. 3.

3. We must with patience expect and wait, till you come  
 to your text, and intreat of the theame propoed, to wit of the  
 infinity and immutability, of divine goodnesse communicative. The  
 first sentence is not well stated; for Sarah was old stricken in  
 age, and it ceased to be with her after the manner of Women, when  
 hearing from the Lord, something concerning the concea-  
 ving of a child by her, she sayd; *After I am waxed old, and my*  
*Lord also, shall I have lust?* Lust, certeynly may be in old age  
 and not a sinne, lust is one thing, inordinate lust is another  
 thing, and where lust is, why should it seeme a Monster, in  
 corrupte nature, for that lust to be inordinate? And if a proud  
 man be brought to a beggars condition, why should it seeme

Gen. 18. 12



hotte fire, desires to be cold as earth, and the cold earth desires to be as hote as fire.

Why doe you not proceed in expressing the good opinion you have of a naturall man, even of the worst of men, and say that they have a desire to repent, to please God, to be holy, to be religious? Continuance in sinne was wont to bee called *altera natura*, and *secunda natura*; and the Prophet justifieth it, where hee saith, *Can a blacke Moore change his skinne, or a Leopard his spots? then may ye also doe good, that are accustomed unto evill.* The sight of Gods judgements causing feare, may restrain from evill, like as an hedge of thornes, crossing a mans way, may hinder him from finding his paths: But as for impulsions unto goodnesse, in a man abandoned unto his lusts, and who, as the Apostle speakes, commits sinne with greedinesse, and is growne to *ἀναλυσία*, I know none. And Seneca seemes to be your onely Oracle for this; a proper master for a Christian Divine to rely upon. And yet upon the scanning, Seneca alledged by you in this place, I finde pleades against you, rather then for you, as who plainly professeth, that *They who erre in matters of life and manners, are delighted with their errors; every criminall person is delighted with his crime, one so-laceth himselfe in adultery, another delights in over-reaching others, and in theft.* He saith, that naughtinesse is afraid of darknesse it selfe, which may restraine from evill, I confesse, but this gives no evidence of any impulsion unto goodnesse, no more then his last conclusion, that *naughtinesse may be safe, but never secure.* Which conclusion serves you for a passage to the next Section.

4. It is very true, an evill conscience will not suffer a man to be secure; for if a good conscience be a continuall feast, surely an evill conscience holds a man continually upon the racke. *Occlutum quatiante animo tortore flagellum.* The Wicked flye when no man pursueth him, saith Solomon; and, *There is no peace,* saith the Lord, to the Wicked. It was one of the Iudgements God threatned to his owne people, when they persisted in their obstinate courses against him; namely, that *the sound of a lease should chase them, and they should flye, no man pursuing them:* but

this is no evidence of any impulsion unto goodnesse. And when Seneca saith, *Even in mindes drencht in the dregs of filthinesse, there remains still a sense of goodnesse*: this is no more then that which the Apostle informeth us of, when he saith, they have a conscience accusing them, by vertue of that law that is written in their hearts: yet the Apostle doth not extend this to them that are drencht in the dregs of filthinesse. Hee acknowledgeth elsewhere, that some through the course of sinne become past all feeling, and have their conscience seared with an hot iron. And it is a proverbiall speech in the world, *Nemo senex metuit Iovem*. Yet it is one thing to have a sense of goodnesse by the conviction of their conscience, & a farre different thing to have an impulsion unto goodnesse.

Be it that the minds of man *in that it is indued with reason, both the rules of equity imprinted in it*, is it not as true, that the rules of iniquitie are imprinted in it also? doth he not know evill as well as good? Nay, hath he not more knowledg of evil then of good, at least as touching the compassing of it? doth not the Lord complaine of this, where he saith, *They are wise to doe evill, but as touching good they have no understanding*. If this were so amongst men brought up in the Church of God, what was the condition of those that were *aliens from the common wealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise?* especially considering what difference the Apostle puts betwene these, when he saith, *We Jewes by nature, not sinners of the Gentiles*.

And therefore if it belongs to the mind to seek to instamp her rules upon inferiour faculties, she shall be as forward to stamp rules of iniquity, as rules of equity. And with what congruity I pray you may rules of equity be said to bee stamped upon faculties, that are not intellectuall? appetites are guided by rules, in their motions, not instamped with them. Rules of knowledge are circumstant to appetites of doing, not inherent in them. And why should not these rules of equity be stamped on the will, as well as on sensuall appetites? or if it be so, why should you reckon the will an inferiour facultie in comparison to the minde? whereas indeed the will rules in



man as king, the minde is but his privie Councillor.

To quash an exception that might arise against your tenet touching the integrity of nature, as thus, If the minde have such good rules, and withall seekes to instamp them upon inferiour faculties, how comes it to passe that there is so little love of vertue in many? your answer is, that this proceeds from their disposition, *being over-growne with sensuall desires.* But by your leave this is a weake reason, for it onely transfers the difficultie, but answers not the doubt; for still I may demand, how it came to passe that these rules of equity did not prevent the growth of these sensuall desires, and without grace what place is left for any goodnesse in the nature of man? Philosophers had a love of vertue, but can you shew they had any love of God? their most vertuous actions in the state of nature, was not Austin bold to call them *splendida peccata*, glorious sinnes? For the discerning of true vertue aright he gives us this rule, *Noveris non officiis, sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes.* I am sure they were not ordered by Gods word, nor referred to his glory, nor proceeded from acknowledgement that all power of doing good was from God, yet they looked for justification by them: and as for repentance and confession of sinnes, they make that no part of their integrity. So that whether their knowledge were in a mist, or out of a mist, it brought them never a whit the nearer unto God: as the Sunne, whether in a mist or out of a mist, was never knowne to set moist stoffe on fire, but first dries it, then fires it. And our Saviour was bold to professe, that *Publicanes and Harlots entered into the kingdome of heaven before Scribes and Pharises.*

Aug. contra Iul. Pet. lib. 4. c. 3.

Mat. 21. 31.

If the notions of the minde be ideall characters, you may, if it please you, bestow the phrase as well on notions of evill, as notions of good; and if the good have so slippery an impression upon the *unfettered affection of youth*, it seemes the bad are more permanent; yet these naturall notions of good are farre distant from true notions of God, or of true goodnesse; *A heart hardened with vast desires, you say, is hardly cured;* but I pray tell me, when one man transgresseth for an handfull

of

- Ezek. 13. of barley, or a morsell of bread, another saith, *Si violandum*  
 19. *est ius impij causa violandum est.* which of these is the greater  
 hardnesse? yet as a stone by losing somewhat of his substance  
 may take another shape, so you signifie the hardest heart may  
 be wrought into a new frame. I confesse, to make a Camell  
 Mahe 10. goe through the eye of a needle, is not impossible unto God:  
 25.  
 Gal. 1. 11. and what naturall man hath not a body of sinnes to be cut off  
 by spirituall circumcision? but that this you make to bee a  
 worke of grace, you give not the least intimation: nay you ra-  
 ther imply the contrary, when you say, that *if hopes of supplies*  
*from internals bee intercepted,* a worke that may bee done by  
 courte of nature, then you say, *the soule thus freed, becomes more*  
*fashionable to reason*; a saying that would become Seneca well,  
 that knew no reason but naturall; but full ill becoming a  
 Christian Divine: let desire be never so vast, as you speake,  
 let seven devils possesse a man, yet the strong man Christ, by  
 the power of his grace is able to cast them out, and make even  
 Ekron become as the Iebusite.

- Zach. 9. 7. Without grace, will any mans morality commend him in  
 the sight of God? As Lebanon is turned into Carmell, so  
 Carmell becomes as the high places of the forest. And most  
 morall men have beene as great enemies to Christianity, as  
 any other; like as the Scribes and Pharises were greatest ene-  
 mies unto Christ. Why you should call that a superficiall  
 draught of reason, that endeavoureth to *stampe the heart with*  
*reall and solid kindnesse.* I know no reason; this in my judge-  
 ment deserves to be accompted a substantiall operation. And  
 when you tell me that Affability consists in this, you goe a-  
 bout to teach me more then ever I learned out of Aristotle. I  
 had thought affability might have place in all men, as a morall  
 vertue, whether they were enabled to *stampe the heart with*  
*reall and solid kindnesse* yea or no. This affability you grant  
 to Epicures, but not temperance; yet Epicurus, if my reading  
 deceive me not, was knowne to bee as temperate a man in  
 moderating his appetite, as most that then lived. And that be-  
 cause he made mans happinesse to consist in pleasure, the sense  
 whereof was quickned by temperance, and dulled by intem-  
 perance.

perance. And therefore little cause there is to charge him with uncharitablenesse to his neighbours or brethren, either in time of plenty, or time of scarcitie. You doe him the greater wrong, to charge him, with sucking in cruelty as wine, and feeding upon the needy as upon delicates: neither will your good phrases make him amends in words for the wrong you doe him in deeds; as for cutting morsels out of other mens throats; this is a phrase incongruous for an intemperate mans diet: is fitter for a superstitious Papist, that in case the Priest should vomit the host, thinkes the people bound to lick it up.

The close of this ninth Section complies with the beginning of the first; betweene which, what suitable matter hath occurred, let the Reader judge. Though indigence be the mother of cruelty, yet herehence it followeth not, that it is not the mother of pitty, for, *Rara est concordia fratrum*: Cleocles and Polynicus both had one mother, yet there is a great difference in indigence, as the cause of these. Indigence heretofore suffered, is made the cause of pitty; but indigence in present alone, is the cause of cruelty, and that onely in case it cannot be relieved but by cruelty.

§ Philosopher-like, or rather meere naturalist-like, you make error of judgement the root of all evill: as the cause of covetousnesse you make to be the opinion of want, either that is for the present, or may be for the time to come. How farre are you different from Aquinas, who maintaines, that our wills are more corrupt, *quoad appetitum boni*, then our mindes, *quoad intellectum veri*: yet the Poet seems to have had another conscience in that of his, *Video moliora proboque deteriora sequor*. Saint Paul, I thinke, was a man regenerate when he made that profession, *I see a law in my members rebelling against the law of my minde, and leading me captive to the law of sinne*. It is true, there are bosome sinnes (as wee call them) like familiar spirits to particular men, and so they may be dispensed withall in these, they will shew themselves very morrall in other points; and thinke it reason God should be mercifull unto them in breaking one commandment, so they

Rom. 7.

keepe the other nine. Herod heard Iohn Baptist gladly, untill hee toucht upon the keeping of his brother Phillips wife. Judas was content to follow Christ, so he might beare the bagge, and so long as hee could make best wages by his service; but thirty pices of silver mooved him to give his master the bagge, and to betray him. A man for judgement able to arbitrate and voide of exorbitant affections, which might expose him to partialitie or prejudice, no doubt is the fittest arbitratour. But if you aske me whereto this running discourse tends, I cannot answer you yet, it may bee you may answer your selfe hereafter. *Internall moderation mixt with outward competency, is the onely supporter of true constancy.* I had thought, integritie had made a man fit for arbitrament, not constancy, for constancy may be in courses unjust as well as just; I presume, it proceeds from constant integrity, That content is little commendable that depends upon sufficiencie of estate, not onely competent, but more then competent. And to my thinking, even in the course of naturall morality, a vertuous condition should not depend upon outward things; the exercise of vertue doth, I confesse, but not vertue it selfe. Bias his saying was, *Omnia meo mecum porto*: but wee are taught of a better Master, that, *Godlinesse is great gaine with contentment*, and that *the righteous eateth to the contentation of his minde*, which is delivered without distinction of poore or rich, like as that which followeth, *The belly of the wicked shall want*: And that, *a dinner of greene herbs, and love with it, is better then a stalled ox with hatred and strife*. The meanest Christian hath the love of God with him, who answereth to the joy of his heart; and the most glorious King that ever was, professeth that, *A good conscience is a continuall feast*; and David the father, a great conquerour, found no blessednesse in any temporall state, but in that which was incident to the meanest of his subjects, saying, *Blessed is the man whose iniquitie is forgiven, and whose sinne is covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth no sinne, and in whose spirit there is no guile*. The truth is, if our pretences depend upon outward things, they shall bee as fraile as those are mutable; and who can give strength

1. Tim. 6.  
6.

Prov. 13. 25  
Prov. 15. 17

Pro. 15. 15

Psal. 12. 1.

strength to resist the temptations of Satan but God? As there is no being but from God, so no permanence of being but from God: & till the time of temptation a man is not known; let the raine fall, and the floods rise, and the winde beat upon the house, then it will appeare whether it were built upon the rock, or upon the sand. Wee know the Angells fell, wee know Adam fell; and how vaine a thing is it to discourse of any naturall permanency in vertuous courses amongst naturall men that knew not God. By the way, your phrase of satisfying capacities is incongruous; of satisfying desires wee usually heare, but of satisfying capacities I never read of but in your discourse. You proceed to discourse unto us of another roote of unconstancy, which you call contingency, which is a terme of art with you and your peculiar dialect: this roote you will have to be, *the infinite capacitie of reasonable creatures, conceits or desires, within whose compasse their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular, as it were a starre fixed in too wide a sphere.* And this applyed to the fall of Angels, in whom wee finde a double change or alteration; the one morall, to wit, a change from the state of integrity wherein they were created, into the state of sinne; the second naturall, to wit, a change from a blessed state, into a wretched and damned condition; the first change was their owne worke, as wherein they sinned; the second, the worke of God whereby they were punished. Their inconstancie in not standing upright, but falling into sinne, is onely pertinent to the present purpose, and to enquire after the root of this, is to enquire after the cause of their fall. Now the cause hereof, as it is plaine, so if we please, we may as plainly expresse it; for, as for their possibility to fall, that rose from the condition of their natures, being made by God free agents, and so accordingly, a law being given them by God, they might freely obey it, freely disobey it: what need wee straine our wits for obscure expression of so plaine a truth, as by referring it to *the infinite capacitie of their conceits or desires, within whose compasse, their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular?* What need we affect such perturbation of speech, in confounding

conceits with desires, and placing finite motions within the compasse of desires, infinitely capacious; which motions undoubtedly were their desires (for they sinned questionlesse in desiring somewhat) and comparing desires to spheres, and againe, desires to starres fixed in spheres, that so the sinne of Angels may be finely phrasified, and called an excentricall motion; thus in catching after a phrase, you obscure the sense of a sentence, which when all is well scanned, is but this, the root of the Angels fall was this, that he might commit an irregular motion, which might have beene done, although the capacity of his desire had not beene infinite, that is, though he had not affected the greatnesse of the divine Majesty; for this I take to be the meaning, and yet this meaning is little congruous. For this infinite capacity you compare to a sphere too wide, and the finite motion you compare to a starre fixed in this sphere, and to it you ascribe the irregular motion, not to the sphere, and that very incongruously too; for the finite motion of Angels you speake of, was their very sinne; but the starre fixed in his sphere, is not his irregular motion. If ever Divinity and Philosophy have beene frayed out of their wits, by any mans discourse, it is your discourse that hath done this deed. You suppose the sinne of Angels consisted in affecting Majestie infinite, whereof, you say, *he was more incapable, then a Whirrie of an Arposies saile*. But how I pray you could such a thing be affected, without errour of judgement? And was it possible that errour, and so foule an errour of judgement could be in an Angell before his fall? Should not so *pœna be prior culpa*? Hereupon it is that Scotus maintaines, there could be no affecting of any such thing, but onely *complacentia simplex* therein, not that he did affect it, well knowing it to bee a thing impossible. For my part, I doe as little like that *simplex complacentia* he speakes of.

No wise man (in this state of our corruption) will please himselfe, in conceiting himselfe to be a King, much lesse to be a God, but reckons of such fancies as most vaine and frivolous: let us leave unto Clownes such conceits, *O if I were a King I would live like a Lord, I would eat fat beefe, and glorry porridge,*

porridge, and have a whip should cry *slasb. Dic mihi si fieres tu Leo qualis eris.* And what devise you should move all the rest of the mutineers to concurre with him in so unreasonable an affectation? Doe you thinke the chiefe called in Scripture the Devill, did sinne in one thing, to wit, in affecting *majestie infinite*, and the rest, called his Angels, in another thing, to wit, in standing with him, and standing for him? I should rather thinke their sin was one and the same: And I make no doubt but their sinne was pride. Sure I am, they were not subject to concupiscence of the flesh, or concupiscence of the eye, but to pride, spirits may bee subject as well as men. But wherein this pride manifested it selfe, that is a great mystery; but if they did affect divine Majestie, I should thinke it was in a way whereby they were capable of it: and this is now revealed to be by hypostatizing. And there is no question but that God could hypostatize an Angell, and as many as he would, as well as man. But I doe not say that they did affect it; I have no ground to conceive that any such thing entred into their thoughts. But as God tooke a course to put Adam and Eve to the triall of their obedience, so it is very likely God had a course to put the Angels to the trial of their obedience, which became a scandall to many of them, through pride and disdainne to be in subjection, not that they disdained to be in subjection unto God, but more likely to some inferiour nature, which was to be advanced to the throne of God. For as God made this visible world for the service of man, so God might withal reveale unto them what his purpose was, namely, to advance the nature of man unto his owne throne, so that all the Angels of God must worship him: This I say might bee the rocke of offence to them, of any more fit then this, I cannot conceive.

As touching the rooffe of mans unconstancy, you are nothing so curious, as about the Angels. But that curiosity of yours tended not to the discovering of any depth of truth, but meerly to the involving of a plaine truth, by most wilde expressions. The bitter fruit of Adams prevarication we all feelee in a generall impotency unto that which is truly good, or to



resist temptation unto sinne in a gracious manner. But yet I see no reason but a man may resist many a temptation, without grace, but not in a gracious manner. For what thinke you? is it necessary that as often as the Devill tempts a man to incontinency, to murder, to theft, he should as often yeeld to the committing of any of these? It is apparent that many naturall considerations may restraine us: but in a gracious manner, that is, in such a manner as is acceptable unto God, no man can resist any temptation unto sinne, without grace.

That maxime, *Mota facilius moventur*, hath no proportion in the case whereto you apply it, for it proceeds of the same individuals, such as Adam and his children are not; yet by Adams yeelding unto sinne, through Satans temptation, all his posterity are made more prone to sinne, then any man in particular is made by the committing of any sinfull act. For a sinfull or vicious act, in ordinary course, hath no more power to habituate a mans inclination unto evill, then a vertuous action hath unto good: but farre greater is mans pronenesse unto sinne, since and through the fall of Adam, then by any vertuous action is our pronenesse unto good.

Touching your close, I say, to seeke our owne welfare with anothers harme, is not to seeke that which is good and right; yet in some cases another mans harme may be sought, without any transgression. For undoubtedly the Iudge sinneth not in pronouncing the just sentence of condemnation upon a malefactor: no nor the Israelites neither, in robbing the Egyptians; nor Abraham, in going about to cut the throat of his owne innocent childe Isaac.

6. In the next place you discourse of the improvement of the force of temptations, which you say is wrought by inequality, partly of our naturall propensions, partly of the meanes which minister their severall contentments or annoyances. Herein you propose a distinction, but I doe not finde you very carefull to follow it, and make it appeare how you accommodate your selfe thereto. Great meanes of annoyances are apt to breed great feares, and feare is a strong passion hindering the course of reason, and of morall duty, according unto reason.

Peters

Peters confession of Christ at the very time when, and in the place where Christ was in his enemies hands that sought his death, might have hazarded his life; and the consideration hereof, being suddenly put unto it, either to confesse him or deny him, surprized him with feare; this feare exposed him to deny his master. Sir Gervas Elvas moved to give way to the poysoning of Sir Thomas Overbury, saw manifestly, that his refusall would have beene an occasion to bereave him of his Lieutenancy of the Tower, which he had bought with a great summe of money. This temptation prevailed with him: wee commonly say, *The greater is the temptation, the lesse is the sin.* So where small meanes of contentments are, the greater is the temptation to discontent, and to tast of the bitter fruits thereof. But I doe not finde that the particular instances following, doe any way savour of this member of your distinction. You seeme to keepe your selfe wholly to the prosecuting of inequality of naturall propensions; yet not that neither with such congruity as might justly be expected. For first you prosecute the inequality of wealth and wit: Wit is a naturall faculty, I confesse, I never heard it called a naturall propension till now. But as for wealth, it is neither propension, nor faculty naturall, nor at all naturall. It is true, I confesse, that some mens wealth gets the start of wit, as he observed, that in a great audience sometimes said unto his auditors, *When I behold your wealth, I wonder at your wit; againe, when I behold your wit, I wonder at your wealth.* I confesse willingly, that to abound in wealth, is to abound in temptations unto sinne; that fulnesse of bread is reckoned among the sins of Sodome, *Ezek. 15.* that, when *Jeshurun* waxed fat, he spurned with the beelee. But the temptations herchence arising, prevaile onely on them that want wit, is an observation I have not beene acquainted with before, neither am prone to beleewe it. I never read this laid to the charge of Sardanapalus of the Assyrians, or of Xerxes, who (as I remember) it was that proposed a reward to him that could invent a new pleasure; nor to Heliogabalus; among the Romane Emperours Nero was luxurious enough, I never heard it proceeded from want of wit, for the first *quinquen-*

nium of his reigne hee manifested himselfe to bee no foole: *Hercules servivit Omphale*, was it for want of wit? That the Merchants sonne of whom it is reported, that in one night at Venice he spent five hundred pounds upon his five senses, had his honesty beene answerable to his wit, he had kept his reputation with the best. And the Gentleman of the house of the Varneys, that in most luxurious manner wasted his estate and afterwards turned Turke, I never heard defamed for want of wit. Yet we commonly say, many men have good wits, but they are in fooles keeping. And indeed a foole in Solomons computation doth usually stand for a knave. And it is most true, that such are most unwise, as appeares by the issue; for by such courses they shorten their dayes, and send themselves with precipitation unto their graves, there to grow Greene before their heads bee gray; and after they are gone, their remembrance rots, and they leave a very ill savour behinde them.

But I should thinke, that dull fellows are neither so in-ventious of mad courses, nor of so active spirits to prosecute them, as those whom God hath endued with better parts of understanding. I grant men of great wits have not alwaies revenues answerable: But I should thinke it is their pride, rather then their wit, that instigates them to injurious courses. For when men cannot subject their minds unto their fortunes but labour to carve unto themselves fortunes answerable to their mindes, this must needs expose them to lewd courses. Yet a good wit, I confesse, to maintaine a bad cause, may animate some more to molest and vex, and it is not the greatnes of revenues will free them from such exorbitant courses. Though mens bodies overgrow their soules, yet if they have not a spirit answerable, they will prove but lubbers, though great lubbers, as great as Gog-Magog, whom *Corineus met with all at Dover, when that great lubber like a timber log came tumbling topsie turvie, over and over.* And it is a common saying, that a short man needs not a stoole to give a great lubber a box in the eare: though he that is weake had neede to be witty, yet it is not alwaies true, or for the most part, that weake persons are

are wily: and where wiliness is found, it is a temptation strong enough without weaknesse, to move men to practise unlawfull policy, where grace is wanting. But to say that wiliness shelters it selfe with craft, is as much as to say, it shelters it selfe with it selfe; and if the distinction be put betweene the disposition of wiliness that is within, and wily crafty courses without, well, something else, to wit, mens private reaches and ends may be said to be sheltered hereby, yet wiliness cannot. For like as wisdom is not sheltered, but rather discovered & laid open by wise courses, & folly by foolish courses, so also wiliness & craftines, by wily and crafty courses. I see no reason to justify that saying, *men love their wits more strongly, when they perceive them set upon that, which in it selfe is good.* And I give a reason for my negation, though you give none for your affirmation; for the more convenient the object is unto the appetite, the more strongly doth the appetite affect it; and the more convenient things are unto us, the more wee love our selves for affecting them. Now it is manifest that luxurious objects are more convenient to a luxurious appetite, then objects temperate; and avaritious courses more convenient to the appetite of an avaricious person, then courses of liberality; and generally to all men in the state of corruption, the pleasures of sinne are more gratefull then the pleasure of righteous courses. Nay, a man regenerate may for good reason seeme not to be so strongly caried in his affections unto good, as the wicked are in their affections unto evill; my reason is, because in the regenerate there dwels a flesh lusting against the spirit, which remits and qualifies the fervour of his affection unto good: whereas on the contrary, in the wicked there is found no spirit lusting against the flesh, to remit or qualifie the fervour or fury, rather of their affection unto evill; especially when they are fitted with most convenient objects to allure them. Gal. 5. 23.

Againe, to doe good to the poore, is not good in it selfe (as you suppose,) we were wont to say in the Vniversity, that *Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias*; and as I remember, it was a saying of Bernard, that *vaine-glory clotheth*

the poore as well as charity. And how can that bee a good will to the poore, that practiseth to coosen others for the gratifying of the poore? so may hee be said to beare a good will to Paul, that robbeth Peter to pay Paul; yet that which hee will leth is good to Paul, I confesse, but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master; neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfie Paul; it may well proceed from other intentions. No man is bound in conscience to hinder any mans welfare, or his owne either, no nor the glory of God by ungodly courses; no nor doth the obligation rest in generall, but it concludes in speciall, all good courses that lie in his power: so to tender it, a man is bound and not otherwise. You have discoursed of divers enormities, in the close you open the cause of them unto us, and of many other like and that you say is *the infinite capacity of finite existence*: this you say is the cause, not why such enormities are, but of the possibility of them. Now the possibility of such enormities is all one with the possibility of sin and transgression. Therefore the infinite capacitie of finite existence is the cause why sinne is possible. I thought it had beene satisfaction enough in this point, to conceive, that because wee are in subjection to a Lord, who can give us a law, and are free agents, therefore we may either obey a law given unto us, or transgresse it. And because, looke what is the cause why disobedience is possible, the same is the cause why obedience also is possible. It followeth, that the cause why obedience is possible, must be *the infinite capacity of finite existence*. And because by finite existence you meane a reasonable creature, your meaning a little more plaine is this, The reason why a man may sinne, or abstaine from sinne, is his infinite capacity. Wee say, it is the libertie of his will, being in subjection to a law which you cannot deny, nor any sober man: herehence it followeth, that this *infinite capacitie* you cant of, is but the libertie of mans will in subjection to the law of a superiour Lord. For man being free, may *overcope*, as you speake, that is, to expresse in a small and still voice, without thundring, or fire, or mightie winde, to doe that which he should not. And thus  
having

having attained to your plaine meaning, wee bid farewell to your mysticall expressions of so plaine a truth, by comparing this infinite capacity you speake of, to too wide a sphere, and finite motions, to a starre fixed in that sphere, and thereby exposed to excentricall and irregular motions, which I think neither Copernicus, nor Ticho Brahe, werethey alive, could well tell how to expound unto us, or to their selves either. We have enough in finding out the cause why sin is possible, as for the life and improvement of this possibility (for so you are pleased to bestow the being, and life, and improvement upon it) by the *inequality of internall propensions, never fitly matching outward occurrences*, that we reasonably well understand, and have discoursed thereof what wee thought fit, enough, if not more then enough.

7 At length you are come to the house it selfe of your present discourse, according to the title of this Chapter; hitherto we have beene complementally entertained in the porch. But, *in God*, you say, there is no place for exorbitancy, hee being an *incomprehensible sphere, which hath omnipotency for his axis, ubiquity for its center*: if you had added, & *nusquam* for his circumference, the illustration, according to your former subtleties, had beene more compleat. We say, that God in doing what he will cannot sinne, because hee hath no superiour Lord to give him lawes, to binde him; his owne wisdom alone can and doth direct him, and it becomes his wisdom to manifest his owne glorious nature; and therefore whatsoever hee can doe, in case hee doth it, it shall be wisely done, for as much as his power therein is manifested. You had rather fetch the cause hereof from this, that *his capacities cannot overcope*, though the Angels did. *One branch of being in him* you say, *cannot missway or overtop another*: what your meaning is I know not, but looke unto it that you doe not contradict your selfe, in maintaining, that God can doe some things by his omnipotency, which yet cannot be wisely or justly done by him, which is as much as to say, that he can do that which is unjust. And if this bee not to acknowledge in God a possibility to overcope, I doe not know what is. To say that God

possesseth all things that possibly he can desire to have, is to say, that hee possesseth nothing; for it is impossible that God should desire to have any thing, for this implies a want of something belonging to the deitie. It is directly false and foule to say, that God is whatsoever possible can be; for if it be true, then it ever was true, seeing this proposition depends not upon the revolution of time, and consequently, before the world was, it was true; wherchence it will follow, that God is an Angell, a man, and every vile thing, as wee account them amongst the creatures: for all these were possible to be before the world was; neither will it salve this foule sore, to say, that God is a man, or an ox, infinitely, for he is no bodily substance at all, neither can any bodily substance be infinitely. We say, that God is all things eminently, whereby we meane no more then this, God is the cause of all things; and better thus in plaine termes to expresse our meaning, then by affecting curious straines, and formes of expression to expose religion and the glory of our God to scorn & derision amongst atheists. God is of necessary being, and therefore of himselfe eternall, without beginning, and without end. To perfect himselfe, or to be greater or better then he is, is to suppose that he is imperfect, and not *Optimus maximus*, which is a thing impossible, and therefore not subject to, nor the object of Almighty power; nay, it destroyes it, as one part of contradiction destroyes the other: for Almighty power were formally destroyed, if it were imperfect, or lesse then Almighty. Therefore all outward employments are for the good of his creature, but how? not as tending to the good of the creature as Gods end, but both his employments for the creatures good, and the creatures themselves are for God and his glory. Hath not the Apostle expressed thus much, that *both from him and for him are all things*: and the Prophet also, *God hath made all things for himselfe, even the wicked for the day of evill*: and that for good reason, as many hundred yeares ago hath beene acknowledged in these termes, *Qui dedit esse, quo sine essent, habui potestatem*. If Gods will to have creatures when they were not, was but the influence or working of his essentiall goodness,

Rom. II.  
last.

Prov. 15. 4  
August. de  
prædest. &  
gratia.



ness, I pray what is his will to destroy them when they are? The scripture tells us, that *God worketh all things according to the counsel of his owne Will*; so he did when he made the world, so he doth when he sets an end to any part of it, so he should if hee should set an end to all, and returne them to the gulfe of nothing from whence they came. It is false to say, that *the continuance of being is desired by all, as the stampe of Gods goodnesse*: for continuance of being was as much desired by those atheists that denied the creation, as by those Christians that doe believe it. And as for the making of the world, it is in holy Scripture (the language of God) attributed to the word of God, to the breath of God, to the wisdom of God, to the power of God, to the counsell of God; but never, that I know, ascribed to the goodnesse of God. And it had need of explication, to shew how Gods goodnesse is communicated unto all, much more how it is communicated unto a stone; yet the earth is filled *with his goodnesse*, in as much as God provides for every thing that which is good for it; so that whatsoever we partake of for our comfort, wee call it Gods goodnesse, for as much as things which are good to us, are derived to us from God, and therein we have a taste of his goodnesse towards us, in that he doth good unto us. Your last position I have heretofore spoken of, and shewed the incongruity of it. That which is good, and that whereunto it is good, must be different; but the entitie of any thing is not different from it selfe, and therefore it cannot be good unto it selfe, as you affirme.

8. God is *μαργδδν* *sermo irarum*, slow to wrath, even against sinners that dishonour him to his face. But to say hee is never swayed to sudden revenge, is a more bold assertion then sound. Did not Zimri and Cosbi perish in their incestuous act, and give up both lust and ghost together, without leisure to enjoy their sinne, much lesse respite for repentance? Perhaps you will say their persons were formerly forborne, notwithstanding former sinnes, though the vengeance of God cannot be denied to be most sudden. So perished Herod in his pride, and Balthasar in his revellings, and the Israelites in

the wilderness; while the meat was in their mouthes, and the delicate flesh of Quailles lay betweene their teeth, the heavy wrath of God came upon them, and before they could swallow their sweet morsels, sent them to the graves of lust to bee swallowed by them.

Againe, Sodome and Gomorrah were consumed with fire from heaven; were not some children in their mothers wombs, some hanging at their mothers breasts, some newly come to the use of reason, all consumed to ashes, and made an example of Gods wrath, and suffered the vengeance of eternall fire, as Iude speaketh? Here is no forbearance of divers particular persons: so it was in the daies of Noah, so shall it bee at the comming of the Sonne of man; *for while they shall say, peace and safetie, sudden destruction shall come upon them, as sorrow upon a woman in travaile, and they shall not escape.*

1 Thes. 5. 2

The difference you make betweene man and God, I like well; man by forbearance may bereave himselfe of power to execute vengeance, God cannot: and this is a good reason of his forbearance towards the verie reprobates; but towards his elect, a power exercised in another kind, yet a power too, namely, to sanctifie the consideration of his forbearance, to bring them unto repentance; as also a power to provide for satisfaction to be made for their sinnes, by the blood of his Sonne. A sentence related out of the booke of Wisdome. ch. 12. 15, 16, you say is canonicall, although the Author bee not; a distinction that I never read nor heard of before. And if the truth of a sentence be sufficient to make it canonical, the canonicall Scriptures shal be multiplied unreasonably, not out of the booke of Wisdome only, but out of the rest of the works of Philo the Jew, and Iosephus too, yea and out of Senecaes workes, and Plutarchs morales; not to speake of Plato, and Aristotle, or your Plotinus. But let us consider this canonicall sentence you speake of, and weigh the truth of it in the balance of the Sanctuarie. I pray, wherein had our Saviour Christ and the Sonne of God deserved to be punished? And did not God (thinke you) *thinke it agreeable to his power to condemn him,* notwithstanding his innocencie, and his fervent prayers

prayers to be delivered from that cup, but with submission to the will of his Father? I pray consider the martyrdom of Gods Saints, were their punishments according to their deserts? Nay, what thinke you? is it not agreeable to Gods power to annihilate the holiest man that ever was? yet wee doe not say that God condemnes any man, *that hath not deserved to be punished*, the Sonne of God and our Saviour onely excepted. But the desert of eternall death is not onely in sinne actuall, but in sinne originall also, which Pelagius did not say, Arminius doth not, whether you doe or no, I know not; the latter clause, which is this, *Because thou art the Prince of all, it maketh thee to be gracious to all*, makes a shew to plead for universall grace, I cannot tell whether you like your lips at this; yet the author of the booke could not be ignorant what a difference, as touching the participation of his grace; God had put betweene the Jewes and the Gentiles, for, *He had shewed his word unto Iacob, his statutes and ordinances unto Israel: But hee had not dealt so with every nation, neither had the Heathen knowledge of his lawes.* And the Apostle, who undoubtedly was canonicall, to speake in your owne phrase, hath plainly professed, *that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.*

Psal. 147.  
19.

And as for the reason here used, drawne from this, that he is Lord of all, the Apostle himselfe taketh notice of it, but in a different manner, Rom. 10. 12. *There is no difference between the Jew and the Grecian, for he that is Lord over all, is rich unto all that call upon him:* and who are they that call upon him, but they that beleeeve in him? for it followeth, *How can they call upon him in whom they have not beleeeved?* Yet like as it is the part of parents, not onely to bring children forth, but after to provide for their bringing up: so God doth not onely make things, but also preserveth them: and for their preservation causeth the Sunne to shine, and his raine to fall, as well on the wicked as on the iust; alwaies provided that even this providence of God is to be dispensed of no other right, but meerly according to the good pleasure of his owne will. For what grace was shewed to infants, either unborne, or hanging,

at their mothers breasts, which perished in the flood, and in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire from heaven? and therefore though there were sixscore thousand persons in Ninivie that could not discern betweene the right hand and the left, and also much cattell, yet God was not bound to spare them. And can you doubt, but as many as these, if not in Sodome and Gomorra, yet at least, or rather many more, perished in Noahs flood. Yet by the way, this sparing of the Ninivites was but as touching salvation temporall, not spirituall.

You have but trifled a long time, now you beginne to bee serious, yet in little or no congruity to the theame; you were more then halfe way over this chapter, before you came to intreat of Gods goodnesse, and now you come to inculcate it, not in the infinity or immutability of it, but in the generality of it unto all, as whereby he wils and desires indifferently the salvation of all. This is the *voluntas antecedens* that so many are enamoured with now adaies, and you as much as any, wherewith we are like to bee acquainted much more in your following chapters. And a chapter you have hereof expressly in your booke of Providence. But first you beat another bush where the bird is not; onely it seemes to have a reach a farte off to something that is of kinne to it; you demand, *What lord would spoile his proper inheritance? what Architect would disgrace his owne worke?* implying, that surely, God will not. Now if you had withall told us whom you do oppose in this, and in what particular point, wee might be the bolder to reply in knowing what to answer; which now wee do not because of your concealements. All creatures are the works of God, which as by generation they are wrought, so by corruption they are defaced: What a beautifull piece of work was Absolom? What a wise piece of worke was Salomon? What a strong piece of worke was Samson? yet these workes of God are all defaced. And the defacing of them is the worke of God undoubtedly, as well as the making of them. And no marvell, for when that worke, for which God hath appointed them, is at an end, to what end should hee continue them,

them, considering that hee made them but for himselfe? Nay, Kingdomes and Nations God hath raised, and made them glorious; then againe, those glorious Kingdomes he hath defaced. Perhaps you will say, but the defacing of these is for sinne. Bee it so, yet God could set an end, both to kingdoms and to the whole world, though there were no sinne: for Gods well-being depends not upon his work, the world, as mans well-being depends upon his inheritance, yea, and upon the worke of his owne hands: for the master of it could have no comfortable habitation without an house, and every trades-man lives by his trade, and therefore it stands him upon not to deface his worke when he hath made it. Again, onely reasonable creatures are capable of sinne, yet all other creatures are the workmanship of God, which he maketh and defaceth at his pleasure, without any prejudice to his wisdom or to his goodnesse. Yet there is another manner of defacing, and that is by damnation; and herein I know no coulour of inveighing against any man, unlesse it be in the behalfe of infants, as many as perish in originall sinne; wherein if it please you, or any man else, to shew your teeth, or hornes, wee will be nothing dismayd, by Gods assistance, but ready to encounter you. Yet there is another defacing, and that is by sinne; so wee say the Devill and his Angels defaced themselves by their free and voluntary rebellion against God: so Adam defaced himselfe, by a voluntary and free action, hearkening to the voice of his wife; and Eve to the voice of the Serpent; each voluntarily and freely neglecting to hearken to the voice of God, and to maintaine the consideration thereof alwaies before their eyes. Thus every man, even the unregenerate, yea, and Devils themselves, doe still continue voluntarily and freely to sinne against God: so that this defacing is not the worke of God, but of the creature, it being a thing impossible that God should be the author of sinne, because it is impossible that he should doe any thing that hee ought not, or any thing in other manner then he ought. Again, it is impossible that hee should omit any thing, or in any other manner then he ought. And no other meanes can

be devised to make any one become the author of sinne. But it is enough for you to propose your interrogatories at pleasure. And in the third place you bring in another interrogatory, different from all the rest, which is more sutable with your tenet; for the delivery whereof in good time, you seem already to travaile in childebirth, and that is this, *Who would leave a good foundation bare or naked, unlesse he be not able to reare it up without injustice.* I professe I wondred a long time, to what purpose the last clause of this exception was pulled in by the eares; for if a man want means to finish an house which he hath begun, though hee would be unjust, yet hath hee no certaintie to enable himselfe for the finishing of that worke hee hath begun. But by comparing it well with the sentence following, I seeme to spring your meaning. The foundation which God hath laid, is the creation of our reasonable natures, the finishing of this worke, is the adding of salvation, or an happy being to this naturall being. Thus to finish the worke in every one, it is the will and pleasure of God, by your profession. This in another Tract of yours, that yet hath not seene the light of the presse, you amplifie, and call it, *A most earnest desire in God of the salvation of all, and every one, though he much desire it, is, as here you say, because he cannot do it without injustice.* And why so? Is it because they are sinners? why, what then shall become of us all, seeing we are all sinners? There be but two things that might be replied, the one is, that though all have sinned, yet Christ hath satisfied for the sinnes of his elect, Rom. 8. 33. *Who shall lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect, it is God that justifieth, who shall condemne us? It is Christ which is dead, or rather risen againe, who is also at the right hand of God, and maketh request also for us.* But I presume, this kinde of answer is no letice for your lips, for that were to maintain, that God willeth the salvation of none but of his elect. 2. The other answer is, that though all are sinners, yet all doe not die in impenitencie. To this I reply. 1. That if Christ hath made satisfaction for all their sins, I see no reason why they should not be saved, notwithstanding their impenitencie: for, what justice

justice can require, that damnation should bee suffered for those sinnes for which full satisfaction is already made. 2. God could give them repentance, if it pleased him, as he gave to Israel, Act. 5. 31. *Him hath God lift up with his right hand, to be a Prince and a Saviour, to give repentance unto Israel, and forgiveness of sinnes.* So then, Christ gives not onely forgiveness of sinnes to them that repent, but hee it is that gives repentance it selfe also: These be no Cabalisms, but the plain testimonie of Gods word. And as to the Iewes, so to the Gentiles also, Act. 11. 19. *When they heard this they held their peace, and glorified God, saying, Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life.* And accordingly Saint Paul warnes Timothy, to cary himself gently towards them that are without, waiting the time, when God will give them repentance, that they may acknowledge the truth, and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devill, by whom they were led captive to doe his will. By this let every one judge what strength there is in your illat-  
tion, when you say, *Wheresoever God hath laid the one* (to wit naturall being, it is to all that rightly consider his wisdom, truth, and goodness, and assured pledge of his will and pleasure, to finish it with the other. Why the truth of God is directly against it, professing, that he hath mercy on whom he will. and hardeneth whom he will: and that the same word of God is, *a savour of life unto life, to them that are saved*; hee doth not say, to them that are carefull to prepare themselves, and *a savour of death unto death, unto them that perish*, and a good savour unto God in both; he doth not say, to them that do not prepare themselves. And by comparing that place with Act. 13. 48. it appeareth who the saved are, even those whom *God hath ordained unto salvation*; for they believed, as there the Apostle professeth, as much as to say, the word preached was a savour of life into life unto them, and wot you the reason hereof? Why surely because they were ordained to salvation, like as Act. 2. 47. It is said that, *God added to the Church day by day, such as should be saved.* You might with as much modestly professe, that in as much as God hath made every man, *It is an assured pledge of his will and pleasure, to give every man repen-*  
K k k 2
tance,



rance, before he drops out of the world. Gods gifts are without repentance; it is true of the gifts of sanctification, but it is as true, that God repented that he made man. *That the current of Gods joyfull beneficence can admit no intermission*, is most untrue, for he dispenseth it freely, so he continueth it as freely; *For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his owne Will*, that is, *nullo necessitatis obsequio*, as Ambrose expoundeth it. Nay it doth admit intermission in this world. In the world to come, indeed, it shall admit no intermission, in this it doth, both in respect of blessings temporall, and in respect of motions spirituall. For as touching blessings temporall, God sheweth *the back* sometimes, and not *the face*, Ier. 28. 17. And as touching spirituall motions and consolations, what moved the Lord to cry out upon the crosse, *My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me*, but the intermission of these? It is true, sorrow to us hath no other originall then our own sinne, yet no sinne in Christ could be found to bee the originall of his sorrow. And though the woman, by reason of sinne, hath ever since conceived in sorrow, yet bruit beasts conceive in sorrow, notwithstanding that they are incapable of sinne. And albeit God be an ocean of joy yet the dispensation of joy unto creatures, is meerly according to the good pleasure of his will. And though all sorrow proceeds from sinne in the way of a meritorious cause; yet all sorrow proceeds from God, in the way of an efficient cause. Hee is the great Iudge that inflicteth sorrow on some, as well as hee causeth joy to others.

9. The comparison is most absurd. For illumination proceeds from the Sunne, as from a naturall cause, working by necessity of nature; but to say that God in such sort doth communicate ought, or send forth any influence, is more Atheisticall then Christian. The devils belike have seeds of joy and happinesse, wherewith they were sowne in their first creation; for undoubtedly they were capable of them before their fall, as well as the Angels of light. And all the influence that God sends forth, you say, is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse; whence it followeth, that God at this day doth by his influence cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in the ve-

rie Devils. And seeing Gods concurrence to the actions of men and Angels, is a part of that influence that proceeds from God, and one action of the Devils is their assurance that they are damned spirits, without hope of recovery; in concurring to this assurance, God doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in them. Besides this, with Devils and Men God affordeth his concurrence to all their most sinfull actions, this your selfe have often acknowledged, and this concurrence of his is a part of his influence, and no influence (you say) can proceed from him, but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse, wherewith their natures were sowne in their creation. Therefore this concurrence of God also to their sinfull actions, doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in reprobate men and Angels also.

Now proceed we along with you: God, you say, doth inspire all that are conformable to his will, with desire of doing to others that, which he hath done to them. This is a done very well worth the picking. I am perswaded many a sweet morsell will be found about it. You doe not tell us, that God doth inspire any man with a conformity to his will, but as many as are conformable to his will, hee inspires with other good desires; whence I pray then comes conformity to his will, if not from the inspiration of God? doe you make conformity to Gods will to bee the inspiration of the flesh? For I presume you make it not an inspiration of the world, or of the devill. Yet S. Paul saith, that it is God that *worketh in us both the Will and the deed*, not by any necessary emanation, as light issueth from the Sunne, but according to his owne good pleasure. Againe, this very desire of doing others good, is it not a part of our conformity to the will of God? Now if God inspire us with one part of conformity to Gods will, why not also with another? And so why may we not runne over all parts of conformity to the will of God, and finde as good cause to ascribe them all to the inspiration of God, as the cause of them? The mystery of your meaning in this, the next sentence serves as a key to open, when you say, *that such as wilfully strive against the stream of his over-flowing goodnesse, or boisterously counterblast the sweet*  
K k k 3
and

Rom. 9.

Phil. 1.

and placid spirations of celestially influence, become creators of their owne woe, and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish. So then Gods influence is to all, like as the light of the Sunne; onely the difference ariseth herehence, that some resist it, others yeeld unto it. As good Arminianisme and Pelagianisme as ever dropt from the mouth or pen of Arminius or Pelagius himselfe. So then it is not God, that *ex nolentibus volentes facit*, but mans free will. And in spight of St. Paul it shall be *volentis & currentis*, and not *misericordis Dei*. For these spirations you speake of, can be no other then exhortations, whereunto some yeeld, and some resist. And I pray, who deserves to be accounted the author of my faith, the author of my repentance? he that exhorteth me hereunto, or rather I my selfe, that doe beleve, and doe repent, though upon anothers exhortations? For exhortation may thus farre be performed by a reprobate: for such plead at the day of judgement, *Have we not prophesied in thy name?* and S. Paul observed, that some preached Christ not chastly, but upon pretence, and that with foule intentions, even to adde affliction to Pauls bonds; yet howsoever he joyced in this, that Christ was preached, which hee would never have done, if by their preaching none were likely to be brought over to Christ by faith and repentance.

Aug. lib. 1.  
de gratia  
Dei, contr.  
Pelag. cap.  
10.

Againe, to inspire them with good desires, and with conformity to Gods will, this is no other in your language, then to exhort them hereunto. And thus it is that God workes in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. Now this speech bewrayeth you as much as ever Peters speech bewrayed him; but with this difference, Peters speech bewrayed him to be a follower of Christ, but your speech bewrayeth you to be a follower of Pelagius, and as like him as if you were spit out of his mouth; for thus did Pelagius discourse, *Operatur Deus in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est, dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos futura gloria magnitudine & premiorum pollicitatione succendit, dum revelatione sapientie, in desiderium Dei stupentem suscitatur voluntatem, dum nobis suadet omnem quod bonum est.* Now see to what acknowledge-

knowledge of grace Austin putteth him, if so be he will be a true Christian. *Nos eam gratiam volumus, isti aliquando fateantur qua futura gloria magnitudo non solum promittitur, verum etiam creditur & speratur, nec solum reveletur sapientia, verum etiam & amatur, nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est, verum etiam persuadetur.* Hanc debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri si vult non modo videri, sed esse Christianus. Now what followeth upon this your doctrine touching the nature of election, namely, that it must bee upon the foresight of mens obedience to Gods exhortations and perswasions, which here you call placid inspirations. Now because God exhorts us to faith, repentance, and all manner of good workes, the foresight of our obedience hereunto must bee it whereupon our election must depend, and so you are ready to shake hands with the Apostle, not of fellowship, but to bid him adieu, as who plainly professeth, that *Election is not of workes, but of God that calleth us*; and he proves it by this, that before they had done either good or evill, Iacob was elected, and Esau reprobated, which must exclude not only the pre-existence of works, but the pre-consideration of them; otherwise hee could not therence conclude that election is not of workes; and the circumstance of not being as yet borne doth evidently exclude as well faith, as good workes. For a man unborne is as unable to beleve, as to performe any other worke. And notwithstanding this foule injury, you offer unto God in robbing him so shamefully of the glory of his grace, and absolute prerogative to dispose of his creatures as he thinkes good, in making whom he will vessels of mercy, and whom hee will vessels of wrath, yet you thinke to pacifie him with an hungry, base, and meeke verball amplification of the streames of his goodnesse, the issue whereof is to injurie him afresh in like manner, by robbing him, and adorning man with the spoiles of his glory. For increase of joy and happinesse shall be, you say, unto a man from the streames of life, proceeding from God as a fountaine of life, provided that man gives free passage to their current. And what is this current, but Gods inspirations formerly mentioned, whereby he exhorts us to profire

Ibid. cap. II.

Rom. 9.

by

by the examples of his judgements on others, and also to patience when we are injured by others. Now if we doe yeeld to this, and doe profit by the consideration of Gods judgements upon others, and doe patiently beare the wrongs that are done us by others, then increase of joy and happinesse shall be unto us from the fountaine of goodnesse, who as he hath some streames of life, whereby hee exhorts us unto that which is good; so he hath other streames of life and happinesse, wherewith he rewards us for our obedience: so that whatsoever shew you make of honouring God, the issue is to bestow all the honour upon the obedience of man. So that the amends you make herein for former injuries, is as if a man having given his neighbour a box in the eare, should make shew of making him amends by kindestroaking of him, and in stead of stroaking him, give him another box in the eare, Thus Ioabooke Amaza by the beard as though hee would have kissed him, but, indeed, stabd him to the heart. You are willing to make God the author of glory, but by no means can you be brought to acknowledge him the author, but only the orator of grace: like to the Panims, who were wont to say,

*Det vitam, det opes, animum mihi ipse parabo.*

You are given so much to painting, that it is a hard matter to discern the native countenance of your discourse, the proper face of your meaning. What meane you by the current of life? Is it a gracious current, or a glorious current? if gracious, that is the same with spirations before spoken of, and these are exhortations and perswasions. But how I pray doe these when they are refused by some, the more overflow to others? They that heare the same Sermon, have never a whit the more for others resisting it; they that heare it not, have no part of it, though all resist it. As for the current of glory, how hath any man the more, for that others are wholly deprived of it? yet it is true, that even the reprobation and damnation of some, tends to the increase of glory to the elect, in  
contem-

contemplation of the mercy of God towards them in comparison of others, and of the sorrowes from which God hath freed them, as both the Apostle signifies, Rom. 9. 22. And is maintained both by Didacus Alvares, and Alphonsus Mendosa. But I doe not finde you have any such meaning. But when you have taken up a metaphor by the end, you play upon it, and make as good musicke with it as pigges doe, in playing upon Organs.

What are the miseries which wicked spirits suffer, are unknowne to us; we reade that they beleeve and tremble, Iam. 2. that they are kept in chaines to the judgement of the great day. They aske our Saviour whether he be come to torment them before their time; they pray him not to send them into the deepe. And therefore a man may very well be ignorant of any good which their miseries work upon us, seeing that their miseries are so unknowne unto us.

Yet as conceiving your selfe to have beene somewhat free in venting somewhat, which alas is but a vaine ostentation of some momentous matter, which hath no moment at all in it; you demand whether God may yet inspire these castaways with mischievous thoughts, seeing their mischievous thoughts worke for our good. A very vaine objection; as if the devill and his Angels had need of any prompting unto villany, or as if prompting unto villany were fit to bee called inspiration, which is never used, but either in the way of prophecy, or in the way of some gracious suggestion. Yet as touching any thought or action of Satan, your selfe dare not deny Gods concurrence to the substance of the action; and as for the manner of concurrence, we are willing to undergoe with you, or any man else that breathes, any scholasticall discourse or inquisition hereupon: as whether the will of the creature determines the will of his Creator, or whether the will of the Creator determines the will of the creature rather.

As touching the evill it selfe, whether from our opinion can be inferred any more then this, that Gods will is it shall come to passe by his permission; and whether we cannot shew better reason for this our tenet, then you or any man else for the

the contrary. As for the intending of the creatures woe and miserie, as occasions or meanes of Gods glory, what sober man can doubt but that God is the efficient cause of their woe and miserie, as it signifies the misery of punishment, and in inflicting punishment on transgressors, undoubtedly hee doth advance the glory of his justice, yea and the glory of his Saints also, who may see in others sufferings, what might have beene their portion, if God had ihewed no more grace unto them then unto others, and hereupon have cause to be so much the more ravished with the contemplation of Gods goodnesse toward them. As for the miserie of sinne, be the sinne as great as the crucifying of Christ, God determined it should be done, Act. 4. be it as great as the Kings giving their kingdome to the beast, little lesse then the giving of their kingdomes to the devill, yet God it is that hath put into their hearts to doe his will even in this also: and even this undoubtedly shall redound to the glory of God, and the good of his elect. For

Rev. 17. 17. both heresies must be, that they which are approved may be  
2 Cor. 11. manifested, and God raiseth tyrants up, to exercise the pa-  
12. tience of his children, yea their own sinnes redound to the pro-  
fit of Gods elect. *Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manife-*  
August. de civ. Dei, l. 1. *stamque cadere peccatum.* But hereupon to make use of that  
14. cap. 13. maxime, *Gods Will is the rule of goodnesse*, is most absurd; for the rule of goodnesse is Gods will of commandement; but the will of God, that signifieth his determination to have this or that come to passe, is farre different: neither I hope will you make question, in case God willeth any thing to come to passe, whether God doth well in willing it; though that which hee willeth or determineth bee the crucifying of Christ Iesus.

As for the will of commandement, that is onely the will of God touching what is our duty to doe, or to leave undone, and accordingly called *voluntas approbans*, for certainly he approves obedience unto his will, in whatsoever he injoyneth us: yet this wide leape hath cast your meditations upon this point, to enquire forsooth whether Gods will bee the rule of goodnesse. But as you have entred upon it without distinction of will



will and will, so you carrie your selfe therein with miserable confusion.

CHAP. XIII.

*In what sense, or how Gods infinite Will is said to bee the rule of goodnesse.*

THE question was never before (that I know) proposed in this manner, viz. of Gods infinite wil, but only of Gods will. The Heathens painted Iustice as an assistant of Iupiter. Anaxarchus to comfort Alexander, cast downe with conscience of his foule fact, inmurdering his deare friend Clitus, deviseth an interpretation of this pageant, sutable and serviceable to the consolation of Alexander; and that was this, Iupiters actions must alwaies be esteemed just. So saith the great Monarchs who are Gods on earth, their actions must bee accounted just. Anaxarchus is censured by Arrian, and justly, for his grosse flattery in the application of this unto Kings on earth, who, it is well knowne, may degenerate into tyrants. But I hope you will not dislike this interpretation as applied unto God: you will not make question, I trow, whether God be righteous in all his waies, and holy in all his workes, much lesse deny it, although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, allowed Samson to sacrifice himselfe, the Israelites to rob the Egyptians; though he send an evill spirit betweene Abimelech and the men of Shechem; though hee put a lying spirit in the mouthes of all Ahabs Prophets, to seduce the King, and to perswade him to goe up against Ramoth Gilead, that he may fall there; though he sends to Pharaoh a commandement to let Israel goe, yet tels Moses hee will harden Pharaohs heart that he shall not let Israel goe; though that worke of the rending of the ten Tribes from the two, comprehending the defection of people from their lawfull King, he by open protestation takes unto himselfe as his own work; like as touching the defiling of Davids concubines, he telleth

David to his face, that he would doe this openly, saying, I will take thy wives from thee, and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lye with them in the sight of the Sunne.

2. Your comparison of Gods power with his goodnesse, I doe not much mislike; onely your comparing of him with Monarchs in goodnesse, is not so fit; for alas what prerogative have they of goodnesse above other men? They are to bee borne withall, though they are not so good as others, because they are exposed to greater temptations then others, and the greater is the temptation, the lesse is the sinne. No great commendation to exceed Sardanapalus, or Heliogabalus in goodnesse; yet wee know there is a great deal of difference betwene the goodnesse of God, and the goodnesse of man in the course thereof: for mans goodnesse in the exercise thereof, is subordinate to a law, and they are bound to exercise it towards all: Gods goodnesse is of no such condition, nothing could binde him to the making of the world, or to the making of any creature at all. They being made, hee exerciseth his goodnes towards whom he will: for though in the course of his naturall providence he causeth his Sun to shine, and his raine to fall both upon the just and unjust; yet as touching the dispensation of his chiefest blessings, his spirituall blessings in heavenly things, he hath mercy on whom he will, yea and

Rom. 9. 18 whom he will he hardeneth also. And though ordinarily all are partakers of his temporall blessings, yet sometimes he puts a great difference even in the communication of them also.

Am. 9. 7. *I have withheld the raine from you, when there were yet three weekes to the harvest, and caused it to raine upon one Citie, and caused it not to raine upon another Citie; one piece was rained upon, and the piece whereon it rained not, withered.* Some dye in their mothers wombe, some hanging at their mothers breasts, some after a long time are consumed with a lingring death: neither is Gods love in Scripture phrase enlarged towards any save towards his elect. Thus Iacob was loved, but Esau hated.

Rom. 9. 13  
In 1. disp.  
85. & 85.  
In opusc.  
de instit.  
commut.  
sect. 2.  
pam 36.

Againe, what justice doe you devise in God towards his creature? Both Vasquez and Suarez concur in this, that the

ju & cc.

justice of God towards man doth alwaies presuppose his will, and God may binde himselfe as he pleaseth by promise. But Gods will (you say) is not the rule of goodnesse, because the *designes thereof are backt with infinite power*. Your theame was to prove, that Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse, when you come to prove it, you prove nothing lesse, but onely that *the cause why Gods Will is not the rule of goodnesse*, is not, for that his *designes are backt With infinite power*. This is not to disprove Gods will to be the rule of goodnesse, but rather to confirme it, for, in saying that this or that is not the cause why Gods will is the rule of goodnesse, you doe imply, that you maintaine, that his will is the rule of goodnesse, though not for this cause. Perhaps you may say, They which maintaine Gods will to be the rule of Gods goodnesse, doe maintaine it upon no other ground then this, to wit, *Because his designs are backt with infinite power*.

But had it beene so, you might have fallen directly upon the overthrowing of such a foundation, without carrying it in such a manner as if you would beare the world in hand, that your selfe in some sort hold Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse, whereas you mean nothing lesse; and therefore in carying your discourse after this manner, you betray a faint heart in maintaining the maine. Secondly, I say it is incredible that any should maintaine Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse, for this cause, because his *designes are backt with infinite power*, as much as to say, because *God can doe what hee will*. This reason carieth no colour of truth with it; for there is no reason why amongst men, they that can doe what they will in comparison to other men, should therefore bee honestier men then other. But because God hath infinite lawfull power, that extends to every thing that implies no contradiction, hence it followeth, that whatsoever God doth is good; and whatsoever God can doe, if it were done by him, it should justly be done, other wise hee should have power to be unjust; which power (in this case) should either be in vain, because it is not possible that ever it should be actuated, or if actuated, God should be unjust. *Holinesse* (you say) *doth so*.

rule his power and moderate his Will, that the one cannot enjoyne, or the other exact any thing, not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patterns of equitie. You take great liberty of discourse throughout. What I pray, according to our understandings is the subject of Gods holinesse? is it not his will? And how can his holinesse worke upon his will? Doth the heat of fire worke upon the fire? or the cold of water worke upon the water? Again, here wee have power and will distinguished, and the act of injoyning attributed to the one, and exacting to the other. Both are acts of command: now I pray consider, doth Gods power command? I had thought *imperium* had beene the proper prerogative of the will, yet both these, by your discourse, are in subjection to the eternall patterns of equity; and equity before you confounded with justice. Now I know no such justice in God, different from his wisdom. And herein I am of the same minde with Aquinas, *Quest. 23. De voluntate Dei*, Art. 6. where hee disputeth this question, *Utrum iustitia in rebus creatis ex simplici divina voluntate dependat*. And there hee professeth, that *Primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis iustitiae est sapientia divini intellectus quae res constituit in debita proportione, & ad se invicem, & ad suam causam*. Now let any man name any thing that God can doe, and then let him answer me whether God bee not as well able by the infinitie of his wisdom to doe it wisely, as by the infinity of his power to doe it at all. And marke what in the same place (where he seems most to favour your present Tenet) Aquinas professeth, *Quamvis in nobis sit aliud intellectus, & voluntas secundum rem & pro hoc nec idem, est voluntas & rectitudo voluntatis: Deo tamen est idem secundum rem intellectus, & voluntas, & propter hoc est idem rectitudo voluntatis, & ipsa voluntas*. Although in us the understanding is one thing, and the Will really another thing, whence it is that our Will, and the rectitude of our Will is not the same, yet seeing that in God, the understanding and the Will are really the same, hence it is, that in God his will, and the rectitude of his will are all one. But be it that his will is consonant to the eternall or abstract patternes of equitie, I pray, what more eternall and abstract paterne of equity then this, that it is

it is lawfull for God to make the world, if he will, and not to make it if he will; yea, and to doe what he will, and leave undone what he will. I hope the will of God revealed, doth as sufficiently warrant all our actions, if things are therefore good because God wils them, as in case because they are good therefore God willeth them. Now the former of these is true, without all question, in most things; for whether the world had beene made sooner or later, bigger or lesser, more Angels or lesse, more spheres or lesse, whether they had moved this way they doe, or the contrary way; whether they should have continued longer or shorter time then they shall, all had been received as the good course of Gods providence equally as now it is. But here you passe to a point of a farre different nature; for it is one thing to enquire whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense, *whether whatsoever God brings to passe in the world, is therefore good because God hath done it*, and a farre different thing to demand, whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense, that *whatsoever God commands us in his word* (for so I understand you when you speake of Gods revealed will) *it is therefore good because God commandeth it*. And I give a manifest reason of this difference, for before the revelation of Gods word, and without thar, all men naturally are able to discern between good and evill, they knew impiety, idolatry, profane swearing, perjury, irreligiousnesse, contempt of government, murder, uncleannesse, gluttony, drunkennesse, theft, oppression, extortion, lying, to be evill, and the contrary to these to be good, by the light of nature, and suggestion of conscience, there being a law of good and evill written in the hearts of all, *their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing, or excusing*, Rom. 2. 14. 15. *And therefore it is false to say, that wee know this or that to be good, because Gods will revealed commends it to be such*. For undoubtedly, in most points of morality, wee know this to be good, and that to be evill, without the revealed will of God, and by the very light of nature. Neither doth it follow, that *because God willeth nothing but that which is just and good*, therefore justice and goodnesse are the objects of his

his will; first, because wee have heard out of Aquinas, that Gods wisdom is his justice: secondly, it is absurd to say, that justice, goodnesse, or wisdom are the objects of his will. Again, if the goodnesse of Gods will consists in willing that which is good and just, to wit, in things that are to be done by man, then the rectitude of Gods will shall accrue to him from without, and shall not be essentiall unto him, like as the rectitude of mans will, which is disproved by Aquinas in the place before alledged. Whereas you say, unlesse this or that had beene good, God had not willed it, this may admit such an interpretation as nothing serves your turne; for the wisdom of God may represent this or that to be good, that is, such as is fit to be done in the way of congruity, so that if it be done it shall be done congruously, yet not to be good, so as it ought to be done in the way of necessity. Nay, marke what Bradwardine professeth, suppose the wisdom of God shall represent this to be more congruous to be done then that, yet is not God hereby bound to preferre the doing of that before this. *Ratio præponderans est, quæ dicat quod melius esset facere hoc quam illud, vel quod melius est, hoc facere quam dimittere, & talis ratio non movet, nec concludit voluntatis divinæ, nec eam determinat ad agendum. Posset enim Deus facere meliora quam facit & multa bona quæ non facit.* And concludes *Homini tutum est semper ut conformet voluntatem suam rationi præponderanti. Deus autem non potest sequi per omnia rationem præponderantem, nisi faceret omnia possibilia, & horum quod libet infinitum, quod contradictionem includit. Sufficit igitur sibi in talibus pro ratione, voluntas, vel saltem ratio congruens & concomitans prælatæ.* Yet the will of God is alwaies reasonable: but marke what is the ground of this denomination, according to Aquinas, in 1. Quest. 19. Art. 5. Ad. 1. *Voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid, sit Deo causa volendi sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud.* Yet you would make the world beleeve that you fetch your divinitie from the fountaine, they that thinke otherwise never taste it but in trenches, yet where have you hithe: to discovered the fountaine from whence you take it?

Bradward.  
lib. 1. cap.  
22.

3 You proceed to free your tenet from exceptions; but alas, you propose but one exception, and that a poore one, *Seeing nothing can be without Gods will, what can be good before God wills it?* And your answer is by concession, *That goodnesse actually existent in the creature, cannot be without some precedent act of Gods will,* as much as to say, this exception is nothing to the purpose: and so you undertake to free your Tenet onely from such exceptions as are nothing to the purpose. Now as touching goodnesse actually existent in God himselfe, doth that depend meerly upon the will of God, or at all upon the will of God? The manifestation of it, or the exercise of it depends meerly upon the will of God, for as much as this is performed onely by outward workes, and God might have chosen whether hee would have made the world, or any part of it, yea, or no. But as for Gods goodnesse, we that tast of divinity but in trenches, acknowledge, that the being thereof is as necessary as the being of God himselfe, and depends not at all upon the liberty of Gods will: *There is, you say, a goodnesse objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of Gods will.* What I pray? Is it any such as bindes God to the willing of any outward thing? take heed what you say, lest you fall into Atheisme by making God a necessary agent, or that he was bound in the way of justice to make the world: whence it followeth, that the world was everlasting. Yet this goodnesse which you make the object of Gods will, savoureth of ditch water rather then of spring water; for it is brought by you, as that which sheweth Gods will, what is to be done. But every novice knowes, it belongs not to goodnesse to give direction, but to wisdom rather: and therefore Aquinas, as I shewed before, makes that *whereupon depends the reason of all justice to be the wisdom of Gods understanding.* And I grant willingly, that the direction of wisdom in God precedeth the operation of his will in order of nature, according to that of Aug. alledged by Bradw. out of his answer to the 7. question of Orosius. *In Deo praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest, ergo prius est rationabiliter sapere, quam rationabiliter velle.* Yet neither the wisdom of God shall determine his will, unlesse



it doth so direct, as to shew that this or that ought to be done. For if it doth onely direct by shewing what is fit to be done, and of many courses which Gods wisdom can devise fit to be taken, if it be left indifferent to Gods will to choose or refuse what hee list, it is apparent, that though before God choose, it was fit to be done, like as many other courses were also, yet no necessity why God should preferre this before an other: sure I am you have proved no such thing hitherto, neither out of the fountaine, nor out of the trenches. *Intellectus divinus* (saith one) *singulos modos operandorum possibiles circa creaturas considerat, & omnes voluntati proponit ut libere quem voluerit exequi eligat, Henric. quodlib. 3. Quest. 1.* Aquinas professeth, that whatsoever God is able to doe, that also hee can wisely doe, in 1. Quest. 25. Art. 5. in Corp. *Divina sapientia totum posse potentia comprehendit.* And again professeth, that the order of things in the government of this world, doth not adequate the wisdom of God; as much as to say, hee could have brought forth a world, and the dispensation of his providence in as wise a manner as hee hath shewed in this: his

Aquina. de  
voluntate  
Dei. q. 25.  
art. 5.

words are these, *Ordo divina sapientia rebus inditus in quo ratio iustitia consistit: non adequat divinam sapientiam. sic, ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem.* And he proves it thus, *Tota ratio ordinis quem sapiens rebus à se factis imponit à sine sumitur. Quando igitur finis est proportionatus rebus propter finem factis sapientia facientis limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est finis improporcionabiliter excedens res creatas: unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem ordinem rerum, ita ut non possit alius cursus rerum effluere.* Scotus in like

1. Dist. 44.  
q. unica.

sort, *Nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus à voluntate divina acceptante statuta.* And he gives this instance of his assertion, *Omnis pescator finalis, damnabitur: quis autem dubitat Deum de potentia absoluta potuisse peccatorem non damnare, sed annihilare?* See also what Iohn Gerson saith to the same purpose, *Deus non ideo vult res ad extra fieri, quia bonae sunt, quemadmodum movetur humana voluntas, ex objectione boni veri, vel apparentis: Est è contra potius, quod ideo res ad extra bonae sunt, quia Deus vult eas tales esse; adeo quod si vellet eas vel non esse vel aliter esse,*

id quoque jam bonum esset, propterea bene enuntiavit magnus Ambrosius post Basilium quod voluntas divina natura primaria lex est. Yet of these you may say that they are but trenches. Although your selfe hath hitherto brought nothing for your assertion, either out of fountaine or trench, save onely out of your owne braine, which may be the fountaine of your invention, and yet inferiour to these trenches. But come we to the fountaine, God is said to *worke all things according to the counsell of his owne will*. Mr. Hooker passeth his censure upon those Divines that referre all the reason of justice to the will of God. Calvin belike is one of those divines whom hee in his reprehension reacheth at; who in his Institutions hath these words, *Adeo summa est justitia regula Dei voluntas, ut quicquid vult, eo ipso quod vult, justum habendum*. Yet Calvin saith not, that in this respect it is just; but onely that in this respect it ought to be received as just. But Mr. Hooker, though he acknowledgeth that there is a law of divine actions, yet he professeth that this law is to be resolved into the will of God, which is somewhat more then Calvin professeth, and as much as Perkins professeth, when he saith, *Nothing is just to God before it be willed by him*, hee speakes in respect of things to be done by him, and not of that justice which is called by the Schoolmen, *justitia condecencia*, which dictateth what may conveniently be done. For certainly, if a thing might not conveniently be done, God would never have done it: but he speaks of *justitia obligationis*, justice that bindes to the doing of it; and maintains, that nothing bindes God to the doing of it, but onely his owne will and determination. And in this sense have I elsewhere justified Mr. Perkins against Arminius. But as for Calvins saying, when hee professeth, that whatsoever God willeth must bee received of us as just, is a most temperate speech. And to what purpose should we trouble our selves to look any further, and to enquire after the reason of it. Whereas we are given to understand, that of the *wisedome and knowledge of God* there is such a depth as is unsoundable, *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God; how unsearchable are his judgements, and his waies past finding out*? But upon

Eph. i. 11.  
Eccles. pol.  
lib. 1.

Perk. de  
prædest.  
mod. &  
ord. cric. 2.

Rom. ix. 33

the matter, we may easily perceive how little difference there is between Mr. Hooker and others, when he professeth, that though this counsell of Gods will, according whereunto he worketh all things, doth signifie a law of divine actions, yet withall, such a law as is resolved into the will of God. Again consider, how is it called the counsell of Gods will? not of Gods will giving counsell, for that belongs to the understanding; but of Gods will accepting the counsell proposed; and if many wise courses are proposed (as why should we conceive that Gods infinite wisdom is limited to the devising of one course) then the will doth freely accept one rather then another. And thus Suarez interpreteth it when he

Suarez. re-  
lect. de lib.  
volunt. di-  
vin. disp. 1.

saith, *Non ita operatur Dei voluntas secundum consilium ejus, ut omnino à consilio determinetur, sed potius (si ita loqui liceat) ut ipsa determinat consilium.* In like sort Didacus Alvarez, though of a sect much opposite to the Iesuites, yet concurrerth with

Alvar. de  
auxil. lib. 2.  
disp. 17.

Suarez in this exposition, *Hic ut notavit Glossa, prius ponitur consilium, quod pertinet ad intellectum, deinde additur voluntatis sue, Ubi significat quod intellectus divinus, seu scientia ejus, ut determinatur à voluntate est causa rerum.* You that pretend to fetch your divinity from the fountaine, have not brought so much for prooffe of your assertion as this place cometh unto; it is enough for you to dictate and say, *There is a goodnesse objective, precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of his will.* And yet I willingly confesse, it is so farre good, as that Gods wisdom doth represent it as a thing that decently and conveniently may be done; but that of necessity it must be done, and that thus divine wisdom represents it, your selfe is so farre from proving this, that you doe not so much as take notice of this distinction. You proceed, and tell us positively, that *Unto some things considered as possible, this goodnesse objective is so essentially annexed, that if it be his Will to give them actual being, they must of necessity be actually good, nor can he that can do all things, will their contraries.* Never, I thinke, was so vulgar an assertion so much honoured, as to be brought in with such state and pompe. As if any Scholler did make question, whether *Eus & bonum convertuntur*; or any sober man doubted, whether

whether the works of God must needs be good. Whereas this is utterly beside the question : which is onely this, Whether because God willeth any thing, therefore the doing of it bee just; or rather because it is just therefore God doth it. So that the question is not, Whether any entity produced by God bee good; but rather, Whether the producing of it be therefore good, because God willeth it.

Yet your instance is more extravagant then your assertion, as when you adde, *God might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankind, when he preserved Noah and his family. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent.* So God did reserve divers beasts at that time also; but to reserve them beasts, and not unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent; as much as to say, to reserve reasonable creatures, no reasonable creatures, and to reserve unreasonable creatures no unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. For certainly God cannot make contradictories to be true: as for the same creature to be both reasonable and unreasonable. And call you this the objective goodnesse of a thing possible? or is this your definition of goodnesse, to imply no contradiction. Then let evill be goodnesse, and injustice goodnesse, and darknesse light, Belial an honest man. For certainly not one of these apart doth imply any contradiction. Your exposition of this is as bad as any of the rest. When we say things implying contradiction cannot have any being, wee understand it of things containing divers notions, which notions are contradictory one to another: not that they are contradictory to the nature and essentiall goodnesse of God, as you expound it. For that which is continuall, to consist of points indivisible, we hold to be contradictions: so did Aristotle: as also that a body existent should be infinite; or that motion properly so called should be in an instant. But neither Aristotle, nor any of his Peripatetickes, that I know, did ever maintaine, that the contradiction here spoken of, consisted in this, that the thing stood in contradiction to the nature or essentiall goodnesse of God; more then in contradiction to the

nature and essence of an Angell, or to the nature and essence of a man.

I doe not finde any reason why the making of the world should be esteemed more consonant to the nature of God, then the not making of it. And whatsoever God willeth, if he willeth it freely, he might forbear the willing of it, and that without sinne. I know nothing that God willeth necessarily but himselfe; and it is improper enough to say, that Gods nature is consonant to it selfe. But in what sense a sphere of heaven, or a tree, or any vile creature shall bee said to be consonant to the nature of God, I am content to be ignorant. I know no purity or holinesse without the will of God, as that must be which is the object of it. In a word, is it created purity and holinesse which is the object of the will of God you speake of, or increated? Increated it cannot be; for the object of that will of God, whereof we speake, is such as God willeth to have existence; but God doth not will increated holinesse to have existence; for that were to will himselfe to have existence, seeing increated holinesse must needs bee God himselfe. But to say that God doth will himselfe to have existence, were to imply, that God as yet hath no existence. If created purity and holinesse be the object of Gods will, you speake of, then God cannot but will some created thing to be, therefore he must necessarily create the world.

A little before you told us, that God could not will ought contradictory to his owne nature and essentiall goodnesse, as in this particular; he cannot will a man to be a man, and yet unreasonable. So then if he will have a man to be, hee must have him to be a reasonable creature: in like sort, if hee will have a beast to be, hee must have him to bee an unreasonable creature.

But what purity and holinesse, or what consonancy to Gods purity and holinesse is to be found in all this, as namely in willing a man to be a reasonable creature, a beast to be a creature unreasonable, seeing now you affirme, that Gods will cannot pitch but upon that which is pure and holy? If I bee not deceived, you are now passing to another point, and doe  
beginne

beginne to apply the termes of your assertion to Gods will of commanding; which makes me remember what the Welsh Tayler said to his boy, in making a garment while the owner stood by: for he cried out, *Potherion, potherion*, which afterwards by inquiry was found to signifie, *Wide stitches, wide stitches*. At length you come to the fountaine whence you fetch your Divinity, whilst others tast it but in trenches. And you tell us out of the booke of Wisedome, that *For as much as God is righteous, he ordereth all things righteously*, thinking it not agreeable to his power to condemne him that hath not deserved to be punished. God is righteous in keeping his word; I hope you will not deny it: neither Philo the Jew, nor the author of the booke of Wisedome, doth informe us of any other righteousnesse in God. Sure I am, that both Suarez and Vasquez, other manner of Schollers then Philo ever was, acknowledge no justice in God, in respect of his creatures, but upon supposition of his will. Now God hath promised, that every soule that sinneth, it shall dye, and not that the sonnes teeth shall be set on edge for the sinnes of the father. And yet I appeale to your owne judgement, whether thus to carrie himselfe be to doe that which is agreeable to his power, or rather that which is agreeable to his righteousnesse. God, you say, *loveth truth & sincere dealing, because he himselfe is true & just*. Yet when the devill testified of the Apostles saying, *These are the servants of the most high God, which shew unto us the waies of everlasting life*, though it were a truth which they uttered, yet the coming of it out of such a ones mouth, I thinke was as little liked by God himselfe, as by his Apostle. Amongst the actions of heathen men, truth was found, as well as other vertuous conversation; yet of their best actions Austin was bold to professe, that they were no better then *splendida peccata*. And he gives this rule for the discerning of true goodness, *Noveris non officiis, sed sinibus discernendas esse virtutes*. And as one blemish of their best actions was this, that they were not performed in reference to his glory; so another very suitable hereunto I take to be this, that they were not performed in obedience to his will. For the horrible sinne of the

Wisd. 12.  
15.

Ezek. 18.

Aug. contr.  
Iulian. Pe-  
lag. l. 4. c. 2.

Jewes.

Ier. 7. 38.

Iewes in offering their sonnes and daughters unto Moloch, is amplified thus in holy Scripture, *Things that never entred into my heart to command them.* And why should God regard that which is not performed in obedience to his will? Many things may be done, and are done by strangers living in farre Countries, agreeable to the lawes of this Kingdome; but wee ken them no thanks for this, because they do it not in obedience to the lawes in this kingdome. There is no likenesse between the goodnesse of God, and the morall goodnesse of the creature. For looke what goodnesse is in God, the same is in him necessarily; it is not so in man.

As for justice, I have often shewed the consent of Suarez and Vasquez, and that opposed by none that I know, that justice in God in respect of the creature, doth alwayes presuppose the will of God. Then as touching the truth of God, it is well knowne that God is a spirit, and hath no tongue to bee the interpreter of his minde, as he hath given unto man; onely he hath taken up the hearts and tongues of his Prophets and Apostles, to deliver his oracles unto his people. And though God is not bound to reveale himselfe unto any; yet if it be his pleasure to reveale himselfe, he is not capable of any such inducement, to deliver an untruth, as man is: man may advantage himselfe by untruth, when by other meanes hee cannot: it is not so with God, who needs not untruth. thereby to advantage himselfe. But whereas you say that Gods veracity is coeternall to his essence, in my judgement it is a very wilde phrase. For veracity hath no place where speech is not; and seeing that God speakes not but by his Ministers, it followeth that before the world was, he never spake at all; and seeing he could have forborne the making of the world, hee might have never spoken at all; so farre off from truth is it, that veracity, which supposeth speech, is coeternall to his essence. For if speech be not coeternall to his essence, how can truth of speech, or truth in speech be coeternall to his essence? Yet veracity taken fundamentally as a disposition in God to deliver truth whensoever he is pleased to cause speech, or to speake by his Ministers, so it is all one with the nature of God, and  
no



no marvell if in this sense it bee coeternall to his essence. In-temperancy, and consequently the opposite vertue of temperance and chastity is found onely in bodies, not in spirits; and as it is no commendation to the nature of an Angell to bee chaste, so neither is it to the nature of God.

You say, God could not give a law for the authorizing of promiscuous or preposterous lust. Yet it is manifest, that promiscuous lust in brut beasts, in all sorts, hath its course, without any transgression, and it being a course of nature in them, it cannot bee denied to bee a worke of God. And Suarez, though hee takes upon him to maintaine a tenet like unto yours, namely, that God cannot dispense as touching his moral law; yet he professeth that God may make it lawfull for one man to have many wives. And I pray you, why may hee not as well make it lawfull for one woman to have many husbands, and what then I pray you will this want of promiscuous and preposterous lust? It may be plurality of husbands to one wife, may bring a greater inconvenience in the course of nature, as touching the corrupting of conceptions, and hindring the course of generation, then plurality of wives; but how in morality it should be more intolerable then the other, I know not. And withall we reade of Massalina, that notwithstanding all her luxurious courses this way, yet not onely brought forth children, but also those like unto her husband also; and being demanded how that came to passe, made this answer, *Non nisi plana nave vectorem fero*. For the brother and sister to know one another carnally, we count it incest; yet unlesse Adams sonnes had married with their sisters, it was impossible there should have beene any propagation of mankind. And in like sort Abraham is supposed to have beene the Vncle of Sarah; and doe you thinke that holy Patriarch would have continued in so sinfull a course after his calling, had it beene such that God could not any way have made it lawfull?

You proceed and tell us, That to legitimate violence, or entitle oppression unto the inheritance bequeathed to conscionable and upright dealing, is without the prerogative of Omnipotencie; and in

stead of giving a reason of your opinion, you expresse it in a double phrase, as if you would make up in figures, what is wanting in argument; and say, *It cannot be ratified by any Parliament of the Trinity*; and indeed I read in Virgil of a Parliament sometimes called in heaven by Iupiter: but I doubt you are of Ovids fault, who as Seneca writes knew not when it was well. But you overdoe onely in words, and underdoe in argument: and as if you had not phrasified enough, you further tell us, that *The practice or countenancing of these and the like, are evill not in us onely, to whom they are forbidden, but so evill in themselves, that the Almighty could not but forbid and condemn them, as profest enemies to his most sacred Majestie*. Thus to phrasifie with you, is to fetch Divinity from the fountaine, and not from the trenches; though you bring neither evidence of Scripture, nor evidence of reason to justifie it. That which you doe bring such as it is, is rather from reason then from Scripture. And if it be so manifest in reason, as you seeme to signifie, the lesse need I should thinke there was of forbidding it: yet you say God could not but forbid it. And where I pray must he forbid it, and by what law? Is it by the law revealed in his word, or by the law of nature? As for the law revealed in his word, that was communicated onely to the Jewes; and why God was necessitated to forbid it to one small nation, and not to another, I can devise no reason. The law of nature I confesse is generall, forbidding such things as are knowne to be evill by the light of nature; but doth it teach that God cannot legitimate any such actions? Iephte thought otherwise, as appears by the message hee sent to the King of

Judg. ii. 24 Ammon, *Wilt thou not possesse that which Chemish thy god giveth thee to possesse? So whomsoever the Lord our God shall drive out from before us, them will we possesse*. And it is observable, that whereas in other particulars you have derived the absolute unlawfulness of such actions, from the incongruities of them to the nature of God; as namely, because he is true, therefore he hateth falshood; because pure, therefore he hateth lust; (whereas to touch one thing more by the way that was omitted, it is well knowne that God is as pure from lawfull lust, as from lust

lust unlawfull) here in this place you make no mention at all of any condition in God, whereunto the practice of violence should bee incongruous, but in place of reason, which you bring not so much as in shew, you make us amends with variety of phrases. Yet what more violent act, then for the father to cut the throat of his most innocent childe? and you well know, God sent Abraham that holy Patriarch in such an errand as this. Samsons faith is commended by S. Paul; his first rising against the Philistins, was as the subject rising against their Princes, as the men of Iudah signified unto him, saying, *Knowest thou not that the Philistins are rulers over us?* and thereupon they were content to deliver him into their hands, to manifest themselves to be no confederates with him in this insurrection. Afterwards we reade how he died flaming with desire of revenge upon the Philistins, and that for his two eyes; and to the end he might be revenged on them, was content to be his owne assassinate; and all this in an holy manner performed, commending himselfe by solempne prayer unto God. For he called unto the Lord, and said, *O Lord God remember me, I pray thee, and strengthen me I pray thee onely this once; O God, that I may bee at once revenged of the Philistins for my two eyes; and thereupon taking hold of the two pillars of the house, he bowed himselfe, and said, Let me die with the Philistins; and the house fell upon the Lords, and upon all the people that were within: so the dead which he slew at his death, were more then they which he slew in his life.* What a strange zeale possessed Phinees, when he ran his javelin thorow Zimri and Cosbi, thus perishing in their incestuous act, and thus hee as it were sending their soules to hel, as well as their bodies to the grave. Yet God approves of it, and seales hereupon unto him the covenant of the Priesthood. The children of Israel expell the Canaanites, and destroy them without all mercy, having nothing to justifie them in these violent courses, but onely the commandement of God. The Israelites are said to have robbed the Egyptians, in borrowing that which they never meant to restore, and the Lord animates them hereunto, and foretels unto Moses that he would cause them to march out of the

Gen. 22.

Heb. 11.

Judg. 15.

11.

Judg. 16.

V. 28.

V. 30.

Numb. 25.

8.

V. 12, 13.

Exod. 3.

21, 22.

land laden with the riches of Egypt; and a great part of this was afterwards consecrated to the service of the Tabernacle.

4. In the next place you tell us after your manner positively, that *the infinite goodnesse of Gods Majestie cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of righteousness as he sets us to follow*; and this dogmaticall assertion of yours is ushered in with a great deal of state, by a comparison forsooth of the contrary disposition of great men, for whom, *to set patterns of the morality* which they require in others, is reputed a kinde of *pedantisme or mechanicall servitude*; and why mechanical? forsooth because it is like the setting of us copies, or songs, or teaching us some honest trade. Yet I can hardly believe but that Sardanapalus or Heliogabalus both did thinke it better becomming the Majesty of a Prince to give examples of honest conversation, then to play the Scrivener or the Shoemaker. Instruction in morality, or in liberall Arts, may in some things have resemblance to mechanicall instructions; but is any man so sottish as thereupon to conceive such morall and liberall instruction to be mechanical? An Ape may bee like unto a man, *Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis*, yet no foole conceives him to be a man. Neither doe I see any cause to wonder, that they who are willing to give lawes to others, are loath to have any lawes given to curbe them. Well, though the garments of morality be too strait for great ones, yet they are not too strait for God; he can bee content to put them on, to weare them, and they become him so well, that *the infinite greatnesse of his Majestie cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of righteousness as he sets us to follow*. As I remember in *Cyri pedia* there is conceived such a good lesson becomming Princes, namely, themselves to observe those lawes which they make for their people. This law you have such a transcendent conceit of, and of the goodnesse of it, that you thinke fit to establish it in the Commonwealth of the Trinity. God (say you) *cannot wrest his will*. Consider, I pray, whether this be a sober speech. The corruptest man that lives, the devill himselfe cannot wrest his will. First because

because the will cannot be wrested: lawes may be wrested by violent interpretations; mens goods may bee wrested from them by violent courses, but I never read nor heard that any mans will may be wrested. For it is a received rule, that, *Voluntas non potest cogi*. Secondly, because a man cannot wrest anything that he undertakes to wrest, but by his will. Now in what congruities can the will of any be said to wrest it selfe? But take we your meaning, that God doth strictly observe the rules of righteousness, which he sets us to follow. Now the rules he setteth us to follow, are partly such as are contained in the first table, and partly such as are contained in the second. In the first wee are commanded to love him, to feare him, to put our trust in him. Are these the rules that God himselfe doth so strictly observe? doth he feare himselfe? doth he put his trust or confidence in himselfe? In the second we are commanded to worship him according to his word; hath God a care to worship himselfe according to his word? God sometimes doth sweare by himselfe, and I hold it impossible that God should doe any thing in vaine, much more that he should take his owne name in vaine.

But as for the sanctifying of the Sabbath, whereunto wee are bound, I cannot well conceive, how that day, and the sanctification thereof should be observed by God; unlesse you are of the Jewes opinion, who thinke that God spends some part of the day in reading their Talmud, and some part in lamenting Ierusalem, and the desolation thereof; and the other part of the day he spends in playing with Leviathan; and you desire to translate these celestiall devotions to the Sabbath. We are bid to honour our father and mother, God hath none to honour. Wee are forbid to kil. any man, yet God did bid Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, and allowed Phinees in slaying Zimri and Cosbi, and exposed his owne innocent Sonne to be crucified, and gives us power over inferiour creatures, as Lords of life and death. God made Adam after his owne image and likenesse; Adams integrity was the image of his holinesse; but when man by his fall lost this his holinesse, take heed you avouch not, that hereby he lost the image of God.

Our holinesse consisteth in seeking the glory of God; and no creature can be so zealous of Gods glory as God is of his owne. But how to expresse our zeale of Gods glory better, then by obedience unto his will, I willingly professe I know not. As likewise what you meane by those ever living examples of goodnesse, which, as you say, *God expresseth in his works; vnlesse it bee in making his sunne to shine, and his raine to fall both upon good and bad.* For unto this is the last precept which you mentioned, referred by our Saviour. And yet I doubt not (nor you neither) that God hath contrary waies and courses, as namely, in making us to *discerne betweene the righteous and the wicked, betweene him that serveth God, and him that serveth him not*; and that in respect of demonstration of mercie to the one, and execution of judgement on the other: Behold, *my servant shall eate, and ye shall be hungry; behold, my servants shall drinke, and yee shall be thirstie: behold, my servants shall rejoyce, and ye shall be ashamed: Behold, my servants shall sing for joy of heart; but yee shall cry for sorrow of heart, and howle for vexation of spirit.* Yea, and in making one piece rained upon sometimes, and not another: yet I nothing doubt, but you will acknowledge God to bee as holy in these waies as in any other; yea, in causing two Beares to come out of the wood, upon Elisha his cursing in the name of the Lord, and teare fourty two children. Yea, in revenging Achans sacrilege, not onely with his owne death, but with his childrens also; and in destroying suckling children, and children in the wombe, both in the generall deluge, and in the conflagration of Sodome: and when for the sinne of Saul, hee caused seven of his sonnes to bee delivered into the hands of the Gibeonites, to bee put to death: for, *God is righteous in all his waies, and holy in all his workes.* And the equity of Gods courses, though sometimes discernable by man, as in the case you put out of Ezechiel 18. 25. yet not alwaies so, but that wee are driven sometimes to cry out with the Apostles, *Oh the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how unsearchable are his judgements, and his waies past finding out?*

5 I confesse, that if to dictate like a positive Theologue be

be to instruct us, you have thus farre instructed us, *That those paternes of holinesse or perfection, which we are bound to imitate in him, are not to be taken from his bare commandement, or revelation of his will, but from the objects of his will revealed, or from the eternall practises which he hath exhibited, as so many expresse and manifest proofes that his will is alwayes holy and just.* The paternes of holinesse which wee are bound to imitate, are not to be taken (you say) from Gods bare commandement: I finde what you say, but I had rather finde what you prove. When our Saviour exhorteth us to be holy as God is holy, and perfect as God is perfect, he speaketh it with a particular reference to a particular course in Gods providence, taking thereby not an obligation to imitate him, but onely an inducement to bee so much the more forward in doing that which God commands us in loving our enemies. And unlesse wee have a commandement from God for the rule of our obedience, it is nothing safe to imitate God. For what? shall Magistrates spare malefactors, because God spareth them a long time? Or because God causeth the children to be put to death sometime for the sinne of the father, shall we do so too? Or because God makes his sunne to shine as well upon one as upon another, shall we therefore put no difference betweene such as are of the household of faith, and others? Wee may not imitate Elisha in cursing little children that mocked him; nor the zeale of Phinees in killing Zimri and Cosbi in their lust; much lesse must wee alwaies imitate God, who hath greater power over mens lives then Elisha, or Phinees had. Yet why you should call the workes of God in the course of his providence *eternall practises*, I know no reason, or colour of reason. It may be that in stead of *eternall*, it should be *externall* practises. God no doubt is holy in all his waies and workes, but herehence it followeth not, that wee must imitate him in all his courses, but rather wee must have an eye to his commandements. And what, I pray are those perfections whereof our generall duties are the imperfect representations? Our generall duties are such as these, *We must not deale unjustly with any; we must deale justly with all, or wee must be holy; Holinesse becomes thine.* Psal. 91. 34.  
house.



*house for ever*; and in the Priests forehead was wont to be written, *Holinesse unto the Lord*. Now, are these the perfections, wherein God, as you say, is holy and just? Then tis as if you should say, *God is eminently and apparantly holy in the perfection which is called his holinesse. God is eminently and apparantly just, in that perfection which is called his justice.* Of all his morall commandements, not one there is, you say, *whose sincere practise doth not in part make us truly like him: and we are bound to be conformable to his Will revealed, that we may bee conformable to his nature, without conformity whereunto, wee cannot participate of his happinesse, for happinesse is the immediate consequent of his nature.* You proceede to cut out work for your Readers, as many as are willing to *Try the spirits*, and not hand over head to receive all for gold that glisters. That the practise of Gods commandements maketh us like him, is a plausible speech. And it is true in the generall: for as God is wise and holy, so our obedience to his commandements, is that which makes us wise and holy. And as God doth nothing but that which very well becomes him; so in obeying the will of God, wee shall doe nothing but that which very well becomes us. But as for particular duties, there is little or no correspondency betwene the carriage of superiours and inferiours. Wee have a God to worship by reverence and feare, and by praying unto him; these are moralities no way incident unto God.

Wee have parents both naturall and spirituall, and masters and magistrates whom we must honour; God hath none such to honour. Wee by our authoritie may not take away the life of any, be he never so great an offender; God may take away the life of any, bee hee never so innocent, without any blemish to his holines. Matrimoniall chastitie is a vertue commendable in a Christian; but this vertue is of so base a condition, that the divine nature is not capable of it, as who hath no lust at all to order; like as on the contrary, the very Devils themselves being Spirits, are no way obnoxious to unchastitie. The like may bee said of temperance, and intemperancie in the use or abuse of Gods creatures through gluttonie,

tony and drunkennes. Tis theft for us to take any mans goods from him against his will ; it is not so with God, who can send any man as naked out of the world , as hee brought him into the world , without any prejudice to the reparation of his justice. And seeing he is not capable of any manner of concupiscence, either of the eye or of the flesh, ( for hee is a Spirit, and not a body or flesh ) nor in the way of pride of life : the contrary conditions cannot be in the way of any commendable vertues attributed unto God. In a word , all the goodnesse that is in God , is essentiall unto him ; our goodnesse, whatsoever we be, is but accidentall unto us : and therefore, when we are exhorted to be holy as he is holy , and perfect as God is perfect , it tends onely to this, even to set before us certaine actions of God , as patternes and precedents to imitate him therein ; and that onely so far forth as they are suitable and congruous inducements to the performing of Gods commandements, not to affect any conformity of nature with the deitie. For what conformity can there be betweene the nature of a creature, and the nature of his Creator ? But Saint Peter telleth us , we are made partakers *τῆς θείας φύσεως*. I have observed some to have rendred this passage thus, We are made partakers of a godly nature ; and the godliness of our nature undoubtedly consists in obeying the will of God ; according to that of the Apostle, *This is the will of God, even your sanctification*. And what godliness can be greater , then for a man to obey the will of his Creator ; and that is the will of Gods commandement, though it may fall out to be contrary to Gods purpose. For wee are bound to pray for the life of our parents and princes, though it maybe, God will not have either the one or the other to live. And God commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, he arose early about this businesse, though it appeared afterwards, that Gods purpose was, Isaac should not be sacrificed. But let it be that we are partakers of the divine nature : in this sense I nothing doubt but that it proceedeth in respect of the holy Spirit , wherewith God hath endued us, and which he hath given us to dwell in us ; and whereby God the Father , and God the

Ioh. 4. 24.

1 Pet. 1. 16  
Matt. 5. 48

2 Pet. 1. 4.

1 Thes. 4. 5

Rom. 8. 5  
Rom. 8. 11  
1 Ioh. 4. 13

- Sonne are said to dwell in us. But let us proceed in washing away this painting, which makes errour appeare with a face of truth. We are bound by the law of God, to forgive our enemies, and to pray for them even to the last, as our Saviour did, and Steven did. But is God bound to forgive his enemies, and that alwaies, as we are? we know he may, and doth sometimes forbear long ( according to the pleasure of his will) but, *If once he whet his glittering sword, and his hand take hold of judgement, he will execute vengeance on his enemies, and make his arrows drunke with blood.* Again, Magistrates must not suffer a witch to live, being once discovered: God knows them when man doth not, yet suffers them to live as long as he thinkes good, and sometimes very long. Wee are bound to have mercy on all according to our power; *God hath mercy on whom he will, and hardeneth whom he will.* Lastly, wee may not suffer any man to sinne, if it lie in our power to hinder it. But God suffereth all manner of all abominations to be committed before his eyes, and in all these hee carrieth himselfe without blemish to his holinesse. *Nos certe (saith Austine) si eos in quos nobis potestas est, ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittemus, rei tum ipsis erimus: Quam vero innumerabilia ille permittit fieri ante oculos suos, qua utique si voluisset, nulla ratione permetteret; & tamen justus, & bonus est, & quod prabendo patientiam dat locum penitentiae nolens aliquem perire.* That wee are bound to conforme to Gods revealed will, the Scripture teacheth us; *Secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the things revealed are for us and our children to doe them.* But that therefore we must be conformable to his will, that wee may be conformable to his nature the Scripture teacheth not: and therefore give us leave to take this superfection of yours to be but a revelation of flesh and blood. In the book of Iudges wee read that Manoah enquired after the name of the Angell that appeared unto him; whom good Divines, upon pregnant circumstances, doe collect to have beene the Lord: but he answereth, *Why askest thou after my name which is secret?* God verily dwelleth in the darke cloud: and though sometimes againe it is said, that he dwelleth in the light, yet forthwith it is added,

is added, that this is such a light that no man can approach unto. As groundlesse is your following dictate, that, *without* *conformitie to his nature*, we cannot participate of his holinesse, *it being the immediate consequent of his nature*. And what, I pray, will you make gods of us? or shall our glorification in the kingdome of heaven be a deification? as it must be if it be a participation of the divine happinesse. But this is an usuall libertie of discourse which you take to your selfe. I hope you will not say, that formall glory which God hath provided for us, shall be a glory increated, though in the way of an efficient cause it shall proceede from the increated glory of God, but created rather.

And all created glory, I hope, bee it never so great, is no part of Gods happinesse, which is, you say, an immediate consequent unto his nature; wherein notwithstanding I doubt much, you speake as Peter sometimes did, when he spake he knew not what; as namely, in distinguishing Gods happines from his nature, as an immediate consequent thereof. You doubt of Lactantius his consequence, as neither certaine, nor authentique; as if it might be authentique, though not certaine in your opinion. Yet you embrace the same consequence applied to another matter that serves your turne, and you swallow it with great facility, it never stickes by the way like a Burre in your throat, as if consequences were but ceremonies, and you the master of them. But you put a difference; Lactantius his inference is sometimes doubtfull, you say; but out of all question, yours (if we may take your word) is not. But you take too great liberty to your selfe, to put things at your pleasure out of question. We should have a mad Church and a mad world, if you had power to put out of question what you list. But let us consider your inference, *God doth bid us unfainedly blesse our persecutoors, therefore he doth unfainedly tender his blessings to such as persecute him in his members*. This then belike is that conformity to Gods nature which we must aspire unto. But by your leave I finde no conformity herein. *Matt. 5. 44* For first, wee are bid to blesse our persecutors, not to tender our blessings unto them upon condition they will admit

Exod. 33.

19.

Rom. 5.15

them; but you doe not say, God doth blesse his persecutors; you onely say, hee doth tender his blessings unto them. Againe, God biddeth us blesse them that persecute us: you doe not say, that God doth blesse, or tender his blessings to them that persecute him, but to them that persecute others, to wit, his members. Thirdly, and chiefly, God bids us to blesse all our persecutors.; for hee exhorts us to be mercifull unto all, as you confesse in the next words; but you dare not say, that God doth blesse, or tender his blessings unto all; but here you lispe, and speake indefinitely, saying, *God doth tender his blessings to them that persecute him in his members*; and that, *Hee sheweth kindnesse to them that are most unkinde*. Indeed, he doth so to some, but not unto all, but unto whom he will: for so himselfe professeth unto Moses, *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion*. And I pray consider, what blessing hath God tendered unto the Angels since their fall? So that albeit Gods charitie towards some infinitely exceeds the charity of man, yet mans duety is to be charitable towards all; Gods duety is not to be charitable to any, but hee loves whom hee will, and hates whom he will, and that before they are borne, as he loved Iacob and hated Esau. Gods fidelity must needs be greater then mans, as being backt with power to performe that he promiseth, the creature is not: nay, all the power and readinesse that the creature hath to performe fidelity towards God, proceeds meereley from the grace of God.

But to compare the chastitie of Virgins with Gods purity, is most absurd; neither is there any correspondency in the parts of this comparison, and of the comparison following, as betwixt the drosse and corpulency on the one side, and the sublimated spirits of the same body on the other side: for both the drosse and spirits you speake of are corporeall: no such proportions betweene the chastitie of Virgins, and the purity of God. The children of God, though in a married estate, yet are they Virgins in the sight of God.

As for Virginitie corporall, it hath beene found in Heathens, and is wondrous base metall to be compared to the spirituall

rituall purity of God, in spight of all preferment you give to the one above the other. That rule, *Doe unto every man as we would be done unto*, must be rightly applied, otherwise it will be farre from equity. For it becomes not a Magistrate to spare a malefactor, because if himsele were in the like case of danger and desert, he would be glad to be spared. We must doe that unto others, which in the way of justice, or equity, or charity, we would have done unto our selves.

As for that, *Him that honoureth me, I will honour*, it is meer- 1 Sam. 2. 30  
ly dependent upon the will of God. For all confesse, that God can annihilate the holiest creature that is, secluding his ordinance to the contrary, and in this case should be nothing guiltie of iniquitie.

At length you come to the point, and demand, *Whether God doth intend thus well to all?* but because the nearer you come to the light, by a true stating of the question, the more your deviations from the truth are like to be discovered, therefore you forthwith obscure it. For whereas the conformity you spake of before, requires, that as we are bid to be mercifull unto all, so should God be mercifull unto all likewise. And so the question, to come to an issue, should be this, *Whether God intends thus well to all, or no?* You declinethis; and whereas the proper place of Gods libertie and cariage of himsele according to the meere good pleasure of his will, is not in designing destruction or salvation unto whom he will, (for the case is cleare, that God doth not determine, that destruction or salvation shall befall any, but according unto congruous dispositions preceding, at least in persons of ripe yeares,) but onely in the dispensation of his grace and mercy, shewing it towards whom he will, and denying it to whom he will; you againe decline this state of the question, and propose it onely of Gods wishing well to all, or destruction unto some.

Nor doe you content your selfe with this, but as fearing lest this state of the question be not safe enough to keepe your shinnes whole, you propose it in a most wilde manner, *Whether God doth intend thus well to all, or destruction to some, as it is a meanes of blisse to those whom he loves.* You have courage e-

nough

nough to dictate positively, but you manifest a very faint hart when you come to be put to the prooffe. What meant you to complicate so many questions into one? By your tenet God may intend thus well to all as you have spoken, to wit, in intending his blessings, albeit he did will destruction unto some, to wit, for the contempt or refusall of his grace offered. And a great deale of difference there is betweene these two questions, *Whether God intends destruction unto any*; and *Whether hee intends a mans destruction after this or that manner*; as namely, *Whether he intends it as a meanes of blisse to those whom he loves*; and yet on this latter onely you insist. And indeed you might well despaire of getting any credit upon the former points: the case is so cleare, that God in the dispensation of his grace doth not cary himselve indifferently towards all, but *hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*. As also that in his sentences of condemnation or salvation he carrieth himselve in due reference unto their former disobedience or obedience, and so accordingly did from everlasting purpose to cary himselve.

But consider we the third point, the onely field wherein you have an edge to shew your strength. And first I demand, Who ever said that God did intend the destruction of any as it is a meanes of blisse to them whom he loves? Wee usually professe that God intends to damne no men but for their sins, and that to this end, even to the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice towards them; but withall we say, that God doth intend also, by the consideration of this their destruction, to illustrate his grace so much the more towards the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory. For when they shall consider not onely their owne salvation, but also the damnation of others, and that God might have made them also vessels of wrath as well as others; how can it be but that their joy should be the greater upon this? and if it be so, God must needs have intended it. And this not onely our Divines have observed out of the Apostle Saint Paul, but even Pontifician Divines also, as Didacus Alvarez, and Alphonsus Mendosa. Now let us consider the force of your aritation against

Rom. 9. 23  
Alvar. de  
auxil. disp.  
III.  
Mendos.  
disp. 1.



gainst this. *If so he did, say you, We might be exempt from that negative precept, of not doing evill that good might ensue.* We deny this consequence, and as for your reason, it seemes to be this, *We may and must imitate our heavenly Father;* and therefore seeing he doth evill that good may come thereof, so may wee doe too. To this I answer, 1. First, that the consequence is nothing true. For God intending the destruction of any, doth not therein doe any evill, no nor intend any evill. For God doth intend onely the destruction of impenitent sinners. But to intend the destruction of impenitent sinners, I hope you will not dare to say that this is evill. Thus may every one see how wide you rove from the marke in your inconsequent consequences. 2. Secondly I answer, it is not lawfull for us to imitate God in all things, as before I have shewed, and gave instance in divers particulars. Now I will adde one more. If we repent, God not onely spares us, but forgives us; *If wee acknowledge our sinnes, he is faithfull and just to forgive us our sins.* 1 Ioh. 1. 9. But Magistrates, when a malefactor is arraigned and convicted, and condemned of some capitall crime, though he doth repent, yet may not they spare him. That wherein our Saviour exhorts us to imitate our heavenly Father, and *to be perfect as he is perfect,* is in a particular case, namely, in loving not Math. 5. onely our friends, but our enemies. For so God not onely last. loveth his children and his friends, but his enemies also, as appears in the pardoning of their sins, and changing of their hearts, as many as belong to his election. And it is false to say, that this is the onely reason why wee must love our enemies, and not our friends onely: for the commandement of God is another reason, and a more chiefe reason; and we may not take inducements from Gods actions to encourage us in the doing of any thing, unlesse in such cases, as when the actions whereabouts we let our selves, are agreeable to the law of God. God determined the crucifying of Christ, but neither Act. 4. 29. Iudas, nor the high Priests, nor Pilate, nor the people of Israel were the more free from sinne for this, while they determined to bring him to his crosse. God turnes not onely 2 Cor. 11. 19. the evils of some to the good of others, but a mans owne sins also

De Civit. also to his owne good, according to that of Austin, *Utile est*  
 Dei l. 14. *superbis in aliquod apertum, manifestumque cadere peccatum.*  
 c. 13.

6. I wonder what glory of God doth appeare in the punishment of the reprobate: not the glory of his mercy certainly; nor say I the glory of his justice. For vindicative justice, whereof this is spoken, hath onely place in reference unto sinners. It is absurd to say, that Gods dealings throughout are to be imitated by us; and you have no ground for this but the saying of our Saviour, Matth. 5. 48. which is applyed to a speciall case. And will it follow, that because wee must imitate Gods actions in a speciall case, therefore we must imitate his dealings generally? To intend evill to some, before they have committed sinne, admits a double interpretation; either this, to intend that evill shall befall some; in which sense it is manifest, that God doth intend the evill of punishment to befall none before they have sinned. Or thus, the very intention of evill unto some is not untill sinne bee committed; in which sense it is notoriously untrue. For sinne is not committed but in time; but Gods intentions are everlasting. Of intending the destruction of any as meanes of others good, I have already spoken that which is sufficient. Why should your tautologies draw me to the like absurdity? The last clause is new, and therefore we will consider it. *If God did absolutely ordaine some to eternall inevitable misery, for the advancement of his owne glory; We should not sinne, but rather imitate the perfection of our heavenly Father, in robbing Indas to pay Paul, &c. Ridetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem.* This argument was in the close of the former section proposed, and the inconsequence thereof discovered. The consequence is this, *God did ordaine to punish some, therefore we may rob them; God did ordaine this to the advancement of his glory; therefore we may rob, to pay our debts.* No proportion is to bee found in any part of this comparison. For if God take away the life of any man, will it follow that therefore we may doe soe also? It is well knowne God may doe such a thing without all respect to sinne; but it is not in our lawfull power to doe so, though with respect unto their sinne. And what a senselesse collection is this, that  
 because

because God may doe this or that to advance his glory, therefore we may doe the like thing for our profit and advantage? We say, God intends to punish no reprobate, but for his sinne; yet I hope you will not say, it is in any private mans power to robbe or take any mans goods from him, by reason of his sinne.

Wee are beholden to you for your counsell in the next place, when you teach us to guesse at the perfection of Gods Justice towards the wicked, and of his bounty towards the godly, by the commendable shadow or imitation of it in earthly gods. A proper course to search out the goodnesse and justice of God, in the courses of heathen men. Yet it is a rule of State, *Better a mischief then an inconvenience.* And by warres is procured peace, but is it without intention of harme to any? Can warres bee managed without harme? even as well as the Fryar could bee satisfied with a goose livor, and a pigges head, albeit nothing for him were dead. And in making Sodom and Gomorrah examples of his judgements, did he not intend our good? and was this without intention of harme to any? And though they of ripe years amongst them had committed abomination, and God tooke them away as hee thought good; yet what I pray became of infants, some in their mothers wombe, some hanging at their mothers breasts? And will you challenge God for injustice in this, because we doe not finde the like course in the commendable shadow or imitation of Gods justice in earthly gods, as you are pleased to phrasifie it? In distribution of rewards upon the obedient, and execution of punishment upon the disobedient, God failes not, as he will manifest at the day of judgement. And as he executes, so he intends to execute, and no otherwise. But God hath a peculiar power, no shadow whereof appeareth in man or Angell; and that is, of giving grace, of giving repentance: and this he distributes to whom he will, and denies to whom he will. You are content to leape over this; and no marvell; for the grossenesse of your opinion would bee too clearly manifested to the world, if you should deale on this. Yet God, you say, *drawes men to repentance by gracious promises of inestimable reward.* And where I

Iude 7.

Ezech. 16.  
50.

Rom. 9. 18

1  
 2  
 3  
 4  
 5  
 6  
 7  
 8  
 9  
 10  
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 15  
 16  
 17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25  
 26  
 27  
 28  
 29  
 30  
 31  
 32  
 33  
 34  
 35  
 36  
 37  
 38  
 39  
 40  
 41  
 42  
 43  
 44  
 45  
 46  
 47  
 48  
 49  
 50  
 51  
 52  
 53  
 54  
 55  
 56  
 57  
 58  
 59  
 60  
 61  
 62  
 63  
 64  
 65  
 66  
 67  
 68  
 69  
 70  
 71  
 72  
 73  
 74  
 75  
 76  
 77  
 78  
 79  
 80  
 81  
 82  
 83  
 84  
 85  
 86  
 87  
 88  
 89  
 90  
 91  
 92  
 93  
 94  
 95  
 96  
 97  
 98  
 99  
 100  
 101  
 102  
 103  
 104  
 105  
 106  
 107  
 108  
 109  
 110  
 111  
 112  
 113  
 114  
 115  
 116  
 117  
 118  
 119  
 120  
 121  
 122  
 123  
 124  
 125  
 126  
 127  
 128  
 129  
 130  
 131  
 132  
 133  
 134  
 135  
 136  
 137  
 138  
 139  
 140  
 141  
 142  
 143  
 144  
 145  
 146  
 147  
 148  
 149  
 150  
 151  
 152  
 153  
 154  
 155  
 156  
 157  
 158  
 159  
 160  
 161  
 162  
 163  
 164  
 165  
 166  
 167  
 168  
 169  
 170  
 171  
 172  
 173  
 174  
 175  
 176  
 177  
 178  
 179  
 180  
 181  
 182  
 183  
 184  
 185  
 186  
 187  
 188  
 189  
 190  
 191  
 192  
 193  
 194  
 195  
 196  
 197  
 198  
 199  
 200  
 201  
 202  
 203  
 204  
 205  
 206  
 207  
 208  
 209  
 210  
 211  
 212  
 213  
 214  
 215  
 216  
 217  
 218  
 219  
 220  
 221  
 222  
 223  
 224  
 225  
 226  
 227  
 228  
 229  
 230  
 231  
 232  
 233  
 234  
 235  
 236  
 237  
 238  
 239  
 240  
 241  
 242  
 243  
 244  
 245  
 246  
 247  
 248  
 249  
 250  
 251  
 252  
 253  
 254  
 255  
 256  
 257  
 258  
 259  
 260  
 261  
 262  
 263  
 264  
 265  
 266  
 267  
 268  
 269  
 270  
 271  
 272  
 273  
 274  
 275  
 276  
 277  
 278  
 279  
 280  
 281  
 282  
 283  
 284  
 285  
 286  
 287  
 288  
 289  
 290  
 291  
 292  
 293  
 294  
 295  
 296  
 297  
 298  
 299  
 300  
 301  
 302  
 303  
 304  
 305  
 306  
 307  
 308  
 309  
 310  
 311  
 312  
 313  
 314  
 315  
 316  
 317  
 318  
 319  
 320  
 321  
 322  
 323  
 324  
 325  
 326  
 327  
 328  
 329  
 330  
 331  
 332  
 333  
 334  
 335  
 336  
 337  
 338  
 339  
 340  
 341  
 342  
 343  
 344  
 345  
 346  
 347  
 348  
 349  
 350  
 351  
 352  
 353  
 354  
 355  
 356  
 357  
 358  
 359  
 360  
 361  
 362  
 363  
 364  
 365  
 366  
 367  
 368  
 369  
 370  
 371  
 372  
 373  
 374  
 375  
 376  
 377  
 378  
 379  
 380  
 381  
 382  
 383  
 384  
 385  
 386  
 387  
 388  
 389  
 390  
 391  
 392  
 393  
 394  
 395  
 396  
 397  
 398  
 399  
 400  
 401  
 402  
 403  
 404  
 405  
 406  
 407  
 408  
 409  
 410  
 411  
 412  
 413  
 414  
 415  
 416  
 417  
 418  
 419  
 420  
 421  
 422  
 423  
 424  
 425  
 426  
 427  
 428  
 429  
 430  
 431  
 432  
 433  
 434  
 435  
 436  
 437  
 438  
 439  
 440  
 441  
 442  
 443  
 444  
 445  
 446  
 447  
 448  
 449  
 450  
 451  
 452  
 453  
 454  
 455  
 456  
 457  
 458  
 459  
 460  
 461  
 462  
 463  
 464  
 465  
 466  
 467  
 468  
 469  
 470  
 471  
 472  
 473  
 474  
 475  
 476  
 477  
 478  
 479  
 480  
 481  
 482  
 483  
 484  
 485  
 486  
 487  
 488  
 489  
 490  
 491  
 492  
 493  
 494  
 495  
 496  
 497  
 498  
 499  
 500  
 501  
 502  
 503  
 504  
 505  
 506  
 507  
 508  
 509  
 510  
 511  
 512  
 513  
 514  
 515  
 516  
 517  
 518  
 519  
 520  
 521  
 522  
 523  
 524  
 525  
 526  
 527  
 528  
 529  
 530  
 531  
 532  
 533  
 534  
 535  
 536  
 537  
 538  
 539  
 540  
 541  
 542  
 543  
 544  
 545  
 546  
 547  
 548  
 549  
 550  
 551  
 552  
 553  
 554  
 555  
 556  
 557  
 558  
 559  
 560  
 561  
 562  
 563  
 564  
 565  
 566  
 567  
 568  
 569  
 570  
 571  
 572  
 573  
 574  
 575  
 576  
 577  
 578  
 579  
 580  
 581  
 582  
 583  
 584  
 585  
 586  
 587  
 588  
 589  
 590  
 591  
 592  
 593  
 594  
 595  
 596  
 597  
 598  
 599  
 600  
 601  
 602  
 603  
 604  
 605  
 606  
 607  
 608  
 609  
 610  
 611  
 612  
 613  
 614  
 615  
 616  
 617  
 618  
 619  
 620  
 621  
 622  
 623  
 624  
 625  
 626  
 627  
 628  
 629  
 630  
 631  
 632  
 633  
 634  
 635  
 636  
 637  
 638  
 639  
 640  
 641  
 642  
 643  
 644  
 645  
 646  
 647  
 648  
 649  
 650  
 651  
 652  
 653  
 654  
 655  
 656  
 657  
 658  
 659  
 660  
 661  
 662  
 663  
 664  
 665  
 666  
 667  
 668  
 669  
 670  
 671  
 672  
 673  
 674  
 675  
 676  
 677  
 678  
 679  
 680  
 681  
 682  
 683  
 684  
 685  
 686  
 687  
 688  
 689  
 690  
 691  
 692  
 693  
 694  
 695  
 696  
 697  
 698  
 699  
 700  
 701  
 702  
 703  
 704  
 705  
 706  
 707  
 708  
 709  
 710  
 711  
 712  
 713  
 714  
 715  
 716  
 717  
 718  
 719  
 720  
 721  
 722  
 723  
 724  
 725  
 726  
 727  
 728  
 729  
 730  
 731  
 732  
 733  
 734  
 735  
 736  
 737  
 738  
 739  
 740  
 741  
 742  
 743  
 744  
 745  
 746  
 747  
 748  
 749  
 750  
 751  
 752  
 753  
 754  
 755  
 756  
 757  
 758  
 759  
 760  
 761  
 762  
 763  
 764  
 765  
 766  
 767  
 768  
 769  
 770  
 771  
 772  
 773  
 774  
 775  
 776  
 777  
 778  
 779  
 780  
 781  
 782  
 783  
 784  
 785  
 786  
 787  
 788  
 789  
 790  
 791  
 792  
 793  
 794  
 795  
 796  
 797  
 798  
 799  
 800  
 801  
 802  
 803  
 804  
 805  
 806  
 807  
 808  
 809  
 810  
 811  
 812  
 813  
 814  
 815  
 816  
 817  
 818  
 819  
 820  
 821  
 822  
 823  
 824  
 825  
 826  
 827  
 828  
 829  
 830  
 831  
 832  
 833  
 834  
 835  
 836  
 837  
 838  
 839  
 840  
 841  
 842  
 843  
 844  
 845  
 846  
 847  
 848  
 849  
 850  
 851  
 852  
 853  
 854  
 855  
 856  
 857  
 858  
 859  
 860  
 861  
 862  
 863  
 864  
 865  
 866  
 867  
 868  
 869  
 870  
 871  
 872  
 873  
 874  
 875  
 876  
 877  
 878  
 879  
 880  
 881  
 882  
 883  
 884  
 885  
 886  
 887  
 888  
 889  
 890  
 891  
 892  
 893  
 894  
 895  
 896  
 897  
 898  
 899  
 900  
 901  
 902  
 903  
 904  
 905  
 906  
 907  
 908  
 909  
 910  
 911  
 912  
 913  
 914  
 915  
 916  
 917  
 918  
 919  
 920  
 921  
 922  
 923  
 924  
 925  
 926  
 927  
 928  
 929  
 930  
 931  
 932  
 933  
 934  
 935  
 936  
 937  
 938  
 939  
 940  
 941  
 942  
 943  
 944  
 945  
 946  
 947  
 948  
 949  
 950  
 951  
 952  
 953  
 954  
 955  
 956  
 957  
 958  
 959  
 960  
 961  
 962  
 963  
 964  
 965  
 966  
 967  
 968  
 969  
 970  
 971  
 972  
 973  
 974  
 975  
 976  
 977  
 978  
 979  
 980  
 981  
 982  
 983  
 984  
 985  
 986  
 987  
 988  
 989  
 990  
 991  
 992  
 993  
 994  
 995  
 996  
 997  
 998  
 999  
 1000  
 1001  
 1002  
 1003  
 1004  
 1005  
 1006  
 1007  
 1008  
 1009  
 1010  
 1011  
 1012  
 1013  
 1014  
 1015  
 1016  
 1017  
 1018  
 1019  
 1020  
 1021  
 1022  
 1023  
 1024  
 1025  
 1026  
 1027  
 1028  
 1029  
 1030  
 1031  
 1032  
 1033  
 1034  
 1035  
 1036  
 1037  
 1038  
 1039  
 1040  
 1041  
 1042  
 1043  
 1044  
 1045  
 1046  
 1047  
 1048  
 1049  
 1050  
 1051  
 1052  
 1053  
 1054  
 1055  
 1056  
 1057  
 1058  
 1059  
 1060  
 1061  
 1062  
 1063  
 1064  
 1065  
 1066  
 1067  
 1068  
 1069  
 1070  
 1071  
 1072  
 1073  
 1074  
 1075  
 1076  
 1077  
 1078  
 1079  
 1080  
 1081  
 1082  
 1083  
 1084  
 1085  
 1086  
 1087  
 1088  
 1089  
 1090  
 1091  
 1092  
 1093  
 1094  
 1095  
 1096  
 1097  
 1098  
 1099  
 1100  
 1101  
 1102  
 1103  
 1104  
 1105  
 1106  
 1107  
 1108  
 1109  
 1110  
 1111  
 1112  
 1113  
 1114  
 1115  
 1116  
 1117  
 1118  
 1119  
 1120  
 1121  
 1122  
 1123  
 1124  
 1125  
 1126  
 1127  
 1128  
 1129  
 1130  
 1131  
 1132  
 1133  
 1134  
 1135  
 1136  
 1137  
 1138  
 1139  
 1140  
 1141  
 1142  
 1143  
 1144  
 1145  
 1146  
 1147  
 1148  
 1149  
 1150  
 1151  
 1152  
 1153  
 1154  
 1155  
 1156  
 1157  
 1158  
 1159  
 1160  
 1161  
 1162  
 1163  
 1164  
 1165  
 1166  
 1167  
 1168  
 1169  
 1170  
 1171  
 1172  
 1173  
 1174  
 1175  
 1176  
 1177  
 1178  
 1179  
 1180  
 1181  
 1182  
 1183  
 1184  
 1185  
 1186  
 1187  
 1188  
 1189  
 1190  
 1191  
 1192  
 1193  
 1194  
 1195  
 1196  
 1197  
 1198  
 1199  
 1200  
 1201  
 1202  
 1203  
 1204  
 1205  
 1206  
 1207  
 1208  
 1209  
 1210  
 1211  
 1212  
 1213  
 1214  
 1215  
 1216  
 1217  
 1218  
 1219  
 1220  
 1221  
 1222  
 1223  
 1224  
 1225  
 1226  
 1227  
 1228  
 1229  
 1230  
 1231  
 1232  
 1233  
 1234  
 1235  
 1236  
 1237  
 1238  
 1239  
 1240  
 1241  
 1242  
 1243  
 1244  
 1245  
 1246  
 1247  
 1248  
 1249  
 1250  
 1251  
 1252  
 1253  
 1254  
 1255  
 1256  
 1257  
 1258  
 1259  
 1260  
 1261  
 1262  
 1263  
 1264  
 1265  
 1266  
 1267  
 1268  
 1269  
 1270  
 1271  
 1272  
 1273  
 1274  
 1275  
 1276  
 1277  
 1278  
 1279  
 1280  
 1281  
 1282  
 1283  
 1284  
 1285  
 1286  
 1287  
 1288  
 1289  
 1290  
 1291  
 1292  
 1293  
 1294  
 1295  
 1296  
 1297  
 1298  
 1299  
 1300  
 1301  
 1302  
 1303  
 1304  
 1305  
 1306  
 1307  
 1308  
 1309  
 1310  
 1311  
 1312  
 1313  
 1314  
 1315  
 1316  
 1317  
 1318  
 1319  
 1320  
 1321  
 1322  
 1323  
 1324  
 1325  
 1326  
 1327  
 1328  
 1329  
 1330  
 1331  
 1332  
 1333  
 1334  
 1335  
 1336  
 1337  
 1338  
 1339  
 1340  
 1341  
 1342  
 1343  
 1344  
 1345  
 1346  
 1347  
 1348  
 1349  
 1350  
 1351  
 1352  
 1353  
 1354  
 1355  
 1356  
 1357  
 1358  
 1359  
 1360  
 1361  
 1362  
 1363  
 1364  
 1365  
 1366  
 1367  
 1368  
 1369  
 1370  
 1371  
 1372  
 1373  
 1374  
 1375  
 1376  
 1377  
 1378  
 1379  
 1380  
 1381  
 1382  
 1383  
 1384  
 1385  
 1386  
 1387  
 1388  
 1389  
 1390  
 1391  
 1392  
 1393  
 1394  
 1395  
 1396  
 1397  
 1398  
 1399  
 1400  
 1401  
 1402  
 1403  
 1404  
 1405  
 1406  
 1407  
 1408  
 1409  
 1410  
 1411  
 1412  
 1413  
 1414  
 1415  
 1416  
 1417  
 1418  
 1419  
 1420  
 1421  
 1422  
 1423  
 1424  
 1425  
 1426  
 1427  
 1428  
 1429  
 1430  
 1431  
 1432  
 1433  
 1434  
 1435  
 1436  
 1437  
 1438  
 1439  
 1440  
 1441  
 1442  
 1443  
 1444  
 1445  
 1446  
 1447  
 1448  
 1449  
 1450  
 1451  
 1452  
 1453  
 1454  
 1455  
 1456  
 1457  
 1458  
 1459  
 1460  
 1461  
 1462  
 1463  
 1464  
 1465  
 1466  
 1467  
 1468  
 1469  
 1470  
 1471  
 1472  
 1473  
 1474  
 1475  
 1476  
 1477  
 1478  
 1479  
 1480  
 1481  
 1482  
 1483  
 1484  
 1485  
 1486  
 1487  
 1488

mouth of God. Secondly, that God is the author of being to all, and therefore loves all. Thirdly, that in as much as he gives being to all, he loves all. For he hateth nothing that hee hath made. All these I will examine in their order.

Touching the first, you beginne with the authority of St. James, *Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing, my brethren, these things ought not so to be.* And he doth illustrate it with similitudes drawne from naturall things, as from a fountaine that sends not forth at the same place sweet water and bitter: and from trees, which bring forth proper fruit onely, according to their kinde: *Can the figtree beare Olive berries, or the Vine figs?* And you seeme to conceive that these reasons of the Apostle, as you call them, (which indeed are but illustrations) have more force to prevaile, then the Apostles authority; for thus you write, *If the Apostles authority could not perswade us to beleeve, his reasons would inforce us to grant, that the issues of blessing and cursing from one and the same mouth are contrary to the course of nature, and argue the nature of man to be much out of tune.* Herein I am not of your minde. I am rather of Abrahams minde. *If they will not beleeve Moses and the Prophets, neither will they beleeve, though a man rise from the dead.* And yet a man rising from the dead, were as fit to make faith of the state of the dead (in my judgement) as these illustrations (secluding S. James his authority,) are of force to prove, that it becomes not a man out of the same mouth to send forth blessing and cursing. For fountaines send forth water, and trees bring forth fruit by necessity of nature: But man speakes by freedome of will; and as a man may be induced to curse, so in case he curseth, and be challenged for it by a brother, hee may answer as David did unto his brethren, *And what have I now done? is there not a cause?* For if all curses were causelesse, Solomon would never have told us, that *The curse which is causelesse shall not come.* I never yet read of any that censured Elisha for cursing the children that mocked him, saying, *Come up thou bald head, come up thou bald head;* and indeed it is said, *He cursed them in the name of the Lord.* And yet this curse of his had a very bloody issue, two Beares coming out of the

*Iam. 3. 10.*

*Luc. 16. 31*

*1 Sam. 17.*

*19.*

*Pro. 26. 2.*

*2 King. 2.*

*23, 24.*

wood, and tearing forty two of them. And in the booke of Iudges the Angell of the Lord bids the people curse Meroz.

Iudg. 5. 23. *Curse ye Meroz, saith the Angell of the Lord; curse ye bitterly the inhabitants of Meroz, because they came not to helpe the Lord, to helpe the Lord against the mighty. And as curses may have their due course, so blessings may bee causelesse. For as*

Deut. 29. 19, 20. *for him that blesseth himselfe in his heart, when hee heareth the word of Gods curse, saying, I shall have peace though I walke after the stubbornnesse of my heart, herein he doth but adde drunkennesse unto thirst, and the Lord will not bee mercifull to that man.*

Esa. 66. 3. *And if some doe sinne in blessing themselves, how much more doe others sinne in blessing idols? Wee well know that out of our Saviours mouth came forth cursings sometimes, as*

Matth. 21. 19. *well as blessings at other times. For he cursed the figtree, and anone it withered. And therefore it were fit to distinguish betweene cursings and cursings, yea and betweene blessings and blessings, lest otherwise we confound truth and errour, good and evil.*

And to this purpose I thinke fit to distinguish betweene cursing as it signifies onely the pronouncing of a curse; and cursing, as it signifieth *curfed speaking*. And S. Iames, as I take it, speakes of *curfing* as it signifies *curfed speaking*, and not as it signifies the bare pronounciation of a curse, which may bee done without *curfed speaking*, and in an holy manner, as when our Saviour *curfed* the figtree, and Elisha the children that mocked him, moved undoubtedly thereunto extraordinarily by the Spirit of God. Like as when prophane persons blesse themselves, and superstitious persons blesse their idolls, their actions are unholy enough, and doe bring the curse of

Psal. 16. 4. *God upon their persons. For they shall multiply sorrow upon their heads that runne after other gods. Now S. Iames useth fit similitudes to illustrate this duty of blessed speaking, and to move them to refraine from *curfed speaking*: considering that Gods Spirit is as a fountaine of holy life in their hearts; and therefore they should send forth nothing but sweet water, not indifferently either sweet water onely, or bitter water onely, but sweet water, and that onely. And seeing they are trees of*  
righte-

righteousnesse, of the Lords planting, that hee may be glorified: *Esa. 61. 4*  
therefore to bring forth nothing but good fruit, but that of  
divers kindes, like unto that tree of life, that bare twelve man- *Revel. 22.*  
ner of fruits, and gave fruit every moneth. *2.*

And yet if sometimes they breake forth into cursed spea-  
king, it is the lesse strong, considering they are in part carnall, *Gal. 5. 23*  
and but in part spiritual; and therefore in part out of tune,  
though nothing like so much as they were in state of nature;  
when they sent forth nothing but bitter water, neither bles-  
sing their brethren, nor God; no nor themselves neither.  
*Not one of these instances, say you, but holds as truly in God as*  
*in man. He being the tree of life, cannot bring forth death. To cause*  
*the vine to bring forth figges, were not so hard a point of husbandry,*  
*as to derive cursednesse or misery from the fountaine of blisse. For a*  
*spring to send forth water sweet and bitter, fresh and salt, is more*  
*competible, then for hatefull and harmefull intentions, to have any*  
*issue from pure love. But God is love, yea love is his essence as Crea-*  
*tor. Why doe you not speake plainely, and tell us, that out*  
*of Gods mouth cannot proceed blessing and cursing? Yet the*  
*Lord protesteth to Abraham, saying, Blessed shall hee be that*  
*blesseth thee, and cursed shall he be that curseth thee: And tells the*  
*Iewes to their face, that he would curse their blessings. Yea, that*  
*he had cursed them already. And equally and indifferently, as*  
*God is made the Author of blessing to the obedient, so is he*  
*made the Author of a curse to the disobedient: and therefore*  
*calls heaven and earth to witnesse, that hee hath set before*  
*them, life and death, blessing and cursing. So that death and*  
*cursing is indifferently attributed to God, as the Author of*  
*them, like as life and blessing; and both are in due propor-*  
*tion to the behaviour of man, as it is found, either in the way*  
*of obedience, or in the way of disobedience. And in this re-*  
*spect perhaps you may say, that man is the cause of cursing,*  
*& not God. To this I answer; 1. By the same reason, man is the*  
*cause of blessing suitable to this cursing, and not God. 2. If*  
*in this respect, cursing be to be derived from sin, it is onely in*  
*the way of a meritorious cause; so doth not fruit proceed*  
*from trees, but onely in the way of an efficient cause. God,*

*Gen. 12. 4.*  
*I will blest*  
*them that*  
*blesse thee,*  
*and curse*  
*them that*  
*curse thee.*  
*Mal. 2. 2*  
*Levit. 26*  
*Deut. 28*  
*Deut. 30,*

*19*



and none but God can be the Author, as of happinesse, so of misery, as of eternall life, so also of everlasting death. And as none is truly blessed, but whom God bleisseth; so none is truly accursed, but whom God curseth. Yet no man, I thinke, that hath his wits in his head, will say, that this cursing proceedeth from Gods love, but rather from his hatred. Gods love towards the creature is essentiall, his love to the creature is not so, no more then to be a creator, is of Gods essence. And love is no more of Gods essence as a Creator, then hatred is of Gods essence as a revenger. And the blessing and cursing attributed unto God in the Scriptures before alledged, belong to God onely as a Iudge, to execute the one by way of reward, and the other by way of punishment. Albeit there is another course of Gods blessing and of his cursing, though you love not to distinguish, but to confound rather; as all that maintaine bad causes, love darknesse rather then light.

Ioh. 3. 19.

I come to the second point, wherein you insist, *In that he is the Author of being, he is the Author of goodnesse to all things that are.* And this is very true; for, *God saw all that he had made, and lo it was very good.* And as it is very true, so it is nothing at all to the purpose. For when we enquire, whether Gods love be extended towards all and every one, wee presuppose their beings in their severall times and generations. And secondly, we speake of a love proper to mankinde, which consisteth not in giving them their being; for, God hath given being unto Angels, even unto Devils as well as unto men; and as to men, so to all inferiour creatures, be they never so noysome and offensive unto man. And it is a strange course of yours, to magnifie the love of God to man, in giving him being, which is found in the basest creature that breathes, or breathes not. I have heard a story of a great Prince, when one of the prime subjects of the land, being taken in a foule act of insurrection, and yeelding upon condition to bee brought to speake with that Prince, presuming of ancient favour, whereof hee had tasted in great measure, and which upon his presence might haply revive, he found nothing answerable, but impe-

Gen. 1. 31

rious

rious taunts rather, and dismissal in this manner, *Know therefore that we hate thee as we hate a toad.* Yet you magnifie the love of God to mankinde in as comfortable manner, when you say that hee hath given us being, which wee well know God hath given to lyons, tigers, and beasts of prey; yea, to snakes and adders, to frogges and toads, and fiery serpents.

Hercheince you proceed to the third point, and do inferre, That because he hath made us, therefore hee loveth us; for, *He hateth nothing that he hath made,* as saith the wise man: and to give the greater credit to the authority alledged by you, you use an introduction of strange state; for you say, *The wiseman saith this of him that is wisest of all, of him that can neither deceive, nor be deceived,* that, *He hateth nothing that he hath made,* But to what purpose tends all this pompe? Is the sentence any whit of greater authority because it is spoken of him *that is wisest of all, and can neither deceive nor be deceived?* May not fooles speake of him, that *can neither deceive nor be deceived,* as well as wise men, and have their sayings any whit the greater credit and reputation for this? If the author of that sentence had beene such a one, as neither *could deceive nor be deceived,* then indeed the sentence had beene of greatest authority, and infinitely beyond the authority of Philo the Jew. Or did you presume that your Reader inconsiderately might swallow such a gull, & take the author of it for such a one, as *could neither deceive nor be deceived?* If you did, this were very foule play, and no better then a trick of conicatching. Yet we except not against the sentence, but pray you rather to take notice of an answer to this very objection of yours, taken from the same ground, above two hundred yeares ago.

You shall finde it in Aquinas his summes, where his first objection is this; *Videitur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet.* Aquin. 1. 2.  
23. art. 3.  
*Nullus enim reprobatur, quem diligit: sed Deus omnem hominem diligit, secundum illud Sap. 11. Diligis omnia que sunt, & nihil odisti eorum que fecisti. Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobatur.* It seemes that God reprobates no man. For, no man reprobates him whom hee loveth. But God loves every man according to that,  
Wisd.

Ibid.

Wis. 11. Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing that thou hast made. Therefore God reprobateth no man. And the answer hee makes unto this objection followeth in this manner, *Ad primum dicendum, quod Deus omnes homines diligit, & etiam omnes creaturas, in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum: non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus. In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum, quod est vita aeterna, dicitur eos habere odio vel reprobare.* To the first is to be answered, that God loves all men, yea, and all creatures, for as much as he willeth some good to them all: but yet he willeth not every good to all. Therefore in as much as unto some he willeth not this good, which is life everlasting, he is said to hate them, or to reprobate them. And you might have beene pleased to take notice, not onely of that wise man (though as wise as Philo) who speakes herein of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived, but of that wise God, who is wiser then men and Angels, and can neither deceive nor be deceived, and affirmeth openly, that *He hath loved Iacob and hated Esau*; as also of the Apostle Saint Paul, who by the infallible direction of Gods Spirit, applies this to the disposition of God towards them before they were borne. And if to inflict the torments of hell upon these, or these for their sinnes be to hate them; surely to intend to inflict the torments of hell upon them for their sinnes, is to hate them. And seeing God from everlasting intended to doe whatsoever hee doth in time, it followeth, that from everlasting hee did hate them.

Yet this truth you dare secretly to outface, without taking any notice of it. But here you argue; well, let us consider it; *For men to blesse God and to curse men, doth argue a dissolution of that internall harmony which should be in the humane nature: therefore for God to hate some men, and to love others, would necessarily inferre a greater distraction in the indivisible essence, besides the contradiction which it implies to infinite goodnes.* This latter clause is thrust in to make weight, and to turne the scale, but being nothing save meere breath and aire, makes it rather lighter.

News from  
Parnassus.

Like as when the Spaniard to make his state weigh as much as the state of France, and finding that Spaine and other places would

would not serve the turne, clapt in Millane and Naples into the ballance, whereupon it was found well the lighter. Yet I am content to consider that also in its turne. But first of the argument. My answer hereunto is twofold: First, as touching the antecedent; I say, and have already shewed, that the passage of Iames, whereat you aime, proceeds of cursing, onely as it signifies cursed speaking, not as it signifies the pronouncing of a curse, which may be in an holy manner, it being cleere, that both God and man; both God the Father, and God the Sonne, may, and have pronounced curses in an holy manner, without giving evidence of any dissolution of that internall harmony which should be in them; and yet such a dissolution is to be acknowledged to have its place more or lesse in the best of men in this world, for they have flesh in them as well as spirit, but neither is nor can be in God. Secondly, I deny the consequence; for, it doth not follow, that, because it is not lawfull for man to curse, therefore it is not lawfull for God to curse. Are not Devills accursed? At the day of judgement shall not our Saviour pronounce that sentence on thousands, *Go ye cursed into everlasting fire*? And why should this argue any distraction in God, more then in a Iudge that absolveth some, and condemneth others? So our Saviour at the day of judgement will say unto some, *Go yee cursed into everlasting fire*: unto others, *Come ye blessed of my Father, receive the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world*. If you do not speake of blessing and cursing in the way of execution of judgement and reward, what meane you to walke thus in the cloud of generalities? If you speake not of execution, but of intention: as God doth execute judgements for sinne, and rewards of obedience; so doth he from everlasting intend both the one and the other, as it is impossible it should be otherwise. Your selfe acknowledging in words Gods decrees to be eternall. And doth it not become God from everlasting to intend to proceed in the day of judgement, as before spoken of? As great a divlne as you are taken for, I much doubt you little understand the state of the question, wherein you seem to oppose some body, for, I cannot be perswaded

you doe wilfully dissemble it. But there is another course of Gods providence in another matter, and farre different from the execution of punishment and reward, maintained by your opposites, and impugned by you: but you are loath to bee scene in your opposition therein, and to have your opinion knowne particularly for feare lest the common voice should cry shame upon you, as upon a profest Arminian; a manifest

Rom. 9.18 impugner of the sovereignty of God, in shewing mercy on whom he will, and denying mercy to whom he will, and so hardening whom he will. Now here you have no comparison to helpe your selfe withall, drawne from the condition of man. For in mans power it is not, either to give grace, or to deny it. But to the contrary wee finde, that Superiours have the dispensation of favours and gratifications in their power, which they enlarge or restraîne at their pleasure, and extend to whom they will. How much more shall the Lord of all take liberty unto himselfe, to have mercy on whom hee will have mercy, and to shew compassion on whom hee will shew compassion; yea, and as to have mercy on whom hee will, so to harden whom he will also, and that I hope without contradiction to his goodnesse, which you besides the word of God cast in, to outface the proclamation of God himselfe. For as Gods goodnesse did not binde him to make the world; so neither doth it binde him to save the world. And as when he made the world, he made as many creatures as he thought good; so in saving the world, he saves as many creatures as he thinkes good, both amongst men and Angels, by giving grace to whom he will, and denying grace to whom he will. When you say, that, *To love the worke of his owne hands is more essentiall to him that made all things out of his meere love, then it is unto the fire to burn matter combustible.* This speech of yours is a grosse unsavory speech; transforming God into a naturall and necessary agent: for, it is well knowne that the fire burnes naturally and necessarily. And if God doth more essentially love his creatures, then he must naturally and necessarily preserve them in being, and cannot destroy them. And because it is out of the same love that you detiye the creation

ation of the world, it followeth, that God was necessitated by the necessity of nature to make the world; and consequently that the world was everlasting without beginning, and so shall continue without end. Behold the flowers that grow in the paradise of your contemplation, fitter for Aristotles Physicks, or Metaphysicks, then for the meditations of a Christian Divine, as being fit onely to make a nosegay for the Devill. The love of God towards himselfe is essentiall, towards his creatures is meerely accidentall. Hee needed not to have made them, neither is it any whit necessary that he should preserve them. And as creation and preservation are attributed of extrinsecall denomination unto God, so is his love towards his creatures also. Neither was it out of love to the creature that he made the world, but out of love to himselfe, as who is the end of all. For, both Salomon professeth, that God *made all things for himselfe*: and Saint Paul likewise gives us to understand, that as *things are from him*, so *all things are for him* also. But Gods love is infinite, therefore, say you, it extends to all, *seeing all are lesse then infinite*. A proper argument, and as well suitable unto your text, which undertaketh onely to shew, *that Gods love is infinite to mankinde*. And this argument proves as well, that it is extended to frogges and toads; to Angells and Devills, as well as to mankinde. This is onely to professe, that it extends to all. Now this is a very improper interpretarion of infinite love: for lesse love, and lesse liberality, may extend to more then greater love, and greater liberality: for he that gives ten shillings to one person, is more liberall, then that divides five shillings amongst threescore persons, in giving them a peny apiece. Lastly, the fruit of this love can be but being: and is it not a proper commendation of Gods infinite love towards mankinde, to say that he gives being unto all? And doth Gods love to man appeare more herein, then to the vilest creature that is?

Prov. 15. 4

Rom. 11.  
last,

2 In the next Section you discourse at large after your manner of the amplitude of Gods love in comparison, which is nothing at all to your purpose, whose chiefe aime is to insinuae, that Gods love is alike to all.

Yet having proceeded thus farre, my resolution is to go on, and to consider what you bring. What thinke you of Adams love in the state of innocency, was it perfect, or no? Though without sinne awhile, yet hee fell into sinne: so did the Angels before him, so should wee, though as perfect as they, if God should not uphold us. Yet our love in greatest perfection could not be so much as a shadow of Gods love, there being no resemblance betweene them: our love being a love of duty, Gods love to us of meere grace and mercy. Besides, betweene the fruits of Gods love to us, and the fruits of our love towards God, no colour of resemblance. Man is bound heartily to desire the good of all; but God is free, and hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he har-

deneth. *Many Widowes were in Israel in the daies of Elias, when heaven was shut three yeares and six months, and great famine was throughout all the land: But unto none of them was Elias sent, save unto Sarepta a city of Sidone, unto a certaine Widow. Also many lepers were in Israel in the dayes of Elisha the prophet, yet none of them was made cleane but Naaman the Syrian. And if Gods will had beene to doe the best that might be, hee could have cured no doubt all other lepers as well as Naaman, and succoured other widows as well as the widow of Sarepta. Yet I confesse, Gods good will exceeds ours, not intensively one-ly, but extensively also: for not a sparrow falleth to the ground without the providence of our heavenly Father: hee saveth both man and beast, and heareth the young Ravens that call upon him: the eyes of all doe wait upon the Lord, and hee gives them their meat in due season.*

Luc. 4. 25.  
 26. 27.  
 Math. 10. 29.  
 Psal. 36. 6.  
 & 147. 9.  
 & 245. 15.

And as touching the conferring both of grace and glory, therein hee saveth more then wee know, or are acquainted with. The number of the children of Israel, is as the sand of the sea that cannot bee counted for multitude. As touching temporall blessings, all partake of his goodnesse therein, in their naturall preservation and consolation; therein wee must imitate him in doing good to all, as it lieth in our power, though chiefly to the household of faith, yet not to them one-ly, but to others also. But though he causeth his sun to shine,

Gal 6. 10.  
 Luc. 10. 30

and



and his raine to fall upon the just and unjust ; yet pronounceth not the sentence of salvation on all promiscuously, whether they be just, or unjust.

And whereas all are equally corrupt in state of nature, yet he doth not equally shew mercy on all, or bestow the meanes of grace on all ; or where he doth bestow these meanes of salvation, he doth not make them effectuall unto us. *He blindes the eyes, and hardens the hearts of some, that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their hearts, and be converted, that he might heale them.* Whereby it comes to passe, that the word of God, though it be the *savour of life unto life* unto some, yet it is the *savour of death unto death* unto others ; and the Ministers of God are a good savour unto God in both ; even both in them that are saved, and in them that perish. For *God made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill.* *Mercie, you say, is not restrained from ill deservers in distresse, so long as the exercise of it breeds no harme to such as are more capable of bountifull love and favour.* Ioh. 12. 40.  
2 Cor. 3.  
Pro. 16. 4.

This is a consideration, which I confesse hath place among men sometimes, and in some cases. Yet hardly can I devise how to suit with a fit instance. For no states (for ought I find) doe take notice of any such distinction of times, wherein the exercise of mercy will not breed harme, and wherein it will, but they execute condigne punishment upon malefactors according to the lawes, that all may see, and feare to doe the like ; not be encouraged *malorum facta imitari*, but rather *eorum exitus perhorrescere*. God doth not so. His patience and long suffering is exceeding great ; yet if hee should give every man repentance in his death bed, and save their soules, what one in the world should be the worse for this ? And though the wicked *many times spend their daies in mirth, and sodainly goe downe to the grave* ; yet by the grace of God we shall be nothing the worse for this, nor provoked hereupon to condemne the generation of Gods children. Yet what is it that makes one man more capable of bountifull love and favour then another I know not : what makes him more capable of love in the execution of reward, I know ; but what makes him more ca- Deut. 32.  
13.  
Iob 21. 13.  
Psal. 73. 15.

pable of love in the communication of grace, and in shewing mercy towards him, I know not. Sure I am, that woman  
 Luc. 7. 47. who had many sinnes forgiven her, loved so much the more.  
 Luc. 15. 7. the ninety nine just persons that thinke they need no repentance, like enough love so much the lesse.

It is true, the lawes of States take order for the just execution of punishment upon offenders for the common good; yet by your leave, Kings on earth, by their absolutenesse doe give pardons to whom they will, respecting more their own pleasure then the common good. And withall I thinke Princes doe lesse offend (if at all offend) in refusing to pardon malefactors, then in granting pardons unto them. As for God, to whom you say the execution of justice is unnaturall, he being the Father of mercy; I pray consider, if God should give repentance to all on their death-beds, and consequently save all, what common good of mankinde would be hindred by this? And as God is the father of mercy, so is he also the Iudge of all the world, and I conceive the execution of justice punitive to be as naturall to him, as he is Iudge of all the world; as the execution of mercy is naturall unto him, as he is the Father of mercy. Yet you seeme to have a place of Scripture to prove a notorious untruth; as namely, that the execution of justice punitive is unnaturall unto God; and that is out of Lament. 3. 33. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men.* Thus you take Scripture hand over head to serve your turne. But I pray consider, is it possible that God should doe any thing against his will? men may have reluctations, and conflicts in them, and doe things *volentes nolentes*; is such a condition possible to be found in the nature of God? Yet in this case Aristotle hath defined the action to be simply voluntarie, and done willingly. If God be represented sometimes unto us as it were fluctuating like men betweene different resolutions of executing either mercy or justice, as in the Prophet,  
 Hof. 11. 8. *How shall I give thee up Ephraim, how shall I deliver thee Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah, how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me, and my repentances are rowled together*; like as he is represented unto us, as well in the shape  
 of

Eth. 3.

of the members of our body, as of the passions of our minde; we have cause rather to take notice hereby of the goodnesse of God in condescending thus far to our infirmities, to make us the better acquainted with him, and the more sensible of his favour, then hereby to take occasion to fashion God like unto our selves, either in body or minde. Yet the meaning of the Prophet is plaine enough, namely, that God comes not to afflict his children, unlesse he be provoked by sinne, and herein he differeth from earthly parents, who sometimes chasten their children for their owne pleasures; but God as hee doth not, Heb. 12. 10 but in case he is provoked; to he doth it for our profit, as the Apostle telleth us in the same place. To doe a thing willingly hath the same signification with the Latine phrase, *animi causa*, that is, when nothing is the cause thereof but a mans owne will, as Caufabon observes out of Seneca *de beneficiis* 4. whose opinion was, *Neminem adeo à naturali lege descivisse, & hominem exuisse ut animi causa malus sit.*

In Characteres Theophrasti, pag. 172.

You further say, that *Nothing can provoke good men to execute punitive justice upon offenders, but the good of others, deserving either better, or not so ill, which might grow worse and worse through evill doers impunity.* I pray consider, doe parents chastise their children for the good of others, and not for the good of the children themselves? God himselfe chastiseth his owne children all manner of wayes, and is this for the good of others that deserve better, or not so ill? and not rather for the good of those his owne children themselves? *No chastising for the present is joyous,* saith the Apostle, *but grievous, but afterwards it bringeth forth the quiet fruit of righteousness to them that are exercised thereby.* Marke I pray, *To them that are exercised thereby,* he doth not say that this fruit is brought forth to others.

Heb. 12. 11

As for the torments in the world to come, who is the better for them, unlesse they tend to the improvement of joy in those blessed ones, while they behold in others that miserie which onely by the grace of God themselves have escaped. For as for any other welfare of the Saints of God, or any welfare at all of the damned crew, or avoidance of grievances that is procured by the damnation of the wicked, if you know, it is well,

is well, but I assure you it is more then I can divine of. Yet doe we not say, that God hath pleasure in the torture either of men or devils, but onely in the demonstration of his owne glorious justice towards them, and in the magnifying of his mercy so much the more toward his Saints.

You say, *It goeth against the nature of God to punish the workes of his owne hands.* A vile speech, and withall senselesse; and no marvell if when men prostitute all honesty and the feare of God in opposing manifest truth, they lose their wits also, and fall upon most unsober meditations. For what a vile speech is it to say, that any worke of God goeth against his nature, who as the Apostle professeth, *worketh all things according to the counsell of his will.* Then againe, what a senselesse speech is it to insinuate, that it were not so contrary to GODS nature, to deale thus with those creatures which were not the workes of his owne hands; but being the works of his owne hands, you say, it is against his nature to punish them. A wonderfull assertion, and wherat the most barbarous people might be astonished in the consideration of the impiety, shall I say? or the insulstie thereof, or both rather, namely, that it should be against Gods nature to punish sinners. For it is well known that God punisheth none other, nor ever did; Christ Iesus the Sonne of God onely excepted. And what a field have you here to expatiate in if you list to aggravate the unnaturallnesse of any action in God? And with as little sobriety doe you amplifie that unnaturallnesse in God by the consideration of man especially, as *who (you say) is more deare to him then any childe is to his Father.* So then to punish others, you are willing to grant not to be so unnaturall an action in God, as the punishing of man. And I pray what are those other creatures? Are they inferiour, as Oxen and Sheepe, and all these never sinned; yet is it not unnaturall to punish them, if punishment may have place (as being taken for the afflicting of them) where there is no sinne. For God gives us leave to weare them out, with plowing, carying, riding, for our necessity, for our d light; yea to set one creature upon another, the greyhound upon an hare, upon a deere, the hauke upon a partridge, or pheasant,

pheasant, or wilde fowle. No unnaturallnesse doe we exercise in all this, such is the liberty which God hath given unto us. But yet to punish man, though a sinner, (for he punisheth no other) *this how greatly* (say you) *doth it goe against the nature of God?* It seemes you cannot tell how greatly; neither can I helpe you herein. For I doe not see how it is against his nature at all. But you seeme to give a reason, in saying that *God is loving kindnesse it selfe*. But I pray consider, is he not iustice it selfe also as well as loving kindnesse? and is it against the nature of Iustice to punish sinners? no nor against his loving kindnesse neither. For I hope that no attribute of God is contrary to another, though according to their different notions, some actions are more suitable to the one, then to the other. And why man should have more speciall consideration here then Angels, I know no reason. For if you say that God is the father of man, in as much as he hath created him, by the same reason he may be the father of the ignoblest creature that is. To say that God is the father of man, in as much as hee made him after his owne image, this is no more true of man, then of Angels, even of the very Angels of darknesse. And men also are borne the children of darknesse, and so continue untill the time that God calleth them, and enlightneth them. Or will you say that in speciall sort he is the father of man, by way of redemption; yet I finde hitherto in your discourse no intimation of this fatherhood. But will you say that all and every one have redemption in Christ through his blood? you may as well say, that all and every one have the remission of their sinnes in Christ thorough his blood. For this is it which in Scripture phrase is meant by redemption. *Eph. 1. 7. Col. 1. 14.* Arminius who maintaines that Christ dyed for all and every one, professeth plainly, that the immediate effect of Christs passion is but this, that God now may, his Iustice nothing hindring him, give pardon of sinnes and salvation, upon what condition he will. Which upon the matter is all one, as if he should say, that seeing faith and repentance are the conditions whereupon God gives forgivenesse of sinnes, none but such as beleeve and repent doe obtaine the forgivenesse of sinnes.

Eph. 2. 8.

Act. 5. 39.

A. 11. 18.

2 Tim. 2.

last.

that is, doe obtaine redemption in Christ, through his blood. Now consider, are not faith and repentance the gifts of God?

It cannot be denied but they are; the Scriptures evidently give testimony hereunto, namely that *faith is the gift of God*, that repentance is the gift of God. And doth God give faith and repentance unto all? All experience of the world doth manifest that he doth not; no nor so much as the outward meanes unto all, whereby faith and repentance are wrought.

I wonder you blush not in setting downe such incongruities; as first, in saying that *God as he is willing to be called the father of the sonnes of men*, so he is ready to doe the kinde office of a father unto them: and for prooffe hereof alledge that of the Psalmist, *As a father pitieth his owne children, so the Lord pitieth them that feare him*. In which passage, the fatherly love of God is not extended unto all, but restrained to those that feare him. And yet I pray consider, what father would torment his children with everlasting fire, though never so unnaturall towards him? or would not keepe him from it, if it lay in his power, without sinning against God? Yet God torments even those whom you call his children, justly for their sinnes, in the torments of hell fire, that never shall have end. We willingly grant the love of God the Father, and the love of God the Sonne is such

Eph. 3. 19. a love as passeth knowledge; but it is enlarged onely towards those that are his children by faith in Christ Iesus. This is the

Gal. 3. 26. filiation alone which the Apostle takes notice of; you take no

Gal. 4. 6. notice of this at all. And againe, *Because ye are sonnes, God hath sent the Spirit of his Sonne into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father*. Now is this common unto all, as you make Gods fatherhood common unto all? So saith the Apostle in another place, *As*

Rom. 8. 14 *many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sonnes of God*. Here is a description of that sonneship we have in respect of

Rom. 8. 16 *our heavenly Father*. And againe, *The Spirit of God witnesseth with our spirits that we are the sonnes of God*. Of these passages I finde no accompt made throughout this whole discourse of yours. And towards these sonnes of God, wee shall willingly give you leave to extend and intend the love of God as much as you thinke fit. But you still continue to extend the father-

hood

hood of God unto all, as it were in despite of all these passages formerly alledged. Where doe you finde throughout the Scriptures, that the title of the sonnes of God is attributed to the uncircumcised, or to the Heathen? To the contrary we reade both before the flood, that *The sonnes of God saw the daughters of men that they were faire*: where we have a manifest distinction opposite to your confusion: And after; for this is the message which God sent unto Pharaoh, *Israel is my sonne, even my first borne*, --- and if thou refuse to let him goe, *I will slay thy sonne, even thy first borne*. How much more under the Law? *Is Ephraim my deare sonne, or pleasant childe?* yet since I spake unto him, *I still remembered him*; therefore my bowels are troubled for him, *I will surely have compassion on him*, saith the Lord. Most of all under the Gospell: *Behold what love the Father, hath shewed us, that wee should bee called the sonnes of God*. What have you here said of Gods love to man, that may not as well be said of his love to the very Angels of darknesse? For is it not true in respect of them as well as in respect of us, that *having given them being, he doth much more love them, after they are enstamped with his image. For he sowes not wheat to reape tares; nor did he give life to Angels that he might bring forth death*. God gave both man and Angels life for the manifestation of his owne glory; and for the manifestation of his owne glory doth he punish transgressors amongst men and Angels with everlasting death.

3. You would willingly draw Heathens to the acknowledgement of this fatherhood in God towards all; though thinking it too narrow to comprehend all references of loving kindnesse betweene him and demy gods, which demy gods you take to be men. I thinke rather they were conceived to be inferiour spirits; like as Aristotle makes all inferiour intelligences to depend upon the first mover. And what reference of loving kindnesse is comprehended in this, that Jupiter is said to be both male and female, you may at leisure dilate of when you please. Gods affection to his children exceeds the affection of any mother towards the fruit of her wombe. For God was content to purchase his Church with



his owne blood. Your next sentence containes meere non sense: I rectifie it thus; *And as if his love could not be sufficiently expressed by these dearest references amongst men, &c. hee hath chosen the most affectionate female, &c.* Thus I make sense of it; but the poorest sense that ever was vented in so grave a matter of discourse. As if the greatnesse of place, or curiosity of education did make mothers so little compassionate towards their children, that God is faine to seeke out for more proper resemblances. Thus you fetch about for matter, as Balaam did for divinations; as if there were no women in the world, but delicate Ladies, or such nice & curious dames, whose nicenesse hath made them so unnaturall, that our Saviour was driven to compare his tender affection unto the affection of a hen towards her chicken; which creature is magnified by you (to hold up the jest) for *the most affectionate female amongst reasonable creatures*: implying that reasonable creatures may in tendernes of affection right well exceed the henne, and so you quite marre your owne play. But where doe you finde (if a man might be so bold to aske) that an henne is so superlative a creature in her affection towards her chicken? I can hardly belceve that either Aristotle or Pliny hath afforded you any such observation, but rather your comment upon them, or upon the booke of Nature. What? is an henue more affectionate to her young ones, then a Pelican is to hers, who is said to let her selfe bloud to feed them? or then a Storke, that hath her name from *אֶרְנָן*, and in the Hebrew is called *אֶרְנָן*, which is a word neere of kinne to *אֶרְנָן*, bowels of compassion, as which indeed are most tender in her. A story whereof we have in the description of the Netherlands: namely, of a Storke, that when the house was on fire where her nest was, kept the fire off from her yong ones with her owne body and wings so long till she was burnt her selfe.

Still you proceede in amplyfying the love of God, nothing to the purpose. For the question is not, how great Gods love is towards those on whom it is placed; but whether it extend to all or no? You say, *All the sweet fruits and comforts of love, whether of fathers and mothers towards their children, or of husbands*

*bands towvrd their Wives, or of brethren to brethren, sisters to sisters, or of one friend to another (their sinfulness excepted) are but distillations or infusions of his infinite love to our nature. We well know, the love of God exceeds all this; bu I verily think your penne hath runne riot ere you are aware, and you have written you know not, or you consider not what. For, hence it followeth, that there is no act so abominable of the will of the creature, but God may infuse it, the sinfulness onely thereof excepted; which yet is a very sory exception. for sinfulness is not a thing that can be infused by God, Angell, or man. Of old is was determined by Austine, that sinne hath not causam efficientem, but deficientem onely.*

De civit.  
Dei, lib. 12.  
cap. 7

And herein you manifestly contradict your selfe, as who maintaine, that whosoever is the author of the act, must therewithall be the author of the sinfulness thereof, for as much as sinfulness doth result (relative like) upon position of the foundation. And of this kinde of argument I have found you wondrous confident, in a certain treatise of yours, though a very weake argument, and long agoe proposed and answered by Capreolus, and whose answer thereunto is again rehearsed by Soncinas.

But here I shew onely how you make no bones of contradicting your selfe very handsomely, in saying, God doth infuse an act which is sinfull, though not the sinfulness of it. *The love of God (you say) though infinitely increased in every particular, and afterwards made up in one, could no way equalize Gods love towards every particular soule created by him.* Thus you steale up, without all prooffe, the extention of Gods love to every particular; and that in infinite manner. Whereas the Scripture professeth as plainly, that *God hath hated Esau*, as that *he hath loved Jacob*. And seeing Gods love can be but infinite towards his elect, and towards his dearest Sonne, and towards himselfe, you make it infinite towards the very reprobrates, whether men or devills: for every particular of them hath beene created by him. Is not this good divinity, and very comfortable divinity? Yet no Arminian will say, that *God so loved the Angels that were fallen*, that he sent his Sonue to

die for them. When you say, *The creatures for feare doe not so much good for their little ones as they might; not so much for the modell of their wit or strength, as God for his part (though infinite in wisdom and power) doth for the sonnes of men.* As hee said of his Bore that was sent him, *Noster te non capit ignis conturbator Aper*, so may I say of this your eloquence, that it passeth mine intelligence. I can neither construe your sentence, nor correct it.

To say that the creature cannot doe so much for his young as God doth for the sonnes of men, is so vulgar a trueth, that when you introduce it with such pompe and state, I may well say, *Tu pulicem Gauræ gigante facis*: yet the adverbative interposed (*Though infinite in wisdom and power*) hath no congruity to this sense neither; for Gods infinite wisdom and power is no adverbative to this I trow, but rather a corroborative thereunto. Bee it that God had done as much as could bee done for his unfruitfull vineyard, what is this to prove, that Gods love extends to all? whereas the place it selfe doth manifestly restraine this love of God unto his vineyard. Yet what is there mentioned besides the well husbanding of this vineyard; wherein hee appeals to their consciences, whether a better course could be devised then he had taken for the well husbanding thereof. But I pray consider, doth the worke of grace extend no further then to planting and watering?

1 Cor. 3. 6. Is it not God that gives the increase also? Is it not in Gods power to give faith, to give repentance? you that will have God to infuse that love in carnall men, which is found to be sinfull, and not to infuse the sinfulness thereof, cannot endure that God should infuse faith and repentance into the heart of man. But if God can doe this, surely hee can doe

11. 5. 1. &c. more then ought that is expressed in that song of God concerning his vineyard. Yet it is true, that in the way of outward husbandry, Gods course was without all exception, neither could the wisdom of man devise a better course for God to take, then was that which hee tooke with them. And therefore you have small cause to charge your adversaries with such sorry shifts, so atheisticall, as if wee thought Gods seri-

ous protestations deserved no credite with us. These are fictions of course, proceeding from an addle braine, to supply the roome of sound arguments.

And surely, did wee not believe Gods serious protestations, why should wee regard his oath? For, amongst men, he that is found to bee no man of his word, is usually little regarded for his oath. Gods word, without protestation, is, and ever shall bee through his grace, sufficient ground of our faith in him. Looke you unto it that you hunt not after some other foundation, the tenour of whose discourse in many places, and in this very place, treating of his infinite love to all and every one, runnes in a current of manifest opposition against the word of God: though now and then you have a snatch at it, and away, like the dog at the river Nilus, for feare of the Crocadile; and content your selfe onely with a superficiall consideration of it, as in this place, like as in the former. For what? is this spoken indifferently of all? of the Gentiles as well as of the Iewes? It is manifestly spoken of the house of Israel, concerning whom the Lord asketh this question, *Why will yee die yee house of Israel?* And the whole proceedeth by way of answer to their murmuring against the providence of God, in saying, *The fathers have eaten sower grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge*; and hereupon God proceedeth to justifie the course of his providence unto their face. Now when God doth not take men upon the hippe, as soone as they have sinned against him, but spares them, and not onely gives them space of repentance, but useth meanes to bring them unto repentance, by sending Prophets unto them to admonish them, to admonish them of their sinnes, and to denounce the judgements of God against them; is not this a manifest evidence that God is not delighted in their death, but rather in their repentance, although he still reserves libertie to himselfe to bestow the gift of repentance on whom he will? And therefore all this is only in respect of his church, not in respect of those who are strangers from the common wealth of Israel, and aliens from the covenants of promise. then concerning those within the church, *All are not Israel,*  
that

that are of Israel, Rom. 9. And though the meanes of grace have their course withall, yet God intends to make them effectually onely with his elect, according to that, *As many as were ordained to eternall life believed; and whom he hath predestinated, them hath he called, and justified, and glorified.* For as Austine saith, *Quantumlibet praeberit patientiam, nisi Deus derit. quis aget poenitentiam:* And speaking of the *Non predestinatis. Istorum neminem*, saith hee, *adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritatemque poenitentiam, qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo sive illis ampliorem patientiam, sive non impari praebeat.* Therefore we say, that as concerning the elect, though they sinne, yet God willeth not their death, but willeth their repentance, and their salvation. But as touching others who are mixt amongst them, as tares amongst the wheat, and are partakers of the same meanes of grace and invitations unto repentance; in as much as he spares them, and giveth them not onely time to repent, but admonisheth them of their sinnes, and affords them the outward meanes of repentance, it is sufficient to justify, that God doth not willingly bring judgement upon them, neither for their sinnes, because hee comes not hastily thereunto, but upon wilfull despising of the means of grace, used to reclaime them; like as before I shewed in what sense God is said, *not to afflict the sonnes of men willingly.* And as for this present place, your selfe elsewhere hath interpreted it thus, *I will not the death of an impenitent sinner*, but that God wills undoubtedly the death of an impenitent sinner. To quash this construction in this place, you say, this oath of God proceeds as concerning those, who *all their life long have hated him.* Here I am perswaded wee shall finde no little inconsideratenesse.

To hate God all a mans life time, what is it but to hate him from the first hower of comming to the use of reason, unto the last, even unto the moment of death? now I pray consider, Will not God the death of such a one as dieth in impenitencie? The text I confesse runnes thus, *I will not the death of him that dieth.* But doe you thinke indeede the meaning is, that as for such a man as now dieth, and hath liyed all his life time

in the hatred of God, God will not the death of such a one? Like enough you are content your Reader should entertaine such a conceite. But I cannot bee perswaded you take this to be the meaning. The text is manifestly against it; for it followeth, *But rather that he returne and live*; so that it is spoken of a man living, and such as is capable of repentance. And wee know, the whole Chapter is to justifie Gods providence in afflicting men with his judgements: so that to die in this place, is to be under the afflicting hand of God, and so in the way to death and to destruction.

Our living is reputed a continuall dying; for as much as nature consumeth and wasteth, as the Poet wittily expresseth it;

*Childhood ends in youth,  
And youth in old age dies;  
I thought I lived in truth,  
But now I die, I die; I see,  
Each age of death is one degree,*

Whereupon he concludes his resolution to correct his former phrase of speech, saying,

*Farewell the doating score  
Of worlds Arithmaticke:  
Life, Ile trust thee no more;  
But henceforth, for thy sake,  
Ile go by deaths new Almanacke.  
----- For while I sing,  
A thousand men lie sick, a thousand bells doring.*

And would you know what is the difference between me and them;

*They are but dead, and I dying.*

So that I guesse your meaning according to the articles of your owne creed, is but this; That Gods love is such to them that all their life past (not simply all their life, but all their life

past) have hated him, that, *He will not their death, but rather that they returne and live.* And I grant, that this is true of many in most proper speech, namely, of all the elect of God, though it bee long ere God calleth and converteth some of them. Of others also that live in the Church, I have shewed, how it may have course in the same sense, that God is said, not so much willingly to afflict them for their sinnes, as for refusing to repent and turne unto God after they have sinned.

When you tell us of *infinite places more of sacred texts, and those most perspicuous in themselves*, and also that, *The whole ancient Church, with some small exception, which yet may bee counterpoised,* is ready to give joynt verdict for you, it favoureth hotly of Smithfield eloquence;

*Pessima quò vendas opus est mangone perito  
Qui Smithfeldensi polleat eloquio.*

Yet it was an old observation,

*Multa fidem promissa levant cum plenius aquo,  
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.*

If you had some about you to justifie you in cleanly manner by some prety qualification, it had beene absolute. As the Gent'eman who professed that he had certaine ponds wherein Carpes were taken as big as that Somer-pole which hee then rode by; and withall askt his man that rode with him, whether it were not so. Sir, quoth his man, though they were so big, yet I am sure they were nothing like so long: and indeed, the dimension of length is more suitable to the proportion of an Eele, then of a Carpe. As Cicero answered him that told a strange tale concerning the length of certaine Eeles which he had seene: for Tully handsomely to convince him of his vanity, made shew of going beyond him in his owne element of tossing; and forthwith replied, saying, *That is nothing strange, for I know a place where Eeles are taken, of*  
such



such a length that they use to make their Angling-rods of them. And this assertion of yours may come as neere to the truth, as an Eele is to an Angling-rod.

CHAP. XV.

*What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love: Of the distinction of Singula generum, and Genera singulorum. Of the distinction of Voluntas signi, and Voluntas beneplaciti.*

**W**Hat you meane by a course of *Compromising contentions betweene some other reformed Churches, in certaine points of religion*, I know not, neither am I acquainted with any such course. I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative, as of Gods grace effectually to every good action; so of his soveraigntie in electing whom he will, according to his good pleasure, and passing by others, as any Church in Christendome; which I do not speake upon, snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the liturgie of our Church, whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I thinke good (as your fashion is) but this I speake upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set downe in the articles of religion, manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England. Yet you would perswade your Readers, the Church of England concurrerh with you, in extending the love of God towards all. But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause, by walking in the cloudes of generalities; as if you feared to come to the light, and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him. You talke of Gods unspeakable love towards mankinde, but you define not in what kinde, but keepe your selfe a loose off for all advantages.

Wee acknowledge Gods love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal, and that in an unspeakable manner. But the question onely is, whether God doth bestow, or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all, or salvation upon all. If Gods love in these respects, in your opinion doth extend to all, say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus, and predestinated all. For predestination in Austines divinity is but *preparatio gratia & gloria*. Now the Church of England, in her publicke and authorized doctrine; plainly professeth, that God hath predestinated none, but those whom he hath chosen in Christ, as vessels of honour. If you say, that the reason why God did not predestinate all, nor elect all in Christ, proceeds not from the meere pleasure and free disposition of God, but that onely upon the foresight of the obedience of the one, and disobedience of the other he elected those, and reprobated these (for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you, though you are loath in plaine termes to professe as much) let any man judge whether this bee suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church, whereupon Rogers in his *Analefis* thereof published by authority, and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft, observes in his fifth proposition, that, *In Christ Iesus of the meere will and purpose of God, some are elected and not others unto salvation*. And he justifieth it by holy Scripture, Rom. 9. 11. *that the purpose of God might remaine according to election, not of works, but of him that calleth*, Ephes. 1. 5. *Who doth predestinate us, according to the good pleasure of his will*, 2 Tim. 1. 9. *Not according to our workes, but according to his owne purpose and grace*, Exod. 33. 19. Rom. 9. 15. *I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy*, Prov. 16. 4. *The Lord hath made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill*, Rom. 9. 21. *Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour*.

But consider the Article it selfe, *They which are indued with so excellent a benefite* (to wite, as election and predestination is) *are called according to Gods purpose by his spirit, working in due seasons*.

season; they through grace obey their calling, they be justified freely, they be made sonnes of God by adoption; they be made like the image of his onely begotten Sonne Iesus Christ, they walke religiously in good workes, and at length by Gods mercy they attaine to everlasting felicity. Whereby it appeares, that election and predestination is made the fountaine and cause of obedience, and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life; whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance; our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination, rather then our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance.

Againe consider, these alone whom God hath elected in Christ, and predestinated, are noted to bee made in due time the sonnes of God by adoption. But you make all to bee the sonnes of God, and Gods infinite love in unspeakable manner to be enlarged towards all and every one; even towards them that have hated God all their life.

Lastly, onely the elect are here noted to bee those vessels whom God hath made unto honour; not that any others are made unto honour; which is nothing answerable to your tender. But proceed we along with you. You undertake to prove that Gods love is extended to mankinde, which no Christian ever called in question; but your meaning is, that it extends to all and every one of mankinde, and that so farre forth as to will the salvation of all and every one, as appeares by the sequels, and all this out of the publique and authorized doctrine of our Church. And yet you insist onely upon certaine passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church. The Liturgie I hope is not the doctrine of our Church, though it be not contradictory to our doctrine. But therein wee have been content to conforme unto the practice of the Church, so farre forth as it might seeme tolerable, and such as might be performed with a good conscience, which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion, it is rather to receive correction from the Articles, then the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy.

But consider wee what is that which you plead for your selfe. You enter upon it after your course with great state, discovering unto us a wonderfull providence of God, in drawing those Articles; for you tell us, that *No Nationall Councell, though assembled for that purpose, could fit their doctrine more expressly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love, then the Church our Mother, even from the beginning of reformation, hath done, as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point, for preventing schismes or distractions of opinions amongst her sonnes.* Here we have a pretty Comedy towards, and you have a poetickall wit for fiction. Had our Church foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point, where I pray was it fit that she should doe this, but in the Articles of Religion? But you finde no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of Gods love, but in the Liturgy and Catechisme. Was that think you a fit place to fit her doctrine for the preventing of schismes and distractions in opinion?

Againe, had she intended to prevent (as you say) distractions in opinion about the extension of Gods love, would shee not have done it rather expressly, then onely in such a manner as to leave it to others to draw consequents therefrom, for the manifesting of her opinion about the large extent of Gods love to mankind? Who would thinke that a sober man should be caried away with such vaine and frivolous presumptions, without all tolerable ground? But let us come to the particular scanning of the places. All of them, I marke, are onely the expression of prayer for others. Whence it no way followeth, that God will therefore save them, because wee pray for their salvation. The childe prayeth for his father, the father for the childe, the brother for the brother; but hence it followeth not that God will save them; though wee are bound to pray for the salvation of one another.

Moses prayed God to wipe him out of the booke of life, rather then to destroy his people in the wilderness. God had no such resolution, and what sober Divine could doubt, but that Moses knew well that this could not be, yet hee shewes hereby

herely what his desire was, secluding the consideration of Gods will to the contrary, and what he would preferre, if hee were left to himselfe, even his owne eternall confusion, rather then the glory of God should bee obscured. And who ever censured this prayer of Moses for sinne? I am sure God doth not: so S. Paul could with himselfe separate from Christ for his brethrens sake, which were his kinsmen according to the flesh, *Rom. 9.2.* yet he well knew that nothing could separate him from the love of God in Christ. Our Saviour in like sort well knew *that the cup must not passe from him,* yet nevertheless he prayed earnestly that that cup might passe, if it were possible, and with finall submission of his will to the will of his Father.

The first place you alledge, is that passage of the Liturgy, where we pray unto God, *that it may please him to have mercy upon all men.* And for good reason doe we pray so: for is not every one bound to seeke the salvation of all men, as much as lyeth in his power? did not the Apostles labour for this in their place? And is not prayer a speciall meanes for this? We are bound to pray for them that persecute us, wee are bound to pray for them that hate us. For what, if God will not save all, and wee know so much, shall that hinder us from doing our duty in seeking by all meanes the salvation of all: specially considering we are not able to put a difference and to discern who are elect, and who are not. S. Paul, though he saved but some, yet would he become all things unto all men that he might save them. Yet he well knew that the word in his mouth was the savour of death unto death unto many; yea to Israel in speciall manner, and yet notwithstanding his hearty desire and prayer unto God for Israel was, that they might be saved. And albeit God should save all, and every one that live in some one time or age, yet were this no prejudice to the doctrine of election. For the number of Gods chosen, for all this might be but few in comparison to the reprobate: And therefore we see no cause why you should upbraid your opposites, as if they thought this practice of the ancient and moderne Church had need of reformation.

As for the restraint of the universall *all men*, in the place of Timothy, by S. Austin unto *genera singulorum*, it is according to the usuall Scripture phrase. For Matth. 3. 5. it is said that *There went out unto John the Baptist Jerusalem and all Iudea, and all the region round about Jordan*; what sober Divine doth extend the signification hereof any farther then to give to understand, that some from all parts of Iudea, and of the region round about Iordan had resort unto him? Matth. 4. 23. it is likewise said, that *Iesus went about all Galile, teaching in their Synagogues, and preaching the Gospel of the Kingdome, and healing every sickness, and every disease among the people; and that his fame spread throughout all Syria, and they brought unto him all sick people*. Doe you thinke there was not one sicke person left in all Galile and Syria that was not brought unto him? Act. 10. it is said, that while Peter was in a trance he saw in a vision a vessell let downe from heaven, wherein was *πᾶν τετραπόδον*, every foure-footed beast; who doubts but that the meaning hereof is no more then this, that of all sorts some, or rather of most sorts some? 1 Cor. 15. 22. it is said, that *in Christ all shall be made alive*; is this true thinke you of all and every one? *All flesh shall see the salvation of God*; what sober man will apply this to all and every man? Rom. 5. 18. *As by the offence of one man the fault came upon all unto condemnation: so by the obedience of one, righteousness came upon all men, to the justification of life*: will you hereupon extend the benefit of Christs death to the justification of all men unto everlasting life, like as all and every one are fallen into condemnation by the sinne of Adam? Rom. 7. 8. the Apostle professeth that sinne wrought in him *πᾶσα ἐπιθυμία*, can this possibly bee applied to every particular concupiscence?

But by the way, what doe you meane to apply S. Austins restraint to this universall in this place? whereas Austin applyeth it onely to this universall in the place following, where it is said, that *God will have all to be saved*. And if no other place did afford us any such restraint of course, yet wee must be driven so to interpret it in this place, lest otherwise we be cast upon denying the first Article of our Creed. For seeing  
all

all are not saved, and the cause thereof is not because God will not save them; it necessarily followeth, that the cause thereof must be because God cannot save them. And it would have become you well to have answered this argument, and not presumed to cary your Reader to the embracing of your construction hand over head, in spight of so manifest a reason to the contrary. Now if you had but accommodated your selfe to make answer hereunto, I doubt not but wee should have had good matter to worke upon; which I speake upon experience of another discourse of yours that passeth by tradition; but you were loth to interfert it there; and made choice rather to pitch upon the universall in the former place; that so you might be out of danger of that gun-shot that must needs have rung a peale in your eares from this place. Yet in this place alone S. Austine interprets the universall according to the restraint mentioned, and not in the former. And therefore you were content not to quote the place in Austin, but onely to say that it is somewhere; and indeed so it is; and that *somewhere* is in his Enchirid. cap. 103. And in the Chapter immediately going before, he professeth; *Deo procul dubio quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsam nostram fidei confessionis initium, quo nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere confitemur. Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest, nec voluntate cujusquam creatura voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus.* That looke how easie it is unto God to doe what he will, so easie is it not to suffer that to bee which hee willeth not. Vnlesse we beleve this, the very first Article of our Creed will be shaken, whereby we professe to beleve in God the Father Almighty. For he is not truly called Omnipotent, in any other respect then because he can bring to passe whatsoever he will have to be, neither can the effect of will omnipotent be hindred by the wit of any creature. So that herein we have both the authority of so great a Father, and manifest reason also directly opposite to your discourse. To avoid the brunt whereof, you juggle and consider his restraint there, where he doth not use it.

And here you tell us magnificently, that if any man will lay

T 11

this



this restraint upon this place, the scanning of the words following, the sitting of the matter contained in both, with the reason of the exhortation, and other reall circumstances, will shake off this or other like restriction, with greater ease then it can be laid upon it. Here we have a great deale of cry, if the wooll be answerable, wee shall speed a great deale better then he in Ælian that shored his hogs. But the mischief is, S. Austin doth use no restraint in this place; but conceives the Apostles commandement to be this, *ut oraretur pro singulis*. So that your paines is like to bee well bestowed, in shaking of Austines restriction from this place, whereupon he laid no restriction at all. It seemes you came to this discourse as a man should come to play at purfinger in the darke.

We grant we are to pray for the salvation of no other then whose salvation we are unfainedly to desire, and we are to desire the salvation of every man, of what condition soever, or sort, or nation, provided that wee know him. For doe you thinke it a sober course for me to desire and pray for the salvation of I know not whom? If so, I see no reason but I may pray also for I know not what. Any malignant and persecuting enemy of mine, I am bound to pray for, and I shall bee sure to take notice of such a one, for I shall bee sure to feele him. And as well for meane persons as for Kings, that I have any thing to doe withall: albeit I may have greater cause to pray for the conversion of Kings then others, and that without accepting of persons: because by the good affection of Kings to Gods Church, the Church of God is like to prosper farre better then by the conversion of meane persons. And the Apostle gives this reason of praying for Kings, that *under*  
 1 Tim. 2.2 *them we may live a quiet and peaceable life, in all godlinesse and honestie*. And therefore I hope you will beare with mee, if I pray with greater devotion for Gods grace upon the Kings heart, and Gods blessing upon his head, then for meaner persons: because the gracious disposition of a King is of far greater importance for the advancing of Gods glory, in the liberty and prosperity of his Church, then the gracious disposition of meaner persons. And herein I hope I shall not be  
 censu-

cenſured for an accepter of perſons, a conceit of yours quite beſides the Apoſtles text you treat of. But yet the Apoſtle doth not command every congregation to pray for all kings (whereunto you drive it, deviſing circumſtances to fill the ſcale.) For what have I to doe to pray for the king of Bungo, if any ſuch king or kingdome there be? or for the kings in *Terra Auſtralis incognita*, diſcovered by Ferdinand de Quir? yet his relations are of ſo little efficacy, that hitherto hee hath made no mens mouthes water after them. It is enough for us to pray for the fulneſſe of the Gentiles, that it may come in, ſo to make way for the calling of the Iewes. But by vertue of the Apoſtles exhortation, every Chriſtian congregation is bound to pray for their owne king. Like as Darius, though an heathen Prince, deſired the prayers of Gods people that lived under him: Ezr. 6. 10. *Let them have to offer ſweet odours to the God of heaven, and pray for the Kings life, and for his ſonnes.* When I pray for the comming in of the fulneſſe of the Gentiles, and the calling of the Iewes, I except none; as likewiſe when I pray for the ruine of Antichriſt, I except none.

I finde, you doe not much ſatiſſie your ſelfe in the weight of this your diſcourſe, you are ſtill caſting about for ſome-what more to make up the totall of your account, *Wee muſt deſire (you ſay) the ſpirituall good of all men, not as they fall under our indefinite, but under our univerſall conſideration.* So that be-like you are ſtill jealous, leſt we draw all men to an indefinite and not to an univerſall conſideration. I deſire to deale as plainly as you would wiſh; name any man throughout the world unto me, try mee whether I will not pray God bleſſe him, and convert his heart, and ſave his ſoule. And yet to my thinking, you ſhould not urge mee to pray for one with whom I have nothing to doe, onely I heare a relation of him, perhaps dwelling in the Ile of Iapan. For though I am bound to love my neighbour as my ſelfe; and by neighbour I muſt comprehend a Iew, although my ſelfe bee a Samaritane, yet this is in caſe we meet together, and I ſee him to have need to make uſe of my charity. Otherwiſe to my judgement, generall prayers ſhould ſerve the turne, as I ſhewed, for the ful-

ness of the Gentiles to come in, for the calling of the Iewes, for the ruine of Babylon. Neither doe wee finde any practice of the Saints to the contrary; and herein I assure you I except none. But because I see you travaile to bee delivered of somewhat, and I take pity of you, tell me I pray, is not your meaning this, that we must pray for all and every one that liveth in the world? If this be your meaning, and it did not satisfie you to say we must pray for all, or desire the salvation of all; you do as much as confesse hereby, that to pray for al doth not include the praying for every one; & consequently the Apostle in exhorting to pray for all, doth not exhort to pray for every one. I would I knew once what forme would satisfie you; for I am apt to entertaine a resolution to gratifie you therein. But to say that we must pray for all, not in an indefinite, but in an universall consideration, if you could make me understand it, I would soone come to capitulation with you. In the meane time, I appeale to your conscience, did you ever pray in this stile, for all, and signifie that your meaning was to pray for them, not in an indefinite, but in an universall consideration? I professe unto you, if God should leave me unto my selfe and to follow mine owne desires, I should desire not onely that all that now live, but that all that ever lived might have beene converted and saved, yea the Angels that fell might have been kept from sin; or having sinned might have beene brought to repentence, & saved. I see no cause why I should desire the contrary. But considering the wil of God, wherby the angels that fell are bound in chaines, and kept to the judgement of the great day, I dare not pray for their salvation. And to pray that every one that now lives might be saved, with submission to the will of God, I see no incongruity; but we have better grounds of faith, and those sufficient to take up our thoughts especially in these daies wherein we live, whereupon to proceed in the ordering of our prayers. And I would be loath you should put upon us any course or forme of prayer for all, which you practise not your selfe. And if I knew your practice in this kinde, I would soone give in mine answer whether I thought good to subscribe to your forme or no.

In the next place you tell us, that *the reason why we are bound to desire the spirituall good of all men universally considered, is, because we must be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect.* Here againe you bewray your jealousie of the weaknesse of your owne cause, as when you content not your selfe in saying, we must pray for all men, but adde hereunto, that we must pray for all men *universally considered*; the opposite member whereto before you signified to be this, *To pray for all men indefinitely considered.* Now the Apostle is farre from these scrupulosities. He simply exhorts us to pray for all men; hee doth not adde as you doe, *We must pray for all men universally considered, and not indefinitely.* Yet in no other sense you think it will serve your turne.

That reason of yours drawne from the conformity to the courses of our heavenly Father, whereon you so much insist, I have already shewed how little it serves your turne. Now I will shew you how in another respect it is rather repugnant, then consonant to your Tenet. For that example of conformity is onely in an indefinite consideration, thus; Wee must pray not onely for our friends, and them that love us, but also for them that are our enemies, and hate us, and persecute us; like as God doth good unto the just and wicked, and not onely to the just and good. To our desires you say wee must adde our endeavours, *that saving truth may be imparted to all.* It seemes you have not failed herein. Now I would gladly know what those endeavours of yours have beene hitherto, whereby you have endeavoured, that saving truth may be imparted to the inhabitants of terra *Australis incognita*, or to the Negroes, or to the Tartarians, yea or the Turkes, Saracens, or Arabians. Hitherto you have seemed to dispute thus: *God will have it our duty to pray for the salvation of all*: therefore God willeth the salvation of all; but now you dispute in a quite contrary manner, thus: *God wils that all should come to the knowledge of his truth, therefore wee must desire and endeavour that his saving truth may be imparted unto al.* The consequence of your former argument is utterly untrue, as I have already shewed; and as Austin long agoe discoursed, *mans will in an holy manner*

Aug. Ench.  
cap. 101.

may be contrary to the will of God ; and againe in a most unholy manner may the will of man be concurrent with the will of God. As it is the duty of the childe to pray for the life of the father, though God will have the father to dye, and not live : On the other side, a wicked childe wisheth the death of his father in an ungracious manner, yet it may bee that herein he concurrereth with the will of God, supposing (as it may well be) that God willeth the death of the father at the same time that the sonne wisheth it.

As for the second argument, we deny therein the antecedent, if you understand it of all and every one. For the case is cleer, that God doth not bring all and every one to the knowledge of his truth ; not because he cannot ; for doubtlesse he could bestow his Gospell upon them that want it, as well as upon us that enjoy it ; therefore the reason must needs be because he will not. As he plainly professeth, he will bring a famine of his word upon a Land, Amos 8. 11. *Behold the dayes come, saith the Lord God, that I will send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but of hearing the word of the Lord. vers. 12. And they shall wander from sea to sea, and from the North even to the East shall they runne to and fro, to seeke the word of the Lord, and shall not finde it.* So the Lord threatens the Church of Ephesus, to remove her candlestick out of his place, Revel. 2. and long before threatned the Iewes

Mat. 12. 14

to take his vineyard from them, and let it out to others that should bring him the fruit thereof in due season. And it is very strange that these and such like judgements should come to passe, and God should not will them. This is the reason whereupon Austin is moved to enquire into a commodious construction of that place, lest otherwise we should fall upon a direct contradiction to the prime Article of our Creed ; and therefore after he hath given two constructions of the place, the last whereof is this, which you impugne, but not answer his reasons, which are two ; the one drawne from the analogie of Scripture phrase, as where our Saviour saith unto the Pharises, *you tishe Mint, and Rue, and every herbe* : which phrase cannot be understood otherwise, then of every kinde of

of herbe : the other reason is that formerly spoken of ; as if we say, That God willett such a thing to come to passe, which yet doth not come to passe ; we shall thereby deny Gods omnipotency. Yet see the ingenuity of this worthy father : hee gives any man leave to give any fair construction of the place, provided that God bee not made unable to bring to passe whatsoever hee will have to come to passe. *Et quocunque alio modo intelligi potest, dum tamen credi & non cogamur aliquid omnipotentem statutum voluisse fieri factumq; non esse: qui sine ullis ambagibus si in cælo & in terra (sicut veritas dicit) quocunque voluit, fecit, profecto facere noluit quocunque non fecit.* Let it, saith hee, be understood after what other manner soever it may be construed, so that wee be not constrained to maintaine, that the Almighty God would have something come to passe, which notwithstanding comes not to passe. For, without fetching any further compasse ; if he hath done whatsoever hee will both in heaven and in earth, as the truth witnesseth, certainly, hee would not doe whatsoever he hath not done.

2 But you proceed to shew, that both this duty of ours to pray for all sorts, and for every man of what sort soever; and also that Gods will is, that all without exception should come unto the truth and be saved, are expressly included in the prayers appointed by the Church of England. And the Collects whencoe you gather this, are in number three : they are, I take it, all appointed for Good Friday. In the first, wee pray, that God would graciously behold this his family, for the which our Lord Iesus Christ was contented to be betrayed. Now this family, being the present congregation wherein the prayer is made, it is very strange, that hereby should be signified all sorts of men, and every man, of what sort soever throughout the world. And what expresse signification doe wee finde here, that Gods will is, that all without exception should come unto the truth and be saved?

To helpe your argument drawn herehence; as if you should reason thus, Wee must pray for this family, therefore wee must pray for every one throughout the world. You tell us that, The tenour of this petition, if wee respect onely the forme, is indefinite,

*not universall: but being in a necessary matter it is equivalent to an universall, as every logician knowes.* To which I answer, first, that the tenour of the petition is not indefinite, but definite, (to follow you in your owne language) for therein wee pray definitely for that family which is before us. Now that family is a particular family; and never any Logician was so simple as to thinke it law full to inferre an universall out of a particular. Again, here is no necessary matter in it. For to use such a forme of prayer is meerly the arbitrary constitution of our Church.

Ioh. 17.9.  
& v. 20

1 Ioh. 5. 16

Suppose God had bid us to pray in this forme, to wit, for this family present; yet this makes not the matter necessary absolutely, but meerly upon supposition of the will of God, and yet in this particular onely. As for example, Our Saviour prayed for them that his father gave him, and for all those that should afterward believe through their word, will you inferre herehence, that therefore he was to pray for the world also? Again, God hath expressly bidden us to pray for them that sinne unto death; and therefore, unlesse I may be assured, that there is none in the world that sinneth a sinne unto death, I have no reason to pray for all and every one; though I were bound to doe so, it would nothing pleasure and advantage you. Hitherto I have followed you in your owne most unlogically discourse, the absurdity whereof, every simple Logician may easily discover.

Where have you beene taught, that petitions indefinite in a necessary matter are universall: we were taught indeed, that propositions indefinite in a necessary matter are as good as universall: but for petitions indefinite to be counted universall in a matter necessary, is one of the absurdest notions that ever I heard to proceede from the mouth of a Logician. You proceede to prove, that the forme of the petition is in the intention of the Church of England to be extended to *all and every one of the congregation present*. But erst you told us, the matter indeed was universall, but not the forme, which you acknowledged to be indefinite. Now the very forme, you say, is to be universally extended: this is not to extend, but to destroy.



stroy. But this that you labour for in so uncouth a manner, I never doubted of, namely, that by this family is understood all and every one of the Congregation there present: onely I deny, that herehence it followeth, that our Church bindes us to pray for all and every one throughout the world; and if it doth, wee must comprehend even those that sinne sinnes unto death, amongst the rest, unlesse wee believe that there are no such sinners in the world: and hee had need bee of a strong faith, and have some extraordinary revelation that believeth that.

So that your second place tending to no other end but to prove that which wee never doubted to be comprehended in the first, wee need not trouble our selves about any answer thereunto; save onely this, though we are bound to pray, not onely for the congregation present, but for the whole Church and every member of it; yet there is a great gulfe of separation betweene the Citie of God, and the citie of the Devill; which makes me remember what Abraham answered Dives, and therefore wee can no way approve this consequence; *We are bound to pray for all Christians, therefore we are bound to pray for all Atheists and heathens. Wee are bound to pray for Christs members, & therefore wee are bound to pray for Antichrist and his members.* Therefore you tell us, the third and last prayer will cleerly quit this exception, *and free both the former petitions from these and the like restrictions.*

But in this last clause you overlash miserably; I see no reason but I may as well say, that the restrictions in the former prayer will quit this latter prayer, for its extension. Certainly two of the three prayers you proposed to evince your Tenent are nothing to the purpose. Herein indeed we pray unto God, *to have mercy upon all Jewes, Turkes, and Hereticks;* which in effect is no more then to pray, that the fulnesse of the Gentiles may come in, and thereupon the calling of the Jewes. And whereas you desire to inferre herehence, that it is Gods will, that all these should come to his truth and knowledge, and be saved. As the consequence you shall never bee able to make good, so the consequent is directly contrary to the word

of God; for it is not, nor ever was it the will of God that all this should be done together, but one after another, namely, that the folness of the Gentiles shall come in first, and after that the calling of the Jewes, Rom. 11. Luc. 21. 24. Hence you conclude, *That if God will not the death of any Turke, Jew, or Infidell, because of nothing he made them men; wee may safely conclude that he willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians.* In reading your antecedent I wondred at your boldnesse, in supposing that which you are never able to gaine by force of argument; but when I view your consequence, I wonder what giddinesse possessed you, to take so wilde a course in proving that which no Christian will deny. For your conclusion is, that God willeth not the death of any, but the life of all whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians. Did ever any Christian deny this? Is this it you are to prove, that God wils the salvation of all Christians? Have you not rather undertaken to prove that God willeth not the salvation of all sorts of men onely (which was Austins glosse, and which you set up here as a mark to shoot at, thinking by the power of your discourse to beare downe the authority and learned discourse of that worthy Father hereupon) but that he willeth the salvation of every man, of every sort throughout the world? And this you would prove out of the doctrine established in the Church of England, that is, out of their Liturgie: and three prayers therein you insist upon, whereas the two first are apparantly nothing for the purpose; whereof your selfe seeme to bee sensible enough, and therefore the third place (Triary like) was to doe the feat, and to cleare all: and the conclusion herehence *desinit in piscem*: being no more but this, that *God willeth the salvation of all men whom he hath vouchsafed to make Christians*: which no man denies or calls into question. May I not justly aske, and that with admiration,

*Quid dignum tanto tulit hic promissor hiatu?*

*Parturient montes nascentur ridendi nati.*

But what should move you to carie your selfe so preposterously, and to balke or blast rather so faire a consequence, and so beneficiall unto your cause, as your antecedent doth bespeake? For if your antecedent be true, namely, that *God willeth not the death of any Turke, Jew, or Infidell*, will it not manifestly follow, that God willeth not the death of any Turke, or Jew, or Infidell? To my thinking it should follow as manifestly, as to say, that if the Sunne shineth it shineth; though in my poore judgement this is identity rather then consequence or concomitance; I say, I wonder what moved you to blast this consequence with such a dash of your pen, in the very face of it, and the addition of such a proviso as this, *whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians*. First, especially considering that no such qualification is in the antecedent; and it is most unreasonable that any qualification should be foisted into a conclusion that hath no ground in the premisses; especially it being such a qualification as utterly marres your market, and that at the end of the day, and you have a long time waited for a good penyworth, and now your selfe are the man that cuts your owne throat. Did the conscience of so foule a conclusion as was towards, make you blush to put it in writing? that cannot be, for you have it full and whole in the antecedent; though straining to proceed most indecently, it fares with you as it doth with the horse in the Poet:

*Peccat ad extremum ridendus & ilia ducit.*

Or by the way did your consequence suggest unto you that the argument drawne from this prayer, proves no more but this, that God will save every Jew, Turke, and Infidell, in case he be first made a Christian? If so, then the supposed consequence in your antecedent, was made against your conscience; and therefore by the consequence herehence made, you desired to strangle it, that so the birth of it might bee abortive. Yet because you carie some shew of argumentation in the antecedent, I will not trust to the corruptnesse of your consequent deduced therhence, but I will take the pains to strangle

it my selfe, since the presse hath brought it to light: your antecedent is this, *If God therefore will not the death of any Jewe, Turke, or Infidel, because of nothing he made them men.* Now this includes such an Enthymeme: Of all Turkes, Iewes, and Infidels it is true, that God of nothing hath made them men; therefore he will not the death of any Iew, Turke, or Infidel. Now I say this consequence is notoriously false, and in stead of your proving it in any manner, I disprove it in this manner. Of all Devils it is as true, that God of nothing made them angels; shall I herehence inferre, therefore he will not the death of any devill? So likewise of all cats and dogs, horses and hogs it is as true, that God of nothing made them such as they are; will it therefore follow, that God willeth not the death of any of them?

But perhaps some may say, that the Collect implyeth some such argument, for it runneth thus; *Mercifull God, who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, have mercy upon all Jewes.* I answer first, here is no such argument implied, as to inferre that God will not the death of any Iewe, Turke, or Infidell, but onely it implieth a reason why we pray God to have mercy upon all Iewes, Turkes, and Infidels. But albeit we doe thus pray for all, yet it followeth not that God will save every Iew, Turke, and Infidell that liveth, as before I have shewed. For who doubts but the childe is bound to pray for the recovery of his fathers health, being cast downe upon the bed of sicknesse, at what time it may bee, it is Gods will that his father shall not recover, but dye the death. Secondly, the complete reason why we pray for all, signified in this praier, is not this, because *God hath made all men, and hatest nothing that he hath made;* for by the same reason we might be urged to pray for devils as well as-for men: This is onely a part of the reason, not the whole reason. The whole reason is this, *Who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, nor wouldest the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be converted and live.* And we finde by manifest experience, that most wicked men are converted, and God hath revealed unto us, that *the fulnesse of the Gentiles shall come in,* Rom. 11. and

and that then shall be the calling of the Iewes ; therefore wee pray for the fulnesse of the one, and of the other ; but with submission unto the will of God, as touching the time of this, and the manner how.

Thirdly and lastly ; like as it followeth not, that because we must pray for all men, therefore wee must pray for every man throughout the world ; in like sort it followeth not, that because our Church prescribes us to pray for all Iewes, Turks and Infidels ; therefore it prescribes us to pray for every Jew, Turke, and Infidel throughout the world ; and looke what restraint may be laid upon *all men*, the very same restraint of interpretation may be laid upon *all Jewes, all Turkes, and all Infidels*. Yet you keep your course, and tel us that *as God made all things without invitation*, (a prettie phrase for them that affect eloquence beyond intelligence) *out of meere love, made nothing hatefull*. Apply this I pray to devils, and see whether we have not as good a ground to pray for them as for others. Againe, if sinne hath made them hatefull, is there not sinne enough in the world, in Iewes, Turkes, and Infidels to make them hatefull ? Wherefore though in case they were in the same state wherein God made them, then they should not be hatefull to God, and thereupon be thought fit matter of prayers ; yet seeing they are in the state of sinne, and consequently hatefull to God ; for the same cause, in just proportion of reason, they are no fit matter for our praier. Though a full measure onely of enmitie against God exempt men from Gods love, yet will you denie that such a full measure is found in many throughout the world ? and will not this be sufficient to forbid our praier for all and everie one ? Sure I am, if there be anie in the world that sin a sinne unto death, we may not pray for such an one. Ioh. 5. 26

3. From the authorized devotions in our Church, you proceed to the Catechisme ; and aske what can be more cleare then that, as God the Father doth love all mankind without exception, so the Sonne of God did redeeme all mankind, not onely some of all sorts, but all mankind universally taken. And I thinke indeed that the one is as cleare as the other.

Eph. i. 7.

Col. i. 14.

2 Co. 5. 19

Ioh. 17.

19. 20.

Throughout the Scriptures shew me one passage wherein the love of God is exprest to Reprobates. If the Sonne of God did redeeme all and everie one, then all and everie one have redemption in Christ, through his blood, and consequently the forgiveness of their sinnes. For in Scripture phrase, remission of sinnes is that redemption which we have in Christ: so is reconciliation also all one with forgiveness of sinnes. Sure I am, Christ professeth, Iohn 17. 9. that he would not pray for the world, but for those whom his heavenly Father had given him, and for those *that should beleve through their word*. And for their sakes did he sanctifie himselfe for whom he prayed; and to what did he sanctifie himselfe, but unto his death and passion, by the consent of as many Fathers as Maldonate had seene, as the Iesuit himselfe professeth on that 17. of Iohn: and he had seene very many, as there hee signifieth, namely, Chrysostome, Cyril, Austine, Theodorus Mopsuestenus, and Heracleotes, Leontius, Beda, Theophilaet, Enthy-mius, Rupertus.

But to proceed; out of our Catechisme you alledge, that *God the Father made us and all the world*; now the Church our mother hath taught us, that *God hateth nothing that hee hath made*. The booke of Wisedome saith so indeed; but because of the little authority that booke hath in matter of faith from God our Father, therefore you charge us with the authority of the Church our Mother. Now you are not ignorant, I suppose, whence the Church our mother taketh this, which hath its course amongst Papists, as well as amongst us. And you know of what authority Aquinas is amongst Papists; and what interpretation he makes of this place, though received to be canonically Scripture amongst them, I have already shewed out

Aquinas in 2

q 23. art. 4.

Psal. 36. 6.

1 Tim. 4. 10

of his Summes: *God (saith he) loves all things, in as much as he willeth unto them some good or other: but in as much as he willeth not a certaine good to some, to wit, eternall life, he is said to hate them, and reprobate them*. And indeed *God saveth both man and beast*, as the Psalmist speaketh; and so he may be said to love them all; and so the Apostle acknowledgeth him to be *the Saviour of all men, but especially of them that beleve*. And to profess

esse ingenuously what I thinke, I see no cause of controversie hereabouts, if so be the question be rightly stated. For when we say, Christ died for mankinde, our meaning is that Christ died for the benefit of mankinde. Now let this benefit bee distinguished and considered apart, and forthwith contentions hereabouts will cease. For if this benefit be considered as the remission of sinnes, and the salvation of our soules; these being benefits obtainable onely upon the condition of faith and repentance: As on the one side no man will affirme that Christ died to this end, namely, to procure forgiveness of sinne and salvation to all and every one, whether they beleieve or no; so on the other side, none will deny, but that he dyed to this end, that salvation and remission of sinne should redound to all and every one, in case they should beleieve and repent. For this depends upon the sufficiency of that price, which Christ paid to God his Father for the redemption of the world. But there be other benefits which Christ merited for us also, even the very grace of faith and of repentance.

For all Gods promises are Yea and Amen in Christ; and amongst these promises one is, *the circumcision of the heart, the healing of our waies, of our rebellions*. These promises doe include the grace of faith and of repentance. Now consider ingenuously, did Christ die to this end, that the grace of faith and repentance should bee bestowed absolutely or conditionally? Not conditionally, for before the grace of faith and repentance and regeneration comes, there is nothing to bee found in man but workes of nature. Now it is meere Pelagianisme to affirme that God bestoweth grace on man upon the performing of a worke of nature. And the Apostle clearly professeth that God doth not call us according to our works.

1 Co. 1. 29  
Deut. 30. 6  
Esa. 57. 18.  
Hos. 14. 5.

2 Tim. 1. 9  
Tit. 3. 5.

Therefore it remaines, that albeit remission of sinnes and salvation are conferred unto us conditionally, to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance; yet the grace of faith and repentance cannot be so conferred: and consequently they must be conferred absolutely. If then Christ died for the purchasing of faith and repentance to all and every one absolutely, it would follow herehence, that all and every one should

beleieve



In Iohan.  
27. 19.

beleeve and repent. But this being found to bee a notorious untruth, it followeth that Christ died for the purchasing of these graces onely unto some; and who can those bee, other then the elect of God? Accordingly as our Saviour professeth, that for those who were Gods, and whom he had given unto Christ, or should in time to come give unto him (the rest excluded) for those he sanctified himselfe, that is, offered himselfe upon the Crosse; which interpretation of Christs sanctifying of himselfe, Maldonate professeth, was received by all the Fathers whom he had seene.

Now to goe along with you. Secondly, we are taught, you say, by the same Catechisme, to beleeve in God, *who hath redeemed us and all mankind.* What I pray is this more then to say, *He hath redeemed us and all men?* Is all mankind more then all men? and in the straining of this phrase we have tried your strength; and the issue of all was to prove but this, that God willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, *whom of men and Infidels he hath made Christians.*

By the way I observe an incongruity. Of Infidels wee are made Christians, as whereby we cease any longer to bee Infidels: but I hope of men we are not made Christians so, as to cease any longer to be men. Yet you couple them together under one yoke, though very unequall heysers: you should have said rather, of meere men we are made Christians. All that are redeemed are unfainedly loved; but if all mankind signifie no more then all men; and all men, no more then all sorts of men, what are you the nearer to that you reach after? And you know, I suppose, that this was Austins interpretation of that universality; and hee gives reasons for it; though you magisterially will have your owne way, in spite of the pie, without answering his reasons.

Againe consider, whether to pay a price which is sufficient for the redemption of all and every one, be not in a faire sense to redeem all & every one. And what one of our Church will maintaine, that any one obtaines actuall redemption by Christ without faith? especially considering that redemption by the bloud of Christ, and forgiveness of sins are all one. I would  
you

Eph. 1. 7.  
Col. 1. 14.

you would speake plainly, and tell us what is meant by redemption, which, you say, every one hath in Christ, denying that every one hath sanctification. So that whereas the Apostle joynes these two together, where hee saith, *Christ is of God made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption*, you divide them, telling us, that Christ is made redemption to all and every one, but not sanctification. And truly I had thought that Christ had deserved the one as well as the other, for all those for whom he died. And it is very strange that God should be said to love them whom he never meanes to sanctifie.

But I pray answer me, Doth he unfainedly love the Devils? I thinke you will say he doth not; what reason have you then to say, that hee loveth all men, though you will easily perswade your selfe that the most part of them are reprobates, and whom hee never will bring unto *wholesome and spirituall repentance, whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Christ, as Austine writes*, lib. 5. cont. Iulian, Pelag. cap. 4. and whether you meane to contradict Austine in this also I know not as yet: yet one word more with you before wee part; How long doth God continue to love them? till the measure of their sinne is at full? tis your owne oracle in the former Section. And then belike hee beginnes and continues to hate them. But I pray consider, how can this change, this alteration stand with the nature of God, that his love, his will to save them should bee changed into hatred, into a purpose to damme them, considering that Gods will is his essence? And the Lord professeth of himselfe, saying, *I the Lord am not changed, and yee sonnes of Iacob are not consumed*, Mal. 3. 6. All that are baptized, in your opinion, are not sanctified: yet some others much agreeing with you in other opinions maintaine, that all that are baptized are regenerate, and they alledge a better testimony out of the book of Common prayer, then any you have brought to serve your turne, namely, the profession that is made by the Minister thus, *Now this childe is regenerate, and grafted into the body of Christs congregation*. Yet that hath beene answered by a Bishop of our Church, and

that out of the doctrine of Austine. Yet I grant, baptism is the seale of redemption, and of forgiveness of sinnes also, but to whom? to none but such as believe: for God hath not ordained, that the benefit of Christs blood shall redound to the redemption and forgiveness of the sinnes of any man, unless hee believeth. For God hath set him forth to be a propitiation for our sinnes through faith in his blood. But your inferences you conceive to bee as cleere as christall, so that the consideration of them makes you doubt, whether such amongst us *as teach the contrary to these, have at any time subscribed to the booke of Common prayer.*

And no question is to be made of your subscription, which deny all them to bee sanctified that are baptized; though in plaine termes the booke of Common prayer professeth of every baptized childe, that hee is regenerate. And now you have plaide your part so well in working our authorized devotions, as you call them, and Catechisme to serve your turn; you promise to performe as much touching the booke of Homilies; but wee must expect your performance therein, untill you come to the article concerning Christ: in the meane time you will give us space to breathe, and take notice of your concludent prooffe, as you call it, thus. *God wills the salvation of all that are saved, and all that are not saved, therefore hee wills the salvation of all and every one.* Now the second part of the Antecedent, which alone is called in question, is proved out of that of Ezech, *As I live I will not the death of him that dieth.*

I had thought you had done with this; but if it bee your course to tautologize in repeating former arguments, I may take liberty to repeat (without tautologie) my former answer.

First therefore, I say, the words as they lye in proper speech are contradictions to your tenent in two respects; First, because in another discourse of yours, you maintaine, that hee whose death God wills not, is the penitent; but here you professe, that God willeth not the death of them that are not saved, when they die; which as much as to say, that God willeth not the death of impenitent sinners.

Secondly,

Secondly, there is a time you confesse, in the former Section, when God hates sinners, to wit, when the measure of their sinne is full; and if then he hates them, he may then as well be said to will their death and damnation, as he was said to will their salvation, while he loved them. In the second place, the words as they lye in proper speech, are contradictions to manifest reason; for, seeing God is he that inflicts death and damnation upon them, hee must needs will their death and damnation, because wharsoever God doth, hee doth it according to the counsell of his owne will, *Eph. 1. 11.* Secondly, if God doth not will the death which he inflicts, then neither doth he will the punishment that he inflicteth, nor the chastisement that he inflicteth; and so indeed it is said, *Lam. 3. That he doth not punish willingly, nor afflict the children of men;* which cannot bee understood in proper speech; for then it would follow, that God doth afflict and chastise the children of men against his will. Therefore I say, this must be understood by a figure of speech, to wit, by a metaphor; and God said not to will or this or that, which hee doth, because in the doing of it hee is *similis nolenti*; as first when hee doth it not, according to the Latine phrase, *animi causa*, for his pleasures sake, but being provoked; and yet not hastily neither, though provoked, but after long forbearance, and giving time of repentance, upon the despising of this goodnesse of God, as *Ezek. 14. 23. They shall comfort you when you see their way, and their enterprises: and ye shall know that I have not done without cause all that I have done in it, saith the Lord God.*

Secondly, when God doth chastise, not as parents, for their owne pleasures, but with an eye to the good of those whom hee chastiseth, *Rom. 12. 10.* According thereto is that of Augustine, *Qui trucidat non considerat quemadmodum laniet, Epist. 48. sed qui curat considerat quemadmodum feret.*

This is my answer, following the course of your owne reading of the place, whereas Piscator blames the vulgar translation in this place which you follow: for, saith hee, in the Hebrew it is not, *I will not the death of a sinner*; but this, *I am not delighted in the death of a sinner.* But saith he, *A man may*

will that wherein he takes no delight: as a sicke man may will to drinke a bitter potion, wherein he takes no delight. For he may will to take it, not for it selfe, but for something else, to wit, to recover his health. And so God willeth the eternall death of reprobates for his owne glory, to wit, for the manifestation of his just wrath in punishing of their sinnes. And Iunius reades it and translates it in like manner: and with the se accordeth our last English translation, *As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turne from his way, and live, Ezek. 33. 11.* And the 18. of Ezekiel doth cleare the meaning of the Holy Ghost, where the same phrase is used, and in the same manner translated by our worthiest Divines, and followed in our last translation, *vers. 23. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should dye, saith the Lord God, and not that hee should returne from his waies, and live?* and verse 32. *I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God, wherefore turne yourselves and live ye.*

Now in this chapter the Lord justifieth himselfe against an imputation of harsh, if not unjust, dealing, as if hee punished the children for the sinnes of their fathers, which in a proverbiall manner was delivered thus; *The fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge*; which might occasion a desperate disposition in them, and provoke them to cast off all care of amending their waies, and turning to God by repentance; because all was one, whether they repented, or repented not, because the sowre grapes which their fathers had eaten, were enough to set all their teeth on edge: Against this the Lord made a solemne protestation, that all soules were his, even the soules of the children, as well as the soules of the fathers, and *that the soule that sinned, that should dye*; and hereupon expostulates with them thus, *Have I any pleasure in the death of a sinner*, to wit, so as to bring death upon him, notwithstanding his repentance, because forsooth his father had eaten sowre grapes? No, no; the Lord hath no delight in their death, but if they returne and live, hee delights in that, and therefore concludes with exhorting them to returne unto the Lord, that they may live.

Now

Now when you forsake the translation of our Church, and stick unto the Vulgar corrupt translation, to hold up your odd conceits; doth it become you to make question whether they that oppose you in your extravagant tenents and proofes, have subscribed to the booke of Common Prayer? Piscator proceedeth further, and saith, that the meaning is not simply, that God delights not in the death of the wicked, but in case he ceaseth not from his iniquity; as appeares, saith he, by comparing of it with that which goeth before, and with that which commeth after: for otherwise God takes delight in all his workes: like as Lyra upon Ezech. 18. *Punitio improbitatis bene est à Deo voluta quia iusta.* In Proverbs 1.26. thus we reade, *I will laugh at your destruction, and mocke when your feare commeth.* How are these places to bee reconciled? Piscator answereth, *God is not delighted in the death of man, as it is the destruction of the creature, but is delighted therein, as it is the just punishment of the creature:* which is as much as to say, he delights in the execution of his owne Iustice: like as wee reade, Ier. 9. 24. *Let him that glorieth glorie in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me. For I am the Lord which shew mercy and judgement, and righteousness in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord.*

4. Now as if you had made all sure on your side, partly out of our authorized devotions, wherein you make choice of three prayers; whereof two are nothing to the purpose, and the third, at your uttermost straining of it, doth but encourage you to conclude finally that God wils not the death, but the life rather of them that of Infidels are made Christians; and partly out of the Catechisme, where you finde that Christ hath redeemed *all mankinde*, which hath no colourable extent further then all men; and without manifest opposition to Austin, you finde this phrase will not serve your turne; whom yet you oppose so, as without answering any one of his arguments; one whercof was drawne from analogie of Scripture phrase, another from manifest reason, professing therewithall that your construction of this place contradicts the prime Article of the Creed.

And last of all, driving the naile of your discourse home, with a concludent prooffe depending upon a translation of the text quite different from the most authentique translation of our Church, which yet must be without prejudice to your conformity, having a sound heart of your owne, and therefore some peccadillies may bee well borne withall, and you take liberty to question others your opposites, whether they have subscribed or no to the booke of Common Prayer; such is the height of your imperious carriage, bearing downe all before you.

Now you come to enquire, *By what will God doth will they should be saved that are not saved*; and you demand *whether God doth will their salvation by his revealed, and not by his secret will*. As if this were our opinion; whereas neither Calvin embraceth it, nor Beza, nor Piscator, but all concurre upon that interpretation which Austin gave many hundred yeares agoe, and which you impugne; and how judiciously, we have already considered. Peter Martyr proposeth it amongst divers others, but embraceth it not; neither doe I know any Divine of ours that embraceth it. Cajetan indeed embraceth it, and Cornelius de Lapide, and Aquinas amongst other interpretations.

As you doubt whether your opposites have subscribed to the booke of Common prayer; so if you take a liberty to put upon us the opinions and accommodations of distinctions used by Papists, you may in the next place make doubt, whether wee have not subscribed to the Councell of Trent. We plainly deny that God doth will the salvation of any, but of his elect. For to will to save, and decree to save is all one, and election we say is the decree of salvation. And as God hath not elected all unto salvation, nor ordained all unto eternall life, so neither hath he willed to save all. For hence two absurdities doe manifestly follow; first, that the reason why many are not saved, must bee, because God cannot save them; which is the argument of S. Austin. Another is, that Gods will shall bee changed: for undoubtedly when God damnes any man, then he will not save him; and therefore if  
before



before he did will to save them, his will is afterwards changed, both by changing his old will, which was everlasting, and by entertaining a new will, which was not everlasting. Hemnigius, a great patron of univerfall grace, interpreteth the place of S. Paul, 2 Tim. 2. 4. *Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri modo fide oblatam salutem recipere non recusaverint.* Neither doe I like Cajetans interpretation after this manner, when he saith, *Est sermo de voluntate signi, qua Deus proponit omnibus hominibus praecepta salutis, doctrinamque Evangelij*; and that for two reasons: First, because God doth not propose his Gospel to all: Secondly, if God should propose the Gospel to all, and bid all men to beleeve, this is no certaine signe that God will have them to beleeve, like as it is no certaine signe that God will give them grace to beleeve, without which they cannot beleeve; for it is manifest that God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance to all that heare the Gospel, nor to a major part of them; but it is a signe, I confesse, that God will have it our duty to beleeve, by commanding us to beleeve. Gods commandement is usually called his will, and the commandement of God Schoolmen make to be one of the signes of Gods will. So he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne Isaak. This they call *voluntas signi*, but yet hee was determined that Isaak should not bee sacrificed, as appeared by the event; this they call *voluntas beneplaciti*. So he commanded Pharaoh to let Israel goe, this was his *voluntas signi*; but yet he told Moses, he would harden Pharaohs heart, that hee should not let Israel goe; this they call his *voluntas beneplaciti*; the end whereof was, that God might have occasion to shew his power, and magnifie himselfe, in his plagues brought upon the Egyptians, to breake those hearts that would not bend unto him.

So that you are out in the interpretation of *voluntas signi*, The will of  
and *beneplaciti*, as well as in the accommodation of it, as out signe, and  
of our opinion. God proposeth no signification of his good the will of  
will to any man, as touching the saving of him, otherwise then good pleasure.  
by faith and repentance: and plainly protests, that without  
faith and repentance they shall not be saved.

You

You would faine have your adversaries grant, that God doth will the salvation of all men by his revealed will, or *voluntate signi*. Indeed if you may have the fashioning of our opinion, you may soone be victorious, in conquering men of straw in stead of reall opposites. This distinction of yours is absurdly applied to our opinion, in this case; who deny that God doth at all or any manner of way will the salvation of reprobates. For revealed will, and *voluntas signi*, is the will of Gods commandement, and the objects of commandements are onely morall duties, and not the rewards of them, such as is salvation. Yet it is truth, that what God is said to will by his will of commandement (so usually called, though improperly the will of God) the same at once he doth not will, but rather the contrary sometimes, by his *voluntas propositi*, will of purpose and decree, which alone is properly to bee accounted the will of God, and which none can resist, Rom. 9. 19. And this we can prove, and have already proved by two instances; the one as touching the sacrificing of Isaak, commanded to Abraham, but not determined by God that it should be brought to pass; as also in the letting of Israel goe, commanded unto Pharaoh, yet God resolving for a long time to harden Pharaohs heart, that he should not let them goe.

Neither will it hereence follow, that there are two wills in God, as you most unlearnedly urge; but that God may command one thing, which yet he is resolved shall not come to passe; so that the thing commanded may be contrary to the thing determined by God, as when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaak, but withall determined that Isaak should not be sacrificed.

But Gods commandement, though it be usually called his will, yet it is improperly so called; onely the will of purpose and decree is properly Gods will; according to that of the Apostle, Rom. 9. 19. *Who hath resisted his will?* For the commandement signifieth onely what is our duty to doe, it doth not signifie what God hath determined shall be done. For as for the crucifying of the Sonne of God; Gods hand and his counsell had determined before that it should bee done, but  
hee.

he commanded none to crucifie him; but rather commanded all the contrary, namely in forbidding the shedding of innocent blood. Neither shall there be a contradiction betweene the objects of Gods will which is one, but onely betwixt the objects of his commandement, and the object of his will and determination, as in the instances proposed I have manifested.

As for your applications of the distinction of *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas beneplaciti*, to the salvation of mankind, I know none of our Divines that embrace it. Wee plainly deny, that God willeth the salvation of any but of his elect. For Gods will we conceive to be all one with his decree, and election we define to be the decree of salvation, or the ordaining of men to everlasting life. So that we may well give you leave to runne riot in your fruitlesse argumentation. You on the contrary doe apparantly maintaine a manifest contradiction betweene the object of Gods will. For seeing God doth damne many, it followeth that he did will to damne many, and that from everlasting, though onely for their sinne: yet these whom from everlasting he did will to damne, you maintaine that out of infinite love he did will to save, till the measure of their sinne was full. So that at once he did will to save, and will to damne the same persons by your opinion; thus the contradiction fairely and fully lights upon your selfe, which upon a meere fiction of yours, and that contrary to our professed opinion, you charged upon us. Wee grant the will of God is but one, but we say his will properly so called, and his commandement usually called also his will, though improperly, are two distinct things. For by the one he sheweth what is our duty to doe, or to leave undone; by the other he determineth what shall be done or not done, what shall come to passe, or not come to passe in the world. Of what force and credit your words are, when you talke of manifest contradiction upon our part, let the indifferent consider and judge.

5. But you will seeme to gratifie your opposites, by not carying your selfe so rigorously criticall, as to banish this distinction of *voluntas signi* and *voluntas beneplaciti* out of the confines

*finis of Divinity.* But therewithall you continue your former fiction, in the stating of our opinion, as if we maintained that God did will the salvation of all, by that will which is called *voluntas signi*, but not by that will which is called *voluntas beneplaciti*: whereas I know none of our Divines that doe professe their opinion in that manner, but rather they utterly deny in plaine termes, that God doth will the salvation of all. And in my judgement, the application of this distinction in this case, by some that are orthodoxe in the point of Predestination, as namely by Aquinas and Cajetan, is most unseasonable, And therefore we have small cause to feare the imputation you cast upon us, forsooth of *canonization of Iesuiticall perjuries, and deification of mentall evasions or reservations*; seeing it is onely grounded upon a meere fiction of yours, fashioning our Tenent at your owne pleasure most unseasonably, and most incongruously, in respect of our opinion, who grammatically and plainly professe, God willett not the salvation of all men. And yet I am perswaded that in the end *this canonization of Iesuiticall perjuries, and deification of mentall evasions or reservations*, will justly light upon your selfe, according to the lawes of your owne making; and the tenour of your consequences, when you come to manifest wherein this distinction of *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas beneplaciti* may have place. Yet I purpose to consider well, how you carrie your selfe in this imputation you cast upon us.

You acquaint us with two Iesuiticall equivocations, each consisting in part of a protestation, and in part of a mentall reservation. The first as touching the protestation, is this, *I doe not intend the ruine of King or State*; as touching the reservation this, *so they will become Roman Catholiques*. The second protestation this, *I know of no conspiracy against them*; the reservation this, *with purpose to reveale it unto them*. Now let us see how you make us to deifie these or such like equivocations, upon your fiction of our opinion. You need not trouble your selfe about putting any interrogatory unto God, it is enough to prove that God by our opinion doth make protestations of such intentions, or expresse such speeches with such  
refer-

reservations. God protests, you say, that *he would not the death of him that dies*; and we (you say) professe this to bee spoken with such a reservation, *So he will repent, which I know he cannot doe.* A second is this, God doth not will the non-repentance of *him that dyeth*; the reservation that wee make, as you say, is this, *with purpose to make it knowne to him*; however, according to my secret and reserved Will, *I have resolved never to grant him the meanes, without which he cannot possibly repent, whereas without repentance he cannot live, but must die.* To each of these I answer distinctly, and to every part of each.

First therefore I deny, that God professeth any such thing in the place you beat upon, as that *hee will not the death of him that dieth*, but onely that *he delighteth not, nor hath any pleasure in the death of him that dieth.* And not onely Piscator and Iunius doe so interpret the place, but our last, and best, and most authorized English translation doth so render it. And wee cannot but wonder at your inconsideration, if you take no notice of it, or at your boldnesse thus to proceed in despite of it, if you did take notice of it, and yet question your opposites Archdeacon like at least, whether they have subscribed to the booke of Common Prayer.

Secondly, touching the reservation; I say it is your owne interpretation, as I have read in a manuscript of yours, namely, that he whose death God willeth not, is the penitent sinner. And in the end of the seventh section of this Chapter you professe that God necessarily hates them that have made up the full measure of their iniquity: whence it seemeth that when God saith (according to your translation) *I will not the death of him that dieth*, it is to bee understood with this provision, provided *that he fill not up the measure of his iniquity.*

Again, I say this supposition of repentance is no reservation, but plainly signified by the tenour of the Prophets discourse, as appeares manifestly both by the consideration of the 33. chapter in Ezekiel, and especially by comparing of it with the 18. wherein are found the same words, as I have already shewed in the end of the third section. So that we adde not this by way of reservation, as you impute unto us, but

make it appeare to be the meaning of the Holy Ghost, by the tenour of the Text : and if Iesuites did in like sort make their meanings cleare unto us, we should never challenge them for equivocation or reservation. We see by this what is the issue of your imputation, which in great pompe you called our *deification of mentall evasions and reservations* ; as if you spent your strength in phrasifying. You seemed to bee sensible of your own weaknesse in justifying this your calumnation, and therefore to give weight unto it, you have your additions, without all congruity to the precedent, of Iesuiticall equivocations, whereunto notwithstanding you desired to conforme our tenent ; and rest your selfe wholly upon the odious nature of that conformity, especially as being charged upon God by our opinion, as you manage the matter. But your addition hath no colour of conformity thereunto, but proceeds of it selfe without all respect of proportion. For the Iesuite protesting he intends not the ruine of the King and State, with this reservation, So they become Romane Catholiques ; doth not adde hereunto these words, *Which I know they cannot doe* ; I doe not doubt but they have a more comfortable opinion of us then so.

Yet when you come to shew how our opinion doth *desire*, as you speake, this very Iesuiticall trick, the greatest strength of your odious expression of our Tenet, consists in such like addition, whereunto not any thing on the Iesuiticall equivocations part is conformable. Doe you see how well you performe the part of a disputant, and that in making good so foule a calumnation as is *the desiring of equivocations* ? As if you followed the politicians counsell, who bids his disciples bee bold to calumniate ; for as much as though a man might cleare his good name, yet in such a case *cicatrix manet calumnia*. Fie upon such shamelesse courses. And as for this addition of yours, what taile of consequence soever it drawes after it, it is like to fall foule on your part, and not on ours. For you maintaine, that there is a state of man in this life, in respect of a certaine measure of iniquity, wherein it is not possible for him to repent. I know no such state, nor any rule that God hath

A scarre  
remaines.

hath given to himselfe to confine his grace. Nay to the contrary we reade, that neither continuance in sinne, nor greatness of sinne, doth preclude the grace of God; but that Gods grace as it can, so it doth many times prevaile over both. But you love not to speake distinctly, but to carie your selfe in the clouds of generalities. They that maintaine a weake cause had need play least in sight; wee say plainly, that God well knowes, no man can repent except he gives the grace of repentance; the Scriptures in divers places expressly testifying that repentance is the gift of God, though you love not to heare of that care, nor are well pleased, as it seemes, with the musique that riseth upon the touching of that string. On the other side, God knowes that every man at any time can repent, if God will be pleased to give him the grace of repentance, yea and that he shall repent also; the habituall grace serves for the one, and the actuall and effectuall motion of Gods Spirit is requisite to the other.

Act. 5. 31.  
& 11. 18.  
2 Tim. 2.  
last.

I come to the second parallell of Iesuiticall equivocation, or rather the *deification* of it, as you are pleased out of glorious spleene to calumniate your opposites. The protestation is on Gods part, *I will not the nonrepentance of him that dieth*, the reservation, *with purpose to make this part of my will knowne unto him*. But where, I pray, doe you finde any such protestation on Gods part? Ezekiel hath none such. In him it is said, *I will not the death of him that dieth*. But no where doth he say, *I will not the nonrepentance of him that dieth*. This is a trick of your owne device, as if you followed the counsell of Lyfander; and where the Lyons skinne will not reach, you are content to patch it up with some piece of a Fox skinne. Wee professe in plaine termes, that as God hath *mercy on whom he will, so he hardneth whom he will*; and as he will give the grace of repentance unto some, so he will not give the grace of repentance unto others. Notwithstanding that he bid all in the ministry of his word, (I meane all those that heare it) *To repent and beleeve the Gospel*. So he did bid the Iewes, and that with great earnestnesse, to keepe the covenant, Deut. 30. 19. *I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you*

Rom. 9. 18

Mark 1. 15



life and death, blessing and cursing. therefore chuse life, that both thou and thy seed may live. By loving the Lord thy God, by obeying his voice, and cleaving unto him, for hee is thy life, and the length of thy daies, that thou maieſt dwell in the land which the Lord didſweare unto thy fathers. Yet I hope you will not ſay, this could be done without grace, though of the nature of grace, what you thinke, and of the univerſall extention thereof, I ſhould be very glad to underſtand, and that there-in you would ſpeake your minde plainly.

As for the reſervation here, it is moſt ridiculous, neither is any equivocation of Ieſuites, I trow, answerable hereunto: for by reſervations, a ſenſe is raiſed, contradictory to the ſenſe of the proteſtation; but by this reſervation, no contradiction ariſeth to the former as it lieth, but onely it denyeth a certaine purpoſe to be joyned with it: but, be it that Ieſuits allow ſuch artifice, what Divine of ours doth? Did we ſay, that God wills not the non repentance of any; we would ſay, hee willet it not, in as much as hee forbiddeth it. And Gods prohibitions and commandements are uſually (though improperly) called the will of God. And here *voluntas ſigni* hath proper place enough.

Like as God commanded Abraham to ſacrifice his ſonne, yet his determination was, that Iſaac ſhould not be ſacrificed. Some may have ſaid, that God willet not the death of him that dyeth, in caſe he repent. But was ever any heard to affirme, that God wills not the non repentance of him that dieth, to wit, with purpoſe to make it knowne unto him? What madneſſe poſſeſſed you to aſcribe ſo incredible a thing to your opposites, ſo contrary to the rule of fiction, *Πευδοῖμην ἀγορεύειν ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, as Callimachus hath ſet it downe.

Your addition here likewise, which drawes a long taile after it, hath no conformity to the patterne. And as for the ſubſtance of it, as touching Gods reſolution, never to grant ſome repentance, or the meanes of it (if thereby you meane the Goſpel) we acknowledge it to be truth: for the arme of the Lord is not revealed unto all, neither doth he give repentance, or faith to all: but hath mercy on ſome onely, even on whom

whom hee will ; and hardenneth other some , even whom he will ; that is , denieth them repentance , and consequently , they cannot repent , which interpretation of obduration , your selfe make in the seventh section following : and consequently they cannot live ; this I doubt not but you will acknowledge with us .

And therefore the vanity of your discourse is not at an end , you proceed to talke of Gods oath in giving assurance , that he will not the death of them that are damned ; built meerly upon a translation which you follow , different from the most authorized translation of our Church ; and that contrary to evident reason : for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon the impenitent , so hee must needs will it ; for hee doth all things according to the counsell of his owne will , *Ephesians 1. 11.* And yet according to your reading of it , a good construction may be given without all reservations , as plainly enough deduced out of the word of God it selfe . And what God hath manifested unto us in his word , I hope is not to bee accounted a *reservation* , but a *revelation* rather . I am not of your minde to thinke , that the keeping of an oath is a branch of perfection ; or to keepe a mans word either , which yet is a better point of morality , then to keepe an oath .

Such justice is to bee found amongst heathen men ; yet workes of mercy go beyond workes of justice , yet no great perfection neither ; but to be mercifull to our enemies , *When Matt. 5. 43 they are hungry to feed them , when they are thirsty to give them drinke :* this is the perfection that our Saviour calleth us unto , and sets before our eyes the goodnes of our heavenly Father , in suffering his raine to fall , and his sunne to shine on the bad as well as on the good . And here withall , how well your calumination hath sped , imputing to us the deification of Jesuiticall equivocations , let the indifferent Reader judge .

6 Here you proceede learnedly to distinguish betweene somethings determined by *oath* , and somethings else , and in the accomodation of your distinction , you tell us , that *Voluntas signi* , and *beneplaciti* , can have no place in things determined

mined by divine oath, but well it may in other things. What is the other member of your distinction opposite to things determined by *divine oath*, you expresse not, but leave to your reader to conjecture. Now because usually when oathes are spoken of by way of distinction, the opposition is made betwene oathes and bare words, therefore wee conceive your distinction completely delivered to runne thus. Some things are determined by Gods oath } other things are determined by Gods bare words. Now this distinction I take to be neither accurate according to the forme, nor sound in the matter thereof.

As touching the forme. It is not right to say things are determined either by Gods oath, or by his word, but rather by his will. For determination is the act of Gods will. Words and oathes are but the signification and outward protestation of the determination of his will. Then as for the matter, I see no cause but that by what reason soever the distinction of *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas beneplaciti*, hath course in the one, by the same reason it may have course in the other also. For Gods word undoubtedly is as certaine as his oath; albeit in condescending to our infirmity he is pleased to protest in solemne manner, and by oath, for the strengthening of our faith. We commonly say that an honest mans word is as good as his oath to binde him. Certainly as God cannot breake his oath, so is he *ἀψευδης Θεός*, a God that cannot lye, and his will can neither change from within, nor bee resisted from without.

Tit. 1. 2.

When you come to explicate your meaning by instance as touching the accommodation of this distinction, we will perhaps speake more of this. The distinction you say of *voluntas signi*, and *beneplaciti*, can have no place in their doctrine who make the bare entity and personall being of men the immediate object of the immutable decree concerning life and death everlasting. It seemes you desire to speake enough, as if you could hardly satisfie your selfe, no marvell if you doe not satisfie your reader. Yet in my judgement it is usuall with you to over-doe. For the distinctions implied by you, of the object of Gods decree

decree mediate or immediate ; and especially of Gods decree mutable or immutable, may soone cast us upon wilde-goose meditations. By the *entity or personall being of man*, I take your meaning is, (for you speake in your owne peculiar phrase) to expresse the pure masse of mankind. This (it seemes) you like not to be made the object of election and reprobation, but rather the corrupt masse of mankind after Adams fall. Now because there was an election and reprobation of Angels as well as of men, if you can devise how a corrupt masse should be the object of Gods predestination, in the election and reprobation of Angels, you shall performe such a piece of work as never any man adventured on before you.

And as for the distinction of *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas beneplaciti*, I am perswaded I shall devise a more commodious place for it, supposing the pure masse to be the object of predestination, then you can upon supposition of the corrupt masse to be the object of predestination. This I presume taking the distinction of *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas beneplaciti* in that sense which they take it that have beene the devilers of it. But if you shall take liberty unto your selfe, to put what sense upon it you thinke good, and make your owne grounds; as Æsop advised his master how to make his undertakings good in drinking up all the water in the sea, to wit, alwayes provided that all the rivers that runne into the sea were first stoppt. For it were unreasonable that as fast as hee dranke up, the rivers should powre in, and that somewhat faster too. And I performe my undertakings thus. To promise salvation upon obedience, and to command obedience unto all, is in the phrase of Schoulemen to will the salvation of all *voluntate signi*. But withall to determine, that by his speciall grace hee will keepe some from sinne, and save them, but not others; is not to will the salvation of those others *voluntate beneplaciti*, whose salvation he is said to will *voluntate signi*. So that albeit to will and not to will the salvation of one and the same man *voluntate proprie dicta*, which alone is *voluntas beneplaciti*, bee contradictions; yet to will the salvation of one man *voluntate improprie dicta*, which is *voluntas signi*, and not to will it *volun-*

*tate proprie dicta*, which is *voluntas beneplaciti*, is no more contradictory then to will the sacrificing of Isaak by commanding it, and to will it by determining the contrary, is contradictory.

Againe, if *massa corrupta* be the object of predestination, which is the more common opinion of our Divines, this distinction in this sense (which I take to be the onely true sense of it) cannot be so well accommodated. For as much as in that case, the onely way left for salvation is faith and repentance; for performing whereof there is no power in nature, as there was power in nature for the performing of obedience before Adams fall. And you hold it ridiculous to say that God wills the salvation of man so he repent, in case he cannot repent, as but erst you signified.

But let us consider your reason why the distinction foresaid can have no place, if the pure masse be the object of predestination. For (say you) *the entity or personall being of man is so indivisible, that an universall negation, and a particular affirmation of the same thing (to wit salvation) falling upon man as man, or upon the personall being of man, drawes to the strictest kinde of contradiction.* All this is but one proposition, but it contains more then one fault. For first you make the affirmation and negation of salvation upon the same men, to follow upon *voluntas signi* touching their salvation, and *voluntas beneplaciti* touching their non salvation. Whereas no such thing will follow. For although from *voluntas beneplaciti*, whereby God doth will the salvation of one man, it followeth, such a one shall be saved; yet upon the *voluntas signi*, whereby God doth will their salvation, it shall not follow that such shall be saved: like as from *voluntas signi*, whereby God did will Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, it did not follow that Isaak should be sacrificed: yet you swallow this consequence without any chawing; but an Estrich will sooner digest a tenne-peny nail, then any sober and intelligent Scholar wil digest this consequence. If you would deale directly, you should professe, that to will and not to will the salvation of the same man is contradiction; but that is untrue as well as the former. For unto con-  
tradiction

tradiction is required that it must be, *ad idem, secundum idem, eodem modo, & eodem tempore*. Now these conditions are not found in this that we speake of. For we doe not say, that God doth will and not will the salvation of the same man, *voluntate eodem modo accepta*; for that hee wils the salvation of this man, is onely *voluntate signi*; that he doth not will it, is *voluntate beneplaciti*; and this will which is called the will of good pleasure, is onely the will of God in proper speech, and that S. Paul speakes of when he saith, *Who hath resisted his Will?* Rom. 9.19 the other, to wit, *voluntas signi*, is improperly (though usually) called the will of God. It being indeed nothing else but Gods commandement; in which sense he willed Abraham to sacrifice his sonne; yet who doubts but that it was Gods will in proper speech, that Isaak should not be sacrificed. And because you perceived how easily the shew of contradiction might be washed off, if it were proposed in this manner, therefore you made bold upon dame Logicke, and without her leave, and in despite of her, saine a contradiction under another forme by way of consequence, which indeed proves most inconsequent.

Thirdly, you speake in a strange language when you say that *the affirmation and negation of salvation falling upon the personall being of men, contains contradiction*; implying that it might fall otherwise then upon the personall being of men, and in that case it would not prove contradictory; both which are not onely untrue, but absurd also. For the affirmation of the salvation of man cannot fall otherwise then upon the person of man, and consequently upon the personall being of man, whatsoever be the cause of it; which cause you most preposterously conceive, to give unto man a being different from his personall being, whereupon, and not upon his personall being his salvation should fall.

Againe, no distinction of personall being and other being will serve your turne, to save the affirmation and negation of salvation of one and the same man from contradiction. I say of one and the same man, which is of principall consideration in the course of contradiction, and yet wholly permitted

by you in this proposition, though therein you talke of the strictest point of contradiction. Straine your invention while you will, you shall never be able to free these propositions from contradiction; *Peter shall be saved, Peter shall not be saved.* But to change the nature of these propositions, and of absolute to make them conditionall thus; *Peter shall be saved if he beleve and repent: Peter shall not be saved if he beleve and repent not*; is neither to affirme nor deny the salvation of Peter. For to affirme or deny the salvation of Peter, is categoricall, not hypotheticall. What you want of force of argument, you supply with devotion, as if you came to enchant your reader, and not to informe him; as when you say, *Farre be it from us to thinke that God should sweare to this universall negative, I will not the death of him that dieth; and yet beleve withall that he will the death of some men, that die as they are men, or as they are the sonnes of Adam.* This is proposed by way of an holy and confident asseveration; but consider how sottish it is, and most averse from sobriety.

For first, what if God had not sworne it, but onely said it, had there been the lesse truth in it for this? Is not Gods word sure enough without an oath? yet before wee heard, that in things determined by divine oath, the distinction of *voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti* could have no place.

Secondly, where were your logicall wits, when you said this was an *universall negative, I will not the death of a sinner?* I pray examine your rules well, and see whether it bee not a singular? will you measure the quantity of a proportion by the predicate, and not rather by the subject? Yet if you should doe so, it would not serve your turne. For both Aristotle of old hath taught us, that it is absurd to put an universall signe to the predicate; and here is no universality added either to the whole predicate, which is, *Nolens mortem peccatoris*, nor to any part of it (which you seeme to confound.) For he that dyeth, is a terme indefinite. Neither is it a necessary matter. For the most holy Angell God could turne into nothing, if it pleased him. And in the 18. chapter of Ezekiel it is apparent, that this is restrained to him that repenteth, without any  
mentall



mentall reservation, but by plaine evidence of the Text it selfe.

Thirdly, you harpe upon a false string, and an erroneous translation, as it were in spight of the most authorized translation of our owne Church, and follow the vulgar Latine herein. And withall in opposition to manifest reason to the contrary; for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon every one that dyeth, and is damned; and he doth all things according to the counsell of his owne will, Eph. 1. 11. it is impossible he should doe any thing and not will it, that he should inflict death on him that dieth, and not will it.

Fourthly, be it as you will have it, that *God doth not will the death of him that dieth*; will you herehence inferre that God willeth not the death of him that dyeth as man, or as the son of Adam, implying that notwithstanding hee may will the death of him that dieth in some other respect, without any prejudice to his oath? what a senselesse collection and interpretation is this? You may as well say, *God willeth the life of him that liveth, ergo, farre be it from us to say that hee willeth not the life of him that liveth, as he is a man, or as he is the son of Adam*; implying that for all this God may be said not to will the life of him that liveth in some other respect. But I say that if God willeth not the death of any man that dieth, (as you will have it, and to be confirmed also with the Lords oath,) then in no respect can it be said that hee willeth the death of any man that dieth. For it is both *ad idem*, death is the same in both; and it is *secundum idem*, for we speak of the same man in both; and it is *eodem modo*, for we speake of the will of God in the same sense in both; and it is at the same time, and must be; for Gods will is everlasting, and therefore willing whatsoever he doth everlastingly, he cannot bee said at any time not to will it. As for the cause of death and damnation willed by God, we maintaine, that God willeth not the death of any man, or the condemnation of any man, but for sinne. But I pray what thinke you of infants perishing in originall sin? If God doth not will their death as the sonnes of Adam, how doth he will it? Or had you rather shake hands with Arminius in this also,

and professe, that no man is damned for originall sinne onely; but that all the children of Turkes, and Sarazens, and Iewes, and Caniballs that die in their infancie, are saved, and enjoy the joyes of heaven, as well as the children of the faithfull?

You proceede in your devout asseveration, and will have it to bee farre from us to thinke, that *God should by his secret or reserved will recall any part of his will declared by oath.* We are so farre from thinking, that God recalls any part of his will declared by oath, that wee doe not believe that hee doth or can recall any patt of his will that hee hath declared by his bare word. And wee thinke it equally impossible for God to lye, and to perjure himselfe; for he is *αὐτῷς ὁσιν*. Neither when hee kept Abraham from sacrificing his sonne Isaac, doe wee say that he recalled any part of his will, which he had formerly declared by his word, although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne: for Gods will of commandement, signifieth onely what God will have to be our duety to doe, not what hee hath determined to be done: though you confound these usually, and that as wilfully and unlearnedly as Arminius himselfe, because it serves your turne, and advan- tageth your cause to confound them. But looke you to it how you free your selfe from maintaining, that God doth recall something which hee hath properly willed and determined to be done. For that God *willeth the death of no man that dieth*, you make to bee the word of God confirmed by oath, and you understand it of Gods will properly so called, and yet you maintaine, that God *willeth the death of him that dieth*, though not as man, and as the sonne of Adam, yet in some other manner; which either is flat contradiction, or else God doth recall and change his will.

The last part of your devout asseveration is, *Farre be it from us to thinke that God should proclaime an universall pardon to all the sonnes of Adam, under the seale of his oath, and yet exempt many from all possibilitie of receiving any benefit by it.* Here you seeme to shew your teeth, but I had rather understand your meaning: for to proclaime pardon to all is ambiguous; for it

it may bee done absolutely, as kings on earth grant pardons, and usually our kings grant pardons at the end and conclusion of parliaments. I doe not thinke this is your meaning; for then all should be pardoned; for to proclaime pardon is to signifie his Majesties pleasure that hee doth pardon them. But if conditionally; it is true, God proclaimes, that whosoever believeth shall be saved, this is a knowne truth, no man takes exception against it. And how doe we exempt any from all possibility of receiving it? You will say, that this we doe, in exempting many from all possibility of performing the condition, to wit, of believing. I answer, that your owne opinion is to be charged with this, ours is not; for you maintain that Pharaoh after the seventh wonder, was exempt from all possibility of repentance; and the like you avouch of all reprobates, and such as have filled up the measure of their sinne, which according to your opinion, may be many yeares before their death: and in the seventh Section following, you expresse it thus, *Having their soules betrothed unto wickednesse*: such undoubtedly was Ahab, that sold himselfe to worke wickednesse, and many such like.

And in this case you professe in your owne phrased, that *the doore of repentance is shut upon them*. But wee like not this opinion of yours, wee know no measure of sinne, nor continuance of sinne that doth prescribe unto the grace of God, and forbids the banes of matrimony betwixt him and his Church, but that in a due time the power of Gods grace shall breake through all obstacles, even through the furious idolatry of Manasses, in giving his children unto Devills, and that sealed with blood, wherewith hee filled Ierusalem from corner to corner; yea, and through his sorcery and witchcraft also, and through the rage of Saul, persecuting Gods saints, and making havocke of the Church of God. \* And for as much as wee maintaine it to be possible for every one to believe and repent through Gods grace, it is manifest, that we exempt no man from all possibility of believing and repenting, to wit, in consideration of the power of God. But in consideration of the power of man, wee exempt not many

\* When I speak thus, I am to be understood onely of finnes of course, and knowne finnes, excluding the consideration of the sin against the holy Ghost, which is a secret,

onely,

onely, but all and every one, from possibility of beleev-  
ing and repenting by power of nature. And dare you avouch the  
contrary? It is apparant that whatsoever you thinke, you dare  
not openly professe thus much. And therefore are content to  
hide your head, and lurke under generalities. So that the case  
is cleare, that you doe us wrong in saying wee exempt many  
from all possibility of repenting: I say it is a notorious slan-  
der; for we exempt men from possibility of repenting onely  
by power of nature; and so we exempt not onely many, but  
all and every one from possibility of repenting. But perhaps  
you may say, that withall wee maintaine that God doth not  
purpose to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all, but  
to deny it unto many, yea unto most; and upon this supposition  
we exempt them from all possibility of repenting.

But I pray consider, to exempt some from possibility of  
repenting upon supposition; is this to exempt from all possi-  
bility without supposition? For you have delivered this with-  
out all supposition. And then the issue is to enquire, whether  
God hath decreed to give the grace of faith and repentance  
unto all, or rather to deny it to many, yea to most. And dare  
you affirme that God hath decreed to give the grace of faith  
and repentance unto all? It is apparant you dare not openly  
professe this, and therefore carie your selfe in the clouds,  
without any cleare and distinct proposing of your meaning.  
In S. Pauls daies there was a remnant amongst Israel which are  
called Gods election, Rom. 11. and these had obtained this  
grace of faith and repentance, as there the Apostle signifieth,  
*but the rest were hardened.* And if God hath purposed to give  
grace unto all, you may as well say God hath elected all. But  
the Holy Ghost witnesseth, that many are called, and but few  
are chosen. Many I say are called, not all neither, nor the  
most part; as all experience, and the histories of the world  
doe manifest: and therefore though God proclaimes in his  
word pardon of sinne to all that beleeve; yet he doth not pro-  
claime this unto all.

Rom. 11.

Mat. 20.

By the way I observe, that whereas you say, *that God doth  
proclaime an univiersall pardon to all the sonnes of Adam under the  
scale*

seale of his oath; this of Gods oath, which you adde, doth draw us to conceive that the meaning of those words, *As I live I will not the death of him that dies*, contains this sense in your construction, *that God will pardon the sinnes of all*, and since these words (as you understand them) doe not runne conditionally, but absolutely; herehence it followeth, that according to your opinion God hath sworne absolutely to pardon the sinnes of all men, the absurdity whereof I leave to everie mans sober consideration.

7. Hitherto you have told us in what matters the distinction of *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas beneplaciti* cannot have place. Now you tell us in what matters it may have place, to wit, *in matters of threatnings, or of plagues not denounced by oath*. And why not I pray in matters of promising, or of rewards not denounced by oath. Now you have already signified, that looke in what matters this distinction may have place, there God may recall by his secret and reserved will, what he hath declared to be his will by bare words. For therefore you professed that this distinction may not be admitted in matters determined by oath, because, *Farre be it from us thus to thinke that God should by his secret or reserved will recall any part of his will declared by oath*. Let the Reader marke it well, and the force of consequence therehence; which I doubt not but you approve of, as we shall farther understand in that which followeth. Now we are so farre from maintaining that God can recall any thing, of that which hee hath sworne shall come to passe, that we stand in defiance of any such opinion, as maintains, that God may choose whether he will be so good as his word, and that he hath liberty to recall ought of that which upon his bare word he hath testified shall come to passe. And it seemes you are ashamed to propose it in these termes, but keepe your selfe in the generall of *voluntas signi*, and *beneplaciti*, the meaning whereof every one understands not; and the best Divines take it in a far different sense from this of yours. And they that doe understand your meaning and explication, yet doe not alwaies consider it, and therefore are the more apt so to be deluded by your generalities.

But proceed we along with you. God by his Prophet *Jonas* (you say) did signifie his will to have *Ninevie* destroyed at fortie daies end; this was *voluntas signi*: and he truly intended what hee signified, yet was it his *voluntas beneplaciti*, his good will and pleasure at the very same time that the *Ninevites* should repent and live. Now I doe observe in all this, you doe not say God recalls by his secret will, what he signified to be his will upon his bare word. Yet the reason why the foresaid distinction might not be admitted in matters determined by Gods oath, you made to be this, because then God should by his secret will recall that which he had declared to be his will by solemne oath; permitting that God may have libertie to recall what he hath determined (as you speake) by his bare word. But here you forbear these expressions; you decline this precipice. And justly. For if it be a part of Gods perfection to keep his oath, as you have said, I see no reason but it should be a part of greater perfection to be as good as his word. Secondly, I say that if Gods intentions and Gods will be all one; for you to say that God at the same time did intend and not intend that the *Ninevites* should be destroyed, is flat contradiction. And you doe as good as say so. For at the same time God did will that they should be destroyed, you say; and also intended that they should live, which is as much as to say he did intend they should not be destroyed. And I prove it thus: To affirme and deny the same thing of the same subject, at one and the same time, is flat contradiction; but you herein doe affirme and deny the same thing of the same subject for the same time; therefore herein you speake flat contradiction. But you pronounce there is no contradiction in this; yet in clearing your selfe, your cariage in words is very preposterous. For whereas to purge your selfe you should say, there is no contradiction in this speech of yours; you quite besides the cushion tell us there is no contrariety betweene Gods will declared, which you call *voluntas signi*, and his good will and pleasure, which you call *voluntas beneplaciti*; and forthwith you tell us there is no contradiction in the object of his will, however considered. All which is delivered very fumblingly, and so perplexedly,

plexedly, as nothing answering to those logical braines and accurate Philosophie, the want whereof elswhere you pittie in others, but not in your selfe. I say you speake contradiction, in saying that God at the same time both willed that Ninivie should be destroyed, and willed that it should not be destroyed.

As for contradictions in the objects of *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas beneplaciti*, we maintaine that such contradiction may have place without any contradiction in the maintainer : As for example ; The object of Gods commandement to Abraham (which I call, and all Schoolmen with me call *voluntatem signi*,) was the sacrificing of *Isaak* ; but the object of Gods purpose and determination (which I call, and all Schoolmen with me, *voluntatem beneplaciti*) was the not sacrificing of *Isaak*. Which are termes contradictory. Yet is it no contradiction for me to maintaine that God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son ; and yet resolved with himselfe that *Isaak* should not be sacrificed.

Yet we must give you leave to take your course, and consider what a fluttering you keepe to unentangle your selfe of this contradiction, wherein you are not taken as in a snare, but wilfully and with your eyes open cast your selfe thereinto, presuming either by the finenesse of your wit to escape, or rather by the perplexity of your discourse so to confound your reader, as not to discover your fumbling to deliver your selfe.

You say the object of Gods will was not one and the same, but much different, in respect of Gods will signified by *Jonas*, and of his good will and pleasure, which not signified by him was fulfilled. And because you repeat this distinction againe containing the difference betweene *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas beneplaciti*, I must needs tell you the exorbitancye of it. Suppose God had made knowne to *Jonas*, that he purposed upon this his preaching to give them repentance, to save the *Ninivites*, had this beene no longer *voluntas beneplaciti* ? If you thinke so, I thinke you cannot name one Divine in the world that ever was of your opinion in this. If it ceased not to be *voluntas beneplaciti* for all this, then you see how absurdly you make the difference



betweene *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas beneplaciti* to consist in this, that *voluntas signi* is Gods will declared, *voluntas beneplaciti* is his will concealed.

The resolution at length to free your former assertion from contradiction, is this, One and the same immutable decree of God did from eternity award two doomes much different unto Ninevie, taking it as it stood affected when Ionas threatned destruction unto it, or as it should continue so affected, and taking it as it stood upon the judgement threatned. All the alteration was in Ninevy, none in Gods will and decree; and Ninevie being altered unto the better, the selfe same rule of justice doth not deale with it after the selfe same manner. The summe of all (were you pleased to speak plainly) would come to this: When he signified by Ionah to the Ninevites, that Ninevie should be destroyed at forty daies end, the meaning was but this, that in case they continued in their sinnes without repentance they should be destroyed; but in case they repented they should not be destroyed. I find no fault in this as touching the substance of truth; but I wonder not a little to see you faile in the accommodation of it, both to the distinction of *voluntas signi*, and *beneplaciti*; as also in the reconciling of your selfe unto your selfe, in respect of what formerly you have delivered concerning the meaning of Ionahs message to the Ninevites. For you doe not tell us which of these doomes is *Voluntas signi*, and which of the doomes is *voluntas beneplaciti*: or if both be *voluntas signi*, (as indeed they are) what is left for *voluntas beneplaciti* to be distinguished from *voluntas signi* in this place? It seemes you distribute those doomes, and make one the object of *voluntas signi*, and the other the object of *voluntas beneplaciti*, in which course there is no sobriety in comparison to your owne dictates. For you make *voluntas signi* to differ from *voluntas beneplaciti* in this, that *voluntas signi* is Gods will declared, *voluntas beneplaciti* is his will concealed. According to the tenour of which distinction, both these decrees are to be accounted *voluntas signi* for God hath declared this to be his usuall course; as namely *Jer. 18. 7. I will speake suddenly against a nation or a kingdomes to plucke it up, and to root it out, and to destroy it. 8. But if this na-*

tion against whom I have pronounced, turne from their wickednesse, I will repent of the plague that I thought to bring upon them: 9. And I will speake suddenly concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdome, to build it up and to plant it: But if it doe evill in my sight, and heare not my voice, I will repent of the good that I thought to doe for them. Neither indeed can you in reason maintaine the one of the doomes to be the object of *voluntas signi*, and the other the object of *voluntas beneplaciti*. For if Ionas had delivered his message thus, God teach in what sinfull courses you are, and hath determined that you continuing in the same your Citie shall be destroyed at fortie dayes end; they would never have doubted but that the Lords determination was, that upon their humiliation and repentance, and turning from their evill waies, Ninevie should not have beene destroyed; and so each doome had beene the object of *voluntas signi*, and nothing (for ought I can gather out of your discourse) should remaine to be the object of *voluntas beneplaciti*.

Again, this elucidation of the doubt doth contradict your former assertion, when in contradictory manner you affirmed, that God at the same time did both will that Ninevie should be destroyed, and also intend that Ninevie should not be destroyed; whereas by the interpretation which here you make of Ionahs message to the Ninivites, according to the two doomes by you mentioned, God was so farre from intending both the destruction and the not destruction of Ninevie, as that he intended neither the one nor the other. For to determine to destroy them, in case they continued in their sinnes without repentance, and not otherwise, is to resolve neither one way nor other, but to remaine in suspence, which is a kinde of reservation of liberty; which heretofore you have so much magnified as a point of very great perfection, and therefore fit to be attributed unto God.

But then I pray consider, did not God from everlasting know whether they would repent or no? I thinke you doubt not, but that God knew they would repent. And I pray what need was there then of any two such doomes as you have devised, when one would serve the turne, and that absolute, to

wit, that God from everlasting determined they should not be destroyed, and thereupon tooke a course whereby they might be brought to repentance.

By the way I am glad to heare you make the repentance of the Ninevites the object of Gods will, which is called, *voluntas beneplaciti*, which wee take to be all one with Gods decree; but I have no cause to rejoyce to see you thus contradict your selfe: for you have in divers places maintained, that no contingent thing, especially no act of man is the object of Gods decree: but to the contrary have professed, that God, though he decreed the contingencie of things, yet hee doth not decree the contingent things themselves. You must bee driven to take the same course in respect of Gods promises of blessing, as well as of his threatnings of judgement. But to distinguish herein as you do between Gods word and his oath, is most out of season. For suppose God had sent Ionah with the same message in this manner, say unto them, *As I live, saith the Lord, yet forty dayes and Ninevie shall be destroyed*, might it not admit the same justification according to the doomes proposed by you thus, *As I live, Ninevie continuing in this sinfull course, wherein I finde it shall be destroyed at forty dayes end, not otherwise.*

Or if God should have beene charged with perjury in saying this, *As I live, yet forty dayes and Ninevie shall be destroyed*; should hee not as well bee charged with untruth in saying barely thus, *Yet forty dayes & Ninevie shall be destroyed*? Now whereas in the judgement pronounced by Ionah against Ninevie, you never speake of any revoking the judgement threatned, though your tenent carried you (as there I signified) so to speake, yet here (the case as you professe being all one) you are bold to professe, that God may revoke the blessing promised (and why (I pray you) may hee not revoke his blessing promised upon oath, as well as a blessing promised upon his bare word? for if he may the one without breaking his word, why may hee not doe the other without breaking his oath. Or if it bee not lawfull for God to break his oath, dare you say it is lawfull for him to breake his word? Alas,

whither

doe your wits carry you ? and whither would you carry us , if wee should suffer our selves to be led by you ? You conclude with a qualification thus , *Yet may wee not say , that the death or destruction of any to Whom God promiseth life , is so truly the object of his good will and pleasure , as the life and salvation of them is unto whom he threatneth destruction.* This you say , but I had rather heare what you prove.

By the will of God , called *voluntas beneplaciti* , we understand no other thing then Gods decree , or the determination of his will. And hath not God as truly willed the destruction of them that die in sinne , without faith and repentance , as hee wills the salvation of them that die in faith and repentance. It is true , God takes no delight in the destruction of any , considered in it selfe , much lesse in their sinnes , whereby they bring destruction upon themselves ; but God delights both in the faith and repentance of his elect , and in their salvation.

But this signification of *good pleasure* , is nothing to the purpose in this distinction ; for no Schooleman understands it in this sense. And I well know Arminius , considering the usual acception of *Voluntas beneplaciti* , amongst Divines professeth , he had rather call it , *Voluntas placiti* , then *Voluntas beneplaciti*. If such lettice like your lips , you may make your selfe merry with them.

A second extent and accommodation of this distinction of *Voluntas signi* , and *Voluntas beneplaciti* , you allow of , applied to men after they have made up the full measure of their iniquity , and are cut off from all possibilitie of repentance. I had thought no man had filled up the full measure of his sinne untill his death ; like as on the other side , no man hath fulfilled the measure of his obedience , untill hee hath finished his course , as Revel. 11.7. *When the witnesses had finished their testimonie , the beast that came out of the bottomlesse pit , made warre against them , and slew them.* You seeme to speake it of a certaine measure , whereupon the doore of repentance is shut upon them , and thereupon excluded from all possibility of repentance ; as here you say it was with Pharaoh , especially after the 7. plague upon

upon Egypt; whereupon you have taken great paines to discourse at large in another Treatise, which I have well considered, and examined your reasons throughout, and that following you *κατα παλιν*; yet there you confesse that it must have beene so with Pharaoh at Moses first comming unto him, yea and was possible to have beene so, when he was but 3. yeares old. And indeed I doe not see how it can bee avoided, but that as many as depart this life in their infancy are excluded from all possibility of repentance.

But it may be you will apply this only to men of ripe years, but by your leave such Pharaoh was not at three yeares old. And though God willed Pharaoh to let his people goe, and sent Moses and Aaron to him to that purpose; yet you say, *It was no branch of Gods good will and pleasure that Pharaoh should now repent: Rather it was his good Will and pleasure to have the heart of Pharaoh hardened*: though you restraîne this to Pharaohs condition after the seventh plague, for which I see no reason. So that in such a case you will have it lawfull for God by his reserved will, to recall that part of his will which hee hath declared by his word or oath: and therefore as touching your holy asseveration mentioned in the sixth Section, it must be restrained to them that have not yet filled up the measure of their sinne, as Pharaoh had after the seventh plague. For in such a case God may will their death, notwithstanding his oath in shew to the contrary. For his meaning is this, *As I live I will not the death of him that dieth*, that is, I will not his death *as a man, or as the sonne of Adam*; neither doe I herein deifie Jesuiticall equivocations or mentall reservations; for I take libertie to charge that upon mine adversaries, and therefore you may well think I would not be so simple as to transgresse in the same kind my selfe. And I thinke so too, if God had not confounded your wits, but it is Gods course, and most just, to strike with confusion those that build Babel; and he makes the Egyptians to erre in their counsels as a drunken man erreth in his vomite, the issue whereof is to defile himselfe and his owne favourites, even those that sit next unto him.

In the same spirit you professe that God did punish Pharaoh

raoh for not letting his people goe; as though it had beene free and possible for him to repent, though indeed in your opinion it was not. *But Pharaohs case was extraordinary, you say, and not to be drawne into example.* But by your leave if God did so but once, it is no unjust thing for God to do so ofner; and therefore pray looke unto it, that whensoever it is your lot to oppose your adversaries in such a point, you doe not lay to their charge that they make God to be unjust, if not for conscience sake of the truth, yet at least for feare of contradicting your selfe.

As for the Apostles intimation (you touch upon by the way) that it was an argument of Gods great mercy and long suffering to permit Pharaoh to live any longer upon earth, after he was become a vessell of wrath, destined to everlasting punishment in hell; I professe I am not so quicke or accurate as to observe any such intimation of the Apostle. What if you devised this to make good some fictions of yours to that purpose, in another Treatise of yours, which I have already weighed in the ballance, and found them a great deale too light of worth, to move any sober man to concurre with you in opinion thereabouts.

But whatsoever it be that the Apostle intimates, you seeme to expresse strange conceits, when you talke of Gods providence in suffering Pharaoh to live longer on earth, after hee was become a vessell of wrath destined to everlasting punishment in hell. I had thought every reprobate had beene destined to everlasting punishment in hell before hee was borne. For Gods destination of them is the ordination of his will; and that I had thought you had not denied to be everlasting. But you referre it to a certaine time, as in speciall to Pharaoh after the seventh plague; and in speciall to all after they have filled up a certaine measure of iniquitie; and shall not men in like sort be destined to everlasting joies in heaven after they have filled up a certaine measure of obedience? And so a little after you tell us, that men doe not become reprobates, till a certaine measure of iniquitie bee filled up; and so in proportion men are not elect till a certaine proportion of obedience bee

filled up. Yet the Apostle plainly telleth us, that the elect are elect of God before the foundation of the world, Eph. 1.4. and consequently so are reprobates reprobated before the foundation of the world: for the word election of some doth connote the reprobation of others. Yea Jacob was loved of God before he was borne, and was not Esau hated also before he was borne? Rom. 9. Did God wait till the measure of Esaus sinnes was full, and the measure of Jacobs obedience, before he did elect the one, and reprobate the other? And if destination unto the punishment of hell, and on the other side destination unto the joyes of heaven, beginne in time after the obedience of some, and disobedience of others, what is the meaning of predestination? for what is that, but the destination of some to the joyes of heaven, and others to the sorowes of hell? No doubt but if you proceed as you beginne, we shall have a world of new Divinity communicated unto us, to endoctrinate us in these latter dayes.

To what end soever God plagued Pharaoh, *for not doing that which he could not doe, all possibility of amending being taken from him*, this action was just in God, and so is the like, where-soever it be found to proceed from God. And although Pharaoh could not repent without the grace of God, yet I make no doubt but that he could have let Israel goe, notwithstanding his obduration. And it appeares he did let them goe after the ninth plague, which followed some time after the seventh plague. And so I doubt not but he could have refrained himselfe from pursuing them when hee had once dismissed them. And yet as for not letting Israel goe God brought ten plagues upon Egypt, so for pursuing after them he drowned Pharaoh and his host in the red Sea.

Now in confidence of your performances in clearing your selfe from contradictions in one point, you are as adventurous to fall upon another. The Jesuites pretend they can equivocate without lying, and you take upon you to speake contradiction without all contradiction: yet by your leave, if no body else will, I will take care it may not passe without contradiction. *There is no contradiction (you say) betweene these two propositions; God*



God from all eternity did will the death of Pharaoh; God from all eternity did not will the death, but rather the life of Pharaoh. In like sort we may say there is no contradiction between these two propositions, God from all eternity did will the salvation of Judas; God from all eternity did not will the salvation, but the condemnation of Judas: and to proceed in the straine of your subtile discourse, I goe along by you step by step. For albeit Judas continued one and the same man from his birth unto his death, yet did he not all that time continue one and the same object of Gods immutable will and eternall decree. This object did alter as Judas his dispositions or affections towards God or his neighbour altered. There is no contrariety, much lesse contradiction betweene these, God unsainely hateth sinners; God doth not hate, but love the elect, though they be sinners. For here the object of his hatred and love is not the same; he hates sinners unsainely as sinners, not having made up the full measure of faith and repentance; but having made up the full measure of faith and repentance, and good works, and having their soules betrothed unto holinesse, he loves them. His love of them as elect is no less necessary or usuall, then his hatred of them as sinners. But though he necessarily loves them being once become elect, or having made up the full measure of good works; yet was there no necessity laid upon them by his eternall decree to make up such a measure of good works. No; to this sufficed the liberty of their wils, both to performe such a measure of good works, and to carry themselves like stout champions and patrons of this power of their free wils, and to gratifie the grace of God so far as to admit her activity, both to admonish them aforehand, and upon their propension to that which is good to concur to the performing of it.

He that walkes in the Sunne must needs be coloured; and I have so long beene versed in the contemplation of your argumentative facultie, that I am growne almost as sufficient to plead for the elects electing of themselves, as you to plead for the reprobates reprobation of themselves; and which of us dischargeth his part best, I leave it to the indifferent reader to consider; and I doubt not but his sentence will bee this; *Et vitulo in dignum & hic.*

But let us run over the contexture of your discourse once more, and consider it in it selfe. I say there is more sobriety in saying, God from all eternity did not will the salvation of an elect, then that he did from all eternity not will the damnation of a reprobate. For the onely qualification of your saying is this, *He did not will the damnation of Pharaoh as a man*; but the qualification of my congruous assertion on the other side is this, *God did not will the salvation or life of an elect as a sinner*. Now I appeale to any mans judgement whether there be not greater congruitie betweene the termes in my proposition, then betweene the termes in yours. The termes in mine are these, *Not will the salvation of an elect as a sinner*; in yours they are these, *Not will the death of a reprobate as a man*. Seeing it is well knowne, and Arminius confesseth it, that God can turne the holiest creature into nothing, without any shew of repugnance unto his justice, But to will the salvation of a sinner, hath some shew of repugnancy to Gods justice.

But to deale with you closely, and upon a point. I deny that God did ever will the salvation of Pharaoh; and I prove it by two reasons; If hee did ever will it, then Gods will is now changed; for certainly now he doth not will his salvation: But Gods will cannot change, *He is without variablenesse or shadow of change*. If God would save Pharaoh, and did not, as it appeares he did not, then the reason why Pharaoh was not saved, was because God could not save him. This was Austines discourse long agoe. For a father desiring the saying of his childe, and not performing of it; who doubts but that the reason is because he cannot. It is enough for us that Pharaoh continued the same man; for like as of the same man it cannot be verified that both he shall be saved, and shall not be saved; so neither can it be verified of the same man, that both God will save him, and will not save him. Neither was Pharaoh ever in any other estate, then in the state of damnation.

In like sort the contradiction is evident enough in those propositions which you adde to illustrate the contradictory nature (as you pretend) of the former; as if you should say,

Aske

Aske my fellow whether I am a thiefe, *which is nimis familiaris probatio*. As if you should say, I unfainedly love such a man, and yet I hate him; here is no contradiction: or as if a King should say, I unfainedly love such a one, yet Ile hang him; yet this with more probability may be saved from contradiction.

It is true, wee may *parcere personis, & dicere de vitiis*, love the man, and hate his qualities, and manifest my love in seeking to redeeme him from his lewd conversations, by prayer unto God, by perswasion towards the man himselfe. But to say I unfainedly love him, and yet I hate him, and thinke to save it from contradiction, by saying I love him as a man, and hate him as a lewd person; is worse then for Adam to seeke with figge leaves to cover his nakednesse.

To say God loves men as they have not made up the full measure of their iniquity, is manifestly to imply that God loves a reprobate untill hee hath made up the full measure of his iniquity, and that this measure being full, God ceasing to love him, God is changed; for Gods love is an act in God, and is made to cease after a certaine time by your doctrine, and be turned into hatred. More probable it is to say that God hates all men, (seeing they are borne and bred in sinne) untill they are regenerate and grafted into the body of Christ. Yet this is untrue: For Gods love is an everlasting love, as without end, so without beginning.

If you had distinguished of love as Aquinas doth, *1. 2. 23. art. 4.* and said, that God may be said to love all things that he hath made, in as much as he wisheth some good unto them; but for as much as he wisheth not unto them a certaine good, to wit, eternall life, therefore he is said not to love but to hate some, your discourse had beene more specious.

Touching a necessity laid upon them by Gods decree to fill up the measure of sinne, Arminius acknowledgeth, *Deum voluisse Achabam mensuram scelerum suorum implere*, God would that Ahab should make up the full measure of his iniquity; which is as much as to say that God decreed it; and the Scripture professeth that both Herod and Pontius Pilate

with the Gentiles and people of Israell, were gathered together to doe what Gods hand and his will had determined before to be done; so then in betraying, condemning, and crucyfying of Christ, they did but that which God determined should come to passe.

And upon supposition that God will expose any man unto temptation, and leave him therein destitute of his grace, all which it is but to harden him; wee say it is necessary that men shall goe on in sinne without repentance, as your selfe acknowledge was verified of Pharaoh after the seventh plague: onely wee say this is necessity onely *secundum quid*, and not *simpliciter*, and hinders not our liberty: for it is necessary that such a thing should come to passe, but not necessarily but contingently and freely, like as upon supposition of Gods decree to make the world; it is necessary that God should make it, but how? not necessarily like a naturall agent, but freely, like a voluntary agent.

Yet once again to take a view of your uncouth tenents obscurely delivered, whe you say, Pharaoh did not continue one & the same object of Gods decree. It is a very strange speech; for was not the man Pharaoh the object of Gods decree? If he was so, & continued the same man, doth it not follow, that he continued the same object of Gods decree; notwithstanding his person altered much in the space of his life? You may as well say of one of Gods elect, as of David and Paul, that neither of them continued the same object of Gods decree, if the alteration of their natures made them become different objects of Gods decree. Nay, much more may you say so, because farre greater alterations are found in the elect of God then in the reprobate: for in the elect there is found an alteration from the state of nature, to the state of grace; no such alteration is found in the reprobate: the reprobate onely growes from bad to worse; the elect have growne so too before their calling, but by their effectuall calling they are changed, and of the children of this world, they are made the children of God. And after their calling, though after the committing of one sinne, they fall into another, as doe the reprobate

reprobate ; yet withall againe , they returne unto God by repentance ; no such alteration is found in the reprobates , but still *proficiunt in pejus* , they grow worse and worse.

Againe, if because the person of a man altereth , therefore the object of Gods decree altereth , seeing that a mans person altereth not only in the course of manners , but in the course of nature , from childehood to youth , from youth to middle age , from middle age to old age , as also from health to sicknesse , from sicknesse to health , therefore the object of Gods decree in this respect altereth also.

If you say the case is not alike ; I say you might then have prevented this objection by plaine dealing , and told us not onely in what case , but why , in the case you meane , the object of Gods decree altereth : whereas wee are now driven to fish it out as well as wee can , and bring your opinion to light , and set it forth in the proper and distinct lineaments thereof. Now the reason of the difference I conceive to be this , to wit , because God doth not will the death of a man , according to his naturalls , but according to his moralls , and considered in his moralls. As if you should say , God did not will the death of Pharaoh , but of wicked Pharaoh.

But say I , Pharaoh did alwaies continue wicked Pharaoh , from his birth to his death , never altering from wickednesse to goodnesse ; and therefore even in this respect he still continued the same object of Gods decree to damne him. Perhaps you will further say , that Pharaoh , as *wicked* , was not the object of Gods decree of condemnation , but as having filled up the measure of his iniquity.

But I say againe , from the first time that he thus became the object of Gods decree of condemnation , hee still continued the same : for your selfe confesse , after once they have filled up a certaine measure of iniquity , all possibility of repentance is taken from them. The last refuge for you , is to say , that this speech of yours in denying Pharaoh to continue the same object of Gods decree , is to be understood not in respect of one and the same decree , but in respect of different decrees , thus ; Though Pharaoh were wicked all his

life ,

life, yet he was not all along the object of Gods decree of condemnation, but untill he had filled the measure of his iniquity, he was the object of Gods decree to save him. For in the consequence you acknowledge, that God doth unfainedly love all men, untill such time as they have filled up the measure of their sinne. And accordingly in another Treatise of yours you acknowledge, that men may change from the state of the elect, to the state of reprobates. And immediately before, you professe that God from all eternity did not will the death, but rather the life of Pharaoh.

This you might have expressed in plaine termes without faulting, but you were loath, as it seemes, to alienate mens mindes with so foule a Tenent, touching the change, not of the object of Gods will and decree onely, but of Gods verie will and decree also ; which manifestly appears by this opening your Tenent, though in termes you professe Gods will is immutable, and would have your reader conceive, that all the alteration is in the object of Gods will and decree, not in the will and decree of God himselfe.

And over and above herchence it followeth, that if Pharaoh had died before the seventh wonder (for till then he had not filled up the measure of his sinnes by your opinion) Pharaoh had beene saved, though he neither had faith nor repentance. For till their soules be betroathed unto wickednesse, God doth not hate them ; this is your dialect : whence it followeth, that either all infants of Turkes and Saracens dying in their infancy are saved, or else all men as soone as they are borne are betrothed unto wickednesse, and consequently all reprobates from their birth unto their death continue the same objects of Gods decree without alteration.

And then againe, I pray consider, if God hates them not, and wils not their damnation, untill by filling up the measure of their sinne they are betroathed unto wickednesse (as you speake) then surely hee did not hate them, nor will the condemnation of them in their infancy, much lesse did hee will it before they were borne, much lesse did hee will it before the world was made ; yet you have already plainly professed, that  
 God

God willed the death of Pharaoh from all eternity; and if from all eternity, then sure he willed it before the world was made, much more before Pharaoh was borne, much more before Pharaoh had filled up the measure of his iniquity. Yet I confesse that though God from all eternity willed the death of Pharaoh, and consequently before Pharaoh was borne, and much more before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity. Yet God did not will that Pharaoh should be damned before he had filled up the measure of his iniquitie, much lesse that he should be damned in his infancie, much lesse before he was borne, much lesse before the world was. So that these two propositions may well stand together without contradiction, God from all eternity willed that Pharaoh should be damned; but God did not will that Pharaoh should be damned from all eternity, or before hee was borne, or in his infancy, or before he had filled up the measure of his sinnes. But the propositions which you take upon you to free from contradiction, are of a farre different nature, and indeed directly contradictory. God did from all eternity will the death of Pharaoh; God did not from all eternity will the death, but rather willed the life of Pharaoh. And for clearing it, you onely tell us that Pharaoh was not the same object of Gods decree, though he continued the same man. A proposition both very obscure in it selfe, and void of all efficacie to free your selfe from contradiction, neither doe you take any paines to accommodate it, but leaving that as a blanke for your propitious reader to fill up after his owne judgement or affection rather. And the issue of all is, to professe that God did indeede from all eternity will the life of Pharaoh, and so continued to will it, untill such time as hee had filled up the measure of his sinne; and that from thenceforth hee hated him, as he doth all reprobates, having once betrothed themselves unto wickednesse: which assertion manifestly betraying your opinion as touching the making of Gods will mutable, your desire to satisfie your reader with calling Gods will immutable, and saying that the object of Gods decree is not still the same: *Sed quid ego verba audiam facta cum vidiam?*



You manifestly maintaine, that Gods love and will to save, doth cease upon the filling up the measure of sinne, and betrothing a mans selfe to wickedness, and thereupon and from thenceforth hee hates them, and wills their death and damnation, whereas till that time he willed their life and salvation. These propositions (*God loves all men, God doth not love all men*) I say, are contradictory. All rules of contradiction justifie these to be contradictions.

And your selfe confesse as much in effect, when going about to cleare them from contradiction, you quite alter the forme of them, by shaping them thus in effect, *God loves all men till they have filled up the measure of their sinnes, but when once they have filled up the measure of their sinnes, he loves them not.* Now these propositions are quite different from the former, neither doe we charge these with contradiction as wee charged the former. But that wherewith wee charge these is this, they make the will of God mutable, contrary to the expresse testimonie of the holy Ghost, saying, *I the Lord am not changed*, Mal. 3. 6. And Saint Iames professeth, that with the Lord there is no variableness nor shadow of change, which you perceiving, are loath to speake your minde plainly, but to avoide so grosse an untruth, had rather cast your selfe upon a manifest contradiction, in saying, *God loves all men, and God loves not all men*; and to free your selfe from contradiction, betray your corrupt opinion another way, in making Gods love to change into hatred after a certaine time, to wit, after the measure of sinne is filled up: and the onely shift you have to charme it, is to confound the difference of time (which alone avoides the contradiction) and expressing it thus, *God loves all men as men, or as men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity; but having made up that, or having their soules betrothed to wickednesse, hee hates them.*

But this will not serve your turne: for seeing this contradiction of making up the full measure of sinne, did not belong unto man from the beginning, but onely after a certaine space of time; the difference specified must necessarily resolve

it selfe into a meere difference of time, thus God did love them till they had made up the full measure of sinne, but after that he hated them. And this is further proved: For if the difference onely consisted in respect of different considerations at the same time; then the distinction should have place as well after this full measure of sinne is made up, as before. And so Pharaoh after the filling up of the full measure of sinne, might bee said to be loved of God as a man, and hated as having filled up the measure of sinne: but no where do you make use of any such distinction. Nay, much more should it have use in this case, and indeed onely in this case: for untill a man hath filled up the measure of his sinne, this distinct consideration hath no place: for a body may bee considered as *Ens*, or *Naturale*, or as *Quantum*, because hee is both *Ens* and *Naturale*, and *Quantum*.

But a man cannot be considered at any time as having filled up the measure of his sinne, but onely after that time comes, hee may bee so considered; for to consider him to bee that which hee is not, is not to consider him what hee is, but to faine him to be what he is not. Again, when you say, *God loves all men as men*; What is the meaning of this? What do you denote by this love of God? For wee commonly say, love is not in God, *Quoad affectum*, but *Quoad effectum*; at least, *Quoad affectum*, it is nothing at all different from Gods will. Now I desire to know what that thing is which God wills to *man* as a *man*, or what is the effect of this love: and I doubt not but when you say, *God hates them as having made up the full measure of their sinne*: your meaning is, that God wills their damnation, and that for this measure of their sin. In proportion your answer should be this, That God wills the salvation of all men as they are men; yet here is very great disproportion; for when you say, *God wills the damnation of men having filled up the measure of their sin*: I finde herein a manifest difference between the reprobate & the elect as touching the cause of damnation, and that on mans part; namely, the making up the full measure of their sin, which is found onely in reprobates, not in the elect.

But when you say on the contrary side ; *God wills the salvation of all men as they are men* , I finde no difference at all betweene the reprobate and the elect as touching the cause of salvation, either on mans part, or on Gods part ; for as touching Gods will, that passeth (you say) upon the salvation of all without difference: then on mans part likewise there is no difference at all, if they are considered onely as men ; for the reprobates are men as well as the elect. To help this, you rest not in this consideration of them as men, but adde a clause unto it very inconsiderately as touching the forme, thus, *Or as having made up the full measure of their sinne*. Now the disjunctive argues that these two considerations are equivalent, which is untrue ; for the first consideration proceeds in abstraction from the second.

But I conceive the weakenesse of your cause urgeth you to take hold of all helps, and thereupon you confound things that differ ; for in some cases, the first consideration usually hath place ; as when tis said, *God hateth nothing that hee hath made* : therefore he hateth not man, true, say some, *he hateth not man as man* : and this distinction seemes plausible to some, and therefore you seemed willing to help your selfe with this by the way, for it might stirre some propitious affection in a pliable reader. But then finding this bed a great deale too short to stretch your selfe thereon, you added by way of disjunctive another consideration, which is this ; *As not having made up the full measure of sinne*. And because you rest upon it, I thinke good to consider it.

Now against this I have already excepted on the part of reprobates, and in the particular of Pharaoh ; and argued, that then Pharaoh had beene saved, had he died before the seventh wonder ? for, till then in your opinion hee had not made up the full measure of his sinne : yet we doe not finde, that Pharaoh before this time had either faith or repentance.

Now I will propose another exception on the part of Gods elect. Paul never filled up the measure of his sinne, for if he had, then had hee beene a reprobate ; but hee was an elect, therefore if hee had died immediately after the stoning of Steven

Steven, hee had beene saved, though accessary to his death; *For he kept the garments of them that slew him*, as himselfe confesseth. In a word, all the elect, though dying before ever they were called unto faith and repentance, should notwithstanding bee saved also.

My third exception is against the disproportion that nevertheless is found in these propositions; for when tis said, God wills the damnation of them that have filled up the measure of their sinne, the filling up the measure of sinne, is noted here as the cause of their damnation; but in saying God willeth the salvation of all, not having filled up the measure of their sinne, the not having filled up the measure of their sinne, cannot be noted as the cause of their salvation. And therefore to mend this foule disproportion, the Genius of your tenet, drives you in conscience to proceede, and professe plainly, that God willeth the salvation of all men that believe and repent: and accordingly God willeth the damnation of all that doe not believe and repent, and such indeed alone are they that fill up the measure of their sinne. Now herein wee agree with you, namely, in justifying the truth of both these propositions.

But like as from the latter it followeth not, that God willeth the damnation of all, but of some onely, namely of those that doe fill up the measure of their sinne, and breake not off their sins by faith and repentance: so from the former it followeth, not that God willeth the salvation of all, but onely that hee willeth the salvation of those that believe and repent. And if you please further to infer that, because perseverance in sinne of infidelitie and impenitencie, as they are the meritorious causes of damnation so they are the meritorious causes of the decree of damnation also: I thinke I may with as good reason take liberty to inferre from the former, that seeing faith and repentance, yea and good workes also are the disposing causes of salvation, therefore they are to bee accounted the disposing causes of the decree of salvation, that is of our election also: And so your opinion shall appeare at full and to life in his proper colours, not an haire breadth

different, either from the Arminian heresie of late, or from the Pelagian heresie of old.

8 The deductions you speake of in my judgement deserve to be called dictates rather then deductions. As for moderne Catechismes, you are not the first that nibble at them: it is a point of imperious learning now a daies from on high to despise such performances. But to speake as a free man, the lesse they shall consort with these your deductions as you call them, the lesse shall they differ from the truth. As for your concurrence with Bishop Hooper in his preface upon the commandements, which you glorie of now a second time: In this place it is hard, if not impossible to discern by your text what that passage is of Bishop Hoopers, which you rest upon with ostentation of your concurrence with him, as if your opinions were confirmed by his martyrdome. In the close of the second Section of this chapter, you told us, *That it was not every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God, but a full measure of it which utterly exempts man from Gods love;* and withall, that this was observed by Bishop Hooper. But in stead of alledging any passage in him to this purpose, you referred us there to the fourth paragaffe of this chapter, which is this present section.

Yet concerning that sentence, I see a good construction may bee made of it, taking love, *quoad effectum* (as usually passions are in such sense attributed unto God, and not *quoad affectum*) and the chiefeft effect of Gods love is salvation. Now it is most true, that nothing but finall perseverance in sinne doth bereave men of salvation, of glory; nothing but finall perseverance in sinne, stands in opposition to the possibility of grace succeeding in the same subject. Now albeit in that which followeth it cannot be judged by your text, what you borrow out of Bishop Hooper, and what you doe not. Yet upon consulting Bishop Hoopers Preface unto his exposition of the tenne Commandements, I finde, that both this sentence following, *Every man is called in the Scripture wicked and the enemy of God, for the privation and lacke of faith and love that he oweth to God;* and all that followeth hereupon to  
the

the end of this eighth Section of yours, is taken out of that Preface of his: and I wonder not a little what you meant, not to discover so much, neither by expresse profession, nor by changing the letter, that thereby at least it might be taken to be another mans discourse, and not your owne.

Well, I am willing to consider what you alledge out of him, and whether his writings bee so consonant as you speake to your deductions. First, you call him, *A learned Bishop, and blessed Martyr*; *Et quis Herculem vituperat?* You adde, that this exposition of the ten Commandements made by him, *Is a fit Catechisme for a Bishop to make*. I am perswaded, the whole Church of England hath a reverend opinion of his learning, of his holinesse, of his martyrdome; and that this Catechisme of his is worthy of a Bishop: but it followeth not herehence, that every Bishop in England doth: neither doe I thinke you your selfe expect they should concurre with him in every opinion of his expressed in this booke.

In his declaration of the ninth Commandement. Fol. 80. he justifieth *mandatum officiosum*, and professeth, that it is required in some cases; Doe you looke that all the Bishops of England should concurre rather with Bishop Hooper, then with Bishop Austine in this opinion.

Vpon the eighth Commandement, Fol. 74. he complains, saying, *A great pitty it is to see how farre that office of a Bishop is degenerated from the originall in the Scripture, it was not so at the beginning when Bishops were at the best, as the Epistle of Paul to Titus testifieth, that Willed him to ordain, in every City of Creet a Bishop*: and Fol. 79. [as sharply as closely censureth the Bishops of his dayes, for arrogating to themselves so much wit as to rule & serve in both states, in the Church and in the Civill policie; and to the contrary professeth, that one of them is more then any man is able to satisfie; and that it is not possible that one should doe both well, and that it is a great oversight of the Princes and higher powers of the earth, so to charge them with two burthens, when none of them, as hee saith, is able to beare the least of them both. Doe you expect that all the Bishops in England should bee of his judgement in this?

On the same commandement, Fol. 73. as touching those who have great Forrests or Parkes of Deere or Conies, which pasture and feed upon their neighbours ground, or Columbaries where-as Doves assemble and hauns, and those feede on the poores corne, hee referres it to the charitie of every man, whether the keeping of such beasts bee not against Gods lawes, and mans lawes, and whether it bee not suffered rather for a few mens pleasures, then for many mens profit: Doe you thinke that either Church or State are precisely of his opinion, as it is manifested by this:

Vpon the seventh Commandement, Fol. 69. he maintains, that vpon diuorſe in caſe of adultery, it is lawfull to marry another; and not ſo onely, but that the adulterous partie ought to be put to death: Do you wiſh that the Church and State of England would bee of the ſame minde with him in this?

Vpon the fourth Commandement he avoucheth, that although the ceremony of the Sabbath be taken away, which appertained onely to the common wealth of the Hebrews; yet one day of the weeke to preſerve and uſe the word of God and his Sacraments, is not abrogated: and that therefore in this are two things to be obſerved, the one ceremoniall during for the time, the other morall, and never to be aboliſhed as long as the Church of Chriſt ſhall continue vpon the earth. Againe, This Sunday, ſaith he, that we obſerve, is not the commandement of man, as many ſay, that would under the pretence of this one law, binde the Church of Chriſt to all other laws that men have ungodly preſcribed unto the Church: but it is by expreſſe words commanded that wee ſhould obſerve this day (the Sunday) for our Sabbath, as the words of Saint Paul declareth, commanding every man to appoint his almes for the poore in Sunday: the text ſaith, in one of the Sabbath: it is an Hebrew phraſe, and it is as much as to ſay, in the Sunday: as you may read the ſame manner of ſpeech in Luke and John, of the Women that came to the Sepulchre to annoint the dead body of Chriſt. Luke ſaith, In one of the Sabbathes early they came to the Sepulchre: and ſo ſaith Iohn by the ſame words, the which was the Sunday, as no man doubteth; for tis our ſaith, that Chriſt roſe the third day.

I preſume you will not preſcribe to all the Biſhops and Di  
vines



vines in this kingdom to bee of Bishop Hoopers opinion in this point. Now if in these particulars it bee lawfull to differ from him in opinion, without offence of Church or State; I hope wee shall have as great liberty to differ from him in other things also upon good ground.

Yet I speake not this, as if I found this godly Bishop to justifie that Tenet of yours, for confirmation whereof you make use of his authority. And that Tenet of yours is this, that there is a certaine time when the wicked have filled up the full measure of their iniquity, though they live many years after; and such you conceive was the case of Pharaoh after the seventh plague. And that from that time forwards all possibility of amendment is taken from them. And until that time God doth unfainedly love them. But having made up that measure, and so having their soules betrothed unto wickednesse, he hates them. That then they become reprobates, and not till then; and from thence to their lives end it is not Gods will and pleasure they should repent, but rather that it is Gods good will and pleasure that they should have their hearts hardned. Your words are these in the precedent Section, pag. 180. *God loves all men unfainedly as they are men, or as men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity: but having made up that, or having their soules betrothed unto wickednesse, he hates them. And againe; He necessarily hates them being once become reprobates, or having made up the full measure of iniquitie. And pag. 179. It was no branch of Gods good will and pleasure that Pharaoh should now repent, or be willing to let Israel goe. Rather it was his good will and pleasure (specially after the seventh plague) to have the heart of Pharaoh hardned. And a little after, God plagued Pharaoh for not doing that which now he could not, all possibilitie of amendment being taken from him. My opinion to the contrary is, that no man hath filled up the full measure of his iniquity till death. As touching the possibility of amendment, I acknowledge none in man, without the regenerating grace of God, whereby he gives man repentance. Neither do I know any time in the course of mans life wherein any man is excluded from possibility of repentance by the*

grace of God. We know God gave the thiefe repentance upon the crosse. Our Saviour gives us to understand, that God calleth some at the very last houre of the day. Paul admonisheth Timothy to carrie himselfe gently towards them that are without; *ἵνα πάντες*, if so be God at any time may give them repentance, that they may come to amendment, out of the snare of the devill, by whom they are led captive to doe his will. Of old it was wont to be said; *Inter pontem & fontem*; and the like is usuall amongst us:

*Betweene the stirrop and the ground,  
Mercy I aske, mercy I found.*

All this which followeth, and which you have transcribed out of Bishop Hooper, I finde nothing that contradicth any of these assertions of mine, or that justifieth any of your opposite assertions, not in this which immediately followeth thus; *Every man is in Scripture called wicked, and the enemy of God, for the privation and lacke of faith and love, that hee oweth to God. Et impij vocantur, qui non omnino sunt pii*; that is, They are called wicked, that in all things honour not God, beleeve not in God, and observe not his commandements as they should doe; which we cannot doe by reason of this naturall infirmity, or hatred of the flesh, as Paul calleth it, against God. In this sense taketh Paul the word wicked. So must we interpret S. Paul, and take his words, or else no man should be damned. In all this I finde nothing to that purpose whereto you alledge it.

Yet by the way, I am not of Master Hoopers opinion, in saying, that *They were called wicked* (meaning in holy Scripture) *that in all things honour not God, beleeve not in God, and observe not his commandements as they should, which we cannot doe by reason of this naturall infirmity, &c.* For all this is verified of the very Saints and children of God here on earth; and I doe not finde that the Saints of God in holy Scripture, by reason of their infirmities, not honouring God, not beleeving in God, not observing his commandements in such measure as they should (as God knows; and our consciences well know that

that in many things we offend all,) are therefore called wicked. Especially considering that the Greeke word which Master Hooper aimes at, and which hee renders by the word wicked in English, is *ἀμαρτωλός*, as appeares by his reference to Rom. 5. 8. *In this sense* (saith Bishop Hooper) *taketh Paul this word Wicked, when he saith that Christ died for the wicked.* Now this state noted by S. Paul in these words, is not the state of grace, but the state of sinne precedent to justification, and the state of enmity against God, as appeares by the two next verses; *Much more being justified by his blood, we shall be saved by his life.* 10. *For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Sonne, &c.* Whereby it is manifest that the state of sinne in which we were when wee were reconciled to God by Christs death, was the state of enmity against God. And indeed otherwise there were no place for reconcilment, which consists in making them friends which before were enemies. Neither doe I know any Divine of master Hoopers opinion, in construing S. Paul in this manner, as if these sinners *ἀμαρτωλοί*, (which he calls wicked) for whom Christ died, were onely such as doe not honour God, beleeve in God, and observe his commandements as they should, which wee know is incident to the very children of God, and to the most righteous Saints that are on the earth, who yet are never accounted in holy Scripture (for ought I know) the enemies of God. Yet such are they termed for whom Christ died, and who S. Paul saith *are reconciled to God by the death of his Sonne.*

I willingly grant that Christ died to procure the salvation of none but such as sooner or later should become the Saints of God, to honour him, beleeve in him, and observe his commandements, though not in such measure as they should, by reason of the flesh which they carie about them, still lusting against the spirit; and this seemes, by this place, undoubtedly to be the opinion of Bishop Hooper, though he erreth in the interpretation of S. Paul, who in this place considereth not what shall be their condition sooner or later, for whom Christ died, but only sheweth what was their condition when Christ

died for them, thereby the more to commend the love of God towards us, who sent his Sonne to die for us, when wee were sinners, and reconciled us to himselfe by the death of his Son, what time we were his enemies. And I am perswaded your selfe are of the same opinion with me in this, though I will not say that the evidence of S. Pauls text seemed so plaine unto you, this very way I have interpreted it, that therefore you concealed S. Pauls passage, mentioned by master Hooper thus, *When he saith that Christ died for the wicked*; and in the margent referres us to Rom. 5. 8. all which you have handsomly left out, to what end I know not. But hereby it comes to passe, that the reader may be to seeke of that passage of S. Paul, in case he have no other meanes to judge thereof, then your transcribing it.

As for the reason of Bishop Hooper to justify this interpretation of S. Pauls text, it is nothing consequent, as when he saith, *Sowe must interpret Saint Pauls words, or else no man should be damned*. If S. Paul had said, Christ died for all the wicked, or for all sinners, then indeed we should be driven to seeke out some such interpretation of the word *wicked*, or *sinners*, or else none should bee damned. But S. Paul doth not say, Christ died for all that are wicked, or for all sinners, but for us sinners: his words are these, *God commendeth his love to us, that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us*. Now he writes unto Christians, and for such onely hee died, though they were not Christians when Christ died for them, but rather in the state of enmity against God. And thus to appropriate Christs dying for mankind, doth manifestly appeare to bee master Hoopers meaning, as before I shewed, albeit he deviates from the right interpretation of S. Pauls Text, in the place mentioned by him.

That which followeth doth in my judgement carie a greater shew of justifying your former assertions, and yet but a shew neither; as when he saith, *Now we know that Paul himselfe, S. Iohn, and Christ damnth the contemners of God, and such as willingly continue in sinne, and will not repent. Those the Scripture excludeth from the generall promise of grace. It may seeme that*

that *The contemnners of God, and such as willingly continue in sinne and will not repent*, in master Hoopers phrale, are the same in your judgement with those, whom you account *to have filled up the measure of iniquity*. But what ground have you for that? Master Hooper saith not, that all such whom he accounts *contemnners of God, and such as willingly continue and sinne, and will not repent*, have hereupon *filled up the measure of their iniquitie*, or that hereupon *all possibility of amendment is taken from them*; these are your assertions, they are not master Hoopers. Again, *all contemnners of God, and such as willingly continue in sinne, and will not repent*, master Hooper saith, *the Scripture excludes from the generall promise of grace*, and this he utters without any distinction, as well he may, to wit for the present, and so long as they continue in this their contempt and hardnesse of hart. For as much as the promise of grace, both for the pardon of sinne, and salvation of our soules, belongs to none but such as breake off their sinfull courses by faith and repentance. But you distinguish betweene such contemnners of God, and presumptuous sinners, and tell us that some of them have arrived to the full measure of their iniquity, and that there is no possibility of their amendment, such as Pharaoh was after the seventh plague; others, though contemnners of God, &c. yet in this their course of contempt, have not filled up the measure of their iniquity, such as Pharaoh was before the seventh plague, who undoubtedly was a contemner of God before that time, and one that willingly continued in sinne, and would not repent; and of all such you professe that God doth unfainedly love them.

Now there are no tracks or footsteps of such strange assertions as either of these to be found in Bishop Hooper. Of all contemnners of God he professeth according unto Scripture, that *they are excluded from all promise of grace*, to wit, for the present; he doth not say, God unfainedly loves any of them; but as for the time to come, he doth not affirme that all possibility of amendment is taken from them. Had hee thought so, then he should acknowledge them to bee in a desperate condition.

But hee is so farre from this, that hee accounts *Desperation* to bee a principall let and impediment unto godlinesse, chap. 18. fol. 90. *The first let, saith hee, or impediment is desperation, When as men thinke they cannot be saved, but are excluded from all mercy; and a little after, Of the contrary nature (to presumption) is desperation, it taketh from God his mercy: For when they offend and continue in sinne, they thinke there is no mercy left for them; and that as in the next sentence he sheweth, specially because of custome and long continuance in sinne. Then he proceeds, saying, This discourse and progresse in that knowledge of sinne beareth him in hand that it is impossible to returne unto God: This is as much as in your phrase to affirme, that, all possibility of amendment is taken from him.*

But, doth Mr. Hooper justifie this? Nothing lesse, for this is a maine let or impediment to repentance, which he desires to remove out of the way of sinners, and to that hee proceeds in this manner, *Moses, saith he, like a good Physitian teacheth a remedie against this dangerous disease, and sheweth the way unto God, declareth that God is full of mercy, and ready to forgive; and beginneth his oration in this manner, unto such as bee afflicted and oppressed with sinne; When there commeth upon thee all those things, when God hath afflicted thee for thy sinnes, and thou returnest unto him with all thy heart, he shall deliver thee from captivity, and receive thee to his mercy againe. Of the Which text learne this doctrine, that God will alwaies forgive, how many and how horrible soever the sinnes bee, and learne to feare presumption, and to beware of desperation. So that hee acknowledgeth no just cause of desperation, no not in respect of custome and long continuance in sinne.*

The next sentence in Mr. Hooper, transcribed by you in this eighth Section of yours, conteines no more then that which wee all acknowledge. *Thou seest, saith he, by the places before rehearsed, that though wee cannot believe in God as undoubtedly as is required, by reason of this our naturall sicknesse and disease; yet for Christ, sake in the judgement of God, wee are accounted as faithfull believers, for whose sake this naturall disease*  
and

and sicknesse is pardoned, by what name soever Saint Paul calleth the naturall infirmity and originall sinne in man. This is something concerning the nature of originall sinne, in the opinion of Mr. Hooper; nothing at all touching a certaine state of sinne, wherein all possibility of amendment is taken from a man; to which purpose Mr. Hooper is alledged by you in this place.

Yet because I doe not know what reaches you have in this also; I answer, that Mr. Hooper speakes of originall sinne, as it is found in the regenerate, and as it is in them, hee calls it onely, *A naturall sicknesse and disease*. And indeed, when wee are once regenerate, wee are no longer dead in sinne, no longer estranged from the life of God.

But herence it followeth not, that Mr. Hooper was of opinion, that originall sinne was even in the unregenerate to bee accounted onely *A naturall sicknesse and disease*, and not rather a death in sinne; especially considering that the holy Apostle acknowledgeth, *A law in his members rebelling against the law of his minde, and leading him captive to the law of sinne*, and calleth it, *A body of death*, crying out against it, and saying, *Who shall deliver me from this body of death?* Rom. 7. 1. The last clause, as I take it, makes more for your present purpose, as when hee saith, *And this imperfection and naturall sicknesse taken of Adam, excludeth not the person from the promise of God in Christ, except wee transgresse the limits and bounds of originall sinne by our owne folly and malice, and either of a contempt or hate of Gods word, wee fall into sinne, and transforme our selves into the image of the devill.* Then wee exclude by this meanes ourselves from the promises and merits of Christ, who onely received our infirmities and originall disease, and not the contempt of him and his law.

This passage I confesse is somewhat strange, and of my knowledge hath troubled some, conceiving it as an assertion of yours, and not so much as dreaming that it was delivered by Mr. Hooper. I answer therefore; First of all, that this serves not your turne for the present, & that in two respects.

First,



First, you distinguish the contempt of Gods word, and of his law, according to different degrees; either such as was in Pharaoh before the seventh plague, or such as was in Pharaoh after the seventh plague. And notwithstanding the former contempt of Gods word and his law, you professe, that God unfainedly loves all such, in whom such a contempt is found, because forsooth as yet they have not filled up the full measure of their contempt: And as for such in whom is found a farther degree of contempt then this, all possibility of amendment is taken from them.

Now Mr. Hooper doth not make any such distinction, much lesse doth hee cast himselfe upon any such uncooth assertions as you deliver hereupon, as before I have shewed. Secondly, your doctrine of filling up the measure of iniquity, proceeds of men in state of nature; but Mr. Hooper delivers that before rehearsed of men in the state of grace. And in my judgement his meaning is no more then this, that imperfections of faith and holinesse, may and doe still consist with the state of grace in this life; but contempt or hate of Gods word, and transformation of our selves into the image of the Devill, cannot stand with the state of grace; not denying but that all contempt and hatred of Gods word, and the fruits of the image of the Devill in us, in case they are broken off, and an end is set unto them by repentance, are borne by Christ upon the Crosse, and satisfaction made for them by the death of Christ, as well as for originall sinne: nor affirming that any man once brought unto the state of grace, doth at any time breake forth so farre, as to contemne or hate Gods word, or to transforme himselfe into the image of the Devill.

But his meaning in my judgement is onely this, that Christ hath made satisfaction for the imperfections of our faith and holinesse, although wee continue therein untill death: but hee hath not made satisfaction for the contempt and hatred of his word, and for our transformation of our selves into the image of the Divell (as hee calleth it) in case men doe continue therein unto death.

Imperfections may and shall continue, and still bee pardoned, but contempt must not. This hath seemed to others as well as to my selfe, an harsh sentence, and I have taken some paines to cleare it: but how little it serves your turne, to that purpose whereto you alledge it, is easily discovered.

\* \* \*

---



Eccc

---

244

2392



### S E C T. III.

*That Gods Will and pleasure is never frustrated,  
albeit his unspeakable love take no effect in many to  
whom it is unfainedly tendered.*

### CHAP. XVI.

*In what sense God may be said to have done all that he  
could for his vineyard, and for such as perish.*



Have now waded thorow fifteene Chapters of these your Contemplations, and should by this in reason be pretie well acquainted with the manner of your discourse. But I finde my selfe as much pussed in searching after the coherence of the parts of the first Section here, as hitherto I have beene in any part of the Treatise. But it may be I doe but labour to gather that which you never strewed, and then no marvell if I labour in vaine.

As in other parts so in this it may be your purpose was to write *Quodlibets*: well, such as they are, I purpose to consider them as I finde them. To summe up the particulars; in the first place you discover unto us the causes of conceiving difficulties, and of ignorance in assailing them, and that is because

we extend this Maxime, (*Both parts of contradictories cannot be true,*) not so farre as we should, and the reason thereof is (you say) because we extend our power to the utmost, yea farther then justice or goodnesse can accompany it: To this you adde that our nature is humourous and inconstant, and therefore nothing can imply any constant contradiction to our nature, and that looke what is constant and still the same, that will at one time or other contradict our humour. And humours, you say, enraged with contradiction arme power against whatsoever contradicts them.

By the way you tell us, that the use of power in creatures sensitive is to satiate their appetite of sense; in man, to accomplish his will and desire of good. And that being corrupt, his power becomes an under-commander unto his unruly appetites, as in voluptuous men; and that in men esteemed good, motions of equity are so weake, that men yeeld their consents to such proposalls, as were they firme, they would offensively contradict them. And the reason why they yeeld, is left upstart appetites, which custome countenanceth, should bee enlarged by reluctance: But love, you say, is not alike set on divers objects, but divides it selfe unequally, when it comes to opposition betweene sense & reason; our selves and friends or common equity: And the inconveniences whereto the world and flesh exposeth us are reducible to two heads, the blinding of the judgement, and consequently the abusing of power and authority.

Then againe you returne to our unconstant humour, and upon the backe of that tell us, that though none doth good, yet we may doe lesse evill then others. And lastly, that they who love equity, are hardly drawn to dispense with injustice; and at last having sate long, you hatch an excellent Maxime, that *where judgement is infallible, and love to justice invincible, there tis not possible to transgresse in judgement.* All which when I compare together, and with your theame proposed, *How God may be said to have done all that he could for his vineyard,* it calls to my remembrance a certaine mad fellows discourse, when I was a Scholler at Winchester, that would talke of  
 master

master Killigree, and Abbey lands, fat venison, and such like uncoherences a long time together.

But let us examine them apart: *Both parts of contradiction cannot be true*; and it is as true that both parts of contradiction cannot be false. But whereto this tends, and how pertinent to your purpose in this place, I cannot devise; Onely you tell us that the not extending of this Maxime so farre as we should, is the cause why wee conceive difficulties in your wilde discourse premised, as also of our ignorance in assoiling them. A strange conceit, and whereof I see no colour of reason, neither do you take any paines to explicate it, by accommodation or instance, but let flie at randome, as if you would employ your readers in seeking after sense and reason where there is none to be found. And if this were true, your selfe should have assoiled the difficulties conceived in the points proposed, by extending this Maxime to the utmost, to serve your turne; and shewed, how by not extending it so farre as is meet, difficulties are conceived, and no meanes found to assoile them: but your selfe have taken no such course: And who was ever knowne, not to extend this Maxime to the uttermost? where can you finde any limitation or confining of it? what doe you meane to abuse your readers patience with such incredible fictions?

Againe, herehence it followeth, that whosoever doe extend this maxime so farre as naturally it would reach, they shall not be apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, nor be touched with ignorance in assoiling them. For the truth whereof I appeale to every mans conscience that reades your writings: of whom I am perswaded not one of a thousand, if Schollers, doth deny but that this Maxime holds universally; yet you take upon you to give a reason why we extend it not so farre as naturally it would reach, and that you say is our proneness to extend our owne power to the utmost, even farther then true goodnesse can accompany it. So then the honestest men are, the more apt they are to extend this Maxime to the utmost, and consequently lesse apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, and lesse ignorant to assoile

them: and the reason why men doe conceive difficulties in your writings, or are not able to assoile them, is for want of honestie. And you in the meane time would not be supposed to shew any want either of wit or honestie in your discourses. Well, this article of your naturall Creed is observable, *They that doe things unjustifiable, they doe not extend this Maxime* (Both parts of contradiction cannot be true) *so farre as naturally it would reach*, which is a mysterie unto me, and whereof I can devise no reason, neither doe you give any. For although our natures are humorous, unconstant, and wee finde contradiction, and are enraged with contradiction, and arme power against that which doth contradict us, yet herehence it followeth not that we limit or restraine the rules of contradiction; unlesse out of some such curious sophistrie and subtiltie as this, you dispute in this manner; We oppose them that contradict us, therefore we doe restraine the rules of contradiction: I doubt my reader would scarce thinke me sober, if I should goe about to dissolve this sophistry; yet the face of your discourse lookes no other way then this. And I confesse the law of God, and rules of good manners shall never faile to contradict him that is of a dishonest disposition. And though passions turne commonly into their contraries, yet notwithstanding all such inconstancy, true morality will alwaies be an opposite to him that is dishonest. But yet I finde no propension herehence to maintain, that both parts of contradiction are true, or both false.

Power, you say, is for the execution of will, and so is wit too, and no marvell if sometimes both of them are in knaves keeping. This is stuffe serving to fill paper. And if S. Paul complained of a law in his members rebelling against the law of his minde, and leading him captiue to the law of sinne, no marvell if naturall men, esteemed good and sober, doe sometimes yeeld to things unfit: but that it is out of such mature deliberation as you speake, to prevent forsooth the enraging of carnall appetites, (which why you should call upstarts, I know not, unlesse you deny them to bee as old as the fall of Adam) I see no reason. I give a theefe my purse, lest I should  
lose



lose my purse, and somewhat else also. But if I give over unto my passions my honesty, to be defiled by them, alas what have we more or greater to lose? And let them rage while they will, wee can but lose our honesty, therefore in reason we will not stop passions mouth at the first with our honesty, we will rather tugge and pull for it, and keepe more adoe then Michah for his gods; *Tee have taken away my gods, Iud. 18. 24* and the Priest, and goe your waies, and what have I more? The motions of the flesh must needs offend the spirit, for they are *lustings against the spirit*. But there is no proportion between this contradiction, and that which is betweene paine and pleasure. For paine and pleasure are not felt at once, as this contradiction is. *Gal. 5. 17.*

Love, as not alike set on divers objects, is brought in by way of adverbative, whereas the sentence is no other then that which went before, touching the contradiction between carnall desires, and vertuous motions. Yet to betray some quaine straine of learning, by way of parenthesis, you make question whether *Love be one simple and indivisible quality, or an aggregation or cluster of divers inclinations rooted in one center*: neither doe you determine it, but leave your reader to gaze upon it, as a childe doth upon a cluster of grapes first ripe, and the more like to be first rotten: you might make the same question of hatred also. For *Quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum, tot modis dicetur & alterum*. It was wont to be said of love, that it was as the weight of the soule. *Anima amore quasi pondere fertur quocunque fertur*. But it hath different acceptions. For there is *amor amicitiae*, and there is *amor concupiscentiae*. And this *amor concupiscentiae* is either ordinate or inordinate: ordinate love becomes morall vertue, and inordinate, morall vice. And S. Iohn divides this inordinate concupiscence into three kindes; concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eie, *1 Ioh. 2. 16* and pride of life. And will you put all these into one cluster, or posse rather, consisting partly of garden flowers, partly of stinking flowers of the field? The two originals you speak of, if subordinate, they are not two originals, there is but one; and the love of the world and the flesh carie men on, even in despite

despite of judgement and conscience to the contrary, into manifest impieties, iniquities, impurities.

I doe not finde it strange that things seeme not impossible to us, if they are within our power, yet though they be within our power one way, I see no cause but they may seeme impossible, and be impossible another way. And bee our variety never so great, yet I see no reason to justify you in saying, that what cannot be admitted to day, will be allowed of to morrow. For the vicious person,

*Qui non est hodie cras minus aptus erit,*

2 Sam. 13.  
22, 23.

to that which is good. And Absolom two yeares together watched opportunity to revenge himselfe on his brother Amnon, and afterwards continued as settled in his course of aspiring to the kingdome: And therefore herein certainly you reckon without your hoast. Yet it is most true, that the better men are, the more hardly are they drawne to unjust courses: this I say is as true, as that all this is nothing to the purpose: yet hereupon you commend unto us by way of consequence, a truth in great state, and scored in the margent as verie remarkable, and yet you call it an experienced truth, *That if any mans judgement in matters of equitie and justice were infallible, and his love to justice constant and invincible, it would be impossible for him to transgresse in judgement*; and indeed if this were not true, both parts of contradiction manifestly should prove true. For tis impossible to transgresse but either by error in judgement, or corruption in will: And therefore where judgement is infallible, and will incorruptible, tis not possible for such a one to transgresse. This is as true as one of Euclides elements. But it depends upon such *ifs* and *Ands*, that the world is nothing like to profit either in wit or honesty by this information. Onely in this clause alone I finde some coherence with the former, to wit, with the first sentence of this Section: for that laid downe the *thesis*, this delivers the selfe same in *hypothesis*.

The conclusion is, that *Gods ideall perfection in integrity and constancy*

*constancie hath no mixture of vice or humerous impotency.* And our conceit of this perfection in God, you say, is rectified thus, to wit, by experience of the strength of unconstant humerous desires, & of the faintnesse of our love and equity, as well as by the contrary vertues. Your wit hath plaid his part here, when you strained to derive the rectification of our conceits, touching Gods integrity and constancie, from the contrary disposition in man.

Belike, if Adam had never fallen, our conceits could not have beene so rectified touching Gods integrity and perfection as now they are, neither shall they bee so well rectified in the kingdome of heaven, because there we shall be acquainted with no such humourous inconsistency, or faintnesse of equity in man.

2 In the former Section you complained of not extending the maxime mentioned, so far as naturally it would reach, and you discoursed unto us the dangerous consequence of such an humour, and the cause of it. The consequence was partly aptnesse to conceive difficulties in the points proposed by you, and ignorance to assoile them. The cause was the extending of our owne power too farre. And in this Section you endeavour to rectifie our conceits hereabouts; now whereas I was intent (as it is fit every Reader should bee) to observe what was your drift and scope in all this, in the end of the former Section, you fell upon the rectifying of our conceits touching Gods ideall perfection, in the way of integrity and constancy, as if that were the scope you aimed at: but neither did your discourse in any handsome manner tend thereunto, though finally it lighted thereupon, neither doe I yet perceive whereunto this ideall perfection of God, you speake of, is directed, as being nothing congruous, for ought I discern, to the point in hand. I rather thinke, that was delivered (as many other things in that Section) on the by, and that the immediate end you aime at, is this here mentioned in the beginning of this Section, namely, the rectifying of our conceits, touching the right extending of the aforesaid maxime, which is the principall negative touching contradi-

Stories. Both parts of contradiction cannot bee true, (no, nor false neither) you had rather expresse it thus, *To make both parts of contradiction true (or false) is no object of power omnipotent*: Now wee seeme to have found the hare againe, at least the tract and sent of the hare, and desire to pursue, without making any fault, as neare as wee can. Now the rule you give us for the right extending of the maxime mentioned, is this, *Many effects are very possible to power alone considered, which imply contradiction to some other divine attributes*. This passage hath seemed wondrous harsh unto me, and as it were, *interpretationem commodam indignata*, such as could not admit a commodious interpretation: and the issue of searching into the meaning thereof, is not to justifie it, but rather to discover sundry incongruities involved herein.

In the former Section you complained of men, as extending their owne power too farre, which you conceived to bee the reason why they did not extend the maxime there proposed so farre as naturally it would reach.

But here you admonish us of extending the power of God aright, not considering it at large, but rather as joyned with other attributes of God.

Secondly, you complained, that men did not extend the maxime you speake of so farre as naturally it would reach, and therfore when here you come to give rules for the extending of it aright, every man would imagine that you take a course to enlarge it at full, whereas indeede you take a course to re-straine it, for you tell us here, that a thing is not to be accounted possible in reference unto power, but in reference unto other attributes of God also, as love, truth, goodnesse, and justice, which manifestly doth restraine the possibility of any thing, rather then enlarge it.

Thirdly, whereas the effect of power which you treat of in this place, is onely this, *To make both parts of contradiction true*, when you tell us, that, *Many effects which are very possible to power alone considered, do necessarily imply contradiction unto some divine attributes*. What doe you but hereby give us to understand, that this effect, to wit, of making both parts

parts of contradiction true, though it bee possible to power alone considered, yet it is not possible in respect of some other attributes divine.

Now I demand in the name of common sense and sobriety, whether this be a decent thing to say, that to make both parts of contradiction true is possible to power alone considered, whereas indeed it is no more possible, in reference to any power to make both parts of contradiction true, then to make both parts of contradiction false. Neither indeed is it in the power of God, as touching any one part of contradiction, if it be not true, to make it true, or if it be true to make it false. As for example, *I am alive*; it is not in the power of God to make it false. Hee may take my life from me, but that is not a course to make that proposition false. For it was true onely for that time when it was pronounced, not for the time to come when my life is taken from mee. So when Socrates is dead this proposition is false, *Socrates is alive*, neither is it in the power of God to make it true: for though hee can restore life to Socrates, yet thereby he shall not make that proposition true. For that proposition was true for that time onely, when it was pronounced, not for the time to come, least of all for that time when God had restored life to Socrates. But you will say, the being of a thing is the cause why a proposition concerning the being of that thing is said to be true, not on the contrary. And God is the cause of the being of things.

This I confesse is a truth in part. God is the cause of the being of things, yet not of all things, but onely of things contingent. God is not the cause of that which hath necessary being, such as he is himselfe. So that these like propositions, *God is eternall, omnipotent, omniscient, most simple, &c.* no way depend on the execution of God his power, which proceeds alwayes according to the counsell of his owne will. But hereupon depends not the nature of God, nor many other principles containing necessary truth: I grant many things are denominated possible to the humane nature, which are not so in reference to the divine. For the humane nature hath power

to transgresse, the divine nature hath not. Yet if you marke it well, this which in this case is called power, will finally be resolved not so much into power, as into impotency: For it is not to be presumed that our Saviour had lesse power then another man, because he could not sinne; or the Angels since their confirmation, then they had before, or that men in their glorified condition shall be more impotent then before. And indeed confirmation of integrity and innocency, doth not abolish power, but onely rectifie the use of it, and establish that rectitude in the use of power. Yet there is a denomination of power attributed to man, and denied unto God, as when we say man can transgresse, God cannot: But the ground of this is not the want of power in God, and a surplussage of power in man; but onely this, that a man is capable of restraint from a superiour power, God is not. For to say, that man can transgresse, is as much as to say, that man can doe that which he is forbidden to doe, or from the doing whereof he is restrained. But this cannot be affirmed of God, as who hath no superior power to restraine him.

Your next sentence is full of non-sense, as when you say, *It is more shamefull then impossible for rich men to lye or coozen, or for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong their inferiours; albeit the ones riches or others power were infinitely encreased, without internall encrease of their fidelity.* For the better opening whereof I will resolve it into its parts. And they are two, considered apart without comparison.

The first is this, *It is shamefull for rich men to lye and coozen, for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong, albeit the ones riches and the others power were infinitely encreased, without internall encrease of their fidelity.* Now I say there is plaine non-sense in this, and that in divers respects.

First in saying it is shamefull for rich men to lye and coozen, albeit their riches be never so much encreased: for the coherence by vertue of the particle *albeit*, doth imply, that it is a shamefull course for them to lye, though never so much provoked thereunto. This I say should be the sense. But your sentence hath a quite contrary sense. For whereas according

to the most convenient sense it should run thus ; *It is a shamefull comse for a man to lye and coozen, though he be never so poore,* poverty indeed being usually a provocation unto lying and coozening, as wee reade Prov. 30. 9. you pronounce it in a quite contrary sense thus : *It is a shamefull thing for a rich man to lye and coozen, though he be never so rich.*

Secondly, your adversative is as unreasonable in respect of the latter part of it, which is this, *Albeit he be without encrease of internall fidelity :* As much as to say, it is a shamefull thing for a rich man to lye and coozen, though hee be never a whit the more honest for his riches : and tis like unto his speech that said of a swine, *It was a creature which though it was polluted yet it was not cleane,* as if there were an opposition between being polluted, and being not cleane : so you imply an opposition betwene *being never the more honest,* and *doing that which was shamefull.* Whereas indeed he that doth shamefull things, is *hoc ipso* never a whit the more honest.

The solecisme is the same applyed to the Magistrate , as touching the latter part, not as touching the former ; because their power and authority may seeme to countenance them in dealing more hardly with inferiours, then if they were not in magistracy would seeme fit.

The second part is this ; *It is possible for rich men to lye and coozen, though they were rich, and never a whit the more honest. --- It is possible for the Magistrate to oppresse and wrong, though they were never so powerfull, and never a whit the more honest.* Here the solecisme is alike in both, as touching the latter part. For you imply by the forme of the sentence, that want of honesty were some hindrance to lying and coozening, some hindrance to oppressing and wronging.

But as touching the former part, the solecisme is most foule in the speech concerning the Magistrate, as when you imply, that the great power the Magistrate hath, is an hindrance to his possibility of oppressing and wronging his inferiours, whereas it appeares manifestly, that rather it is a furtherance thereunto.

But it is impossible for God to speake an untruth, or to do wrong.



Before, I have shewed, that to have a power to transgresse, is to imply a being in subjection to a superiour power that restraineth him, and consequently such a power is resolved into weaknesse and impotency. In speciall to speake untruth implyeth lesse power then to speake truth; for to speake truth implyeth knowledge of truth: And to know truth is a thing of more power, then to beignorant of truth.

But it may be you propose this of lying, which is to speak contrary to a mans knowledge: but this is not power to doe ought: For the speaking of this or that is not the lying: but lying is a denomination of the act of speaking, arising from the contrariety of the speech, to the knowledge or intentions of the mind. So that if he speake the same thing in his dream, or if another delivereth the same words, yet is it no lying: In a word, power to doe ill, or *peccabilitas*, which is *per naturam*, doth no more relish of true power, then *impeccabilitas per gratiam* doth favour of impotency and weaknesse. But God you say cannot speake untruth. The truth is, God cannot speake at all in proper speech; for God hath no tongue to be the interpreter of his heart. But God doth inspire his servants with truth, and move them to speake it, or to write it: And it is impossible hee should inspire with falshood; man himselfe would never speake falshood, but alwayes truth, if hee might advantage himselfe as much with telling truth, as telling untruth. Now though a man sometimes promotes his ends by false courses, yet it is absurd to thinke that God needs false courses to promote his ends, seeing he is almighty.

As for the doing of wrong, it is well knowne, that if hee should command Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, and see him execute it; or command Sampson to sacrifice himselfe by dying with the Philistins, he shall doe no wrong either to the one or to the other; or by making Prince Iob as poore as poore Iob, in destroying his substance, his children, and last of all striking his body with a sore boile, yet shall hee not doe any wrong to Iob. Nay were Iob as innocent as Adam was in his creation, or as the elect Angels are now in their confirmation, and should deale so with them as he did with Iob, yet should they

Aug. Ep.  
174. Ille in  
servis sui  
loquitur.

they have just cause to say as Eli did, *He is the Lord, let him doe what seemeth good in his sight.* 1 Sam. 3. 18

Arminius confesseth, that the most innocent creature God can annihilate without prejudice to his justice, yea to inflict the torments of hell upon such a creature. Medina maintaines, that God as Creator hath such power over his creature, *Ex consensu omnium Theologorum sententia*: yet doe wee distinguish betweene *potentia absoluta*, and *potentia ordinata*; God can doe that by power absolute, which he cannot doe on supposition that he will not doe it: for that were to change, and that were impotency, rather then power. And to speake in proper termes; It is not fit to say that God cannot doe this because he will not; for there is no consequence in this, either in respect of God or man: Such a one will not doe this or that; therefore he cannot doe it.

Exam. prædest. Perk. p. 107.  
In 12. q. 87. art. 8.

But supposing Gods will to doe this or that, tis more proper to say, that upon this supposition, it is impossible God should do otherwise, because it is impossible he should change his will. For there are but two causes of the change of the creatures will and resolution, the one sicklenesse of the will, the other improvidence of the understanding, in not foreseeing all that might come to passe. But neither of these is possibly incident unto God. So then if God hath promised ought, tis impossible that it should not bee performed, or that God should prove untrue. If God loves a man, tis as much as to say, he is determined to doe him good, and tis impossible it should be otherwise then he hath determined. But to say that God in point of justice cannot performe that, without performing whereof he shall be untrue, is a paradox of paradoxes. For if in performing it he shall be true, then in not performing of it he shall be untrue. And doth Gods justice binde him to be untrue? you might as well say, it binde him to bee unjust.

Againe, if God out of his love hath resolved to doe this or that good unto man; shall his justice hinder the fulfilling of the counsailes and determinations of his owne will? This is strange Divinity; yet you deliver these uncouth assertions like a positive

a positive Theologue, without all prooffe, as if they caried their evidence in their foreheads. Men are bound by rules of a superiour power to worke after this or that manner; and therefore it is not lawfull for them to doe many things, from the doing whereof they are restrained by lawfull authority, which commands them. It is not so with God, who doeth what hee will in heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and no man can say unto him, *What dost thou?* In this sense you thinke you may say *that all before Christ were theeves and robbers.* And though I thinke this interpretation is very

*Ioh. 10. 8.* aliene from the true meaning of the Text you point at, yet I doubt not but that every one, Christ excepted, hath beene found in sinne, and thereby more or lesse found to play the theefe, and rob God of that glory of obedience which is due unto him.

I doubt not but the Angell of the Lord that discomfited the army of Senacherib, might in like manner have smoakt away the army of the Romanes, yea and God might have done so to, even the one as well as the other, had it pleased him, without any prejudice to his justice. For if it be justly possible to him to pardon our sinnes, tis as justly possible to him to remove his judgements. And both Suarez and Vasquez, though opposite in some specialities about the justice of God, yet concurres in acknowledging that there is no justice in God in reference to his creature, but upon presupposition of his will. Tis just with God to approve a merciless warre. And tis as just with God to approve a mercifull peace: neither is it disgracefull to God though by his long suffering and patience he gives space for repentance, although his goodnesse were despised unto the end.

As many live prosperously in sinfull courses unto the death and then obtaine *ἐὐθανάσιαν*, an easie departure at last, as Guicciardine observes in the particular of Pope Alexander the sixt; and no marvell: for what is wanting in the condigne vengeance in this life, God can and will supply to the full at the day of judgement. And the reason why God leaves some mens sinnes unrequited in this world, is out of a speciall providence

Disput. de  
just. Dei.  
In 7. disp.  
86.

vidence, as Chrysostome hath observed of old, namely to this end, that wee may entertaine some conceite of a resurrection, *Ἰνα περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως φιλοσοφῶμεν*. And though God doth not afflict them with outward terrours, yet he hath inward terrours enough to exercise the wicked, and to keepe peace as farre from them, as a guilty and tormenting conscience is neare unto them, according to that of Salomon, *The wicked flieth when no man pursueth him*. The Deere when hee is stricken, albeit *Sylvas saltusque peragrat Dictæos*, yet, *he- ret lateri letalis arundo*. O what an uncomfortable sentence do you edge this Section wirhall; as if Gods infinite power could not save them *that stubbornly abandon the waies of peace, and wilfully neglect saving health, so often and lovingly tendred unto them?* For consider, did you never abandon the waies of peace, or wilfully neglect saving health, lovingly tendred unto you? Were you never out of the state of grace? For Augustine hath taught me, that *Libertas sine gratia, non est libertas sed contumacia*. Or were you converted at the first, or second, or at the third sermon that you heard? Nay, when Gods children are converted, doe they not too often abandon the waies of peace, and wilfully neglect saving health? Did not David in the matter of Vriah and Bathsheba? Did not Salomon in his idolatry? Did not Manasses in his idolatrous fury, sealing it with blond? Saint Paul exhorts Timothy, to carry himselfe gently towards them without, *ἡς ἔργα*, if at any time God give them repentance, implying manifestly, that God can at any time give repentance to any man if hee will. Neither are wee taught, that God hath denied possibility of renovation by repentance unto any, but such as sinne the sinne against the Holy Ghost. Aug. ep. 89

3. You say, it had beene unjust with God to strike the men of Sodome with blindenesse, before lust had entred their eies. A manifest untruth which yet you deliver, *fatis magistraliter*, as a dictate without any reason to enforce it. In the ninth of Iohn wee read of one that was borne blinde, is it not just with God to deale with any one so as hee dealt with him? You will not deny I hope this worke to have been the

Ioh. 9. 3. worke of God; if you should, our Saviour would convict you of errour, when hee saith, that *hee was borne blinde, to the end the mighty worke of God might bee manifest in the curing of him.* And this work to this end could be no others but Gods worke.

I had thought, to have beene borne blinde had beene a judgement, yet you make it to bee a blessing, as whereby the Sodomites had beene guarded from temptations. And indeede, lust usually enters into the heart by the windows of the eyes. Yet the Poet tells us also of one,

*Qui nunquam visa flagrabat amore puella.*

Mal. 2. 2. So then it had beene a mercy of God that their eyes had beene pulled out of their heads in your divinity. I doe not deny, but the greatest temporall blessings may bee cursed unto a man by the power of God, and the greatest temporall curses, blessed unto him. But I never heard or read before, that blindenesse should bee considered onely as a mercy, and such a mercy as whereby wee are guarded from temptation. But were a man never so lustfull, yet I thinke in just reason he should rather desire to enjoy his eyes then to lose them, that so hee might be partaker of Gods word by private reading, which hath more power to his salvation, then the sight of any Cocatrices to his destruction.

And if Democritus had beene acquainted with this word of God, I doe not believe hee would have pulled out his eyes, in pretence as if they hindred his meditations. Alas, what had the Sodomites beene the better for the blindenesse of their eyes, if God had not corrected the lusts of their hearts? Especially considering that fancy can supply the want of sight, for the provocation of lust in any degree upon any unknowne object. For a man can fancie him as hee lusteth. Say rather, God could not in justice change their hearts, seeing they had wilfully contemned his goodnesse, and abused his long suffering and loving kindenesse.

Yet this saying of yours should bee farre enough off from  
truth

truth and sobriety? Who hath not wilfully contemned his goodnesse, and abused his long suffering? All out of the state of grace doe so; for, *Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia*. Yea and too often wee doe so in the state of grace also. Then againe, a yeare before, this sinne of the Sodomites was not so obstinate, lesse a yeare before that, and so the farther we descend to times passed, they were lesse and lesse obstinate. Why did not God then change their hearts; or if you wil have this to be a fruit of mercy, why did he not blind their eyes in mercy to keepe them from these temptations? But you put it out of question, that to have prevented the Sodomites former contempt and abuse of his long suffering and loving kindnesse, did imply contradiction to his goodnesse, and eternall equity. A most unreasonable assertion. For I demand, Hath God prevented your wilfull contempt of his goodnesse, yea or not? your abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse, yea or not? If he hath not prevented it, then either your selfe have prevented it without his grace, or you are guilty or have beene guilty of wilfull contempt of his goodnesse, and abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse: which if it be so, what would become of you, if God should deale with you according to these immutable and eternall rules, according whereto you professe he deales with all? I perswade my selfe you have a good opinion of your owne sufficiency to prevent these foule symptomes of humane corruption, otherwise you should make but a bad reckoning.

The reason you give to enforce this assertion, is in part nothing for you, in part against you. For though all his wayes are truth, yet this is nothing for you, unlesse you can prove that in such a state of sinne as the Sodomites, God hath determined to use no effectuall meanes to the curing of them. But how will you prove this? for hitherto you have not. You might as well say, God could not cure the sin of those Iewes, to whom our Saviour said, *It shall be easier for Sodome and Gomorrah in the day of judgement, then for you*: If this were granted you, yet herehence it followes onely, that God cannot cure them, because he will not, for hee hath determined the

Aug. xp.  
89.

Mat. 10. 15

contrary. But you undertake to prove, that God cannot doe it in point of justice, although hee would doe it out of his love to mankind.

But when you say that all Gods waies are mercie, that is directly rather against you then for you. For mercy doth rather incline to pardon sinne, then not to pardon it: and withall we are given to understand, that as touching the execution hereof, God will have mercy on whom hee will; and therefore surely he can have mercy on whom he will.

You take after your fashion of an eternall rule of goodnesse appointing his justice to debarre the fruits of his mercy. But you are a meere talker, and prove nothing. Who is not wilfull in the state of nature in concerning Gods goodnesse? Yet doth not he by his grace and holy Spirit *ex volentibus volentes facere*? Doth not Austin professe that God hath converted not onely *aversos à vera fide*, but *adversus vera fidei voluntates* also, and bindes it with a *Novimus*, we know it to have beene so. Was it not so in Saul? Doth not God professe of his wilfull and stubborne people, that he will rule them with a mightie hand, and make them *passé under the rod, and bring them under the bond of his covenant*, Ezech. 20. 37. Doth he not call some at the first, some not till the last houre of the day?

Ep. 107. ad  
Vital.

Neither can it be made good by any tolerable colour of reason, that because a creature cannot be *impeccabilis from his creation*, therefore God cannot cure mens wilfulnesse in the way of his mercy towards them, as you most incoherently discourse, as if you were in potting verses, rather then upon meditating a coherent and methodicall course of argumentation: yet the maxime here mentioned, though brought in with some state of selfe conceit, is very preposterously contrived by you. We commonly say, a reasonable creature cannot be *impeccabilis per naturam*, incapable of sinne by nature; he may be *impeccabilis per gratiam*, incapable of sinne by grace, as the elect Angels are, elect men shall be in the state of glory: but of being so some while after the creation, and not immediately from the creation; of being so absolutely, and of being so not absolutely, I know no sobriety in these conceits, neither doe

I thinke



I thinke you have any authority to countenance them. The Sonne of God I doubt not but you will confesse that hee was *impeccabilis* from the first: So might Angels have beene, so might men have beene by grace, had it so pleased God to make them; I see no reason to the contrary; yet had not this beene absolutely impeccable, but meerly upon the supposition of the will of God. Such is the impeccability of the elect Angels at this present, such shall bee ours in the world to come. God indeed without supposition, & out of his own absoluteness is no way obnoxious unto sinne: If Angels are, or we at any time shall be free from this obnoxious condition, it is and shall be by the meere will and good pleasure of God; whereby yet I meane not to exclude all second causes in the way of Gods glorious qualification of our natures: And therefore it is an idle discourse to say that God intended to make us happy after a certaine manner, to wit, by way of reward of our obedience; therefore he could not make us immutable at first. For thus to discourse, is to professe that God could make them so upon supposition, to wit, upon supposition of such an end as was incompatible with their impeccability. And this is not to prove that God could not make them absolutely impeccable, but to prove that God could not make them impeccable onely upon a certaine supposition. Such is the miserable incongruity of your miscellaneous discourse. If to decline to evill, implyes no contradiction but only to omnipotent being, then seeing neither the elect Angels for the present have, nor the Saints of God for the time to come, shal have any omnipotent being, it followes that to decline from evil is neither contradictorie to the present state of the elect Angels, nor to the future glorified condition of the Saints of God: God is *impeccabiles per naturam*, the creatures some are & others shal be *impeccabilis per gratiam*, & to decline to evill impliyeth contradiction to them both. To say that to decline to evill is possible to all creatures, is true onely in men, in the confirmed Angels tis not true. It was once of them also I confesse, but now it is not: It is false for the present of the Saints of God in heaven; it ever was false of the

manhood of Christ, which yet was and is a creature, yet is Christ as man more like to his Creator, then either Angell or any other Saint of God. *If restraint of possibility in man to decline from good to evill*, doth cause him not to be truly and inherently good, then either Christ as touching his manhood could have sinned, or else he was never truly and inherently good. Further, if the elect Angels from within few dayes after their creation have continued truly and inherently good, notwithstanding their impeccability, from that time forward, why they should not have beene altogether as truly and inherently good, if their impeccability had begunne a few daies sooner, even with their creation, I see no reason. For did not God make them good, yea truly and inherently good? Surely he did; therefore if immediately they had beene impeccable by grace, they had notwithstanding their impeccabilitie continued unto this day truly and inherently good: Gods goodnesse is his happinesse, this happinesse of his being increate, cannot be communicated unto us subjectively, but objectively onely.

Yet there is a goodnesse created, called Gods goodnesse, because it proceeds from God, which is our happinesse of grace, shall be our happinesse of glory, not the foundation of it, but it; save that the happinesse of grace is the foundation of our happinesse of glory, but to this manner of foundation you seeme to have no reference.

Neither is there any colour of reason to inferre as you do, that therefore Gods justice and loving kindnesse did remove all necessity from mans will, because that had utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein onely it was possible for the creature to expresse the Creators goodnesse manifested in creation. And you may as well say, that Christ also might have sinned; for necessity to keepe him from sinne would have utterly extinguished that goodnesse, wherein onely it was possible for his manhood (being a creature) to expresse his Creators goodnesse manifested in his creation and assumption into one person with the Sonne of God. Nay the truth is, if from the beginning wee had beene necessarily enclined unto good, wee had more lively expressed Gods  
good-

goodnesse, then now wee doe being freely good. For God himselfe is good necessarily, not freely.

It is a senselesse speech to say that mans goodnesse expresseth Gods goodnesse communicative: for mans goodnesse is the very goodnesse communicative of God. For Gods goodnesse communicative is no goodnesse formally in God; but Gods formall goodnesse is uncreate, and therefore incommunicable unto creatures. Therefore it must be goodnesse create which is Gods goodnesse communicative; and that is the verie goodnesse of man it selfe. For God is the author of it, *in genere causa efficientis*. Create in mee a new heart, and renew a right spirit within me. And therefore the distinction of the goodnesse of God communicative, and communicated is very absurd: like as your similitude resembling it to a scale, and the stampe thereof: Onely the Sonne is the image and character of his Father, we are made after the image of God. His goodnesse increate is that which doth communicate goodnesse unto us *in genere causa efficientis*. And our goodnesse, is the worke of Gods goodnesse. But no more proportion betweene them, then is betweene nature increate, and nature create. But it is your usuall course to affect similitudes contrary to all sobriety.

Observe, communicative goodnesse is here taken for the goodnesse of God which is communicable, and opposed to Gods goodnesse incommunicable. Psal. 51.

Yet you have found out a proportion betweene Gods goodnesse and ours: but in as disproportionable a manner as could be invented. For you compare Gods working freely with mans being freely, most incongruously. God communicates his goodnesse freely, that which duly answereth unto this, is mans communicating his goodnesse freely. But seeing Gods being good, is as a being necessarily, if God had made us to bee good necessarily, that is impeccable by his grace, herein had wee better exprest the manner of his goodnesse. And if otherwise we could not be like unto God, it followes that the Angels now for many thousand yeares have not been good like God, because they have beene good by necessity, and not freely. So neither Gods Saints in heaven are good like God, because they are good by necessity, and not freely. Tis untrue which you adde, that man could not be confirmed

in.

in such goodnesse as hee had, or translated unto everlasting happinesse, but by continuing freely good for some space. For Christ was impeccable from the first moment of his conception, yet this never hindred his confirmation in his goodnesse, or translation to everlasting happinesse. And it is a most absurd conceit to say that impeccability should hinder confirmation in that goodnesse which man had from the beginning, even from the creation. For if God made him good and withall impeccable, how was it possible he should not be confirmed in that good wherein hee was created? And yet here you decline to the corrupting of the question, as when you oppose impeccability to the doing of good freely. For I hope your selfe will not deny, but that Christ was impeccable, and that what good soever he did, he did it freely: For like as the wicked, in state of nature, cannot but sinne in generall, that is one way or other; yet because they are not necessitated to any particular sinne, therefore there is no particular evill that they doe, but they doe it freely: In like sort though Christ could not but doe good in generall, so that whatsoever he did should be good; yet seeing he was not necessitated to any particular good, therefore what good in particular soever he did, did it freely. So doe the Angels, so shall we in the kingdome of heaven.

Hitherto under colour of consequence, which yet indeed was no tolerable consequence, you did stride very wide from the matter you had in hand, (to wit, of Gods obligation in justice to make men take of the fruits of his mercy, after their wilfull contemning of it) into an aliene matter farre removed, touching impeccability.

Now you seeme to returne to your former discourse, but in such a manner, as if you meant utterly to overthrow it: for here you give us to understand, that so long as man doth lesse evill then he might doe, he may be confirmed in goodnesse, and translated unto happinesse. Now I pray, as bad as the Sodomites were, yet were they not lesse evill then they might be? For if God had suffered them longer, and left them destitute of his grace, had they not profited *in pejus*, growing worse and worse?

worse? And yet I confesse hereupon to bee confirmed in no better goodnesse then they had, had not beene much, seeing this their goodnesse had beene never a whit: but you say not onely this, that they that doe lesse evill then they might, may hereupon not onely bee confirmed in that goodnesse which they have (which may be very farre off from any goodnesse at all) but also translated to everlasting happinesse. *Since mans fall (you say) wee are not capable of mercy, but by free abstinence from some evils.*

Now I demand whether this free abstinence from some evils, be of grace or no? If of grace, whether this grace be not a fruite of mercie? If so, then it appears that before we abstaine from any evill, wee are capable of mercy, thereby to obtaine grace, to abstaine from evill.

I know no state that makes a man incapable of mercy in this life, but onely the state of sinning against the holy Ghost. I doe not like your distinction of doing good, and doing it naughtily; for, whatsoever we doe naughtily, therein we cannot be said to doe good, but evill rather: for therein we sinne, and in sinning wee doe not any good, but evill rather. Yet I confesse, wee may be said to doe good imperfectly, but not naughtily in my judgement. *Though we doe both lesse evill, and the good that we doe lesse naughtily then possibly we might doe, God still you say diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us.* I professe at first sight, I tooke this to bee a notorious untruth, but when I considered a claw of your sentence, which is this, *lesse evill then possibly we might doe.* I reverse my judgement, and finde it to be a most vulgar and despicable conceit, though in the way of truth. For the contrary proposition to your supposition is a thing impossible. For how is it possible that a man can doe at once all the evill that he can doe? Now if he doth not doe all the evill that possibly hee can doe, there is some comfort in your paramutheticall contemplations, and hee neede not feare lest God proceede to diminish the riches of his bounty towards him. And so might the Sodomites comfort themselves at the worst, for certainly they had not done all the evill that possibly they might doe. Now it was well

worth the having, to heare you explaine unto us, what you understand by *the influence of Gods gracious providence, which you say God restraines*, and by restraining suffers men to fall from one wickednesse to another, *suffering the reines of our unruly appetites to bee given into our unweildie hands*. Here be good phrales, which if you would bee pleased to interpret unto us in plaine termes, I doubt not but wee should finde good matter to worke upon.

But to the comfort of all profane persons bee it spoken, God doth never deal thus with any by your computation, but such as have done as much evill as possibly they can doe. To be capable of well doing is to be capable of Gods mercy, and you have already told us to our comfort, that to do lesse evill then possibly wee can doe, doth make us capable of Gods mercy; yet here you say, this cannot bee done without Gods love and favour. Now to my judgement, no person is so profane or impious, but that hee doth lesse evill then possibly he might doe; whence it followeth, that to this state of impiety considered as *lesse then possibly might be*, he is arived through the love and favour of God. Yet what you meane by the love and favour of God I know not, and throughout I finde cause to doubt, that you meane nothing lesse then to advance the honour of Gods grace, but onely your scope to advance the power of mans free will.

And I wonder you consider not how you enterfare, and crosse your owne shinnes in your discourse, when you conceive the love and favour of God as a meanes to make us capable of the mercy of God; you might as well say, that the mercy of God makes us capable of his mercy: for love and favour shewed unto him that is in misery, is in the way of mercy. So when you make a great difference betweene withdrawing a mans selfe from the extremities of mischief, and the doing of such good as may make a man capable of well doing, you contradict your selfe: for to do lesse evill then possibly might bee, what is it other, then to withdraw from extremities of mischief? yet that is enough to make a man capable of well doing, as you have signified in this very page  
more

more then once, as namely, both in the first sentence, and in the third, yet this is wilde enough to say, A man must doe good to make himselfe capable of well doing. By the sentence following it seemes that this good that is to be done to make us capable of well doing, is to repent, and this you say cannot be done without the *attractions of infinite love*; yet usually you make a worke of nature to bee a preparation to grace, and sometimes you call that worke of nature humility, sometimes the doing of lesse euill then wee might doe. And what you meane by the *attractions of infinite love*, I know not, for you make it incident to men without the Church, who are not so much as drawne hereunto by the word, so that, as it seemes, it can be no other then Gods patience in sparing them, and so leading them to repentance, that you meane in this place.

Yet see into what absurdity of conceit you cast your selfe, while you make shew to honour the grace of God; as namely, when you say, since Adams fall, our love to *sinfull pleasures is so strong, that we cannot repent without the infinite attractions of love*, implying thereby that before Adams fall, wee could repent without infinite attractions of love. But I pray consider, what need was there of repentance before Adams fall? Yet such obedience as then was congruous to innocent and undefiled nature, could he performe without speciall grace? Yes you thinke he could: this is a bit you can swallow easily, and digest with as great facility,

And so belike your opinion is of the Angels, to wit, that the good Angels stood by the meere freedome of their owne wils, having no other *adjuutorium gratie* then the reprobate Angels had: directly against *Austin de Civitate Dei, l. 12. c. 9.* You beginne to discover the mystery of your meaning, when you say, that *Many whom this infinite love doth daily embrace, because they apprehend not it, are never brought by the attractions of it, to true repentance.* So then the attractions of Gods infinite love are the *causa sine qua non*, but what is the cause, *que posita ponitur effectum*? O this is our apprehending of it. And I pray what stile doe the learned give to that *causa sine qua non*?



doe they not commonly account it *causam fatuam*? So then you make shew to magnifie the attractions of Gods love, and the efficacy thereof; but tis onely in a fatuous manner, and you make but a fatuous efficacy thereof: but mans will alone, in the apprehending of it, hath the true efficacie of repentance in the course of your Divinity. Now I pray what is this love you speake of, and what manner of attraction is it, and wherein doth it consist? and how are we said to apprehend it? and wherein doth that consist? By the place alledged out of Rom. 2.4. you signifie that this love of God is no other then that *goodnesse whereby he leadeth unto repentance*, and that goodnesse there mentioned seemes to bee no other then Gods forbearance and long suffering. Call you this the attractions of his infinite love? Yet notwithstanding Austin was bold to professe, *Quantumlibet praeberis patientiam nisi Deus dederit quis aget poenitentiam*? Though God affords never so much patience, yet who shall repent except God gives repentance? your present discourse preacheth unto us another doctrine, to this effect; *Quantumlibet praeberis patientiam nisi homo apprehenderit quis aget poenitentiam*? Though God affords never so much patience, yet who shall repent except he apprehends it? And I pray what is it to apprehend Gods patience, or his leading of us to repentance by his goodnesse and patience? Can it be any thing else then the taking of the opportunity offered, and to repent indeed?

Cont. Iul.  
Pelag. l. 5.  
c. 4.

So then your meaning is this in plaine termes, *Many whom this infinite love of God doth embrace*, (to wit, in leading them by his goodnesse and patience unto repentance) yet are never brought by the attraction of it to true repentance, and all because they doe not apprehend it, that is, because they doe not repent.

Is not this issue of your discourse very grave and Theologicall? yet when you say the reason why by this love they are not brought to repentance, is because they doe not apprehend it, you seeme to imply that they may apprehend it if they will. Yet because the Text alledged by you is expressly against this, therefore you are content to nicke your former assertion your

selfe.

selfe, with a crosse blow, that so your selfe may have the first credit of contradicting and confuting your selfe, as when you say, of whom *speakes he thus*, of such onely as truly repent? A mad question as ever was proposed, as if there were any colour that the Apostle should say of them that repent, that they despise the riches of Gods goodnesse, leading them to repentance; yet that you may have some matter to worke upon, having erected an enemy of straw, you soile him most valiantly, by answering, *Nay, but of them who for hardnesse of heart cannot repent.* Not considering how fondly herein you contradict your selfe. Nay by the way I note an acknowledgement of yours, to wit, that a man may despise the goodnesse of God leading him to repentance, though through the hardnesse of his heart he cannot repent at all.

4. You demand in the next place, whether *the riches of Gods bountie were fained, or whether hee did onely profer, but not purpose to draw them to repentance which repented not?* I answer, it was not fained, neither doe I finde any thing that he profered at all in this passage of the Apostles. But that this is a meere fiction of yours, *ut recto stet fabula talo*, and that hee did truly draw them to repentance; but how? as by patience and long-suffering he may be said to draw them, and no other goodnesse of God drawing them to repentance is mentioned in this place. Like as opportunity is said to draw and invite men to the doing of something in season.

In like sort the judgements of God invite unto repentance, the mercies of God provoke unto obedience, to thankfulness. But yet Austin was bold to say, *Quantumlibet praeberit patientiam nisi Deus dederit, quis aget penitentiam?* So that this is a tacite exhortation and invitation to repentance by Gods workes. And much inferiour to the power of the exhortations of his word: yet God doth exhort by the ministry of his word, many whose hearts notwithstanding he hardneth. As is apparent in sending unto Pharaoh, and commanding him to let Israel goe; yet withall made knowne to Moses, that hee would harden Pharaohs heart, that hee should not let Israel goe.

Cont. Iul.  
Pelag. l. 5.  
c. 4.

And dare you professe this course of his, so plainly testified in holy Scripture, to be no part of Gods protection, *no fruit of that wisdom which is from above, but a point of earthly policie devoid of honesty, a meere trick of worldly wit, to whose practise nothing but weaknesse and impotency to accomplish great designs, can misfine mans corrupted nature?* And the truth is, in this course of God nothing is profered at all, but onely something suspended, to wit, the execution of just vengeance. In his word something is profered, but what is that? Not repentance, as you misconceive, that rather is required and commanded onely upon repentance, remission of sinnes, and salvation is profered. And if repentance were profered, I pray upon what termes? you will say, in case they would apprehend it. This have I already shewed to be all one, as if you should say, In case they did repent; and of the sobriety hercof let any man judge.

Againe, you professe that this is profered to such men as through the hardnesse of their hearts cannot repent, and judge whether the same incongruities which you charge upon our Tenet, are upon any other ground then this, and while you maintaine this, whether they doe not reflect upon your Tenet also.

Now on the contrary, whereas we object against you, that if God willeth, and so ardently as you speake, that all men should repent and be saved, how comes it to passe that they doe not repent? Considering that the Apostle professeth that Gods will cannot be resisted, and that it manifestly implies an impotency or weaknesse in God, in not being able to bring to passe what he so ardently desires. Now to the latter objection of these, you answer, by deniall that it implyeth any such impotency in God; yet Austin long agoe did acknowledge this consequence, *Enchirid. 96. Deo quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus, periclitatur, ipsum nostra fidei confessionis initium, qua confitemur in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere. Neque veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest; nec voluntate cujusquam creature, voluntatis omnipotentis, impeditur*

*ditur effectus. Et cap. 27. In celo & in terra non quædam voluit & fecit: quædam vero voluit & non fecit, sed omnia quacunque voluit fecit. Et cap. 98. Quis porro tam impij desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere.*

And whereas you say, that man is not capable of endlesse joyes, unlesse he will be wrought by meere love, without the impulsions of irresistible power to love him, to love God, the same infinite love which drawes him unto repentance in congruity leaving a possibility not to be drawne by it: This is a notorious untruth. For was there any possibility in Christ to sinne, or not to bee drawne to that which was good? I thinke you will not avouch it: And was he not therefore capable of endlesse joyes? And if Gods will be unresistible, as the Apostle plainly testifieth, shall not the operation whereby his will is accomplished, bee irresistible? And shall such a bug-bear deterre us from acknowledging God to be the author of repentance? and move us to give the glory thereof to the will of man, who through the hardness of his heart cannot repent, as the Apostle speaketh.

Againe, the Scripture testifieth that whatsoever God willeth, that he doth both in heaven and earth; whether it be by power resistible or unresistible is nothing to the purpose. But you maintain, that what God ardently willeth, is not brought to passe, by reason that man willeth not. Neither doe we maintaine, that God in working whom hee will unto repentance, doth doe this by bereaving man of power to resist, (which alone denominates the operation of God irresistible) but onely by taking away the will of resisting, while *ex nolentibus volentes facit*. And consequently wee say not, that God takes away all possibility of refusing to be drawne by it. For we maintaine that God brings to passe contingent things contingently, that is, with a possibility to the contrarie; though supposing Gods wil to the contrary, this possibility shall not be actuated. And so when God workes a man to faith and to repentance, *nullum humanum resistit arbitrium*, No mans will resists; and that the grace which God gives, *a nullo duro corde resistitur*,

*respuatur*, is refused by no hard heart. So that all this is done without all coaction. For neither can the will be constrained, and God in making men *volentes ex nolentibus*, cannot without great absurditie be said to constraine them, as you would faine insinuate, having no sound argument for it, but such poore trickes to serve your turne withall.

And when God promiseth to circumcise the hearts of his people, and thereby to make them love the Lord their God with all their heart, and with all their soule, hee doth not say he will constraine them to repent, Deut. 30. 6. So when hee promiseth to take away their stony heart, and give them an heart of flesh, and put his owne Spirit within them, and cause them to walke in his statutes and judgements, and to do them, Ezech. 36. 27. hee doth not signifie that hee will constraine them. For God can change any mans will without constraining. Nay in making them willing, it is contradiction to say he doth constraine them to be willing; for constraint is against the will: but it is impossible a man should bee willing against his will; yet this you obtrude upon your adversaries, as though they maintained that God by his power did make them repent against their wils.

Neither yet can we like that other extreame which you approve, that men must first be brought to a willingnesse, and then God makes them repent. For to will to repent, is to repent; for repentance is the very change of the will. Neither can you in any sober manner expound unto us, how God is said to make men repent after they are made willing hereunto. And yet the very will to repent is the worke of God, as who it is *that worketh in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure*, Philip. 2. 13. not by such attractions onely you speake of, though you are loath to betray your Pelagian Tenet, though you expresse the threatening of judgement and thereby imply what you meane by attraction of love, to wit, the promises of reward.

Now this apparantly is not to worke it: for this is onely *suadere*, and *suadere* is not to worke it. And the case is cleere, even by your opinion, that God doth not work it, as oft as he doth

doth exhort unto it, which yet he should, if *suadere* and *hortari* thereunto were to worke it. And indeed *suadere* & *hortari* ut *resipiscamus*; is onely to exhort and perswade, that wee would worke our selves unto repentance: And in this sense to interpret S. Paul, where he saith, *God workes in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure*, was of old the practise of the Pelagians, as S. Austin hath discovered long agoe, *de grat. Christi cont. Pelag. & Calest. cap. 10.* For thus Pelagius plaied the commentator upon S. Paul: *Operatur in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est, dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos mutorum more animalium tantummodo presentia diligentes, futura gloria magnitudine & premiorum pollicitatione succendit; dum revelatione sapientia in desiderium sui stupentem suscitatur voluntatem; dum nobis suadet omne quod bonum est.* And therefore he urgeth Pelagius to confesse another manner of grace then this, if he will be accompted a Christian: *Ibid cap. 11. Nos eam gratiam volumus isti aliquando fateantur, qua futura gloria magnitudo non solum promittitur, verumetiam creditur usperatur. Nec solum revelatur sapientia verumetiam & amatur, nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est, sed & persuadetur: hanc debet Pelagius gratiam confiteri, si vult non modo vocari, sed & esse Christianus.*

And thus to circumsise our hearts in causing us to love him, and to walke in his wayes, and to keepe his statutes and judgments, and to doe them; this I hope is not to strangle us, yet here is no violent operation in all this. For, *Dum non modo aversas à vera fide, sed adversas vera fidei voluntates convertit & exvolentibus nolentes facit*: it is so farre from violence, that the will rejoyceth that God hath thus reformed it; we do but as Scriptures teach, when we make the work of faith a worke of power, *2 Theff. 1.* And shall not the raising of men from the dead be a worke of power? and is not the worke of grace such a worke, *Eph. 2.2?*

But you doe ill, under colour of magnifying the love of God, to dishonour both his love and his power; his love, in confining it onely to promises, and threatnings, as if by these operations alone he moved us unto repentance; his power, in

denying that God brings to passe those things which hee desires to bring to passe, and that ardently. And this latter is Austins objection as well as ours; and hee makes the former to be meere Pelagianisme, as well as we doe.

In the next place you tell us, *We are to beleve that Gods infinite power shall effect all things possible for them that love him; but constraines no mans will to love him.* But doth he make mans will to love him without constraint? why did you not expresse your minde on this point? you are willing to acknowledge God to be the author of glory; but I doe not finde you so ready to acknowledge God to be the author of all goodnesse, the author and finisher of our faith, of our repentance, of our obedience. Did you acknowledge this, there should bee no difference betweene us. For we doe not affirme that he works faith and repentance in us, by way of constraint. And when **Web. 13. 21.** the Apostle prayeth that God would *worke in the Hebrewes, that which was pleasing in his sight*; you shall never finde in any of our Divines, that the meaning of the Apostles prayer was, that he would constrain them to doe that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God: I know no power in God but infinite, and seeing what worke soever he workes, is by the exercise of his power, it cannot be denied, but that it is the exercise of that power which is infinite.

Againe, is man or Angell able to circumcise our hearts, so as to make us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts; It is not, as I presume you will confesse; why then shall not this worke of Gods love in circumcising our hearts, and making us to love him, be accounted a worke of power infinite? And Austin divers times professeth, that God doth convert our hearts, *omnipotenti facilitate*, by an almighty facility, and when God regenerates us he quickneth us and raiseth us from death to life, **Eph. 1. 2.** and is said to transform us as it were of beasts to make us become men, **Esay 9.** and how can this be wrought by lesse then power infinite, as when Bernard confesseth of God saying, *Bern. in circumcis. Dom. Serm. 2. Numquid non vere admirabilem experti sumus in imitatione utique voluntatum nostrarum.* As for Gods power to the immediate parent



rent of our love to God, it is no article of our Creed, but a Deut. 30.6  
 trick of yours to insinuate any thing on your adversaries part  
 that may make your owne cause seeme plausible: wee rather  
 conceive Gods grace and mercy to be the immediate cause of  
 the circumcision of our hearts, whereby wee are brought to  
 love him. Neither doe we say, that he workes in us the love  
 of himselfe immediately, but rather by faith brings us first ac-  
 quainted with the love of God towards us, according to that  
 of Iohn, 1 Ioh. 3.19. *We love him, because he loved us first*; and  
 to that of S. Paul, *The end of the Law is love out of a pure heart  
 and good conscience, and faith unfained*, 1 Tim. 1.5. No other seed  
 of our love to God, doe I acknowledge to be sowne in our  
 soule.

Yet I doubt you referre this to a seed of nature, and not to  
 a seed of grace, though you doe not affect to manifest your  
 meaning so plainly, as it were fit you should. And no marvell.  
 For they which doe evill hate the light. As for constraint; Ioh. 3.20  
 we hold that infinite power cannot so worke the will: Bo-  
 dies may be constrained to suffer the execution of mens lusts  
 upon them, and may justly breed loathing in the parties so  
 constrained.

As for the will, that *non potest cogi*, cannot be constrained:  
 And I wonder you that take notice of so many choice points  
 of philosophy and divinity, whereof others doe not, should  
 not all this while take notice of so popular a Maxime as this:  
 though I confesse your taking notice of it in this place had  
 marred your game; for the furthering whereof you are con-  
 tent to obtrude upon your adversaries to unreasonable a conceit,  
 as if they maintained, that the will of man may be constrained:  
 yet suppose the will were constrained by God to love him,  
 would this breed in God a loathing of him? Thus the foule  
 and uncivill resemblance you make transports you. Yet  
 I have read, *My soule loathed them, and their soule abhorred  
 mee*: but I never heard the contrary, *My soule loathed them,  
 and their soule loved mee*: for while we abhorre God, as ene-  
 mies unto him, yet notwithstanding even then hee loved us,  
 Rom. 5.8. how much more when we love, will he continue

Zach. 11.8

to love us, and not turne his love into loathing; as mens lusts turne into loathing sometimes, as being satisfied, and disdain-  
ing to be scorned by them, whose bodies though they could  
force to be subject to their lusts, yet could not winne their  
loues.

But God never makes us unwillingly to love him (it is a  
thing impossible) but as Austine saith, *Ex nolentibus volentes  
facit*. Tis true, God loves a cheerefull giver, but who makes  
this cheerefulness but God? and whose workes is it fit hee  
should love but his owne? Like as it is said of him, that *Co-  
ronat non merita nostra sed dona sua*, he crownes not our works,  
but his owne: And where there is a willing minde, there it is as-  
cepted, not according to that which a man hath not, but to that  
which he hath: but whose worke is this willing minde? Is it  
not God that worketh in us both the will and the deede? And  
that God doth not wrest any obedience from us, but makes  
us willing, and ready, and cheerefull in the performing of  
it, not onely in the way of doing what hee commandeth,  
but in suffering what hee inflicteth, or permitteth the sins of  
others to inflict upon us. In so much that the Apostles rejoy-  
ced that they were accounted worthy to suffer for the name of Christ.  
And if a father prevaile to worke his childe to dutifulnesse,  
though with much adoe, yet in the end masters his stubborn-  
nesse, will hee love his childe, or his obedience, or dutiful-  
nesse the worse for this: yet God more effectually, and with  
a great deale more ease changeth our hearts, even *omnipotente  
facilitate*, as Austine speaketh, and shall hee love our obedi-  
ence, our thankfulness, our repentance the lesse for this?

Now wee are like to receive something concerning the  
maine problem, to wit, *In what sense God may bee said to doe  
all that he can for his vineyard*: All this while you have beene as  
it were in trimming your instrument, and it seemes not to bee  
yet in tune: the first musick is so harsh, and without all har-  
mony, I cannot devise a construction thereof to carry any  
tolerable sense. But the sentence following seemes to bee of  
the same nature: where you call that *Revenue*, which before  
you called *Charge* very incongruously, as if a mans revenues  
were

were a burthen unto him, whereof he did exonerate himselfe. Or if it bee spoken of Bursers accounts in Colledges, the incomes are not to them that are charged, and put to exonerate themselves, but to the Colledges; this at the best is but a gamboll, lets come to the naked truth. *Though mans love to his dearest friend, bee in respect of Gods love to us, but faint, and his power small, yet because his love to justice is much lesse, hee oft-times effects that for his temporall good, which God, though infinite in power doth not effect for those whom he infinitely loves.* I thinke I may bee bold to say that this is infinitely false: God loved Iacob, and hated Esau: now all whom God hates as hee hated Esau, he damnes; and all those whom he loves as hee loved Iacob, he saves; yet this love was but infinite: and what love of man or Angel, vicious or vertuous, can effect the like? Yet God blessed both Esau and Ismael with temporall blessings; and what friend by good courses or lewd courses was able to equall it? what creature can equall that temporall good that God affords to any reprobate? for hee gives him his being and all that hee enjoyes; nay, what man or Angell can doe ought for him, in the effecting whereof, God hath not a greater hand then the man or Angell himselfe? Yet you suppose that God infinitely loves the very reprobates. It is familiar with you to suppose, that God loved Esau, and that infinitely, of whom the Scripture professeth, that God hated him. Your suppositions are fat and well fed, but your arguments are more leane and ill favoured then the leane kine of Pharaoh.

Yet I will be content to helpe you a little in the way of argument: Gods love, saith Aquinas, is in respect of designing some good to his creature; now God doth will temporall good to the very reprobates, and that in such a manner as cannot be supplied unto them but by power infinite.

In no other sense doe I finde, that it may bee tollerably avouched, that God loves them infinitely, though you are pleased to suppose it often.

It is untrue, that his grants made to man, must undergoe the examination of justice; for it is lawfull for him to doe what

hee will with his owne, to bestow being, and gracious being, and consequently glorious being on whom he will; for both grace and glory is executed on man in the way of mercy, and hee hath mercy on whom hee will. And though he hath revealed unto us by what rules hee will proceede in pronouncing the sentence of salvation, or condemnation, yet hath he revealed unto us no rules, according whereunto hee proceedeth in giving grace unto some, and denying grace unto others. And both Suarez and Vasquez (though opposite in other points about the justice of God) concurrently professe, that there is no justice in God towards man, but upon presumption of his will.

And those unchangeable rules you speake of, for confining God in the execution of his power, according to his gracious will, are like Castles in the aire that have no foundations, and fit for nothing but to discover the new world in the Moone, and to ease the man there of his burthen, that travelled so long with a bush at his backe: God may convert whom hee will, and consequently save whom he will, as the Holy Ghost teacheth us; this is no fiction, *Quis porro*, saith Austine, *tam impie desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere?* Who doth so impiously doat as to say, that God cannot convert the evill wills of men, whom hee will, when hee will, and where hee will. Yet you say as much as this comes to, when you tell us of unchangeable rules of justice, restraining God from converting and changing the hearts of men, without all feare of imputation, either of dotage or impiety: *God you say loves justice more then mankinde: God loves himselfe better then hee loves mankinde, or all his creatures; for he made all things for himselfe, Prov. 16.4.* But as for any justice in God that limits his will, I know none, neither are you able to prove any as I am verily perswaded. What you have hitherto delivered, I thinke I have not suffered in any materiall part to passe unsaluted, unanswered.

Enchirid.  
cap. 98.

## CHAP. XVII.

*The truth and ardency of Gods love unto such as perish, justified by our Saviour, and S. Paul.*

**I** Would your propositions were onely paradoxes ; but indeed , we have weighed them in the ballance, and found them plaine untruthes ; yet what those propositions are which you intimate when you say , *These are no paradoxes, but plaine truth* , I am to seeke ; neither can I tell whereto to referre it , but to a point which you aime at and insinuate rather then expresse , as if you feared plaine dealing most. For, that which you undertooke to shew in the former Chapter , was onely this, *In what sense God may bee said to have done all that he could doe for his vineyard* : yet your ensuing discourse throughout hath very little correspondency thereunto. But the point you aime at is to perswade , that God doth all that hee could doe for all reprobates, and that hee doth as much for them as for his elect , and the difference betweene the elect and reprobates, ariseth rather from their free wills, then from any different dispensation of Gods providence , in giving that grace unto the one which hee denies unto the other. A most foule opinion , and therefore no marvell if you are content to travaile long in the delivery of such a monster, and seeme to desire that your Readers forwardnesse in understanding your meaning, should deliver you thereof, and if his propitious affections should be as ready to embrace it upon your weake suggestions , the whole businesse shall be very preposterously carried.

Yet unlesse this conceit of yours bee admitted , you tell us, *Wee shall hardly finde any true sense or good meaning in Gods protestations of sorrowes for his peoples plagues , or in his expostulations of their unthankfulnesse , or in his kinde invitations of them to repentance which never repent , or in his tender proffer of salvation to those that perish.*

Whensoever.

Whensoever you shall charge us with any of these like places ; if a true sense and good meaning of them shall be found by us, though *hardly*, without the acknowledgment of your foule Tenets, wee shall not faile to obtaine wherewithall to answer you.

Certainly, sorrow is not incident to God, no not for the plagues of his elect, and therefore cannot be attributed unto him but, *per ανθρωποπιδειαν*, by conformity to the nature of man. Sorrow may be incident unto Christ, for hee was man as well as God; and so man is subject to the law of God, which commands us to love our neighbour as our selfe, and who is to bee accounted our neighbour, himselfe hath taught us in the parable of a certain man that descended from Ierusalem to Iericho, by the way as he went fell into the hands of thieves; and a fruit of this love is well knowne to bee compassion, whereby wee rejoyce with them that rejoyce, and weepe with them that weepe; yea, weepe for them who weepe not for themselves.

And yet it is very strange to inferre, that because Gods sorrows for his peoples plagues, doth inferre that he hath done all that he can for his people, therefore God hath done all that hee can doe for them that perish. Or, because God doth expostulate with his people for their unthankfulnesse, therefore he doth all hee can doe for the salvation not onely of his people, but of them that perish also. But it is true, in the ministry of the word, hee invites them to repentance that doe not repent.

And it is as true, that if this bee required to the doing of all that hee can doe for the salvation of them that perish, then many thousands perish, for whose salvation God doth not all hee can doe. For many thousands have perished that never enjoyed the ministry of the word to bring them to repentance. They indeed that live within the precincts of Gods sanctuary enjoy this benefit, though many thousands of them perish. Neither doth it follow, that because God invites them to repentance, he doth all hee can doe for their salvation: For if it pleased him, hee could not onely invite them to repentance,  
but

but give them repentance, 2 Tim. 1. last. and Act. 5. 35. and Act. 11. and the 18. And as Austine saith, *Quantumlibet Deus praberit patientiam, nisi Deus dederit quis aget pœnitentiam*; so may I say, *Quantumlibet Deus invitaverit ad rescipiscendum nisi Deus dederit quis aget pœnitentiam*. And as Austine in the same place professeth of such as God hath not predestinate, whether out of the Church or in the Church, *Ïstarum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemq; pœnitentiam, qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive illud ampliore patientiam, sive non imparcem prabeat*. Cont. Iul.  
Pelag. l. 5.  
c. 4.

And consequently though hee profereth salvation upon condition of faith and repentance (for no otherwise doth he profer it to any) unto some of those that perish; yet herehence it followeth not, First that hee profereth this unto all that perish; or secondly, in profering it to any that perish, he doth all that he could doe for the salvation of them that perish, as when he saith, *Esa. 65. 2. I have spread out my hands all the day long unto a rebellious people which walke in a way that was not good*; and herehence it followeth not, that hee did all that he could doe for their salvation: For this signifieth onely his invitation of them, and readinesse to imbrace them upon their repentance, and complaint of the hardnesse of their heart in not repenting,

But God could doe more then this, hee could take away their stony hearts, and give them an heart of flesh, and put his owne Spirit within them, and cause them to walke in his statutes, and to doe them, *Ezech. 36. 27*. And therefore it is a very vaine discourse of yours, when you say, *The unremovable rules of eternall equity, will not suffer him to stretch out his hand any further then he doth towards the sonnes of men*: for it is apparant that he doth stretch them further, to as many as in the course of his loving kindenesse he doth convert; and thus farre hee doth stretch them out to as many as hee transports into the land of promise, as your selfe confesse.

But whetcas you say, *The measure of their iniquity being accomplished*, is an obstacle to God, as whom his justice in this case will not suffer to stretch them out so farre any longer; this is



one of the articles of your creede, besides all text of Scripture, or Christian reason: for God calls some even at the last hower of the day, as the Gospell preacheth in the parable of the labourers hired into the vineyard, and in the example of the thief upon the crosse, & the example of the Apostle, 2 Tim. 2. 26. *si oportet*, if at any time God may give them repentance: and the ancient saying is, *inter portam & fontem*. And S. Augustine counts it impietie and madnesse to thinke otherwise, Enchir. 98. *Quis porro tam impie desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere?* And the order of our Church in visiting the sick doth justifie this, in urging us to visite all, to invite all to repentance, even to the last gaspe, saying that indeede no mans iniquitie is at full till his death, and after death no calling to repentance; for the wicked immediately upon their death are carried into hell, as Dives was; and, *Ex inferno nulla redemptio*, out of hell no redemption. As you say, that with sorrow hee doth withdraw his hands, so you may with as good sobriety say, that with sorrow hee doth punish the reprobate men and Angels with eternall fire, and directly contrary to Scripture phrase, Prov. 1. 24. *Because I have called and you refused: I have stretched out mine hand and none will regard: 26. I will also laugh at your destruction, and mock when your feare cometh.*

As for the love of God in stretching out his hands, I deny it not, because to stretch out his hands in inviting unto repentance, is a speciall favour which God denies to many thousands, and such as whereby many a reprobate may and doth profit, *ad exterioram vite emendationem quo minus puniantur*, to an outward emendation of their lives, that they may be punished more mildly.

But you make this love to reprobates equall to the love of God towards his elect; for you maintaine, that God doth as much as he can doe for the salvation of the reprobates. And it is apparant, hee doth no more for the salvation of his elect. Now this is an abominable opinion. And the stranger is Gods mercy in electing you (whereof as I have read in some of your writings

writings you make no doubt) when you thinke you are not bound to render him more thanks for his goodnesse towards you then a reprobate is: but though yet you do not, you may doe ere you die, and be pulled out of this abominable opinion of yours, as out of the fire with feare. For as Paul was a chosen vessell of God, though for a while hee persecuted the truth of God, even unto blood, so may you bee notwithstanding your impugning of it, though in a milder manner I confesse: for your impugnation is not like to do any great harme save onely to your selfe.

Act. 9. 15:

Our Saviour was the Sonne of man as well as hee was the Sonne of God, and made under the law, and therefore was bound to bee as compassionate to his people as Jeremy was, Ier. 13. 17. *But if you will not heare this, my soule shall weepe in secret for your pride, and mine eye shall weep and drop down teares, because the Lords flock is carried away captive:* So our Saviour wept over Ierusalem, saying, *If thou hadst knowne even then at the least in this thy day the things which belong unto thy peace, but now they are hid from thine eyes.* Luk. 19. 42. You aske, whether hee spake this as man, or whether the Spirit doth not say the same? and I aske whether your wits were your own when you made such a question? Who could weepe and speake but man, and how could man weepe or speake this but as man? Hath God any heart to be filled with woe, or eyes to bee filled with teares? yet the Spirit moved him to speake this.

Gal. 4. 4:

So if any Prophet had said it, as hee might have said it, the Spirit of God had moved him hereunto. And when Jeremy said, *My soule shall weepe in secret for your pride, and mine eye shall drop down teares,* the Spirit of God moved him to utter this, for, *Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the holy Ghost,* 1 Pet. 1. 21. The truth is, the words are congruous to him, both as God, and as man, but the sorrow of heart, and teares of eyes wherewith it was uttered, are onely agreeable to the nature of man.

How doe you prove, that he that spake this, spake nothing but words of Spirit and life; because our Saviour saith, Ioh. 6. 63; *It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing, the words*

Kkkk 2

that

that *I* speake unto you are spirit and life; will it therefore follow that all that he spake was spirit and life? Suppose it were so, would it herehence follow, that these words were not spoken by him as man? Then belike, when he said I thirst, this also being words of Spirit and life (as it needs must if all that he spake were spirit and life) hee spake not this as man like-wise when hee said, *My soule is heavy unto death*, and on the crosse, *My God my God why hast thou forsaken mee*, these words were not his words as hee was man: and though hee spake nothing, but what the Father gave him in commandement to speake, yet herehence it followeth not, that therefore he spake them not as man. For by just proportion of reason, if this were admitted, it would follow, that hee spake nothing as man; no not that, *I have desired to eate this Passeeover with you*; nor that, *How was it that hee sought after mee*, Wist hee not that *I* must goe about my Fathers businesse? nor that, *My Father is greater then I*,

Tis true, His bowels of compassion were freely extended towards them in exact conformitie, not to much to the love of God (as you discourse at pleasure, according to your owne extravagant conceits of the love of God, equally extended to the elect and reprobate) as to the will of God: for, being made under the law, he was bound to the like compassion & commiseration, as to pray for his persecutors, so to mourne for the judgements of God upon his brethren, according to the flesh: yet one word by the way concerning this, Was the measure of Ieruselems iniquity at this time filled up, or no? It seemes it should be so in your computation; for now its said, *The things that belonged unto their peace, were now hid from their eyes*; When should the doore of repentance be shut upon them, if not at such a time, and in such a case as this? If so, then by your owne doctrine, Gods love ceaseth towards them, as but in the former sentence you signified; & consequently Christs love and compassion should cease also, if it were but in conformity to Gods love; but rather it was in conformity to Gods law, as I have shewed; God the Father having made him in subjection to the law, and consequently was he bound to mourne for

for them, as well as to pray for them : for he was by vertue of the law to love his neighbour as himselfe. This incongruity (as it seemes) of yours you observed, and therefore as I guesse, you added, that his bowels of compassion were restrained also, *by the same conformity*, and though you tell us, that *from different motions and distractions, occasioned from the indissoluble union of his divisible soule* (this is your owne language) *with these two attributes of the indivisible nature* (to wit, love and justice) *his teares were squeezed out.*

Yet neither doe you tell us how his bowels of compassion were restrained, or wherein; neither doe you make knowne unto us what these different motions and distractions in our Saviour were : Neither doth the story of the Gospell afford us any discovery of any such different motions & distractions you talke of : But to the end hee continued in his bowells of compassion towards them, as it appeares by his prayers for them upon the crosse : for indeede, his first comming was not to condemne the world, but to save the world. But in the old Testament, *God himselfe, as God, expresseth his desires of his peoples obedience; O that my people had hearkened unto me.* This you will have to bee understood in proper speech : Piscator by a figure of speech, *Talis optatio*, saith hee, *Deotribuitur per anthropopasiam. Utri creditis.* With Piscator concurreth Iunius also. And wee have reason for it, because whatsoever God wills, that brings hee to passe both in heaven and earth; how much more what hee desires, and that ardently. Yet you keepe your course contrary to reason and authority, in attributing desires unto God, of such things which never come to passe, which Augustine long agoe professed to be all one with the denying of Gods omnipotencie.

And not content with this, you most ridiculously contradict your selfe, and call it also an unquenchable desire, whereas your selfe have often professed, that the filling up the measure of mans iniquity doth quench this desire in God; thereby making God not onely impotent, but mutable also.

Israel might have truly said, *Was there ever any love like unto this love wherewith the Lord embraced mee?* But what Israel?

even the true Israel of God wee say : but the true Israel of God cannot say so, the elect of God cannot say so according to your Tenet, for as much as you make the love of God towards reprobates to bee as great as the love of God towards the elect, yet as if you strained your words, *you call it the excessive fervency of his loving kindenesse, to wit, even towards them that perish: and adde by way of Parenthesis, that Gods Will is infinite, as if you had a minde to inferre thereby, that his love towards them were infinite.*

Now of Gods infinite will I never heard before : his power we say is infinite, because hee can doe every thing that is possible to bee done, his knowledge is infinite because hee knowes all things that may bee knowne, but God doth not will all things that may bee willed by him : Nay, his power receives limitation and restriction by his will, as touching the execution thereof ; for hee doth no more then what hee will. Likewise wee say Gods love is infinite in the way of extention, for it neither had beginning, neither shall it have end. But such is not Gods love towards them that perish, for it ceaseth by your doctrine when the measure of their iniquity is filled up: but such as it is, you say, it layeth no necessity upon their wills. A most ridiculous speech, as much as to say, it doth not make men repent necessarily; whereas concerning them that perish, it is apparant that it neither makes them repent necessarily; nor contingently.

And as for the elect, hee gives them repentance, which he doth not to the reprobates ; as Austine long agoe professed, *Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque penitentiam qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive illis ampliore patientiam sive non imparem praebeat.* Nyther doe wee say, that to whom God gives repentance, he gives obedience, he makes them to repent necessarily, to obey necessarily, but freely. For it is manifest that grace takes not away the power of disobedience, but onely prevents the act of disobedience, and that not in all particulars neither : for the children of God sinne too often. And as for those which want this grace which God bestowes on his elect, they have not onely liberty left them

Cent. Iul.  
Pelag. l. 5.  
c. 4.

them unto sinne, but also this liberty turnes into wilfulnesse, according to that of Austine, *Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia*, Liberty without grace is not liberty but wilfulnesse. Ep. 89.

But yet wee say upon supposition, that God will give any man repentance and that at such a time. that man shall repent at such a time; and tis impossible hee should not repent; yet in repenting hee shall repent freely, and not necessarily Like as God ordaining Christs bones should not be broken, upon this supposition it was impossible it should be otherwise, albeit the soldiers abstained from breaking of his bones, not necessarily, but deliberately and freely. It is true the Lord saith, *Open thy mouth wide and I will fill it: but his people would not hearken unto his voice.*

And now the question is onely as touching their obedience, whether God did any otherwise will that, then by commanding it in respect of those that perish; wee say hee did onely command it in respect of such, wee say hee did not resolve to give them repentance, to give them obedience, though he could have done this, and doth doe this unto his elect, *making them to passe under the rod, and bringing them under the bond of the covenant, not onely seeing their wayes, but healing them also; healing their rebellions, and subduing their iniquities, and treading Satan under their feet: opening their eies, and bringing them out of darknesse into light, and from the power of Satan unto God, quickning them when they were dead in trespasses and sinnes, creating a new heart, and renewing a right spirit within them: Doe you but acknowledge this, as you must unlesse you will renounce the Scriptures, and wee will never quarrell with you for saying, God doth all this contingently, and not necessarily.* Ezech. 20. 37. Isa. 57. 18 Hos. 14. 5. Mic. 7. 19. Rom. 10. 7 Aēt 26. 18 Eph. 2. 2. Psal. 51.

2 The Apostles move a question to our Saviour concerning him that was borne blinde, Ioh. 9. whether hee had sinned or his fathers, that *he was borne blinde*, this was in respect of judgement corporall, you apply this to a judgement spirituall; that judgement was positive to bee bereaved of sight, which in course of nature is otherwise then onely permissive,

in.

in suffering them to be such as hee found them. That was spoken in respect of some not common, but extraordinary sinne: for though there bee sinne common unto all, yet this judgement is not; and therefore they might well thinke, if sinne were the cause, it must bee some extraordinary sinne, but our Saviour signifieth, that it befell him in the course of Gods providence, not so much in respect of sinne, as in respect of a certaine end whereto God had ordained it. But I hope neither the Apostles, nor any sober man would imagine that some extraordinary sinne was required unto this, that God should leave men as hee findes them, without bestowing some supernaturall grace upon them.

And in despight of sinne, God doth afford this grace to **Rom. 9. 18** many thousands: for God hath *mercy on whom he will*; like as on the other side, in despight of mens civility, and naturall morality, *whom hee will he hardeneth*. Yet to the question by you proposed at pleasure you make no answer, but adde hereunto out of Ion. 2. 8. *They that follow lying vanities forsake their owne mercies*: as if you had a minde to imply, that there is something in man, that makes a difference, why some are *suffered to walke in their owne waies*, some are not, wherein you doe but corrupt the state of the question after your usuall manner.

For the question is not about the consequent of lying vanities, or not observing them, but about the observing of lying vanities it selfe, or not observing them; that is, how cometh it to passe that some are suffered to goe on in the course of their lying vanities, some are not, but rather are taken off from those ungodly courses wherein they have beene brought up, as many thousands were taken off thus in the Apostles daies: wee say it is the meere good pleasure of God that puts this difference, *having mercy on some, and hardning others*; you take another course, as when you say, in your familiar and soliloquiall meditations with God; *Never hadst thou given them up to their owne hearts lust, to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, had they not despised the riches of thy bounty*: Here you mixe different courses of God together; for



for when you talke of *giving them over to their owne hearts lusts* (Which scripture applieth to Gods dealing with his own people Israel, upon the despising of his grace, offered them in his word) but the rest, as this also, being accomodated unto the heathens, you seeme to referre to the despising of the riches of Gods bounty declared to them in his workes: for as for the riches of Gods bounty declared in his word, the heathen were not pertakers of this, untill the dayes of the Gospell: and whereas by the phrase of speech used, you seeme to have an eye to that of the Apostle, Rom. 2. 3. 4. the riches of Gods bounty in that place is specified onely to consist in *patience and long-suffering*: And how did they refuse it, but in refusing to repent? For the bounty there mentioned is noted to be a bounty leading unto repentance. So that in the issue your meaning comes to this, that *God would never have suffered them thus to have walked in their owne wayes, and to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath*, if so be they had repented?

Now the question is, whether they had power to repent or no; you seeme to imply they had, but you dare not expresse so much, because you see how manifestly contradictory that were to the text it selfe, where it is expressly said, *But thou after the hardnesse of thine heart, which cannot repent, treasurest up wrath against the day of wrath*. So that you, what by taking up pieces of Scripture at pleasure, and leaving out pieces as you list, make up a patcht coat contrary to the Scripture, which yet you commend unto us as Scripture it selfe; Nay, what will you say if God did not so much as admonish them to repent? Doth not the same Apostle plainly signifie so much, Act. 17. 30. where hee saith *And God regarded not the time of this ignorance: but now hee admonisheth all men every where to repent*. Againe, consider I pray you what is to be accounted the time, when this ceasure deserved to be fastened upon them, namely, of *despising the riches of his bounty*? It seemes by your former discourse, it is not till they have filled up the measure of their iniquity; for till then Gods infinite love was towards them (according to your opinion) and hee did not give them over

to their owne lusts. Now I pray consider, did hee not even afore this time suffer the Gentiles to walk in their own waies, according to the Apostles meaning, Act. 14. 16. although as  
 i. 17 the same Apostle saith, even at that time, *Hee left not himselfe without witnesse, giving them raine and fruitfull seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladnesse.*

And this you take hold of in the next place, and tell us, that *these were unquestionable earnestts of Gods everlasting love,* and to prove it you adde by way of reason, *for thou so lovedst the world, still holding up your deyout Soliloquies, as if you would enchant your Readers with an affected straine of devotion; that thou gavest thine onely begotten Sonne, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish.*

If this be not like capping of verses, I doe not know what is: for will it follow by any Logicall method, that because the giving of Christ for everlatting life to all that believe in him, is an evidence of Gods love to all; therefore the giving of raine from heaven, and fruitfull seasons, is an unquestionable earnest of Gods everlasting love to all? Yet I grant it is an evidence of Gods love as touching the preservation of their state temporall; but you urge it as an evidence of Gods love, as touching the state of their soules spirituall and eternall: otherwise your discourse were nothing to the purpose. Yet to speake according to the Apostles drift in that place, hee proposeth them not as witnesses of his love, but as of his providence, which wee know extends even to bruit beasts, and to the very lillies of the field. Onely man is capable of deserving this testimony of divine providence, and so accordingly should be moved to secke the Lord, and to worship him as God, who governes all, and provides for all, and not as a corruptible thing, thus wee interpret the Apostle, Act. 14. 16. according to the Apostle, Act. 17. 27. and Rom. 1. 23. and not at randome as you doe, fashioning his meaning in such a manner as may best accord with your extravagant opinions.

Lastly, who seeth not, that if these be unquestionable earnestts of Gods love towards them, then notwithstanding they have filled up the measure of their iniquity, yet Gods love

conti-

continuerh towards them the same still, and therefore cannot be said to give them over to their owne lusts, and to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath. For these and the like temporall blessings they enjoy still, and that in greater measure then is usually the portion of Gods owne deare children. To concludethis, wee make no doubt but that if all and every one should believe in Christ, all and every one should bee saved by Christ.

But the question is, whether God gives faith to all: it is apparant he doth not, but onely to those *whom hee hath predestinated*, Rom. 8. 30. to those *whom hee hath ordained to everlasting life*, Act. 13. 48. to *such as shall be saved*, Act. 2. last. Perhaps your meaning is, that though God doth not give faith to all, but only to some; the reason is, because some fit themselves for faith, and others doe not. And I verily believe this is your opinion, but it seemes you are ashamed to professe it and speake it out plainly.

Yet the texts mentioned are directly against you, which confine the giving of faith not to mans disposition, but to Gods predestination; like as those other also, Rom. 9. *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will hee hardeneth, and it is not of him that willeth, or of him that runnes, but of God that sheweth mercy*: and 2 Tim. 1. 9. the Apostle professeth, that *God calleth us, not according to our workes, but according to his owne purpose and grace*.

To the prosecuting of every which place, and making it good against any exceptions that you shall bring, I shall be willing to condescend, so long as God affords mee life and opportunity. But as yet you dissemble your Tenet, and play least in sight; and discover your meaning onely by insinuation. I know there is no greater argument of Gods love, then the giving of his Sonne, whence it manifestly followeth, that unlesse Gods love to reprobates bee as great as his love to his elect, Christ was not given to the reprobates; like as our Saviour signifieth, that, *Hee sanctified himselfe unto his death and passion; not for the world, but for those for whom he prayed*, which were partly those whom God had already given him, and

Ioh. 17. 9.  
20.

partly those who hereafter should believe through their word. Yet I confesse you are audacious enough to resist this argument, and openly to professe, that Gods love to the reprobate is as great as his love to the elect, which no Arminian was ever yet knowne to professe: yet you take upon you to prove, that *this love was tendred to all.*

A strange phrase, which I thinke was never heard of before, as if love were like an ointment in a box, that might be offered and received if a man would. Of tendering grace I have heard, to wit, the grace of remission of sinnes and salvation upon our beliefe, but of tendring love I never heard.

And of the tendring of this 'grace in Christ unto all that heare it preached, who ever doubted? For this is no more then to say, that *It is tendred unto all to whom it is tendred.* And are you well in your wits to addresse your selfe to the proving of this, with some notable argument, which should be like a thunderbolt, and therefore no great marvell if some great noise preceed it.

But still I perceive your meaning reacheth further then you dare as yet to professe; for your meaning is to prove, that *All that heare the Gospell and doe not believe it, seeing they shall bee guilty of greater sinne*, and incurre greater condemnation at the day of judgement, therefore they could believe it if they would. This is the point that sticks in your teeth, and which you dare not openly and plainly professe, as indeed it is manifest Pelagianisme, and which the Arminians dare not at this day openly avouch, but rather professe that no man can believe or repent without grace.

Whereas yet, like as your selfe maintaine, that no man in state of nature can doe otherwise of himselfe then sinne, yet is he justly condemned for sinning, none compelling him: in like sort, no man of himselfe can believe the Gospell, yet hee may be as justly condemned for not believing. For as for that naturall impotency unto that which is good, which is in all derived unto us from our father Adam, that is of it selfe sufficient to condemne us, and therefore most insufficient to excuse us. And that impotencie being in all alike, the con-

demnation

demnation therefore shall be unto all alike; but the increase of it by actuall transgressions which are freely committed, is not in all alike: for neither doth inclination naturall, or tentations spirituall, or occasions temporall hinder a mans libertie, in doing or refusing to doe any act; so likewise neither can it hinder the aggravation of his sinne. But neither can this naturall impotency bee cured in any part but by the grace of God habituall, neither any good act according to this grace habituall be performed without another grace, both prevenient and subsequent actuall. If your minde serves you to deale plainly in opposing ought of this, you shall not want them that will bee ready to enter with you into the lists, and scholastically to encounter you. Yet I confesse the providence of God, especially in ordering and governing the wills of men, is a misterious thing, and the operation and cooperation of his will, with the operation and cooperation of the will of man.

But I am a long time inured unto this, and now I feare no bugbeares, least of all from your selfe, with whom I have beene of old acquainted in our private and familiar discourse on these and such like arguments, and to tell you plainly my opinion, I doubt you have written so much, that you have had time to read but little. And truly as for my selfe, as I have written little, so also I have not read much. But in these points I have spent not a little time, in searching after truth, and examining arguments.

As for the place of the Apostle, Act. 17. 30. it seemes your meaning is, it pleads for universall grace now after Christs death: yet your selfe immediately before professed, that onely they that heare it and doe not believe, are guilty of greater finnes; implying manifestly, that since Christs death all doe not heare it. Yet if you have any other meaning, and will deale roundly in propounding it, I will be ready to consider this or any other place that you shall bee able to produce to what purpose soever, if orthodox in my judgement to subscribe unto it, if otherwise, to doe my best to confute it.

3 In the next place you are so farre from maintaining uni-  
versall

verfall grace, that you undertake to give causes why all men in the world have not heard of this love of God in Christ. But these causes to be assigned by you are put off till hereafter, and that not of certainty neither: you onely say, *They may bee assigned.* Tis your usuall counse to feed your Readers with expectation, as it were with empty spoones. If you doe not gull them in putting them off to expectation tis somewhat the better.

The reason you give why many might have heard of Christ, which yet have not heard of him, and might have beene partakers of h's death, ( I thinke you meane of the benefit of his death ) which yet have not beene partakers of it, is starke naught. For that evill courses of men cannot hinder them from the participation of Christs death, appeareth by the calling of the Gentiles, and casting off of the Iewes. For were the deeds of Babylon ( thinke you ) better then they of Sion? *Wee Jewes by nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles,* saith the Apostle, Gal. 2. 15.

The Apostle in divers places, puts no difference betweene them that are called, and them that are not, as touching their manners before grace, 1 Cor. 6. 11. Eph. 2. 23. Tit. 3. 23. God findes us weltring in our blood, when he saith unto us, Live, Ezech. 16. and Saul was taken off from his bloody courses to be made a member of Christ.

And your doctrine to the contrary tends shamefully to the obscuring and disparaging of Gods grace, and to the advancing of the power of nature, and liberty of will; the trick of the Pelagians of old, of whom Austine professed thus, *Inimici gratia Dei latent in commendatione natura*, The enemies of Gods grace welter themselves under the commendation of nature. And Austine professeth it to be impiety and madnesse to deny, that God can convert any mans will, when hee will, and where hee will. And you blush not to professe in another discourse of yours, that humility is the disposition, which prepares us for grace. I doubt you will finde little comfort in such humility, and that at the day of judgement, such humility will be found abominable pride.

Cont duas  
epist. Pelag  
l. 2. c. 1.

Enchir. 9. 8

What

What you meane by pledges I know not, you love to walk in cloudes, and in the darke: if you mean the fruits of Gods temporall blessings, how will you prove that these were evidences of that love which God man fested in the death of his Sonne? And if it were so, then this evidence should be manifested to all of ripe yeares: for all are partakers of Gods temporall providence, even they that have filled up the measure of their iniquity. Yet then you usually professe, God withdrawes his love from them: but how can that bee if hee afford them the unquestionable earnestes thereof, as before you called these pledges: whereas in the close you say, that many are not acquainted with this manifestation of Gods love, and that out of meere mercy, it may well passe for one of your paradoxes. I never doubted but that it was a mercy to know Christ, and the love of God to the world in him; but that it was a mercy to want Christ, I never read nor heard till now. Neither is it necessary that men, though reprobates, should be enraged to evill by the Gospell: for God can make even reprobates to profit by it, *ad exteriorem vitam emendationem quâ minus puniantur*, To the outward emendation of their lives, to the end their punishment may be the milder. And we finde by experience that all were not enraged against it.

---

### CHAP. XVIII.

*Want of consideration, or ignorance of Gods unsained love to such as perish, a principall means or occasion why so many perish.*

**F**ROM Gods love to his Vineyard, you have proceeded to discourse of his infinite love towards them that perish; and because in the issue they are never the better for it: and Solomon saith, that *open hatred is better* Prov, 27.5 *then secret love*, which some understand of frumlesse love: therefore



therefore to save this inefficacious nature of Gods love as you shape it, (though yet you count it infinite and ardent, and excessively fervent) you here take upon you to discover unto us the reason why it proves so inefficacious, and that without prejudice to the love of God; and that is, you say, on mans part, to wit, *Want of consideration, or ignorance of Gods unfained love towards them.*

Yet wee doe not say, God is made any looser by the damnation of so many thousands, both men and Angels: for the glory of God is indifferently advanced, as well in the condemnation of them that perish, as in the salvation of his Elect. And the Apostle in this case professeth, saying, 2 Cor. 1. 15. *Wee are unto God the sweet savour of Christ in them that are saved, and in them that perish:* But you proccede and tell vs, *That God hath from eternitie infallibly forecast the entire redemption of his infinite love, which unto us may seeme utterly cast away. And of men, if many die, the fault is their owne, or their instructors.*

But by your leave, I see not how Gods infinite love (if there be any such towards them that perish as you plead there is) is redeemed from being utterly cast away; for surely, they that are thus cast away, are never a whit the better for it. God I confesse is never a whit the worse for their damnation: but if Gods love were such towards them that perish as to will their salvation, surely God is much the worse for that in two respects; First, because his omnipotency is hereby shaken, in as much as that is not brought to passe which he would, and ardently desired (as you speake) that it should come to passe. In which case it followeth, that God is *not omnipotent*; as Austine long agoe discoursed, and thereupon was driven to give such commodious interpretation of that place (whereupon you onely insist in your owne sense, notwithstanding the analogie of Scripture phrase is as directly against that construction of the place, which you lay for a ground of your present discourse as for it) as might not enterfare upon Gods omnipotencie: for by experience wee finde, that whatsoever wee desire to bring to passe, wee alwaies doe bring to passe, if it lies in our  
power

power to bring it to passe : and if wee doe not effect it , it is a manifest signe that wee are not able to effect it. Secondly , God is the worse for it in another respect ; for this love and will of God to them that perish , you make to cease , as soone as they have filled up the measure of their iniquity , how much more after the time of their damnation is come ? And this is to make God mutable , and his will and love to bee of a changeable condition. But God is so perfect as to be without all variablenesse or shadow of change. Iac. 1.

And by the way I observe, you are apt to discourse of Gods infinite love towards them that perish amongst men , but of any such love towards them that perish amongst Angells , nor a word : yet it is as evident, that if any perish amongst Angels, it is meerely their owne faults also : Nay, much more evident is this in the nation of Angells, then in the nation of men. For many thousand infants perish in originall sinne , for no personall originall fault of their owne , but for the transgression of Adam, and in that corruption which is naturally derived unto them from the loynes of Adam , after that by his actuall transgression hee fell into the state of that corruption, which since from him is become hereditarie unto us all. As for that miscarriage which makes all men obnoxious unto the wrath of God , and unto condemnation , wee hold it impossible to be prevented.

For originall sinne and Adams transgression is it , which you well know, cannot be prevented : Onely God may have mercy on whom hee will, even in despight of any actuall miscarriage (which you doat upon as an only hinderer from grace) like as on the other side he hardeneth whom hee will, in spite of all civill and morall good carriage found in the best of heathen men.

This I speake according to the doctrine of Saint Paul ; I confesse , I speake it not according to the doctrine of Silius Italicus , nor according to the doctrine of Sozimus, as found at heart for true heathenisme , as Silius was for his life. And that Sozimus amongst other reproaches he casts upon Christianity, this is one , that wee offer Gods free grace of pardon-

ning all manner of sinnes, to all manner of men that believe in Christ Iesus. And to touch by the way, if it bee the fault, or may be the fault onely of their instructors that many perish, then it is not their owne fault.

Yet certainly it is their owne fault that Angells perish: yet wee see not any paines you take to shew, *How God hath infallibly forecast the intire redemption of his infinite love towards Angells that are cast away*: belike he never entertained any love towards those Angells at all. But Silius Italicus himselfe, that knew this, and considered this, and preacheth it unto others, what did he fare the better for it, was hee saved by it thinke you?

Nay, how many thousands knew this amongst heathen men, as well as Silius, that *Mite & cognitum est homini Deus*, and that he delighted not in the sacrificing of the blood of men, which yet were never a whit the nearer unto salvation for all this: Much lesse so neare as Abraham, even at that time when he travelled three dayes journey to the sacrificing of his sonne Isaac. Yet we confesse, his love is unfainedly extended to all that call him *Maker*; for in that hee made them, and a world for them, and by giving raine and fruitfull seasons, doth fill their hearts with food and gladnesse, hee may bee said to love them, but herchence it followeth not, that hee loves them unto salvation.

Act. 14. 16

And yet how many are so far from having their hearts filled with food and gladnesse, that sometimes they perish for want of bread? But in stead of arguing you turne to prophesying, and tell us, that *Had the doctrines which those divine oracles (God is love and would have all men to be saved) naturally afford, beene for these forty yeares last past, as generally taught, and their right use continually prest with as great zeale and fervencie as the doctrine and uses of Gods absolute decree, for electing some, and reprobating most in that space have beene; the plentifull encrease of Gods glory and his peoples comfort throughout this land, might have wrought such astonishment to our adversaries, as would have put their malicious mouthes to silence.*

I commend your wit in this; for I professe of all inartificiall

ciall arguments, I never heard any answerable unto this. Now if you had added an artificiall argument, unto this inartificiall which you might have had the hap to have read in Southwell, it had beene most compleat; and I had not easily devised what could have beene added hereunto. And the argument is this, Suppose God the Father had written this, and that with the pen of his Spirit, dipt in the bloud of his Sonne, would you not then have believed it? I presume you would, why then believe it now, for the differenee is not in substance, but onely circumstance.

It is the onely thing I remember in that booke of Southwell; and this argument of yours I may perhaps remember when you have forgotten it. But I pray consider, what sect is there in the world that might not use the like? Perhaps you will say, they might use it, not so truely as you doe. But then I pray consider, what evidence have wee for the truth of it on your part, but your owne confidence, and your bare word expressing it? And I hope you will give every sect leave to be as confident of the truth of their owne way, as you are of yours; and as liberall in proving their bare words for it as your selfe.

I have read in Chaucer (to betray unto you what use I can make of him, as well as you of Silius Italicus) of some rime that is called rime dogrell, and if there bee any Logick dogrell, I thinke this is it. But I doe not meane to let your grave discourse passe thus; those Oracles, *God is love, and would have all men to be saved*, you suppose doe naturally afford your doctrines, to wit, that Gods infinite love extends to all and every one, as that hee will that all and every one should bee saved.

But no such things doe these oracles afford, either expressly, or by any just consequence. And of the first (God is love) it is apparant that it containeth no such thing expressly; and as for the deducing of any such consequence herehence, your selfe never yet adventured, nor yet doe; you may as well deduce herehence, that hee will save all Angells, as well as all men, yea the very devills. And as for the second, you think

th at doth expressely signifie as much; but that is untrue; the Scripture phrase doth use that universall signe frequently in another sense, as when it saith of the Pharisees that they did tithe *omne olus*, which cannot be meant of every herbe in particular, but of every sort of herbe in speciall, as Austine himselfe 1200. years agoe observed. So Peter is said to have seen a vessell let down from heaven, wherein was *ᾠὰν τριπλοῦρον*, which cannot be meant of every particular, but only that of every sort, or of most sorts, or of many sorts some one. So it is said, that all Ierusalem and all Iudea went forth to Iohn, the meaning whereof can bee no other then that of all parts of Iudea and of Ierusalem, some went forth unto him.

As for the plentifull encrease of Gods glory and the peoples comfort, which you promise upon the preaching of your doctrine; this is onely upon your word, which unlesse you take upon you to be a Prophet, and be received also for such a one, is of no force.

Act. 18.

But suppose it had beene preached, and not received nor believed by the hearers, I pray what then? Had the peoples comfort beene any whit the more encreased? And for you to presume, that upon the preaching of it, it had beene received, is to take upon you too much; the Gospell it selfe when first preached, the Iewes told S. Paul when hee came to Rome, it was every where spoken against: Yet I confesse, the more erroneous a doctrine is, especially if it be plausible to the judgement of flesh and bloud, the more apt it is to bee entertained by flesh and bloud.

But I pray, what comfort is this you speake of, is it comfort in things spirituall, or comfort in Gods blessings temporall? I graunt willingly, that the truth of God is more apt to breed comfort spirituall, then errors in matters of faith. Now first you must prove your doctrine to be true, and then wee will nothing doubt but it shall be comfortable. You take too much upon you to prophesie that it shall be comfortable and therehence inferre that it is true. But if you speake of comfort in respect of blessings temporall; as I guesse by comparing this with what you delivered in the Epistle dedicatory,

we

wee have but your bare word for this also. But suppose it would prove so, shall we from the temporall comforts wee may enjoy, conclude, that therefore our religion is the true religion?

Alas, what comfort in outward things had christianity in the first three hundred yeares? why may you not as well conclude, that the Synagogue of Antichrist is the very Church of Christ; and our Churches which wee call reformed, are no Churches of Christ; seeing for many yeares God hath humbled us under their hands, and given us over into the hands of beastly men, skilfull to destroy, and still sends serpents and cokatrices amongst us, that will not be charmed? Ezech. 27.  
31.  
Well, this wee see is the comfort you afford us in these heavy times; you give us to understand that tis Gods just judgement upon us, for preaching so much of Gods absolute decrea of electing some, and reprobating most, Ier. 4. 17.

And yet the Lutheran Churches preach as little of this as you doe, and yet wherein have they fared better then their brethren the Calvinists; witnesse the Marquisate of Baden, the land of Brunswick, the land of Hults, the land of Pomerania and Meckelburgh. And the whole kingdome of Bohemia, wherein it is well-knowne, the Calvinists were but few in compariſon to the Lutherans. In the dayes of King James, a restraint began of preaching the doctrine of predestination. Did the peoples comforts, or the comforts of this kingdome encrease any whit hereupon? Within these foure yeares space bookes favouring of Arminianisme, such as youas, have had the presse open unto them with farre greater libertie then their opposites, yet how do the comforts of the people, and of this kingdome encrease?

Yet this is an old trick of Satan, who is therefore called by one *κυκλοδράκων*, a circkling Dragon: For in Saint Austines dayes, when the Empire began to bee invaded by the Gothes, the cause of this was by the heathens alledged to be the embracing of Christian religion, whereupon it was that Austine was moved to write his two and twenty books of the Citie of God. Why may not wee as well say, that the cause

why we taste so little of the grace of God is, because there are so many risen up with might and maine impugning the grace of God. And it is well known, no reformed Churches prosper so well as the Hollanders, though no doubt they have as ranke sinnes to bee found in them as others; yet this they have to their singular commendation, that they suppressed Arminianisme, that Canker-worme of Gods grace, and of his soveraignety over his creatures, & banished the greatest patrons thereof out of their territories.

This inartificiall argument of yours I thought deserved the canvassing, and therefore I have spent so many lines in discovering the rottenness of it.

Now to proceed; you aske, *Who would not be willing to be saved, if he were fully perswaded that God did will his salvation in particular?* When we read this, I muse at the contrariant disposition of our adversaries: for, when wee discourse of election absolute, the Arminian party cryeth out against us; as if hereby wee tooke a course to make men most careless of their salvation; you, though you shake hands with the Arminian party, oppose in a direct contrarious manner, and say, *Who would not bee willing to bee saved* (which is as much as to say, *Who would not bee carefull of his salvation*) *if hee were fully perswaded, that God did will his salvation in particular.* Your meaning is, every one would be carefull of it. So then, all that are of your minde, are most carefull of their salvation: so that it is opposite to the Arminian Tenent, to harden himselfe, or humour himselfe in any profane course, or lewde course of life.

All such must needs turne Saints here on earth, which if it were true, tis to be feared they would be accounted Puritans, and then their opinions would bee liked so much the worse for that. Touching Gods protestation that hee will not the death of any, but the repentance of all, we have said enough, and shewed how you vary from the most authentick translation of our Churches. And it is apparant, that God neither gives repentance nor life to all; and to say that God wills any thing (otherwise then by his will of commandement, which



is improperly, though usually called his will) which cometh not to passe, Austine long agoe professed, was as much as to deny God to be omnipotent.

How sorily you have performed the justifying of your doctrine in this particular, by the authoritie of the Church of England, wee have likewise shewed in its proper place. And if it bee true, that if *this doctrine of yours were believed, all would unfainedly endeavour with fervent alacrity to bee truly happy*, then it must needs bee that like as your selfe doe, so every Arminian doth, *unfainedly endeavour with fervent alacrity (words enough) to bee truly happy*: So that a profane person like Esau, that sold his birthright for a messe of pottage, is not likely to be found amongst the Arminian generation: And I doubt not but a part of your owne *unfained endeavours, with fervent alacrity* in this kinde, consists in writing such books as these, containing so many blasphemies both against the nature and against the grace of God.

For prooffe whereof I appeale to the consideration and judgement of every indifferent Reader, that shall peause the answer of mine therennto. You tell us, *Gods love and goodnesse is so great, that he cannot passe any act, whereby any of his creatures should be debarred, either from being like him in love or goodnesse*. Thus you dictate magisterially, more like a Prophet then a Pastor of Gods Church. But though you bring no reason for what you say, I will trie whether I cannot bring something against it.

And because it is proposed of his creatures in generall, I will begin with the Angels. If this be true, then the Devils are not excluded by any act of God from being like him in love and goodnesse. What hinders then, but that they may be like him in love and goodnesse if they will, and that they may will it? for is not their will as free as mans, in the state of his corruption? Secondly, God hath decreed, that all that are descended from Adam, shall be born in originall corruption; also he hath ordained, that many thousands of them shall die in their infancie, as well out of the Church as within the Church. Now let any man judge, whether by vertue of these decrees.

Aug. cont.  
Yul. Pelag.  
lib. 5. c. 4.

decrees of God, they bee not utterly excluded from being like unto God in love and goodnesse, after an ordinary manner, whereof alone you speake. Againe, all that shall be damned, God hath ordained unto damnation. Now let any man judge, whether by vertue of this decree, and upon supposition thereof, it is not impossible that such should be saved. Of those who are not predestinated unto life, *God brings none unto wholesome and spiritmall repentance*; If God brings none of them unto true repentance, then he hath decreed to bring none of them unto true repentance; and by vertue of this decree they are debarred from being like unto God in love and goodnesse, which I prove thus, None can be like unto God in goodnesse without true repentance, and none can repent except God gives repentance: therefore God having decreed not to give them repentance, by vertue of this decree they are debarred from repentance, and consequently, from being like unto God in goodnesse.

You close this Section with an, *Alas*, the effect whereof is, that by your opposites doctrine, *a mispersuasion is wrought in most men of his goodnesse towards them*; and consequently your meaning is, they grow carelesse of their salvation. Because as before we heard from you, carefulnesse of salvation is an herbe that grows onely in the gardens of Arminianisme. And what is this dangerous doctrine? Surely it is very pretily expressed by you, to wit, in *teaching that God doth oftentimes dispose his blessings of this life, not as undoubted pledges of a better*. Well then, to say, that God doth dispense his blessings of this life unto Turkes and Sarazens, not as pledges of a better, is in danger to make Christians conceive that God is not good to them.

But perhaps you meane it onely in respect of those who pertake of these blessings. Now I professe I never read any of our divines make use of any such consideration in this argument: you love to shape opposites opinion after your own fancy: And yet the truth is, that according to Scripture evidence, temporall blessings are so farre from being generally the pledges of a better life, as that they are noted out unto us

in Scripture to be the character of the wicked, namely, *to Luk. 6.*  
*have their portion in this life. Woe bee to you rich (saith our Savi-*  
*our) for you have received your consolation. And they are the*  
*poore of this world for the most part that God hath chosen.*  
*Iac. 2. 5. God hath chosen the poore of this world, rich in faith and*  
*heires of salvation. And on the other side, the prosperity of the*  
*wicked is such as hath been a scandal to the children of God,*  
*as we read Pf. 73. David himself took offence at it, until he went*  
*into the sanctuary of God, then he understood their end, verl. 17.*  
*Surely (saith he) thou hast set them in slippery places, and castest*  
*them downe into desolation, how suddenly are they destroyed, peri-*  
*shed, and horribly consumed.*

So likewise Ieremie desired to dispute with God here-  
 abouts, *O Lord (saith he) if I dispute with thee thou art righte-*  
*ous: yet let me talke with thee of thy judgements: Wherefore doth*  
*the way of the wicked prosper? why are all they in wealth that re-*  
*bellionously transgresse, 2. Thou hast planted them, and they have*  
*taken roote: they grow and bring forth fruit: Thou art near in their*  
*mouthes, and farre from their heart. 3. But thou, O Lord, know-*  
*est mee, thou hast seene mee and tried my heart toward thee: pull*  
*them out like sheepe for the slaughter, and prepare them for the day*  
*of slaughter.* *Ier. 12. 13*

Now to my simple understanding, the Prophet herein dis-  
 covereth unto us that particular of Gods providence which  
 you impugne; when hee seeth the prosperity of the wicked,  
 he is scandalized, but when hee seeth that this prosperity of  
 theirs is but like the fattening of sheepe and oxen unto the day  
 of slaughter, he is satisfied. For as Salomon saith, *Ease slay-*  
*eth the foolish, and the prosperity of fooles destroyeth them.* *Prov. 1. 32*  
 And looke in what sense God doth make mens tables to bee their  
 snares, *Psal. 69. 21. may he not, or doth hee not in the same*  
*manner make their prosperity be their snares? how can it bee*  
*otherwise if God doth not blesse their prosperity, but rather*  
*curse it?*

And is not this in Gods power? Nay, is it not found to be  
 practised in the course of his providence? *I will send a curse*  
*upon you (saith the Lord) and will curse your blessings; yea, I have* *Mal. 2. 2.*

**Isa. 8. 14.** *cursed them already.* And if it bee lawfull for God to make Christ to be a snare, and a rock of offence unto many, how much more may it well become him to make temporall blessings to be snares unto them, wherein they shall be taken unto destruction? As S. Peter compares some to brut beasts, borne to be taken and destroyed, 1 Pet. 2. 12. And that Christ was made by God a snare unto many, you may learne out of your Forerius (whom I have heard you commend not a little) upon that in Esau 8. 34. *And he shall be as a sanctuary, to wit, unto some, but unto others, a stumbling stone, and a rock to fall upon, and as a snare and a net to the inhabitants of Jerusalem.* And old Simeon prophesied as much of him, saying, *Behold, this childe is appointed for the fall and rising againe of many in Israel, and for a signe which shall be spoken against,* Luk. 2. 34. Even heathen men have observed, that in the course of Gods providence, wicked men are exalted to their greater shame in their ruine. *Tolluntur in altum, ut lapsa graviore cadant.* And if it bee a base minde in any man to bestow guifts on others, hoping thereby for advantage in the way of his commodity: shall it not bee lawfull unto God to give the wicked their hearts desire, which is onely set on temporall prosperity; and to expose them unto temptation, and abandon them, leaving them destitute of his grace, for the distribution whereof he is bound to none; to advance his glory in making them examples in the way of his justice, punishing their pride, unthankfulnessse, lusts, and intemperance?

**Claudian.** What can you say to that of Solomon, *God hath made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill,* Pro. 16. 9. and that of the Apostle, *Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power of the clay to make of the same lump, one vessell to honour, and another unto dishonour?*

But you keepe your course in the way of your owne invention, without reflecting your eyes upon these sacred oracles, as if you meant to broach unto the world a new Law, and a new Gospell. As for the love of the reprobates, God cares not for it. It is in his power alone to worke his love in the hearts of men, by the circumcision of them, Deut. 30. 6. and that

that he will do in whom he will, for he hath mercy on whom Rom. 9. 18  
he will, and whom he will hardeneth.

2 As for sinister respects, they may be found in the creature; they may be found in man, they cannot be found in God. He must respect, and cannot but respect himselfe, and the manifestation of his owne glory as the supream end of all. For, as all things are from him, so all things must bee for him, Rom. 11. last. And accordingly, *He made all things for himselfe.* Prov. 16. 4. And his glory is as well seene in the hardening of whom hee will, as in the comiserating of whom hee will.

And for all the good wit that you and others have learned, *to take good turnes, and not to be taken by them;* There is a wisdom of God that will be sure to take them, for whom hee hath laid snares; and make their wisdom, and cunning, and pride, and insolencie, and wilfulnesse, tend to the praise of his glory, in what kinde soever pleaseth him, either in the way of his justice in their just condemnation, or in the way of his glorious grace, in the pardoning of their sinnes, and saving their soules.

As for your rules of observation, touching the natures of men, I might let them passe: I am no professed student in such like; yet I finde yours shallow enough. I see no reason but such as are worldly wise may meete with their matches, that may know when to trust them, and when not, and work out their owne advantage either way.

Why mistrust should make an honest man the worse, I know no reason; as for a knave, whether he mistrusts others or no, what becomes he the better? A silly conceit it is in my judgement, to thinke that any man should bee moved to justify an others ill opinion of him, by doing evill, unlesse that evill be pleasing to him, whose good opinion he affects for his owne advantage. For as *he that refraineth himselfe from evill, maketh himselfe sometimes a prey;* so a man must, *audire aliquid brevibus Gyris & carcere dignum si vult esse aliquid.* And there never want some knights of the post, and such as will prostitute their conscience to serve any turne for advantage. No faithlesse age can make any good rules of morality out of date of

Eccl. 9. 15.

truth, though out of date of practise. Yet I have heard a storie of a French Gentleman in the wars of France, when certaine Freebooters were unawares entred within his house, saved his owne life, and his family from spoiling, by meere confidence, and was bid at parting, to thanke his owne confidence for speeding so well.

It is alwaies true, *Ipsa fides habita* (in good ground) *obligat fidem*: it is sometimes true, *procurat fidem*. Themistocles found it true, when hee offered himselfe to the king of the Molossians, who formerly had beene his enemy: and many generous Generalls deale never a whit the worse with them that cast themselves at the foot of their mercy. Yet *God is true, and every man a lyar*.

Let us be bold to trust in God, and desire to fall into his hands, and keepe us from falling into the hands of men: yet if God calleth us thereunto, to commit our selves unto God, when we doe cast our selves into the hands of men. Because in Gods hands are the hearts of kings, and hee turneth them whither soever it pleaseth him; certainly, *They that put their trust in the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good*, even at such times when *Lyons want and suffer hunger*. Yet by your leave it is not the nature of God that is the ground of our confidence, but the revealed will of God. For whatsoever Gods nature is, hee workes freely in the communicating of any good thing unto us: but hee hath revealed, that *he will never faile them that put their trust in him*. And this is that loving kindenesse of God, as much as to say, his loving and gracious will and pleasure revealed to us, which excites the *sonnes of men to put their trust under the shadow of his wings*. It was improbable that there should bee any motive from the creature, why God should give them a being; neither was it his love to the creature that moved God to make the creature, as you superficially use to discourse, but meere the love of himselfe.

PREV. 16.4 *For he made all things for himselfe.*

And the creature before God made him was just nothing, neither was there at that time any distinction betweene King Alexander and his horse Bucephalus. It is a strange conceit to  
say

say, that the being of the creature is like unto Gods being, who is the Creator. For what likenesse is there betwene an apple and a nut, between an horne and a bagpipe, an harp and an harrow.

*Ens* hath no univocation in the comprehending of all created entities, much lesse as by denomination it comprehends both the Creator, and the creature. Certainly all do not love God whom he loves; for he loved us when we were his enemies, Rom. 5.8. But if all did so love him, as all shall either sooner or later, it will not follow that all should bee saved. For onely such as Iacob are loved of him in Scripture phrase, and such as Esau are hated rather.

And though you will not bee beaten off from that uncouth assertion, *That they whom God wills to be saved are not saved*, yet we had rather abhorre so foule a sentence with Austine, as denying Gods omnipotency, then concurre with you in boldnesse to the embracing of it. The apprehension of Gods love to us, is the cause (morall) of our love to him: though God it is that by the circumcision of our hearts workes it, Deut. 30. 6. But if lovelinesse in the object be the cause of love; how dare you professe God loves the reprobate, and that ardently, and with excessive and infinite love. Is there any lovelinesse in them in the state of their corruption, and not rather unlovelinesse throughout?

Neither will it serve your turne to say, that he loves them as his creatures: For if this be sufficient to qualifie the businesse of the object which hee loves, you may as well say that hee loves frogs and toads; yea, and the Devills and damned Spirits.

3. I make no question but an unregenerate man may love his friend and companion in evill, as brethren in evill do love one another: and our Saviour hath taught us as much, Matt. 5. 49. *If yee love them that love you what reward shall ye have? doe not the Publicanes even the same?* I never heard nor read before that condemnation was dispensable: The doing of things otherwise unlawfull, in some cases may be dispensed with, but punishment was never knowne to be dispensed with; it may



be remitted, but that is not to dispense with it. I take your meaning and leave your words, you thinke belike that infinite mercy cannot free the world from condemnation. I no way like such extravagant assertions, though frequent in your writings; as if you would innovate all both naturall reason, and divinity.

I know no sinne which infinite mercy cannot pardon; neither doe I know any sinne beside the sinne against the Holy Ghost, and finall impenitency, which God will not pardon in his elect. Much lesse is mans dull backwardnesse to love him unpardonable. For though as it seemes you were never conscious of any such dulnesse in your selfe, yet I cannot easily be perswaded untill I finde cause, that any Christian in the world entertaines such a conceite of himselfe, as you doe of your selfe. Be God never so louely, yet if a man know him not, how can hee love him?

And doe you thinke it is naturall for a man to know God? Suppose we doe know him to be most wise, most powerfull: yet if he be our enemy; how should this move us to love him, or put our trust in him? If we know him to love us, and to be our friend, yet are not the best backward enough from loving him, when we are easily drawne to sinne against him? And are all sinnes of this kinde unpardonable? what an uncomfortable doctrine is this, and how prone to carry all that believe it into desperation? God regards not our love unlesse we keep his commandements, 1oh. 14. 5. Againe, what is the love of God? Is it not to love him above all things? even above our selves? as Gerson expresseth it, *Amor Dei usque ad contentum sui*. Is this naturall? long agoe Austine hath defined it to bee supernaturall: And if any dull backwardnesse bee found in us to this love of God; if wee are loath to lose our lives for Christs sake, is this sinne unpardonable? You are a valliant Champion, I heare you are ready to dye in maintenance of your opinions, but I cannot believe you are any whit the readier for that to die for Christ.

But, alas, what should become of poore Peter, that for feare of some trouble upon confessing himselfe to bee a fol-  
lower

lower of Christ, denied that he knew him, and that with oath and imprecation? Yet Christ looked back upon him, as before he had praied for him, that his faith might not fail; and Peter looked back upon himselfe, and went forth and wept bitterly; and within three daies after the Angells take speciall order, that Peter by name should be acquainted (with the first) with the comfortable newes of Christs resurrection from the dead; that as he died for his sinnes, so hee rose again for his justification. The infinite love of God becomes known onely to the regenerate, who take notice of it chiefly, as touching blessings spirituall. As for temporall blessings, Gods love therein to man, how can it be knowne to a man unregenerate, seeing it can bee knowne onely by faith? Those temporall blessings you speake of in the judgement of flesh and blood, comming to passe onely by course of nature.

But that his intencion in bestowing temporall blessings upon the wicked, is to binde himselfe to instate them in *the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life*, which hee never meanes to performe, is one of your incomprehensible paradoxes. To the children of God there is no such obligation: for tis not the blessings, but the sanctified use of them, that is a pledge and assurance to them of the favour of God unto salvation; and so the sanctified use of Gods temporall curses, are no lesse evident a pledge and assurance to them of the same favour of God: For by chastising divers and sundry waies with crosses and afflictions, hee manifests unto them, that God receives them for his sonnes, and so esteemes of them, and not as bastards. Heb. 12. 8.

I am glad to heare you acknowledge, that, *Of all the motions of our hearts and soules God is the sole author and guide*. For such acknowledgements are most rare with you; and which you cannot embrace without manifest contradiction to your selfe, and overthrowing all your discourse touching Gods decree, which as you say, decreeth contingency, but not the contingent things themselves.

But the motions of the soule and heart are contingent things, and these must needes be decreed by God, if they be produced

produced by God: And if God be the author of them, hee must needs produce them. So that the whole tower of your discourse touching Gods decree is suddenly overthrowne by your selfe, and that with the blast of this one sentence. Besides, when you acknowledge God to be the authour of all the motions of our hearts and soules, you therewithall acknowledge him to be the author of evill motions as well as good: For you doe not say, hee is the author of all good motions, but, *of all whose motions* (in reference to our hearts, our soules, our strength) *God is the sole Authour and guide*: yet we dare not avouch that God is the Author, much lesse the sole Author of all our motions, without manifold distinctions. And to my thinking, it became you to be very cautulous of such assertions, who are so apt to charge your opposites with making God the Author of sinne.

Of every action of man that is free, wee maintaine man to be the author as well as God; but man wee make in operation subordinate unto God, the second cause unto the first. This is true as touching actions naturally considered, and as touching good actions, but with a difference; man in working any naturall action we make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence generall; in working good actions, wee make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence speciall.

But as touching evill actions there wee make man alone to be the author of them as they are evill, without any subordination unto God in respect of any influence, generall or speciall. And cannot sufficiently wonder what improvidence hath overtaken you, to out-lash in so strange a manner. But even in this we acknowledge a providence of God confounding the wittes and tongues of them that build up Babel. I  
 xli. 19. 14 remember what the Prophet saith of the Egyptians, *The Lord hath mingled among them the spirit of errors: and they have caused Egypt to erre in every worke thereof; as a drunken man erreth in his vomit: and how is that, but in defiling himselfe; and that which is before him. of his owne favourites that sit next unto him. Christs yoke is easie and his burthen light to the regenerate;*

regenerate : but is it so unto naturall men ? doe they not account it coards and bands ? Psal. 2. Doth not the Apostle tell us, *The affections of the flesh are not subject to the law of God; nor can be ?* It seemes you are a very morrall man, you do so willingly fall upon this theame, of advancing the power of mans naturall morallity. But I remember withall what Austine sometimes said, *Malo humilem peccatorem quam superbum innocentem.* And arrogancie is a speciall fruit of pride : And you discourse in such sort of the nature of man, as if it had never beene corrupt in Adam. Rom. 8.7.

4. If our love of God be raised from the beliefe of his loving kindenesse to us, then our love to God is not the first conception or plantation of true happinesse, but rather our faith, as the Apostle plainly testifieth, 1 Tim. 1. 5. saying. *The end of the law is love, out of a pure heart, and good conscience, and faith unfained.* And neither the one nor the other is the worke of nature, but of Grace; nor the worke of God neither by influence generall and naturall, but by influence speciall and spirituall.

As for the conclusion you deduce herchence, it is well known that life, and sense, and reason we obtaine by course of nature, and naturall generation of naturall and reasonable parents. And to know that God gives all this, and maintaines naturall generation by the counsell of his will, that he it is that fashioneth us in the wombe, is not knowne by light of nature : for the greatest Philosophers knew not this but by light of grace, and so the meanest christian comes acquainted with this mysterie. But herehence to inferre that God *hath a purpose to give me with them whatsoever good things my heart, my sense, or reason can desire,* is a verie loose inference. God hath no purpose to give his own children whatsoever good thing they doe desire, much lesse what they can desire. Paul desired 2 Cor. 11. and prayed thrise to be delivered from the buffetings of Satan, but God granted it not unto him. Moses desired to go Deut. 3.25 over Iordan to see the goodly mountain, and Lebanon, but it was denied him. Abraham desired that the blessing might be conferred on Ishmael, but could not obtaine it. And no

marveyle. For God knows what is better for us then our selves; the childe prayeth for his Fathers health sayth Austine, but it is Gods pleasure to take him away by death. God hath not promised to give us all that we desire, much lesse that sense desireth; but hath promised that all things shall worke together for our good. even povertie as well as riches, sicknesse as well as health, and adversitie as well as prosperitie. For every creature of God is sanctified unto them that beleive and know the truth. This is the faith only of a childe of God, who is the heyre of the World by faith in Christ. But to say of all and every one, hand over head that God hath a purpose to give them all eternall life, is your common errour, that now is like an hereditary sicknesse unto you: driving you to maintayne two foule tenets; the one, that God is not omnipotent, as purposing to give that which he never performes, a manifest signe that he is not able to performe it; as Austine many hundred yeares agoe disputed Enchirid 95. *Deus noster in caelo sursum, in terra omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit. Quod utique non est verum, si aliqua voluit & non fecit, & quod est indignius, ideo non fecit quoniam ne fieret, quod volebat omnipotens, voluntas hominis impedivit.* And Enchirid. 96. *Deo procul dubio quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse, non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsum nostra fidei confessionis initium qua nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere confitemur. Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest, nec voluntate cuiusquam creature, voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus.* The other tenet as foule as the former is this, that God changeth. For undoubtedly at this time he hath no purpose to save the Divells and damned soules of men: therefore if ever he had any such purpose it is now changed; and consequently God is changed himselfe. You have no way to avoyde this, but by saying that Gods purpose you speake of, is not absolute but conditionall as before you upbraided your opposites for maintaining Gods decree of election to be absolute. Yet the Arminians at the conference of Hage utterly declined the maintenance of Gods decree of election to be conditionall,

Yet the shirte will not serve your turne , being too narrow a lease to cover the shamefull nakednesse of your assertion. For to purpose conditionally is no more a purpose of salvation then of condemnation ; which is no way an evidence of Gods love to any man in particular, the issue wherof is indifferent to be condemnation as well as salvation. But you hitherto in this respect have insisted upon the maintenance of Gods love to all and every one.

The beginning which God found out for mankind was a being indifferent to stand or fall, which indifferency fitted him no more for salvation in case he stood, then for damnation in case he fell ; save that God was withall resolved to provide him of a Saviour upon his fall, that should be as *tabula post naufragium*, but to whome ? only to these whome he loved as he loved Iacob, not unto those whome he hated as he hated Esau. For as *he made all things for himselfe, so also he made the wicked against the day of evill*, and ever that for himselfe also. Why Gods love in respect of creation, should be accounted his infinite love, I know no reason, considering, that the meanest creature was partaker of that love as well as man. Pro. 16. 4.

And as he gave being unto all things, so he maintaynes being to Divells and damned men and ever will doe. We are knit unto God by faith as well as by love and of the two, faith is the more noble as being the Fountaine and cause of love. If God out of love be sayd to make us what we are ; it may as well be sayd that out of love he made all other creatures what they are. If you reply, that they were made out of his love to us, for as much as they were made for our use and service: In like sort I answere, that it was out of love to himselfe that he made us, for as much as he made us for his owne use and service; yea and all things else that were made. For he made all things for himselfe. In like sort if God made us what we are because he was lovinge to us : he made also all creatures what they are because he was loving to them. Yet by your leave, *He made all things for himselfe.*

And this is the foure and twenty Elders acknowledgment Revela. 4. 11. *Thou art worthy o Lord, to receive glory, and honour,*

and power. For thou hast created all things, and for thy Wills sake they are and have bin created. You say true, where faith and love is found there is assurance of Gods favour towards us to set both his wisdom & power on worke to make all things worke together for our good, and so to preserve us to his heavenly Kingdome.

But the question is whether this faith and love be the workes of nature, and wherof all are capable by power of nature or whether they are the meere fruites of Gods grace, afforded to some denied to others according to the good pleasure of his owne will, as *who hath mercie on whome hee will and whom he will he hardneth.*

## CHAP. XIX.

*How God of a most lovinge Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge.*

**N**OW because you cannot but perceave how this pincheth sore upon the unchangeable nature of God. Therefore you spend two chapters in the clearing of this difficulty; wherein if you satisfie your selfe it is well. As for my part I am so farre from receaving satisfaction that I am utterly to seeke in understanding the course you take to give satisfaction. Whether anger, hate, or jealousy, have any seate in the omnipotent Majestie is litle to the purpose.

But to shew how God of a most loving Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge, without any change, this alone is to the purpose. For the very manner of proposing it doth imply the ceasing to be a loving Father which he was, but becomes a severe & inexorable judge, which he was not. For to bee a loving Father and a severe judge all at once, is not of a lovinge Father to become a severe judge. And though this were granted you; yet it is not congruous to your tenet to main-  
tayne



sayne that God was an inexorable judge to any, before the measure of his iniquity be full. And as then he first begins to become an inexorable judge, so it is requisite that then he ceaseth to be a loving Father. And albeit you are loath to acknowledge this because it doth so manifestly imply a change in the nature of God; yet you must be driven hitherto whether you will or no unlesse you maintayne, that still God continueth a most loving Father unto the Divells and ever shall be both unto them and to all damned persons notwithstanding the wrath of God continue upon them to everlasting damnation.

And it is a very strange dialect to acknowledge that God is a most loving Father unto damned persons: especially considering that in Scripture phrase we are sayd to be the *Sonnes of God by faith in Christ Jesus*. Gala. 3. 26. And indeede if you can make good, that to inflict everlasting damnation, doth consort with infinite mercy; then you shall obteyne, not that God of a most loving Father doth become an inexorable judge; but that at once he is both a most loving father and a most inexorable judge also.

As for anger whether it be in God or no, or whether Lactantius hath carryed himselfe well or no in this Argument, it is nothing at all to this present businessse. The question is whether God ardently desiring the salvation of any man doth at length cease to desire it, or whether still he continueth to will and ardently desire a mans salvation notwithstandinge that he purposeth to inflict or actually doth inflict upon him condemnation. For this seemes to be the intended issue of your discourse as when you undertake to illustrate, *how extreame severitie may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love*. As much as to say, that God loves the Devills and loves the damned; and continueth the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love towards them, notwithstanding that he doth inflict everlasting condemnation upon them, and because this love you account all one with mercy and that it is infinite; in like sort infinite mercy may consort (as before you speake) w<sup>th</sup> extreame severity.

Hence it followeth that all are vessels of mercy, the reprobate as well as the elect, only here is the difference, the elect are only vessels of mercy, but the reprobate are both vessels of mercy and vessels of wrath also. Now I demaund what is the fruite of this love, and of this mercy of God towards the damned. Can you devise any fruite of this but the preservation of them in being? And may you not as well say; that he loves at this day every creature, in as much as he preserveth them? And consider I pray doe you call this fatherly love and doe you account this the fervency of fatherly love? And doth either Scripture or Ecclesiasticall phrase allow you in this? Yet speake your minde plainly, and say that Gods will to preserve his creatures may stand with extreame severity used towards them, and no man will contend with you at all in this.

But then consider, whether you are well in your witts, when you enter upon the prooffe of this as of some rare notion; when the issue of your meaning falleth upon a most vulgar conceyte and explication. And whether this be to proove that *God of a most lovinge Father becomes a severe and inexorable Judge*, when the only fruit of his love is the holding of his childrens noses unto the grindstone of his wrath, and inplacable displeasure. Yet let us take notice of your illustration.

2. Here wee have a large discourse of Manlius Torquatus and his severe execution upon his owne Sonne, for transgressing the commaundement of his Generall; therefore Martiall lawe was executed by the father (being at that time Generall) upon his owne sonne. But were it all true that you discourse in justifying that fathers severitie upon his child; Yet you miserably forget your selfe, when you say, *That excessive love which he bare unto his person, whilst his hopefull beginnings did seeme to promise an accomplishment of his Martiall vertues, turnes into extreame severity and indignation after hee proves transgressor.* For this is not to shew, how extreame severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love; but rather to shew how fatherly love ceaseth and severity and indignation comes in the place thereof,

This

This is rather answerable to the theame proposed *how a most loving Father becomes a severe judge*, and answerable to the former discourse of Gods withdrawing his goodnesse from those that have once filled up the measure of their iniquity. But because in this manner it cannot be applyed unto God without acknowledging mutability in the nature of God, as well as in the nature of men: Therefore as I conceive your pretence was to illustrate *how extreame severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly love*; though indeede you performe nothing lesse, but rather shew how that fatherly love ceased as being turned into extreame severity and indignation. Yet it seemes you did but forget your selfe in this.

And that your drift was to shew how notwithstanding his love towards his sonne continuing the same, yet in a greater love of Martiall discipline he caused his head to be stricken off. But this also will nothing serve your turne. For notwithstanding this, we see a manifest alteration. For Manlius conceived not any such indignation against his sonne till now, never entertayned any will to cut him off till the noyse of his transgression came unto his eares. All which cannot bee sayd of God (as it must be if the case be alike) without acknowledging as manifest alteration and innovation in the nature of God.

There was a time wherein Manlius desired his sonnes life and prosperitie; there was a time when he willed and commaunded him to be put to death. It was impossible that both those should be at once in Manlius as implying flat contradiction: Yet you place them both in God eyther at once and so imply contradiction, or successively and so introduce alteration into the nature of God: Manlius his purpose and will was changed upon the fact of his sonne, and his sonne was consumed by it.

But God is the Lord and is not changed, and therefore the sonnes of Jacob are not consumed. So Selencus never intertayned any thought or purpose of pulling out his sonnes eyes til he was found guiltie of adulterie; this cannot be sayd of God without subjecting him to variablenesse and somewhat

more

more then shadowe of change. And therefore though Manlius and Selencus be justified in their courses and God justified in his, as no man makes question, whether God be just in that which he doth: yet this proves not that God is exempt from alteration one way, in making a will to damne a man succede in God his will to save him; or your selfe from contradiction another way, in making God at one and the same time both to will a mans salvation, and at the same time to will the same mans condemnation, yea and to inflict it also. And looke by what reason God may at one, and the same time will both the salvation, and condemnation of the same man, by the same reason he may at the same time both damne and save the same man.

For if you say he wills to save him as he is a man, and wills to damne him as he is a sinner; by the same reason you may say that he can both save him, as he is a man, and damne him as he is a sinner. For the contradiction is as manifest in the one, as in the other: Yet there is a greate deale of difference betweene the course of Manlius Torquatus and the courses of God. For Manlius did not cut off his sonnes heade, but for an actuall and personall transgression of his sonne: but God causeth many thousand Infants to perish in originall sinne, through no actuall and personall transgression of their owne. What place can you find for that fervency of Gods fatherly love towards them?

Agayne God hath power in the course of his gracious providence to keepe men from those transgressions, which make them incurre condemnation.

Now let any man judge whether Manlius would not have kept his sonne from transgression in this kinde if he coule. Thirdly Manlius was not able to provide that the strictnesse of Military discipline should not be remitted, by relaxation of the punishment of his sonne; but God is able to procure that no discipline shall bee the more remitted by reason of his shewing mercy on whome he will. Nay there is mercy with thee sayth the Prophet that thou mayst be feared.

Lastly Manlius had no power to pardon whome he would without

without partiality: but God hath power to have mercy on whome he will, yea and to harden whome he will and that without injustice or partiality. Yet I am content to consider the course you take in justifying Manlius.

First you acquaint us with your persuasions and lay them for groundes, a very proper course of argumentation. And these are that *few had taken the like care and paines to train up their children in the most commendable qualities of that age.*

Secondly, that *None would have adventured his owne person further to have rescued his sonne from the enemy, or justified him in any honorable quarrell;* and this is very ponderously amplified by comparison with a tender harted Mother whome notwithstanding all her tenderesse, the imbecillity of sexe would not suffer to goe so farre. *Speētatum admissi risum teneatis amici?* Most frivolous conjectures and serving to no purpose. For no man doubts but that it might well be, that the love and care of maintayninge Martiall discipline prevayled above the love of his sonne.

I say it might well be so, I doe not say it was so. Now give me leave to say somethinge against Manlius and the like *Manliana imperia* as you have spent many wastfull lines in pleading for him and them. Consider what Livy observeth hereupon; in his returne homewards victoriously, the fathers only went forth to meete him: the youth of Rome both then and ever after hated and abominated him. Before this we reade of Aulus Posthumius a famous dictator, of him Livy writes thus: *Egregia dictatura tristem memoriam faciunt qui filium ab Aulo Posthumio, qui occasione bene pugnandi captus, in iussu discesserit praesidio, victorem securi percussum tradunt, nec libet credere: & argumento est quod imperia Manliana non Posthumiana appellata sint quam qui prior autor tam sevi exempli foret, occupaturus insignem titulum crudelitatis fuerit.* Livy. dec. 2  
lib. 4.

After this L. Papirius Cursor nothing inferiour in care of Martiall discipline to Manlius Torquatus, as whome the Romans had destinated as fit to oppose Alexander the greates, had he invaded Italia, in the like case pardoned Q Fabius, upon the intercession of the people; who yet was no sonne of Pa-

pirius. Consider the case it selfe. No laws of men are so strict but may admit *temperantum aliquod*, because mans providence is so shallow, as cannot foresee all particular cases. *Lex non caret de particularibus*. For a stranger to goe upon the walls of the Towne in some places hath bin Capitall, yet when the enemy hath bin in skalinge the walls, and a stranger seing it hath encouraged himselfe to advance, and beate downe the enemy, this fact of his hath bin deemed rather meritorious of reward then of punishment.

Manlius the young Gentleman was provoked by the proude speeches of Metuis the Captaine of the enemy. To indure his braving, had bin to suffer the reputation of cowardice, and enough to have discouraged his owne troupe & made his enemyes insolent. As Goliahs defying of Israel strooke feare and terroure into the hearts of the Israelites and lifted up the hearts of the Philistins.

Neither doe I comprehend how any ranke was broken or disordered by this single fight or any inconvenience might redound by this fact of his. But the end being victoriouse and all the damage redounding to the disgrace and dishonour of the enemy. I feare something els possessed the carnall heart of Manlius the Father besides care of Martiall discipline. Why might he not disdeyne that the glory of his sonne allready equalling the glory of his father, might shortly blemish it? at the best a dogged and pertinaciouse adherence to the maintenance of his owne imperiouse course might quench all naturall affection in him. For could no other punishment serve the turne but death?

And might not discipline be maintayned unlesse in so extraordinary a case, the Consulls sonne transgressing, were adjudged to the same punishment that the basest coward deserved? Observe what issue the like severity of Papirius had; and whether it had not bin likely to have marred all, had not hee in time tempered it with mildnesse and gentlenesse. For the enemy understanding of such like strict commaundes, whensoever the Dictator was absent, then would they stirre most, knowing that the Roman Soldiers durst not stirre, yea the hearts

hearts of his owne Soldiers beganne to forsake them , that they had no courage to fight.

Yet consider how Papirius caryed himselfe towards a Cap-  
tayne of Præneste (not his sonne) and that when he had played  
the coward. *Prænestinus Prætor per timorem segnis ex subsidij  
suos duxerat, in primam aciem, quem cum inambulans ante ta-  
bernaculum vocari iussisset, victorem expedire securim iussit. Ad  
quam vocem examine stante Prænestino. Agedum licet, excide  
radicem hanc, inquam, incommodam ambulantibus: perfunsumque  
ultimi supplicij metu, multa dicta, dimisit.* By the way I cannot  
but take notice of an inconsideration if not altogether in dicu-  
lous passage of yours , as when you say of this Manlius, that  
the more desirous he was to make him like himselfe in religious ob-  
servance of *Martiall* discipline, and practise of justice towards  
the enimies, the readier he was to doe justice upon him for doing  
the contrary. Why was the cutting off of his head a fit course  
to make him like himselfe in religious observance of *Martiall*  
discipline, and practise of justice towards the enemy? I pro-  
fesse, I see no reason for it, it might rather make him the more  
desperate, because now he had no more heads to loose. Yet  
I confesse he taught him effectually hereby never to spare any  
in the like transgression.

As for the rest , I esteeme it but frothe, I have no cause to  
trouble my selfe or others with any farther consideration  
therof.

3. God you say *must enjoy libertie or priviledge of loving  
himselfe best.* Your forme in expressing this I doe not so well  
like: For I had thought this had rather bin a necessity then a  
liberty; And priviledge is of signification too base to bee ap-  
plied unto God. For priviledges are granted from superiors  
to inferiors. But who shall priviledge God? In a worde God  
loves himselfe only as the end of all other things, and all  
other thinges which he loves but as meanes tendinge to that  
end. For he made all things for himselfe; and of Israel he pro-  
fesseth that *he hath formed him also for himselfe.* Here you con-  
clude that he loves equity and justice better then he doth any man;  
but what meant you to leave out Mercy? did that sticke in

Ec. 43. 21.



your teeth, especially considering that forthwith you acknowledge him to be the eternall patterne of mercy as well as of justice? And if he be equity it selfe, is he not justice it selfe also? And if he be justice it selfe, is he not mercy it selfe also? seeing you make him the eternall patterne of the one as well as of the other? And give that as a reason why he must love justice better then any man? Yet I no way like your divinity in this. For I doe not acknowledge the nature of God to be the patterne which we must imitate in the first place, but rather the law of God; and we are to imitate his nature only in those things, the performance wherof is allowable by Gods law, God might allowe the Israelits in robbing the Egyptians, Abraham in sacrificing his sonne, Sampson in sacrificing himselfe; we may not allowe any in the like: God hath power to expose men unto sinne, to harden mens hearts, we may not take any such courses; but rather doe all we can to keepe our bretheren from sinne.

Now from your discourse it no more followeth that God cannot be unjustly mercifull, then that he cannot be unmercifully just, especially towards those whom he loves more dearly then any man doth himselfe as you speake. And if you would be pleased to take notice by the way of the oracles of God, and not follow still the course of your owne inventions you might find that *God hath mercy on whome he will, and hardneth whome he will.* Yet is not he either unjustly mercifull in the one, or unmercifully just in the other; Neyther should he be, though the case were altered, and he were mercifull to those whome now he hardneth, and hardned those whome now he comiserateth *satis contraria fata reponens.*

But let us goe with you along the coast of Barbarie. Gods love (you say) extends it selfe unto our nature so polluted with corruption. It is true and that not only in respect of corruption by sinne originall but by sinne actuall. For he gave his sonne to dy for us, when we were his enemyes, and when we were dead in sinne and walked after the Prince of the ayre, and fashions of the world, he quickned us. Ephes. 2. 29. The effects of this love you say are limited towards men by the correspondency, which

which they hold or toose with that absolute goodnesse, or with those rules of equity, in which his will is to have man made like him. This manner of limitation is unsound, and fowly unsounde; as that which apparantly excludeth our correspondency to Gods goodnesse, and unto Gods love, out of the number of the effects of Gods love; as much as to say that faith and repentance, thankfulness and obedience are no effects of Gods love, but merely works of nature, as if it were not God that worketh in us both the will & the deede according to his good pleasure.

Phil. 2. 13.

As if regeneration were but the imagination of a vayne thing; For I presume, you will not say, it is in the power of man to regenerate himselfe. And how can it be a work of God if not an effect of his love, and correspondency unto Gods goodnesse you make to prevent the effects of Gods love. Agayne the effects of Gods love the Scripture teacheth us are limited according to the good pleasure of God, both as touching graces of edification (for he distributes to every one as he will. 1 Cor. 12.) and as touching the graces of sanctification. For he hath mercy on whome he will. Rom. 9. And according to his purpose and grace he hath saved us and called us not according to our works. 2 Tim. 1. 9. And of his owne will hath he begotten us, &c. There is a condition of morall goodnesse, which God doth accept to reward with glory; but there is no condition of morall goodnesse which God doth accept to reward with grace: For then grace were of works, and consequently no more grace. And then God should call us according to our works which he expressly denyeth. Tit. 3. 5. and 2 Tim. 1. 9. There is no condition of morall viciousnesse that excludes Gods mercy in calling men unto faith and salvation.

Iac. 2.

Austine coumpts it impiety and madnesse to thinke otherwise, as I have often alleaged him. Enchirid. 96. He calls some at the first houre of the day, some at the last. And what absurde conceyte is it to require some mitigation of sinne or morall good qualification to make correspondency unto mercy in pardoning sinne and curing it? As no disease of the

body is uncurable by God ; so no disease of the soule or sinfull course is unpardonable or uncurable by the mercy of God the Father, the merits of God the sonne. For each are infinite; but the sinnes of all the world are finite. God himselfe may limite the demonstration and exercise of his mercy as he thinks good. Now as touching the limitation hereof nothing is revealed unto us, but only this, that the sinne against the Holy Ghost shall not be pardoned and cured no small infidelity and impenitency.

All other limitations are merely revelations of flesh and blood, and the inventions of idle Braines ; that impugne the prerogative of Gods grace, and in the place thereof advance the operation of nature, as that which first commends us in some sort unto Gods grace ; you are apt to discourse of Gods inviting men unto God, and of the riches of his bounty that way ; but of Gods working men unto God, and of the riches of his bounty, that may never any Arminian or Pelagian spake lesse then you. Yet the despising of Gods goodnesse shewed eyther in his word or in his works shall indoubtably increase mens condemnation. But God can breake of these their contemptiouse courses in whome he will, and when he will, and where he will, as Austine professeth with such confidence, as that he censureth him of impiety and dotery whosoever he be that denyeth it.

A silly course it is, to inferre that vicious courses doe exclude men from Gods mercy, because God hates filthinesse or uncleannesse. For God undoubtedly hates all manner of filthinesse and uncleannesse whether the measure of it be filled up or no ; For did he not hate Manasses his idolatry and his bloody courses, and his using them that were given to sorcery and witchcraft ? Yet all this excluded him not from the participation of Gods mercy. And if for this reason, to wit, because God hates filthinesse, men are excluded from Gods favour, so as to be incapable of his mercy ; then every man should be a reprobate and incapable of mercy, and abandoned as a vessel of wrath unto everlasting condemnation.

And you consider not, that to be incapable of mercy is to

be incapable of Gods love; even in your owne discourse; whence it followeth, that God must after a certayne time cease to love them; as in reason it should be acknowledged by you, according to the tenour of your opinion; and that when the doore of repentance is shut upon them, as your selfe have phrasified it, most of all when God condemnes them to everlasting torments in hell fire, he must needs cease to love them. And consequently you must necessarily admit mutability in the nature of God, which is directly contrary to the perfection of God delivered unto us in holy Scripture. *For the Lord am not changed and you sonnes of Iacob are not consumed.* Mala. 3. 6. And with God is no variablenesse nor shadow of change. Iac. 1. 19. This rocke you have in your eye & labour to keepe your Tenet from dashing it selfe desperately against it. Wherin how well you have carryed your selfe we are to consider in the next place.

## CHAP. XX.

*Whilst God of a loving Father becomes a severe judge, there is no change or alteration at all in God, but only in men and in their actions. Gods will is allwayes full-filled even in such as goe most against it. How it may stand with the justice of God to punish transgressours temporall with torments everlasting.*

**T**He objection that by your Tenet the nature of God is made subject to change and alteration, your selfe proposed in the former chapter; but you addresse your selfe to make answer therunto in this yet not without fetching a greate compasse which inclines rather to a worke of circumvention then of satisfaction. *Love you say is the Mother of all Gods workes and the fertility of his power and essence; that is the fruitfull Mother of all things, and the power*  
and

and essence of God by love becomes the fruitfull Mother of all things. Yet to shew how apt you are to forget your selfe (which usually falleth out whē men discourse *quicquid in buccam venerit*) in the 8. chap. and pag. 91. you told us as a quaint conceyte that *we may conceive wisdom to be the Father and power the Mother of all Gods works of wonder*; and I thinke you account few or no works more wonderfull then the creation.

And yet that which you say here, I preferre before that which you had formerly exprest there; because the love of God hath stricter sociation with the will of God then eyther wisdom or power. But you have not discovered unto us, if love be the Mother what is to be accounted the Father. Or if you referre this to the loving will and affection of God, why this should be accounted the Mother rather then the Father of the works of God.

Agayne we have earthly parents as Father and Mother, which are indewed with wills and loves and other affections, and it is out of all course to say that theire love or theire will is the Mother of theire children; especially considering that will is found in the Father, as well as in the Mother, yea and love also; if not in greater measure. But I deny not but that God made the world out of love; but out of love to whome? to the creature? Nothing lesse I should thinke (as before I have shewed) but rather out of love to himselfe, as Prov. 16. 4. *God made all things for himselfe*. And greate reason, God who is the soveraigne Creator of all things, should be the supream end of all things. But let this passe. Your next sentence is more serious and ponderous, but very preposterous, and unsound. First it contains a generall proposition with the reason of it; and then a qualification or limitation thet of (by way of exception) unto a certayne time. The proposition is this: *No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love*. Now the fruits of Gods love you make to be not only grace and glory, but our temporall being also and the preservation therof. For you make creation to be a fruit of Gods love.

Now this proposition so generall to my understanding is utterly untrue. For not only God is not bound to give grace and glory unto any. (For they are merely *gratuita dona*, and it is lawfull to doe what he will with his owne, in bestowing it on whome he will, and denyinge it to whome he will. And therefore the Apostle testifieth that *He hath mercy on whome he will, and Whome he will he hardneth.*) But more then this as God was not bound to create any, so neyther can any thing (save his owne will) binde him to preserve any thing in being. But as he deales with other creatures so could he deale with men, even take their temporall being from them, without any purpose ever to restore it, and not only the being of their bodies, but of their soules also, turning both into nothing. Yet thus could God deale with men and Angells were they never so innocent, never so holy as Arminius confesseth.

But let us consider the reasons wherupon you ground this. Now these are two, the one because God hath created our natures: Now the unsoundnesse of this reason appeares by this, that God hath created other things as well as man; Yet who will conclude herehence, that God must needs preserve them, and not exclude them from this fruite of his love. Your other reason is because, *God cannot change* and this is as weake as the former. For like as God though at one time he gives us life, another time takes life from us; yet all this is done by him without any change in himselfe, like as in course of nature, though he causeth changes and alterations in the seasons of the yeare in the wether, in the heavens, in the earth, in the Sea, in the states and Kingdoms of the World; and in the bodies of all creatures, yet without any change at all in himselfe; yea though he set an end to this visible World, this can inferre no variablenesse in God, so if he should take all manner of being from men and Angells, and so exclude them from all fruits of his love: Yet should all this come to passe without any shadow of change in God.

Yet you have a third reason, which is this; *Love is the nature of God as Creator*: You could not be ignorant that God did freely create the World, and therefore that it was not na-

turall

turall to God to create it; therefore you say that *Love is the nature of God as Creator*, the sense and meaning whereof I comprehend not. And I have made it already appeare that though God creates a thing, yet is he not therby bound to preserve it any longer then he seeth good; and what other sense you imply when you say, *Love is Gods nature as a Creator*, I discern not. You make creation to be a fruite of Gods love; it is very incongruous to say that this love of God, wherby he creates any thing belongs unto him as a Creator: But rather creation of things belongs unto him as he loves them. For fitter it is that the effect should be thus modified by the cause, then the cause by the effect in denominating any subject. Who ever sayd that a man was *rationalis quatenus risibilis* and not rather *risibilis quatenus rationalis*?

But let us proceede to the limitation of this your proposition; and that is this: *No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love, untill the sinister use of that contingency wherwith he indued it, or the improvement of inclinations, naturally bent unto evill come to that hight, as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour.* First touching your meaning in this, then touching the manner how you expresse this meaning; your meaning in brieve is this. *No part of our nature can be utterly excluded from all fruits of Gods love: untill men have filled up the measure of their iniquity.* Of this your opinion I have spoken often; I hope it shall be sufficient now to consider the reason whereupon you ground it. And that is this, *Such an hight of sinne implyeth a contradiction to infinite justice to vouchsafe them any favour.*

Now of this proposition of yours I see no reason. Nay I seeme to observe manifest reason to the contrary. For justice consists in giving to every one his owne; Now seeing the wages of any sinne is death even everlasting death; Not to condemne him that hath deserved to be condemned, seemes as contradictory to justice as not to condemne him that is come to an hight of impiety.

And which is more, many thousand infants perish in Original sinne, and yet we beleive that Manasses who unto Original



ginall sinne added many abominable finnes, was notwithstanding all this, saved; and will you say, there was any contradiction unto Gods justice in all this? And I wonder you so much beate upon the contradiction unto Gods justice and take no notice of Gods mercy, whereas we doe not consider the pardoning of finnes as an act of Gods justice but rather as an act of his mercy: and without quest on it is not contradiction to Gods mercy to pardon any sinne.

And God is mercyfull as well as just; and it is very absurd in my judgment to say that God in performing an act of mercy contradicts his justice, as well as to say that in performing an act of justice he contradicts his mercy. And the reason is because it is indifferent to God to exercise eyther his mercy in commiserating whome he will, or his justice in hardening whome he will. And therefore when the Apostle proposeth such an objection, against his former doctrine of election & reprobation as this; *What shall we say then, is there any injustice with God?* He answereth it by this, that God is free and hath a lawfull power to exercise mercy and compassion on whome he will. God forbid sayth he we should thinke so; *For he sayth to Moses, I will have mercy on him to whome I will shewe mercy, v. 15: and will have compassion on him, on whome I will have compassion.* Rom. 9.14

And yet I pray consider, what colour of contradiction to Gods justice in pardoning the finnes of them, be they never so many never so fowle; for whome the sonne of God (as you say) hath suffered the sorrowes of death, and therby made full satisfaction for all their finnes; unlesse you will say, that Christ dyed to make satisfaction for originall sinne only and not for finnes actuall, or for some of their actuall finnes and not for all; to which strange and uncouth opinion: You seeme to incline in the end of your 15. Chapter, where you say, that *Christ only receaved our infirmities and originall disease, and not the contempt of him and his law.* I have cause to suspect that you concurre with Arminians in maintayning, that all Infants, the very children of Pagans, Turkes and Saracens that perish in their infancy are saved. For how can it be con-

ceaved that any improvement of evill inclinations is made in them unto such an hight as that it should imply contradiction to Gods justice, to shew them any favour?

And where such an hight of impiety is not, you professe they cannot be excluded from all fruits of his love. Yet I confesse theire soules have a being and that eternall; and if this be a fruit of Gods love, then though the hight of impiety be never so greate, yet is no man or devill excluded from this fruite of Gods love: For they shall continue for ever and that to theire everlasting wo. As touching your manner of expressing your meaning, this increase of sinne, you call the sinister use of contingency that God hath bestowed upon them, your meaning must be the sinister use of the liberty of theire wills: which in your phrase is the sinister use of contingency, whereof I am perswaded you can give no example.

And by the way I observe you suppose in every naturall man, a power to use the liberty of his will, eyther will or ill. I had thought and doe still thinke there is no power in carnall man to use theire naturall liberty well, but only to use it either in this or that subject, but so as still the use of it shall be evill. *Rom, 8. 7.* For *the affection of the flesh is not subject to the law of God nor can be*, sayth the Apostle, and every man is dead in sinne till God quickneth him. Ephesi. 2. 2. And a dead man can performe no action of life naturall, if dead naturally, no action of life spirituall, if dead spirituall: But *whether naturall inclinations unto evill may be thus farre improved in the children, by theire Forefathers on no*, (you say) *is disputable but in another place*: that is, it is a disputable question, whether children may not by the sinnes of theire Father be so farre corrupt, that it implyeth contradiction to Gods justice to shew them any favour.

You might as well say it is a disputable question whether there be any God or no; For that there should be a God, and yet not able to cure the naturall corruption wherein any man is borne is contradiction. And if he were, then sure he were able to shew them no small favour. And as for contradictions to Gods justice, there is so little colour herof in the saying

ving of Infants, that on the contrary, there is nothing (the condemnation of the Sonne of God alone excepted) wherein the justice of God is more obscure, then in the condemnation of Infants. I thinke you have litle mindeto come to an account, how you doe accommodate this your doctrine unto Infants; yet you must be called hereunto whether you will or no, unlesse you clippe the wings of your generall propositions, as when you say: *None can be excluded from the fruits of Gods love untill the improvement of inclinations naturally bent to evill come to that height of impiety as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour.* Yet by the way you put in an exception concerning Infants, and that is in case there be a neglect of duties, to be performed to them by their Elders; why doe you not speake plainly and say, *saving in case they are not baptized?* And what thinke you in this case? Are they damned? I cannot beleive you thinke so; yet the face of your discourse lookes this way. I say I cannot beleive it; and that for two reasons.

The one is, because the tenour of your tenet caryeth you rather to maintayne with the Arminians, that all children dying in their Infancy though they dye without the Church, are saved. My second reason is, because herein you should directly contradict the discourse Kinge James had with certaine Divines a litle before his death, and his apparent profession to the contrary; not as his private opinion, but as the opinion generally of our Divines, whome he had learned in his younger dayes to have censured Austine for his opinion to the contrary, as one that was *Durus Pater Infantum.* Now I am so well perswaded of you, that I thinke you would not willingly enter upon so flat a contradiction to such a discourse of Kinge James in the dayes of Kinge Charles, and that so soone after his death.

If you write only concerning men of ripe yeares, you must have a care to limit your propositions accordingly, and not to give them longer wings then is fitt.

In the next place you touch upon a distinction much talked of, and as much advanced by some as cryed downe by others.

others. Yet both Scotus and Durandus give a tolerable, and Aquinas with the Dominicans after him, an orthodoxe interpretation thereof, though neyther suitable to the minde of Damascene commonly reputed the father of it. Yet looke what in this kind is wanting in them is supplied by Arminiensis, who gives both an orthodoxe construction thereof, and that also in conformity to the opinion of Damascene, of whose text he gives a very sound and orthodoxe interpretation and the more orthodoxe the more opposite to their constructions, who with greate cry of words draw it to the countenancing of their Arminian Tenets without cause, *Love you say is the fruite of Gods antecedent will, wrath and severity are the proper effects of his consequent Will.* Fruite and effect you make all one (as with good reason you may.)

Now what, I pray you, is this effect which you call love? You seeme to intimate, that they are the effects of creation, as when you say, *Every particular faculty of soule or body is a pledge undoubted of Gods love.* Yet faculties of soules and bodies are found in beasts, but Gods antecedent will in Damascene is referred wholly unto men. Neyther doth Damascene at all referre it to the worke of creation; but makes it to be that wherby God will have all to be saved.

Liberty of will is proper to man in distinction from beasts, but who seeth not that this indifferently makes him obnoxious unto damnation as well as capable of salvation? Then when you say wrath and severity is the effect of Gods consequent will, what doe you meane by wrath? Is it eyther a resolution to take vengeance, or the execution of vengeance it selfe? I think you take it for the execution of vengeance it selfe. Now there is an execution of reward also properly opposite unto this which whether it be the same love you speake of, it became you to expresse so much, or whether you conceive it to be different, yet it were fit you should take notice of it, and acknowledge that this is a fruite of Gods consequent will, as well as wrath; that as effectually presupposing obedience, as this disobedience: and that love in rewarding is every way as infallibly consequent to the obeying of Gods will revealed,

led, as wrath is of our neglecting and despising it. A full explication of this distinction you promise in good time, how well you performe it we may in good time consider with Gods helpe.

Next you enter upon another forme of the same distinction (as you pretend) and you suffer it to fly with one wing; For you talke of Gods absolute will, (which you seeme to confound with Gods antecedent will) but as touching the member congruently opposite, you leave us to seeke for that. But as it is we are to consider it; *Gods absolute Will was* (you say) *to have men capable of Heaven and Hell, of joyes and miseries immortall.* This cannot be understood of Gods consequent will; for this absolute will is indifferent to end in the bestowing of reward or punishment, and is immediately terminated only in making man capable of eyther; but his consequent will is not so indifferent. For the only effect thereof you mention to be wrath and severity, and this presupposeth rather then causeth capableness.

Neyther can this absolute will be the antecedent will of God according to Damascens meaning. For the antecedent will in Damascene, is only referred to the will of God, whereby he wills mans salvation: but this absolute will is (you say) to have men capable of Heaven and Hell. To helpe this you tell us: *That this absolute will (whose possible objects are two) is in the first place set on mans eternall joy.* But you doe not proceede to shew on what it is set in the next place, as if by such like incongruities you desired rather to confounde your reader, then to satisfie him.

Yet by the tenour of your discourse you leave it to us to gesse, that in the second place to witt upon the despising of Gods love, it is set upon a mans damnation. So that by this your doctrine, both Gods antecedent will and consequent will is all one, and that is Gods absolute will. But no such thinge is founde in Damascene, from whome such as you are, doe usually take this distinction of will antecedent in God, and will consequent: And indeed you doe well to make one as absolute as another; for like as wrath, the fruite of this will

will of God in the second place (as you imply) hath not its course but upon presupposition of disobedience; so in like manner, the proper opposite to wrath on the other side the fruit of this will of God in the first place, hath not its course but upon presupposition of obedience.

And that you may know what this fruit I speake of is; I say as wrath is taken for the execution of vengeance; so the proper opposite herunto must be love as it is taken for the execution of reward; And let any man judge whether this doth not every way presuppose obedience, as well as the other presupposeth disobedience. And thus shall God as truly be sayd absolutely to wish a mans damnation as his salvation, and no more conditionally will the one then the other. And like as if God be absolutely sayd to will a mans salvation, it shall not herhence follow he shall so will it, as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibilitie, which unto man he had appointed: so though God be sayd absolutely to will a mans damnation; yet it will not follow that God doth so will it as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibility which unto man he had appointed: Only it is absurd to call this possibility a contrary possibility. It is I confesse a possibility to the contrary, but not a contrary possibility. Like as liberty unto good and liberty unto evil are liberties unto things contrary in the way of manners: but yet they are no contrary liberties; so the possibilities of obtaining salvation or damnation, which are consequent upon the use of this liberty, though they are possibilities to contrary things, yet are they not contrary possibilities. And as Gods anger signifying the execution of vengeance doth never rise up, but upon the dispising of his love alluring unto good; so Gods love signifying the execution of reward, doth never rise up, but upon the embracing of his love alluring unto good.

But if you take Gods wrath for his will to punish, I say that looke by what reason Gods wrath, as it signifies his will to punish, doth not arise in God but upon foresight of mans disobedience; in like sort the love of God, as it signifieth his will to reward, doth never arise in God but upon foresight of his obedience.

obedience. And looke in what congruity Gods will to punish for sinne deserves to be called reprobation : in the same measure of congruity Gods will to reward for obedience , is to be called Election, if so be we will make Election and reprobation congruously opposite, as it is fit we should. Neither can it be avoyded , but that *the turning of tender love and compassion into severity and wrath* must imply manifestly an extreame change in God. For like as when mans obedience is turned into disobedience, this cannot be without change; so when Gods fervent love is turned into severe wrath, this cannot be possibly without change. Which I further proove *a priori* thus, where that which was, ceaseth to be, and that which formerly was not , beginneth to be , there must needs be a change, and that more wayes then one: But where tender love is turned into severe wrath and that inexorable (as before you have expressed) there that which was, ceaseth to be , and that which was not, beginnes to be : therefore there must needs be a change, and that more wayes then one , to wit a change from some thing, and a change into another thing.

The minor is proved; For if the same tender love did still continue, it could not be sayd to be turned into wrath , but rather it should be sayd to consist with wrath. Likewise wrath formerly was not in God; for as much as you make it arise out of the ashes of his love despised, wherby that phrase (the ashes of Gods love) doth manifestly argue that you will have Gods love as it were consumed to ashes ; therefore it must needs cease towards those that have thus despised it.

Neither is it true but a bold affirmation without all truth, to say that *the change is wholly seated in mans deviation* , which you avouch without any colour of proove : But I have already proved that this Tenet of yours maintaynes a change in God, unavoydable by all the wit of man.

It seemes you would reason thus, the cause why the love of God is turned into wrath , is wholly seated in man ; therefore the change is onely in man. But this is so inconsequent that it seemes common modestie would not suffer you expressly to insist upon it.

R E R E

Though



Though we sinne, yet can we not make any change in God; Mala. 3. 6. *I the Lord am not changed: therefore yee Sonnes of Iacob are not consumed.* To touch this by the way; Adam I confesse deviated from the good course of obedience, which he might have taken: but I deny that any naturall man hath liberty, to take any good course of obedience, till God hath renewed him; yet such Pelagian acknowledgements are so frequent in your discourse, that they are found in every hedge.

2. The Sunne indeed never changeth with the Moone, nor without the Moone, saving from place to place, and so he never changeth, one time only excepted in the dayes of Iosuah.

But what meane you to say, that it is one & the same heate, that is with us in the spring time, and with them that travaile in the sandes of Affricke? Can it be one and the same accident in so not different only but distracted subjects. Yet it is one in kinde but not in degree; like as grace and glory in the Saints of God is the same kinde though different in degrees; and produced in them all by one and the same love of God, that neyther differs in kinde nor in degree. The same heate of the Sunne enflames matter capable of combustion not other matter. So God the same and without all change doth refresh the good, and consume the wicked. We nothing doubt of this; but then we must not say, his love is turned into wrath. For like as the heate of the Sunne could not be turned into colde without change in the Sunne; so neyther could Gods love be turned into wrath without alteration in God himselfe: God consumes the wicked, but not by love. God saves his Elect, but not by wrath; Yet his will is one and the same in both, though the effects be different, and no marvaile; For his will is free, as wherby *he hath mercy on whom he will and whome he will he hardneth*; and as the one tends to the salvation of some, so the other tends to the condemnation of others.

It is true, there is none but hath bin partaker of Gods blessings one way or other. It is true, the measure of his wrath is equall to the riches of his bounty despised thus farre. The  
more

more riches of his bounty we dispise, the greater will by the measure of his wrath, of we continue in impenitency. Yet there is a subordinate difference, according as the same riches of Gods bounty, may be in greater measure despised by one then by another. You are pleased needlessly to phrasifie this over and over agayne insleede of affoording better matter to satisfie your reader; but you are very liberall of words. But by the way you foist in a false dye as thinking, that in the multitude of wordes it might not be perceaved, as truly I was like to have overslipped it. As when you say, *the only rule for measuring sinne or transgression right, must be taken from the degrees of mans opposition to Gods delight or pleasure in his salvation.* Wherein you manifestly contradict your selfe; For before you sayd it was to be taken from the degrees of mercy despised; But now you say it is only to be taken from the degrees of mans despising it. Which indeede is the righter of the two. So then the measure of Iudas his sinne is to be taken from the degrees of his opposition unto grace; which you in a strange manner expresse by *the delight that God doth take in his salvation*; Why what meane you by this? Is Iudas saved thinke you or shall any reprobate be saved and not damned rather? what mooved you then to talke of Gods delight in the salvation of them, that are or shall be damned?

Is it possible that God can take delight in that which never was, nor is, nor ever shall be? You may as well say that God takes delight in a multitude of other worlds of men and Angels, which were and are possible.

Yet as if this conceyte of yours were a principle of credite you tell us demurely, *that not a dramme of Gods delight or pleasure can be abated, not a scruple of his Will, but must be accomplished,* to wit of that delight in Iudas his salvation, which you doe very gravely attribute unto God, and so consequently, Gods will you speake of, which must be accomplished, is his will of Iudas his salvation.

And this must be accomplished, & indeede so it had neede, before God can take any delight and pleasure in it. But how or when shall Gods will of Iudas his salvation be accompli-

shed? Will you give me leave to reade this riddle out of your intimations? You seeme to mee to imply that this will of God is accomplished in Iudas his damnation. Because looke in what measure of love, God would have saved him, in such a measure of wrath, he doth damne him and so accordingly, looke in what measure, Gods delight would have bin in Iudas his salvation had he bin saved; in the same measure God doth delight in his damnation he being damned. *Vou avez*; thus have you the interpretation of this riddle.

And by the same reason, you may proceede to make other riddles, and aske how is the will of God as touching Peters damnation, and Gods delight and pleasure therein accomplished to every dramme and scruple; and answerè that this is accomplished in his salvation. For looke in what measure God would have delighted in his damnation had he bin damned; in the same measure God now delights in his salvation, he being saved.

1 Cor. 6.

And thus the delight and pleasure that any man takes in his childes salvation may be sayd to be accomplished in the delight and pleasure, which he shall take in his childes condemnation. For the Saints shall judge the World, even the Godly Father joyne with Christ in pronouncing the sentence of condemnation upon his ungodly Sonne, &c. God delights in our obedience and in our repentance when it is; but where there is no repentance or obedience how is it probable he or any should delight in that which is not. 1 Sam. 15. 22. *Hath the Lord as greate pleasure in burnt-offrings and sacrifices as when the voyce of the Lord is obeyed?* Perhaps you will say, yet his will is that all should repent; I answerè his will commanding, is so to all that heare it; but his will decreeing is not that all shall repent that are commaunded to repent. For then all should repent: To say, that God will have any thing come to passe which yet never comes to passe, Austine hath long agoe professed to be as good as to deny Gods omnipotency. And whereas repentance is the gift of God, as the Scripture plainly testifieth, it is apparent that God doth not give repentance unto all, and therefore neyther did he will or determine to

Act. 11. 18.

2 Tim. 2.

last.

give

give repentance unto all. God is sayd to love persons in as much as he willeth good things unto them. God may be sayd to love things morall as repentance and obedience, in as much as he will reward persons for their repentance and obedience.

Neither of these loves is accommodable to punishment, no more then unto reward. Yet looke in what respect God may be sayd to love the one, so may he be sayd to love the other; And the Apostle professeth of himselfe, and his fellows that they were *the good savour of the Lord even in them that perish*. And every man knoweth reward to be a fruite of justice remunerative, as well as punishment is of justice vindicative; and each presupposeth the will of God, as well one as the other. For God is not bound to punish sinne, he may pardon it. Nay how is he not bound to pardon all sinne, of all men, if so be Christ hath made satisfaction for the sinnes of all? 2 Cor. 2.

And with these Tenets of yours you are growne so farre in love, that because some schoole poynts doe not beare such faire wether towards them as might be wished; you would put the maintayners of them upon some better explication of such Tenets. The Tenet is, that *God doth punish sinners in the life to come citra condignum*. The Moderne divines (as it seemes) by your margent are Calvin & Zanchy that maintayne this; against whom you oppose Coppenius, a Lutheran I guesse, I doe not thinke he is a Papist. Sure I am, Bradwardine and Gerson maintayne the same; and as I remember it is most generally receaved amongst the Schoolemen. And as for Coppenius his reasons; when he demaunds whether God doth remit ought for Christs satisfaction or no: I answered it is not for Christs satisfaction; but merely according to the good pleasure of his owne will. And Aquinas 1. 2. 2. Art. 4. ad. 2.

And when he urgeth that of James, *Judgement mercyleesse shall be to him that sheweth no mercy*: I answered that like as when the Apostle prayeth for Onesiphorus *that he may find mercy at that day*, his meaning can be no other then this, that his sinnes might be pardoned and his soule sayed: so likewise in just. 2 Tim. 4.

proportion they may be sayd to tast of judgement mercyleffe, whose sinners are not pardoned and whose soules are not saved. As for your reason it is groundd merely upon a fiction of your owne, that subjecteth the delight of God unto degrees, (whereas his simplicities freeth him as well from composition of degrees, as from any other kind of composition,) as also unto change even there where you undertake to cleere God from change: If Iudas had bin saved and Peter damned, God had still bin the same and no other then now he is, as touching will and delight, and every thing that is in God. But by the way let me tell you, you corrupt the state of the question in supposing that by this Tenet, which you doe ke, the punishment of reprobation is lesse then divine justice exacts. For they maintayne no such thing, but rather the contrary that no degree of punishment is exacted by any justice in God, but left indifferent to the determination of Gods will; And therefore Bradwardine distinguisheth betweene *meritum actuale* and *meritum potentiale*. *Meritum actuale* is in reference to such a degree of punishment or reward, which the will of God hath determined.

Bradward.  
lib. cap. 39.  
pag. 360.

But *meritum potentiale* is in reference to any degree of reward or punishment which God might have determined. And Gerson professeth that when a sinne is committed, it is merely in the good pleasure of God to inflict what kinde or degree of punishment he will.

Gers. de vi-  
ta spirituali  
li. anima  
lect. 1. Co-  
roll. 8.

2. Your text is to proove that Gods nature admitteth no change, albeit of a loveing Father he becomes a severe judge; albeit his tender love be turned into wrath. And for prooffe of this you thinke it enough to say that the change is in man: and that Gods wrath kindles not but out of the ashes of his love despised. To this you take on an other poynt (nothing at all to the purpose) that Gods wrath is in proportion to mens sinnes, neyther lesse nor more; and this you prosecute a whole lease and more, that what you want of solid answere, you may supply by filling mens eyes with an idle discourse. Well we have considered what your discourse hath bin on the by, touching this, that mens punishments are not lesse then

then their deserts. Now let us consider your following extravagancy, in shewing that mens punishments are not more then their deserts.

And here you tell us *that to thinke God should punish sinne, unlesse it were truly against his will, or any sinne more deeply then it is against his will and pleasure is one of those 3. grosse transformations of the divine nature which Saint Austine refutes. For thus to doe, is neyther incident to the divine nature, nor to any other imaginable.* I would we were worthy to know 3. things. First who they are whom you oppose in this: Secondly what those 3. so grosse transformations are, which you speake of out of Austine. Thirdly, to what end tends all this, on which you spend so many words.

But to take it as we find it. No Christian I think ever doubted, but that all sinne is *avouica*, a transgression of Gods law, & accordingly contrary to the commaundment of God, which is usually called the will of God. But that any sinne should be committed contrary to the will of God, as it is taken for the decree and determination of God, I had thought no sober man would have affirmed. Austine I am sure plainly professeth that *Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotens ferri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo.* And albeit Aquinas seemes concealedly to oppose Austine in this in q. 9. 19. art. 9. Yet notwithstanding concludeth thus: *Deus igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult permittere mala fieri*: Ibid. ad tertium. Yet I willingly graunt that every sinne is against Gods will and pleasure, as it signifieth *his pleasure what shall be our dutie to doe*; which is nothing els but his commaundment. And it is as true that herein are no degrees, every sinne is equally against the commaundments of God.

Enchirid.  
cap. 95.

And the will and pleasure of God whereby he will have this or that to be our duty to doe or leave undone, hath no degrees. For Gods simplicity freeth him as well from composition of degrees as from any other composition. But yet some transgressions are greater then others in as much as God may be more or lesse wronged by us, or our selves, or our brethren. It is neyther incident to the divine nature nor to the humane,

Iohn. 8.

humane, to punish any more then it is ones will and pleasure to punish. But to a man it is incidēt to punish for those crimes wherein themselves take delight. For a man may be condemned and punished for adultery by them who are adulterers themselves; as appears in those that brought unto our Saviour a Woman taken in adultery. For when our Saviour sayd. *Let him that is amoungst you without sinne cast the first stone at her, the text sayth herupon being accused by theire owne conscience, they went out one by one beginning at the eldest, even to the last.* Iohn. 8. 7. Wherefore you doe overlash in not contenting your selfe to affirme this of the divine nature, but extending it to every nature imaginable.

Agayne, what meane you to call that a waywardnesse of men, whereof you professe the humane nature is incapable; as namely to be offended at that which doth not offend them? What is a wilde manner of discourse, if this be not? Nothing inferiour in absurdity is that which followeth, as when you say, that *To punish any which doe not contradict theire wills, is an injustice scarce incident to the inhabitants of Hell.* If the Divills punish any, as you say they doe; doe they punish them for sins committed in contradiction to theire wills? And how many Magistrates doe punish even such sinnes, wherof themselves are guilty? They are bound by law to punish profane swearers, to punish drunckerds; is it necessary that every such Magistrat should be free from such sinnes themselves? But *the Divills themselves you say doe not vex the wicked but the Godly*; this being a most absurde conceyte at first sight, you have taken a course to charme the absurdity of it by adding, concerning the wicked, *Till Gods justice overtake them*; might you not as well adde concerning the Godly, *Till Gods will and pleasure is, and so farre as his pleasure is, the Divill shall vex them*; as appears in the example of Iob? But ordinarily in the course of Gods providence; who are more vexed by the Divill, the godly or the wicked rather?

Now because it is apparent that in your opinion the Divill torments infernally the damned and hath no power over the Saints of God; though they are more prone to vex the godly then



ly then the wicked as you thinke: therefore you put your selfe to devise a reason why the Divills torment the damned, whereas the sinnes of the damned men were committed only in following the will of the Divill too much.

But the reason you give is of the wildest and most contradictory nature that ever any I thinke was heard of. For the reason you give is this: *Therefore the Divills cease not to torment them, because they can find no ease in tormenting them*: Whereas if they could finde any ease in tormenting them, then (you say) they would be lesse displeased with them, and consequently torment them lesse; which if it were true the Divilla should be as arrant fooles as ever lived; as namely in ceasing to doe that, by the doing whereof they should finde ease, by this supposition of yours.

And in the meane time you represent unto as a proper modell of Gods providence, while you conceive, the tormenting of the damned to be put over by God to the will of the Divill; as if the dispensation of the degrees of punishment, thereby to justifie Gods proceeding, were remitted to the discretion and equity of those Angells of darkenesse. And who I pray shall be the dispenser of that punishment, that in justice belongs to the Divills themselves? Yet as if you had performed some greate exployte against some body, you demaunde bravely; *Whether they did not rather dreame then thinke of God, that some times write, as if it were not as much against Gods will, to have men dye, as it is against mans will to suffer death*. In writing this, you thinke, they did rather dreame then thinke on God in writing of the former, sure I am you did if not dreame yet thinke of the Divill.

But which writing yours or theirs, be like unto a sicke mans dreame, let not the indifferent only, but the unindifferent also judge: For you shew as little sobriety in the impugning of these, in their writing concerning the will of God, then in inventing your former fancies concerning the Divill. Is it not by the will of God appoynted that all must dye? And is it probable then, it should be against Gods will that any should dye? O but you speake belike of the second death, I answer;

Is it not as well appointed by the will of God that all that dye the first death in sinne, shall dye the second death of everlasting sorrow; as it is appointed by the will of God that all shall dye the first death? And will it not by the same reason follow; that looke in what sense it is impossible that any should dye the first death against the will of God, in the same sense it is impossible that any should dye the second death against the will of God? and if they suffered death (as you say) to this end, that Gods will may be fulfilled in their suffering; how is it possible that this their suffering of death should be against the will of God? which yet you boldly affirme and that with such confidence as to breake out into a censure of them that thinke the contrary, as if they did rather *dreame then thinke the contrary.*

And yet when you breake forth in avouching manifest contradiction, would you have your reader conceave your selfe to be in a sober discourse waking? or in a dreame sleeping? Yet this is usuall in your writings.

4. The mayne poynt proposed: (to wit how God without change of a loving Father becomes a severe judge) you dispatched in a few words saying, *the change is wholly in man;* and therein giving us your word for it; and afterwards served your selfe with certayne illustrations nothing to the purpose. And to refresh your spirits and get some breath you turned aside, to the consideration of the proportion of mens punishments to their sinnes; poynts merely extravagant. And now you take liberty to maintayne your extravagant discourse by inquiring, how it stands with Gods justice to inflict eternall punishments for temporall sinnes. We must be content to follow you in your wilde goose race; For seeing we are in, we must goe thorough and get out as we can. Yet you acknowledge the doubt proposed nothing pertinent; but to make matter of farther discourse you tell us, *it were pertinent, if the immortall happinesse wherunto the riches of Gods bounty did daily leade them here on earth; had not further exceeded the pleasure of this life, then the paynes of Hell doe those grievances which caused them to murmur against their heavenly Father.* You are

very bold to acknowledge God to be the heavenly Father of the reprobates. Whereas the Apostle professeth that we are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. Gal. 3. 25. And if sonnes then heyres even heyres of God and coheyres with Christ. Rom. 8. Much more bold, if because our Saviour Christ exhorts the Apostles to be like their heavenly Father, therefore you will acknowledge him the heavenly Father, even of reprobates also.

This is by the way, I come to the maine: and say first; were it so as you speake, yet this doubt were nothing pertinent to this place, of cleering God from innovation and change of nature, as often as his tender love is turned into fierce wrath. Secondly, your argument contracted being this, *Immortall happinesse doth more exceede the pleasures of this life, then the pains of Hell exceede the grievances of this life: therefore it is impertinent to make a doubt how Gods justice doth appeare in inflicting eternall punishments for temporall sinne.* I see no just consequence at all in this. I will drawe it to the best forme I can devise, in congruity to your meaning which I desire to picke out as well as I can. And that is this; *Theire obedience should be rewarded with infinite joy: therefore their obedience may be justly punished with infinite sorrow:* and no doubt is to be made hereof. And this I confesse is more suitable, speaking of the protension & duration of each then of their intension as you doe. For though the joyes of Heaven were never so greate beyond the degree of sorrows of Hell.

Yet if they were not everlasting the comparison would not hold. Because there could be but a finite difference betwene their intensions; for joys of man cannot be infinite in degree. But if the one were everlasting the other not; there should be an infinite difference in this. And albeit the joyes of Heaven were but of equall degree, in proportion to the sorrows of bell; Yet the argument would every whit proceede as well upon supposall of inequality, and that of exuberancy on the part of joyes.

Now I will shew, what exception may be taken against this. First no laws of the World (the execution whereof are

reputed just) doe or can proceede after any such proportion? Let a man take a purse upon the high way, or kill a man he shall dye for it; Let him give tenn times as much to the poore; let him save ten mens lives, they neyther doe, nor can reward, in proportion to the punishment; Let the greatest honour or any other kinde of rewards be heaped upon him; all are inferiour to his life. For all that ever a man hath, he will give for his life.

Iob. r.

But then you will say, if it be just with man, to punish with death; though they cannot possibly administer rewards in any proportion therunto; how much more is it just with God, to punish with eternall death, seeing he can and will reward obediency with eternall life? And I nothing doubt but that it is just; but the question is wherein consisteth this justice? For it seemes that justice in this kinde should stand in reference to the worke, and not be measured by any aliene consideration. Especially considering that the question may be revived on the part of the reward. For how stands it with justice to reward with everlasting blisse a temporall obedience, so that still we shall be to seeke of the right measure of justice in this kinde.

Agayne, if a Master shall say unto a servant; doe such a thing and I will give thee an hundred pound; it will not here-hence follow, that for his disobedience the Master may make him pay an hundred pound. And the reason is because it is manifest, that like as a man may give what he will freely; so he may reward as liberally as he will. But it is not so manifest that God himselfe mai doe what evill he will unto his creature, and accordingly afflict what punishment he will for the transgression of his creature.

And therefore the reason that you give for justifying God in this is unsound; and you seeme to be sensible of it, when you desire to helpe your selfe with the consideration of mens multiplyed contempts of grace, all which neverthelesse doe make up but a short continuance in sinne. Besides that, this consideration hath no place in such infants as perish in original sinne. You cannot find any neglect in them, much lesse  
often,

often, and yet to say, and barely to say *That often and perpetuall neglects turnes flames of eternall love into an eternall consuming fire*, is to please your selfe in your own dictates, but to proove nothing. The same song you sing still; when you tell us, the oftner God pardons a man, the greater is his wrath against impenitency; save that the prosecution of it is more absurd then the former; For it hath reference rather to the intention of his wrath, which is greater or lesse according to the qualities of mens sinnes, not to the protension and duration of it, which is equall to all.

But by the way, where I pray doth it appeare, that God doth often pardon the sinnes of reprobates or that he doth at all pardon them? Doth God pardon any sinnes without repentance? Or are the reprobates at any time brought by God unto repentance? I am sure Austine professeth the contrary, where he saith, *Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque poenitentiam, qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, siue illis ampliorum patientiam siue non impariorem prebeat.* But to returne to the poyn't; with farre more reason doe they discourse, that considering the infinite nature of God against whom sinne is committed, doe therence inferre the desert of infinite punishment, and because a creature being but finite is not capable of infinite punishment in intention, therefore make him liable to infinite punishment in duration. Though I well know also, this is excepted against; and therefore Mirandula whom you mention makes choyce to reply on this; that as many as dye in sinne, their sinnes, being never broken of, continue with them in infinitum, and therefore doe justly expose them to infinite punishment in duration.

Yet I very well consider what just exceptions may be taken against this also, and the lesse we can satisfie our selves in the reason herof, the more cause have we to referre all to the will and pleasure of God; untill such time as the wonderfull wisdom and congruity of his actions shall be more clearly discovered unto us.

5. As for Laetantius I am not apt to quarrell with him about any incommodious speeches; but willing to accept any

Contra Iul.  
lia. Pelag.  
lib. 5. cap. 4

convenient interpretation of them; In anger, as it is in man, we all know there is something materiall as the kindling of the blood about the heart, and something formall, which is the desire of revenge.

But as diverse other passions doe include imperfection in the very formall part of them, so doth anger, for it supposeth griefe: Yet some passions in the formall part of them imply no imperfection as love and joy. And accordingly the rule that Aquinas gives is this: *Cum nihil horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est naturale in eis: illaque imperfectionem important; etiam formaliter Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphoricè propter similitudinem effectus: Qua autem imperfectionem non important de Deo propriè dicuntur ut Amor & Gaudium, tamen sine passione, ut dictum est 1. q. 20. art. 1. ad 2.* And in another place, *Ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, sed secundum iudicium iustitiæ: prout vult vindicta facere de peccato.* 1. q. 47. art. 1. ad. 1. *God you say is more deeply displeased with sinne then man, as if Gods displeasure and mans differed only in degree, and not rather toto genere.*

Neyther are there any degrees of displeasure at all in God properly, but *attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus*, as anger is, when God punisheth; so he shewes a greater anger when he punisheth more severely, and a lesse anger, when he punisheth lesse severely. You make God unchangeable in worde yet not so allwayes neyther, as where you discoursed of an impotent immutability. But if you maintayne that God did for a time will the salvation of any man before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity, and not afterwards: or that his tender love is turned into severe wrath, it cannot be avoyded but you must make change and innovation in the nature of God.

6. It is true that love includes no imperfection in it, as touching the formall part thereof, unlesse it be considered as a passion, but anger doth, in as much as it supposeth griefe. But take love as it signifieth a will to doe good, and anger as it signifieth a will to take vengeance on them that doe evil; and the one is as naturall unto God as the other. The truth is, neither

neither of them naturall, but free; Gods love to himselfe is naturall and necessary; but his love to his creatures is not, no more then his mercy, and *he hath mercy on whom he will*. He is neyther tyed by any naturall inclination to make the World, nor being made, is he bound to maintayne it, but as he made it according to the good pleasure of his will, so he doth maintayne it. Every love of God to his creatures is not suitably opposite to his anger. For the anger of God being the will of punishing, nothing is congruously opposite herunto but his love, as it signifieth the will of rewarding; and rewarding presupposeth obedience; as well as punishing presupposeth disobedience; but the will of doing the one or the other presupposeth neither.

You might as well say that justice is not so naturall to God as mercy; and I wonder at your unreasonable declination of this comparison in this place; whereas in other places you insist so much on Gods justice, as to take little or no notice of his mercy. Yet if it be true, as you have hertofore discoursed, that there is a justice before the will of God, by which the will of God is ordered; how can you make that doctrine conformable unto this? It is true, God condemnes no man but for sinne; and it is as true that God rewards no man but for obedience; only here is the difference. The best obedience of mans is no meritorious cause of his salvation, but only disposing therto: but mans disobedience is not only a disposing cause, but meritorious of his condemnation.

It is untrue that compassion come naturally from God; it comes freely: so doth punishment also; not naturally, much lesse unnaturally, but freely: For he could pardon sinne in all if it pleased him, and doth pardon it in all his elect. God when he punisheth, relinquisheth the exercise of his mercifull nature, but undoubtedly he exerciseth his vindicative nature. Now indeede the exercise of his mercifull nature is proper to his owne people, as whom he hath made vessels of mercy, and for whom Christ hath made satisfaction upon the crosse.

And therefore when he proceedes to punishment against them,



them, he may be sayd to exercise *alienum opus*, and is represented unto us loathe to come unto it. *How shall I give thee up,* **Mal. 11. 8.** *Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? Myne heart is turned within me, &c.* Gods anger is seene and felt by the effects of it, but to whom? only to those that know God to be the Author of the things they suffer.

But the Angells and Saints of God doe otherwise see God in the joyes of Heaven. In this world the manifestation of Gods wrath doth not alwayes hide God from men, but rather is many times a meanes to make God known unto them; yea a better meanes then continuall prosperity, which makes men grow proude and say, *Who is the Lord?* If anger and hate are not in God, but upon supposall of sinne, then they cannot be sayd to be in God, but only by eternall denomination attributed unto him; least otherwise we should introduce a manifest innovation into the nature of God.

And indeede anger sayth Aquinas is often attributed unto God *propter similitudinem effectus*, and so as often as he punisheth: and not till then is he sayd to be angry. But if you take it for *voluntas vindicandi*, this must needs be as everlasting as Gods will; and if you deduce any cause herof from the creature you were as good to derive from the creature the cause of Gods will, which Aquinas professeth never any man was so madde as to doe. And Gods hatred of Esau, is in Scripture made suirable to Gods love of Iacob, and if this love be the will of election, then hatred must be the will of reprobation. And if the everlasting purpose of God to give both grace and glory, be deservedly accounted Gods love, why should not the everlasting purpose of God to deny unto others both grace and glory, be as deservedly accounted Gods hatred? You undertake to show how, *Love and anger being passions or linked with passions are rightly conceived to be in God;* but I hope you will not attribute them unto God, either as passions, or linked with passions. For albeit love and joy may formally be attributed unto God, because they include no imperfection, yet not as passions saith Aquinas in the place lately alleaged out of him.

## CHAP. XXI.

*How Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy or other affections are in the divine nature.*

**I** I is true some Schoolemen thinke that distributive justice may be properly enough attributed unto God but not commutative; not because this includes *rationem dati & accepti*, but rather because it includes, *aqualitatem dati & accepti*. Yet others are of opinion that justice distributive can be attributed unto God with no greater propriety, then justice commutative: as may be scene in Vasque 1. in 1. part. disput. 86. Likewise I know none, that thinke, mercy is more properly to be attributed unto God then anger. For *voluntas vindicandi* as properly and formally belongs to God, as *voluntas miserandi*: that being as easily abstracted from greife, as this from compassion.

As for revenge there is no colour why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward. To say that affections or morall qualities may be containd in the divine essence eminently, is a very poore justification of them to be the attributes of God. For to be eminently in God is no more (as your selfe heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect. 2.) then God to be the Author of them, and produce them. Now in this sense you may attribute the name of any body or beast unto God, and say God is such, or such a thing is God, to wit eminently. But who can doubt but *voluntas miserandi* and *voluntas vindicandi* are in God not eminently but formally. Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitely different from the will of man. No passion, as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man, may be truly verified of Gods signifying the nature of God in a certayne reference unto his creatures without all passion.

So there is a will and understanding in God, but nothing like to the will and understanding of man: For will and understanding in man are accidents they are not so in God. Our anger at the best, as being displeated only with such things that displease God, though in some little thing it be like Gods anger; yet in many things it is very unlike: For it is a passion in us, not in God, it riseth in us which before was not no such innovation in God. Gods anger is vindicative ours ought not to be so, but only in case we are his ministers. For *vengeance is myne I will repay sayth the Lord.* I cannot justifie you in so speaking, when you say that *mercy is more reall, and truly affectionate in God then his anger*; For taking them sequestred from their imperfections, each is formally attributed unto God, though not as passions, and not eminently only as you have delivered it.

As for the execution of each more or lesse, that receaveth moderation merely from the pleasure of Gods will. *For he hath mercy on Whom he will, and Whom he will he hardneth*; and farre more hath he made vessels of wrath amongst the nation of men, then vessels of mercy, though it be reputed otherwise amongst the nation of Angelis. Mercy consists in pardoning sinnes, and saving sinners and no passion at all is required unto this in the nature of God, but passion enough, even unto death upon the crosse in the nature of man, & person of the Sonne of God. The better use men have of reason, the lesse are they subject to perturbation, but no whit lesse doe they participate of affection, for vertues are not *ἀπαθῆαι* or *ἡσυχία τῶν παθῶν* as Aristotle hath taught us; but the right ordering of them. Christs soule was heavy unto the death, at the approaching of his passion, and wept often before this; yet had he never a whit the worse use of reason; For all this. But no passion at all can be in God; for passions rise and fall upon new occasion, but no such alteration is incident unto God. I know not what you meane by *devouring affections*. They may be concealed or restrained not in a vertuous manner, but vicious; only to keepe the rankor of their hearts from discovery, as Absolon a long time sayd nor good nor bad to Am-

non after he had deflowered his sister Thamar, he was not any whit the more charitable in that, but playd the foxe in waiting opportunity to doe mischeife. Likewise, *when Haman saw Mordecai in the Kings gate that he stood not up nor mooved for him then was hee full of indignation at Mordecai.* Everthelesse Haman refrayned himselfe, though hee had plotted the destruction both of him and all his nation. To say that passions are moderate in matters, which men least affect is as much as to say, that affections are moderate in matters which men least affect. And indeede affections must needs be moderate, when they are least in motion.

Ester. 5.9.  
10.

But perpetuall minding of a thing should argue strength of passion, in my judgement rather then moderation. To my thinkinge, now you are in a vaine of writting essayes: Yet I find no greate substance of truth in them. How secret carriages can be violently opposed I conceive not; For if opposed then no longer secret. And the more cunning men are, the more notice (I should thinke) they take of violent opposition, unlesse they doe apparently, see such opposites are like to overshoot or come short; which is a very rare case and comes oftner into a schollars fancy then into reall practise. I finde no greate passion in Achitophel; but rather as Cæsar came soberly to the ruinating of his country. So Achitophel proceeded soberly to the destroying of himselfe. To have the mastery of his passions like enough is a greate poynt of pollicy, undoubtedly to have a gracious mastery of them is true Christianity; not allwayes to restraine them, but even profusely to enlarge them whatsoever the World thinks of them.

As Moses in the cause of God was mooved so farre as to breake the tables of the law, and calling others unto him to fall upon the massacring of the people, yet this testimony is given of him that, *hee was the meekest man on the earth.* I doe not dislike your allowance of men to be passionate, in the promoting of Gods glory; I hope you will give like allowance to men to be passionate in the defence of Gods truth. I have no greate edge to make Christians contend in passion, with worldly men how wise soever.

Psal. 119.

136.

2. Pet. 2. 7

Yet well I wote, that David (one of the worthyes of the World amongst Martialists) his eyes did gush out with rivers of water, because men kept not the law of the Lord: & holy Lot did vex his heart with the uncleane conversations of the Sodomites. These morall essayes of yours have a foule issue; as when you inferre, but most inconsequently (as arguing from the nature of man to the nature of God) that passions are in God, nor so only, but even such affections as essentially include perturbation; you were as good plainly professe, that God is not exempt from perturbation.

Neyther is, to be zealous or compassionate, to be like God in wisdom, but rather in affection. Yet zeale and compassion are accidents in man, not in God; arise in man never without alteration, but no alteration, as your selfe have made shew to maintayne, is incident unto God. Yet I doe easily grant you, that the vehemency of mans passions doth as significantly represent the want of passion in God; as the swift motions of the Heavens doth represent Gods immutability; Like unto him that presenting an unsufficient person to his degree, and being demaunded what he meant to prostitute himself to such profanesse; made answer he might doe it with a safe conscience; For he undertooke for him, but *tam, quam, tam moribus quam doctrina*, and he thought him as good one way as the other, though indeede good at neyther.

And now if your selfe be arrived after all this unto a rest (I doe not say *vigorous* least that might proove the embleme of greater motion) from your passion; I pray consider how these doe agree: First to say that Gods wisdom doth not exempt him from passion; and then to acknowledge a want of passion in God.

2: I see no reason why you should complaine of the barrenesse of your imagination, in illustrating the attributes of God; to my judgement it hath bin more fruitfull then all that ever went before you; who I dare say were never able to discerne that lively resemblance you speake of betweene the swift motion of the Heavens and the immutability or vigorous rest of God, as also betweene the vehemency; of mens passions

passions and the vacuity of all passion in God. Your Mathematickes (though I professe my selfe a very sory scholler in that science) I doe reasonably well understand; as namely that a circular figure is, as it were *ὁλωγενία*, and of all figures of equall circumference the most capacious, and that all other figures the nearer they draw to a circle, and the more Angles they contain of equall circumference are the more capacious. I expect your mysterious and profound explication.

3. The Analogy spoken of betweene sides and Angles, as found in circles and other figures doth fitly expresse (you say) that analogy which Schole divines assign betweene Wisdom, science, love, hatred, goodnesse, desire, as they are found in God and man. Your theame was, how *Anger, Love, Compassion, mercy* or other affections are in the divine nature: of all these there is but one found in this latter enumeration of yours, and that is love; and whereas you proposed to speake only of the affection, and to shew how they are in God. Yet here you mention wisdom, science, goodnesse; which never were accounted affections. *No name or title of affection can (you say) be univocally attributed unto God.*

And this is true, and as true of habits and powers of our soules, that they cannot univocally be attributed unto God. For whatsoever is in God is mere essence; and therefore such titles as signifie accidents in us, cannot denominate God *secundum nomen & nominis rationem*. But as we love by an act of passion: so God may love by an act, which is his essence. Our wills and understandings are accidents; yet doth God as truly will and understand as we, by his very essence; not by any act which is really distinguished from his essence, Gods love, Gods wrath, are merely his will, to doe good or to revenge evill, as they signifie any thing within God. But if they be used as externall denominations, so, when God punisheth us, he is sayd to be angry with us; when he doth us good, he is sayd to love us.

And in the like sense may every name of any affection, be attributed unto God, provided it doth not essentially imply any imperfection, as feare doth, and desire doth, which can-

not be attributed unto God but metaphorically. The fruits of love & compassion proceede from none so freely, so plentifully as from God, and therefore he may justly be sayd to be most loving most compassionate, but to whom he will. In like sort the fruits of wrath and a revenging will, proceede from none more powerfully and more heavenly then from God. Psal. 90. 11. Heb. 10. 13. *Who knoweth the power of thy wrath?* Psalm 90. *It is a fearefull thing to fall into the hands of God.* Therefore may he justly be accounted a most severe regenger of iniquity, but on whom he will; For he can pardon it and cure it in whom he will, these being but the fruites of his mercy and he hath mercy on whom he will. But to say he is *wholly love and wholly displeasure*, is a wild expression in my conceyte. For to say, that *he is wholly love*, is as much as to say, that *whatsoever he is, is love*; whence it followeth that seeing he is displeasure also, as you say his very displeasure is love; and consequently by the same reason, his very love is his displeasure.

The truth is, affections in us belong only to the will; and so translated unto God they should only denominate his will. Now his power, his understanding, his will are very distinct notions; though in God they are not really distinct: yet so farre distinct as that it seemes absurd to say, that his power is his will, or his wisdom, or that his wisdom is his will or his power, or that his will is eyther his power or wisdom. So you speake truth, we are content, you take what liberty you think good in the illustration of it, and to satisfie your selfe with your illustrations, though your readers you doe not. I finde you are much pleased in the commodious illustration which a circle doth afford you, or which you divide in a circle, which you call *the true embleme of eternity*.

Some I confesse have professed that eternity doth *ambire tempus*, but I never observed that they compared it to a circle; but only I conceive their meaning was, that at this present it was not only before all time but after all time. You adde unto this, and will have this comprehension to be circular; and elswhere have called it a *circular duration*. Yet as for



for this conceyte of theirs, Durand hath longe discovered the absurdity therof, & confuted it. And as greate a Mathematician as you are, I doe not like your interpretatiō of ὁλόπλευρος and ὁλόγωνια, which you render, as if it signified *all sides* and *all angles*; I rather take it to signifie, *all angle*, *all side*, as if it were an angle throughout and one side throughout not all sides and angles.

Ant it is apparent the circumference is but one that encloseth this figure, and angles arising from inclination of lines in the circumference, there is a perpetuall inclination, not the least part that may be designed and imagined, but hath an inclination of partes. When you say, *the sides are angles, and the angles sides if not essentially yet penetratively the same*. You speake gibbrish, you may as well say, in any right angled figure, that the angles and sides are penetratively the same; the sides are lines, and in the predicament of quality the angles, are the beginning of figures, as poynts are of lines, and so in the predicament of quality: of which figures, lines are the determinations and outward limites.

This I speake but upon remembrance of my old philosophy; and the angles arise from the inclinations of lines one towards another. What liberty you take in saying that a circle is of equall sides and of equall angles, whereas indeede it is but a side throughout, and an angle throughout, let the reader judge. Yet it containes the space of any other figure of equall circumference and somewhat more: and so virtually it may be sayd to conteyne them even their sides and angles, in as much as it doth conteyne the space of them. So whatsoever the power, habits and affections of men doe signifie (allwayes provided that you take their significatiō as touching the perfections in them severed from their imperfections) they are in God, and much more.

And thus touching your theame proposed how Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy and other affections are in God, your resolution may be this, if you thinke good, that all perfections are conteyned in him, not *tanquam trigonum in tetragonon*, but *tanquam triganon and tetragonon and pentagonon*, and all angled

angled figures in circulo; but then they must be of equall circumference, which limitation hath no place in the comparison betweene God the Creator and his creatures. If your meaning be no other, then that these, which we call passions, are in God *eminently* the resolution of the question proposed had bin as easy as it is vulgar, for to be in God *eminently* is by your owne exposition, no more then God to be the Author of them. And no Christian doubts but that as God is the Author of our bodyes and of our soules; so he is the Author of our naturall affections also.

4. The Diameter I confesse is the measure of a circle; that being knowne all is easy to be knowne, I meane in the poynt of measure: but as for the proportion, you speake of, betweene that and a man in reference to the World, I leave to every one to judge of that. Who they be that are the Authors of such proportions, I willingly confesse I know not. In these kindes of proportions you are very excellent, although you complaine of the barrenesse of your imagination that way; as when you tell us, that *mans nature uncorrupt did include such an eminent uniformity to all things created as the eye doth unto colours*. I professe you stone me with these resemblances of yours, and make me wonder at my dwarfy capacity, that is so overcoped (to speake in your owne phrase) with these your tall inventions. For it were strange you should not understand your selfe; that were like the Nunne at Delphos, to give out oracles to set others on worke to understand, that which shee understood not her selfe.

And first I cannot devise, what that uniformity should be, which you say the eye hath to all colours; you seeme not to understand it of the morall constitution of the eye; for that is different as colours are different, but rather of the formall constitution in respect of the discerning faculty it hath. Now the uniformity betweene this is no other then betweene any faculty and his object.

So then the uniformity runnes this way; like as the eye of man judgeth of all colours; so man was in his innocency to *all things created*; here I was about to adde, for the completing

ing of this sentence, *I know not what*; but on a sodayne I remembred what erst you proposed, namely, that man was like the diameter in a circle, the measure of all things. The meaning whereof I conceaved to be this; as by the knowledge of the diameter the circle is easily knowne: so by the knowledge of man, which conteynes the nature of all things created, the nature of all created things may be knowne. In like sort touching this last uniformity you speake of. *Like as the eye judgeth of all colours*; so by the knowledge of man we may judge of all other things created. I neede not trouble my selfe in taking exception against these illustrations; I doubt not but I shall performe a meritorious worke in gratifying your reader so farre as to blanch your meaning, and of the congruity or incongruity to leave it unto him to judge. Thus was *man the true image of God for his essence*; and in this properly beares a true shadow of the divine prerogative. For like as all perfections are conteyned in God: so all created things are conteyned in the nature of man; save that they are eminently conteyned in God, in such sort as he is able to produce them; but so created things are not conteyned in the nature of man: Yet as the eye judgeth of all colours; so man participates of all other natures, and by the knowledge of him men may judge of them.

If the divine nature conteyned lesse perfections then the perfections of all things, then indeede it were something strange, it should be the measure of all. But seeing perfections in him are infinite, there was no reason, that you should bring mans acknowledgement, that his essence is the measure of all perfections; with an (*alldough*) in reference to his measurelesse perfection. Yet I professe I am to seeke how to conceive Gods essence to be the measure of created perfections; seeing *mensura & mensuratum* ought to be in the same kinde, as it was wont to be sayd. But all this may be helpt with saying he is the measure of them eminently; and indeed he is the Author of them; For he made all things in number, weight, and measure.

And indeede ere I was awarte, I find you fall upon this in

the very next sentence, where you say. *All the conditions or properties of measure assigned by Philosophers are as truly conteyned in the incomprehensible essence, as sides or angles in the circle, but farre more eminently.* Vpon this I looke for an enumeration of the conditiones and properties of a measure, and the application of them unto God; and particularly that, that a measure must be that which is better knowne then the thing measured.

And it is of use to bring us acquainted with the things measurable. Now God is not better knowne to us then any other thing. To himselfe I confesse he is as well knowne as ought els. But he hath no neede of any measure, whereby he should arise to the knowledge of any thing; though in knowing himselfe he knoweth all other things, nor lookes out of himselfe to be acquainted with ought. But you I perceave are willing to ease your selfe of this burthen; you tell us what a measure he is not, as when you say, *the Divine essence is a measure not applyable to measurables, for kind or quantity much different, according to diversities of parts; as who hath no parts: but in steede of telling us what measure it is, you say that the nature, essence, quality, and quantity of all things are applyed to it, in that they have a small being.*

So that for God to measure all things, belike is as much as to say, God hath created all things. Now if to be created is to be applyed to God; then to create is to apply. And so Gods creating and application active, in order of nature was before their creation and application passive. You say *it is impossible the Creator should be fitted to any thing created.* And is it not I pray alike impossible that the thing created should be fitted to the Creator? Yet before you sayd that God is a measure not applyed to things created, but wherunto things created are applyed, in as much as they have their a small beings. God is immutable and eminently conteyneth all things in his indivisible essence; but to say that hee eternally and immutably, fits all the possible varieties whereof contingency it selfe is capable. I doubt, will proove non sense in every particular. For first contingency is not capable of such variety you speake of:

The

The things contingent themselves are various indeede, but not the contingency of them. Things are very various, but the *modi rerum* are not. There are but two *modi rerum*; the one we call *contingency*, the other *necessity*. You may say *necessity* is capable of variety as well as contingency. And indeede there is farre greater variety of agents necessary, then of agents voluntary.

Agayne what is it to fit varieties, other then to produce them? For if you meant of fitting them after they were produced, it is like you would have told us, wherunto God doth fit them. Thirdly it is absurd in a Philosophers phrased to say God doth produce varieties; for variety is no fit object of production, it being a relation, which indeede results upon the producing of the foundation, rather then is produced. But suppose you understand it of the things produced in all possible variety: Yet this is directly untrue. For it is possible for God undoubtedly to produce things in greater variety then he doth.

Neyther is this production eternally wrought, or the things you speake of fitted by God; for surely this fitting of varieties, as you speake, beganne not till the world beganne. And what you meane in saying that God doth *immutably* fit them I well understand not, God I doubt not is immutable, but the things he fits are not, especially contingency, which includes mutability you say God is fitteste it selfe; but eyther you consider not, that *fitteste* is a word of relation, or if you did, you were to blame in not telling us, in what respect this fitteste is. With greate pompe of words filling up eleven lines you tell us, that God fitted all things better by eternall immutable, and incomparable fitteste, then it could be by any other measure fitted.

And doe you thinke any man doubts whether that fitteste, which is measured by incomparable fitteste, should be better then that which is measured and ordered by any inferiour measure of fitteste? And what is all this, if we speake plainly, but to say, that rewards of obedience, and punishment of disobedience are so well fitted, as they cannot be amended. And

this plain and vulgar truth is expressed in termes as obscure as those Paracelsus was wont to discourse in. Not only rewards and punishments which are chiefly reserved for another world, but every thing in this world we beleive to be so ordered, that the wits of men and Angells were not able to mende it.

But yet whether the infinite wisdom of God might not exceede this, the Schoolemen in their disputation heaupon, as I remember doe generally deny. He is eminently all, in as much as he produceth all; but you may be pleased to except relations, such as contrariety and equality. For they are not *termini producibiles* but such as doe usually result upon position of their foundation. When you say, *As of his other attributes one truly and really is an other. so in respect of man his measure is his judgement*, &c. You seeme to reckon amongst the attributes of God a strange one, which you call *his measure*; and this you say is not only the rule wherby he rewards or punisheth, but the reward and punishment it selfe. Rewarding and punishing are kindes of Gods working. Now if we would know by what rule God works, the Apostle plainly informes us herin, when he sayth, *God worketh all things according to the counsaile of his owne will.* Ephes. 1. 11. But when you say that *his retribution of rewards and punishments is his measure*; I pray of what? for measure is a terme of respect; but you speake in a dialect of your owne making; and if we had a dictionary too of your owne making for the opening of your owne dialect; perhaps we might understand you better then we doe.

There is no composition in God, such as is betweene the subject and the accident, which founds the distinction of abstract and concrete. We admit God to be *bounty it selfe, love it selfe, mercy and compassion it selfe*; but to whom say you? only to those who are touched with the sense of their owne misery; or only in solliciting men to repentance? As you would faine steale up your Arminian Tenets and cunningly obtrude them upon the faith of a credulous reader, of a weake reader. We say his mercy and love and bounty chiefly appears in causing

Man to be touched with the sense of his owne misery; as also in giving repentance and not only in soliciting thereunto, not only in being gracious unto them that repent. A great deale of froth of words you spende, in amplifying the goodness of God in rewarding our repentance, when in the meane time you endeavour to drowne all consideration of Gods goodnesse unto sinners, while they lye weltering in their sins as in their blood, and draw away the minds of your readers from taking notice therof, as if humility and repentance were a worke of nature, not of grace, a worke of flesh and blood and not of the spirit of God.

And all the way no touch of faith, your discourse favoring of the humour of a naturalist throughout, rather then of a Christian. To them that are sanctified, he is you say felicity and salvation; but what is he to them that are not sanctified? belike to them damnation. Yet the holy Apostle hath taught us, that *God hath made Christ to be unto us, wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption.* 1 Cor. 1. 30. And that *God is he that justifieth the ungodly.* Rom. 4. Alas, how often hath the best despised his bounty, love, mercy, grace, and salvation; yet is not he justice, indignation, and severity unto them, but bounty still, love still, mercy, and grace and salvation still, and at length overcomes them, and brings them from the power of Satan unto God. When for their wicked covetousnesse he was angry with them, and hath smitten them: he hid himselfe and was angry, yet they went away, & turned after the way of their owne heartes: Yet after all this, *He hath seene their wayes and hath healed them.* Eccl. 57. 17. Yea he rules them with a mighty hand and outstretched arme, and makes them passe under the rod, and brings them under the band of the covenant. Ezech. 20. 37. He takes away their stony hearts and gives them an heart of flesh, and putteth his owne spirit within them, and causeth them to walke in his statutes, and keepe his judgements and doe them. I am sorry to find so litle evidence throughout your discourse, that your selfe have neede of this.

Ezech. 36.  
27.

What did the heathens understand by their Nemesis: God? or a creature? If God, surely he is not more powerfull then himselfe




himselfe. If a creature, is it strange that the power of a creature should be inferior to the power the Creator? VVhen the Apostle sayth, *God shall be all in all*, he speaks only of his elect, to fill them with the joyes of Heaven, and with God himselfe. VVill you take boldnesse to apply this presence of God to the very diuills and reprobates? It is true we looke for the comming of the mighty God, who shall be glorified in his Saints, & even then shall he shew himselfe from Heaven with his mighty Angells, in flaming fire rendring vengeance to them that doe not know God, as also vnto them which obey not the Gospell of the Lord Iesus Christ: which shall be punished with everlasting perdition from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power: When he shall come to be glorified in his Saints, and to be made marvellous in all them that beleive (and because his servants testimony towards us, was beleived) in that day. Then shall the Heaven depart away like a scrolle, when it is rolled and every mountayne and yle be mooued out of their place. And the Kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and the cheife Captaines, and the mighty men, and every bond man, and every free man, hide themselves in denues and among the rockes of the Mountaines; and say to the Mountaines and to the rockes, fall on us and hide us from the presence of him, that sitteth on the throne, & from the wrath of the Lamb. For the greate day of his wrath is come, and who can stand?

Anno Dom. 1629.

Aprilis 30.

FINIS.





**I**N the Epistle to the Reader. pag 7. l. 24. for (pag, i. read (page 642. In the Preface. pag 4. l. 30. for which. r. with. p 6. l. 13. r. necessitie & contingencie. l. 31. for your sweet. r. the sweete. p. 10. l. 32. for si antea. read line 22.

1. Sect. p. 12. l. 14. for good. r. God. p. 20. l. 7. for Salm. r. Salmuth. p. 23. l. 21. for kigheswes. r. kickshewes. p. 25. l. 25. r. of things that doe appere. l. 26. r. omnis causa est principium, & omnis causatum est principium. p. 30. l. 24. r. to be some 12 or 13 inches. p. 31. l. 4. for αλλε, r. ωαλλε. p. 50. l. 3. r. and as we all confesse. l. 32. r. finite or infinite. p. 63. l. 17. r. If you say a true being. p. 74. l. 18. r. are life and power.

2. Sect. p. 92. l. 27. for is not only. r. it is not only. p. 99. l. 16. for motis. r. molis. p. 102. l. 29. for most unlike. r. most like. p. 104. l. 1. for motis. r. molis. p. 118. l. 21. for quia es. r. quia est. p. 119. l. 24. for & so they are. r. so they are. p. 123. l. 28. for the paradoxes. r. your paradoxes. p. 125. l. 2. for disputation. r. ejaculation. p. 126. l. 7. compets. r. competeret. l. 23. dare. r. dari. p. 127. l. 8. for, returne to. r. returne from. p. 128. l. 4. for, numerably. r. numerable. l. 5. for, nothing. r. nothing. p. 130. l. 15. for, Sincet. r. Snicet. p. 131. l. 31. for, musili. read subtili. p. 133. l. 30. for properly. r. properly. l. 32. for motis r. molis. p. 135. l. 29. for per sium. read per situm. p. 141. l. 23. for maxime. r. matter. p. 142. l. 4. for tertium. r. tantum. pag 143. l. 12. for liberall. r. litterall. p. 144. l. 26. blot out so. & l. 28. they draw it from. leave out, it, and in the place thereof interline; their existence & continuance of being from that which did every way exist before them, I know not: how much lesse how they draw it. p. 145. l. 33. for sett. r. section. l. 36. for spere. r. sphere. p. 146. l. 15. for what such move. r. what should move. l. 21. blot out the first word of the Greeke there, and read instead thereof, earum p. 147. l. 18. for what I ever. r. what ever. p. 148. l. 15. for corsune. r. continue. p. 149. l. 8. r. entertaine time that wasted. p. 150. l. 9. r. some things move more or lesse. p. 152. l. 31. r. move any way.

way. p. 153. l. 5. for and shall be, it shall be. p. 155. l. 7. r. and  
 the miserablest. p. 156. l. 17. for Dorphiry. r. Porphyry. pag  
 157. l. 1. r. or of being what it is. l. 10. for hastens. r. hastens  
 l. 16. for Timex. Time is. p. 158. l. 8. for be not. r. be  
 not scored. p. 161. l. 3. r. severall branches of time. l. 9. r. is  
 impossible. p. 162. l. 7. r. is diversified. l. 8. r. one is sicke. l.  
 11. for crosse. r. crasse. p. 163. l. 11. r. then that being. p. 164.  
 l. 3. for even. r. even. l. 34. r. in that hope. p. 169. l. 4. r. with  
 out begining. l. 28. r. but eminently. p. 173. l. 2. r. I know  
 not: the. l. 31. r. diminution in quantitie. p. 177. l. 35. r. to  
 his power. p. 182. l. 9. for forme. r. formes. p. 148. l. 13.  
 r. world doth truely. p. 191. l. 9. 10. 11. to all things that  
 have been & is and shalbe, coexistent to all that shalbe ) is  
 most absurd. reade the sentence thus. to all things that have  
 ben; hath been and is and shalbe coexistent to all things  
 that are; hath bin and is & shalbe coexistent to all things  
 that shalbe ) is most absurd. p. 192. l. 3. r. that is your mea-  
 ning. p. 195. l. 10. r. as it is and was. l. 14. r. that divers such.  
 p. 205. l. 7. r. coexist. p. 208. l. 17. at everlasting. r. an everla-  
 sting. p. 210. l. 6. for what. r. where. p. 211. l. 30. for fist. r. first.  
 p. 213. l. 14. for how should. r. so should. p. 218. l. 11. for nor  
 points of instance. r. nor time of instants. p. 221. l. 1. for the  
 wonderfull. r. your wonderfull. p. 222. l. 16. 17. 18. begining  
 at. To this ] should be of the same letter with that which fol-  
 lowes. p. 235. l. 7 & 8. r. rather then in the wisdom. p. 237.  
 l. 28. r. you overlash. p. 248. l. 37. r. so much of these things  
 p. 249. l. 27. r. professed: pag 293. l. 14. for frarius. r. Sua ius.  
 p. 265. l. 20. for more. r. snares. p. 269. l. 35. between the words  
 passe & now put in, may be annexed. p. 274. l. 18. r. as  
 God decreeth. p. 276. l. 23. r. within Schoole. l. 24. r. how  
 God doth. p. 297. for conceiving. r. concerning. p. 306. l. 7. r.  
 whereof as yet. p. 309. l. 6. for quilted. r. guiled. l. 11.  
 for patted. r. packed. p. 18. l. 23. for identicall. r. iden-  
 ticall. p. 330. l. 1. for infallibility. r. infallibly p. 330. l. 3.  
 r. existence with him p. 332. l. 25. for rate. r. roote. p. 334.  
 l. 33. for as he hath. r. (as he saith.) p. 348. l. 25. r. it is  
 untrve. p. 351. l. 30. r. figure Catechrefis. p. 356. l. 33. r.

is such a conceit. p. 356. l. 34. r. naturall reason. 364. l. 13.  
for growns, r. ground. p. 379. l. 29. for commons, r. com-  
mouelle. p. 380. l. 9. for iue, r. give. l. 17. r. excedis. p.  
383. l. 12. for eternally, r. certainly p. 392. l. 3. for groun-  
ded r. governed. p. 400. l. 23. for Andin, r. Audin. p. 402.  
l. 18. r. mutable. p. 403. l. 1. r. the axis. p. 408. l. 25. for me-  
diate, r. immediate. p. 409. l. 35. r. xpartat 7 d p. 410. l.  
52. good to it selfe. p. 411. l. 26. r. want of fruition. p. 418. l.  
33. r. power to captivate the will. p. 419. l. 2 r. Africanus.  
p. 425. l. 16. r. Breodes and Polynices. l. 28. r. yea the Poet.  
p. 426. l. 36. for pratences, r. vertues. p. 428. l. 13. r. your mea-  
ning. p. 329. l. 32. for roofe, r. roots. p. 434. l. 9. for hinder,  
r. tender. l. 11. for concludes, r. includes. p. 435. l. 10. r.  
bestow the being. p. 436. l. 5. r. possib y. p. 443. l. 20. r.  
an assured. p. 446. l. 37. r. suadet omne quod, p. 451. l. 13.  
r. (saith he,) p. 459. l. 31. r. it is a most, p. 474. l. 6. r. and  
that alwayes, l. 21. r. rei cum ipfis, p. 475. l. 32. r. persecu-  
tors, p. 486. l. 7. for the creature, r. himselfe, p. 489. l. 35. for  
diuine, r. divine, p. 491. l. 17. r. that as all thinges are, p. 493.  
l. 7. r. effectuell unto all, l. 21. r. suit it with, p. 504. l. 25. r. a  
penitent, p. 513. l. 11. for there, r. here, l. 32. r. hindred  
by the will of, p. 508. l. 18. r. bidden us to pray, l. 21. r.  
though if I were, p. 531. l. 31. for sores, r. sores, p. 547. l. 37.  
r. pratermitted, p. 569. l. 35. r. you desire, p. 575. l. 22. r.  
Austine in opinion upon this point, p. 578. l. 12. r. In all this  
which followeth.

3. Sect: p. 593. l. 37. r. principle, p. 603. l. 7. for descend,  
r. ascend, p. 605. l. 35. r. It was once true of, p. 607. l. 29.  
r. is his being necess rily, p. 610. l. 23. r. your scope is to  
advance p. 613. l. 11. r. Now by the way: l. 35. r. withall  
he made knowne p. 615. l. 1. r. impie p. 617. l. 28. r. nolen-  
tibus nolentes, p. 618. l. 35. for imitatione, r. immutatione,  
l. 37. r. to be the im mediate p. 619. l. 37. r. when wee love  
him, p. 621. l. 31. for wimming, r. tuning, p. 625. l. 9. r.  
sive illis, l. 19 blot our and, p. 628. l. 15, & 16. r. that yee  
sought after me, wilt ye not that, p. 630. l. 31. r. gives re-  
pentance, gives obedience: p. 634. l. 27. r. capable of dis-  
cerning

cerning, p. 638. for welter, r. shelter, p. 643. l. 20. for pro-  
ving, r. pawning, p. 653. l. 26. for businesse, r. lovelinesse,  
p. 654. l. 28. for contentum, r. contemptum, p. 660. l. 3. for  
but becomes, r. and becoming, p. 666. l. 2. r. temperamen-  
tum aliquod, p. 667. l. 3. r. which he loves, hee loves but  
as meanes: p. 670. l. 8. for no small, r. not finall infidelity,  
l. 27. for that may, r. that way, p. 686. l. 31. for take on, r.  
tacke on, p. 687. l. 27. blot out in, q. 9. 19. art. 9. and put in,  
1. q. 19. art. 9. p. 689. l. 33. blot out then, and put in as, p.  
696. l. 19. r. externall: l. 34. r. love and joy may formal-  
ly be attributed, l. 26. r. verified of God: p. 699. l. 20. r.  
rare case.

**F J N I S.**





